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Beginning in the late 1970s, policymakers enacted a series of legislative and 
regulatory changes that, by 1985, combined to dismantle the New Deal-era system of 
housing finance. These policy changes fundamentally restructured the way that 
Americans accessed credit for homeownership from primarily borrowing via long-
term, fixed-rate mortgages from local, federally insured S&Ls that collected deposits 
at a regulated cost, to increasingly borrowing through adjustable-rate mortgages 
issued by unregulated brokers who then sold those mortgages to investors in a 
secondary market, typically through an intermediary such as Fannie Mae or Freddie 
Mac.  
 “Dream Deregulated” argues that this transformation of housing finance 
undermined the progressive intent of the open housing and community reinvestment 
initiatives of the 1960s and 1970s by making housing credit less stable for all 
borrowers, relative to the New Deal system, and by largely disconnecting housing 
  
finance from the institutional structure that the civil rights initiatives were designed to 
regulate. It further argues that policymakers pursued broad deregulation of housing 
finance only after their pursuit of a narrower agenda of deregulation, that of deposit 
interest rate ceilings, opened the door to a series of arguments for further 
deregulation, particularly of S&L assets, including authorization of adjustable rate 
mortgages. The populist politics of the deregulation of deposit rate ceilings, taken up 
by and on behalf of “small savers,” provided a discursive wedge for advocates of 
broader deregulation, taken up by and on behalf of the interests of the largest 
financial institutions and a neoliberal political agenda.  
 “Dream Deregulated” investigates the policymaking process as a case study in 
what Paul Pierson calls “politics in time.” This study bridges scholarship on fair 
housing and community reinvestment with that on the deregulation of housing 
finance, and contributes to a deeper understanding of the politics of opportunity in the 
United States during the latter third of the twentieth century. It historicizes the politics 
of financial deregulation, and, with its focus on the populist politics of deregulation, 
helps to explain the “construction of consent” to a neoliberal regime. Finally, “Dream 
Deregulated” demonstrates how a contradictory complex of housing policies 
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 In fall 2005, Gillian N. Miller, an African American divorcée and mother of three 
began looking for a home to purchase in Boston.1 She sought a good neighborhood for 
her children, and, ideally, a backyard in which they could run and play. Working with a 
real estate agent, she looked at several properties, passing on a few that she liked but 
could not afford. Discouraged, she was ready to put her search on hold for the winter. But 
in January 2006, Miller met a broker from a company called Summit Mortgage. The 
broker assured her that she qualified for 100% financing, and soon she had a loan and a 
new house for her family. For this Barbadian immigrant, a home, along with an 
education, a career, and family, was the American Dream–and, for the moment at least, 
she had it all.  
In the context of American history, that a single woman or an African American, 
let alone a single African American woman, could secure a home mortgage was a truly 
remarkable development, possible only because of a hard-fought civil rights battle for 
equal access to credit for housing, culminating in the 1968 Fair Housing Act and 1974 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act. Had someone of her demographic profile embarked on the 
same search fifty years earlier, in 1955, she would have stood no chance of securing a 
                                                 
1 The details of Gillian Miller’s borrowing experience are drawn from, House Subcommittee on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the Committee on the Judiciary, “Testimony of Gillian N. 
Miller,” April 29, 2010. http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Miller100429.pdf (accessed June 21, 
2012). See also, Kimberly Blanton, “Borrowers Sue Subprime Lender, Allege Race Bias,” The Boston 
Globe, July 13, 2007, 
http://www.boston.com/business/personalfinance/articles/2007/07/13/borrowers_sue_subprime_lender_alle
ge_race_bias/ (accessed June 21, 2012), and Miller v. Countrywide Bank, N.A., 571 F. Supp. 2d 251 (D. 




mortgage loan from the banks or savings and loans (S&Ls) that then dominated 
residential mortgage lending. If, that is, in the equally unlikely case she could have found 
a homeowner or builder and a real estate broker who would sell to her. For much of the 
twentieth century, lenders, sellers, and brokers discriminated against women and racial 
minorities as a matter of course.  
 But simply accessing credit was not the end of Gillian Miller’s story. It mattered a 
great deal exactly to what she had gained access. What she had gained access to in 2006 
was a form of mortgage financing very different from that operating in 1955, or anytime 
from the 1930s through the 1970s. In those earlier times borrowers typically obtained a 
low-interest, long-term, fixed-rate, self-amortizing2 mortgage originated and held by a 
bank or, most commonly, a local savings and loan association. Mortgage rates were kept 
relatively low by a host of government policies that subsidized housing credit, protected 
it from competitive pressures that would increase its cost, and shouldered some of the 
risks that would otherwise be borne by lenders and borrowers. This system of housing 
finance, the laws, regulations, and institutions that governed the way borrowers accessed 
credit for housing, was expansive in the sense that it made homeownership more 
affordable for more Americans, but it was also exclusive, in that it systematically 
discriminated against racial minorities and women–people like Gillian Miller.3  
                                                 
2 That is, with interest and principal paid back in regular amounts over the life of the loan. 
 
3 To say that “housing finance” discriminated is not to unduly personify a regulatory system or to remove 
the actual persons from historical acts of discrimination, but to emphasize that discrimination was “built in” 
and endemic to the very system itself through historical processes. Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass 
Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). Jill 
Quadagno, The Color of Welfare: How Racism Undermined the War on Poverty (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994). Melvin L. Oliver and Thomas M. Shapiro, Black Wealth/White Wealth: A New 
Perspective on Racial Inequality (New York: Routledge, 1995). Ira Katznelson, When Affirmative Action 
Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in Twentieth-Century America (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2005). Kevin Fox Gotham, Race, Real Estate, and Uneven Development: The Kansas City 
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 The system that Miller had access to in 2006 had long since been transformed. 
Policy changes in the late 1970s and early 1980s fundamentally restructured the way that 
Americans obtained credit for homeownership and how that credit was created. The long-
term, fixed-rate mortgages of the 1930s-1970s had been joined by adjustable-rate 
mortgages, shifting interest-rate risk from creditors to borrowers. And the local, 
federally-insured banks and S&Ls that collected deposits at a regulated cost had been 
supplanted by unregulated brokers who originated and then immediately sold mortgages 
to investors in a secondary market, typically pooled with other mortgages by an 
intermediary such as Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.  
Borrowing in 2006, Miller was signing not one but two mortgages, both with 
variable rates (one of them with a two-year fixed introductory period that then converted 
to an adjustable rate). Though she did not know it at the time, the mortgages she received 
were “subprime,” with interest rates and fees higher than those issued to purportedly 
better qualified “prime” borrowers.4 Miller, who had bought a house once before with her 
ex-husband, was confused when the broker presented her with two mortgages instead of 
one, and was unfamiliar with adjustable-rate loans. She signed the paperwork 
nonetheless, despite feeling rushed through a closing that had been expedited to suit the 
needs of the seller. Adding to her confusion, Miller’s broker informed her that her 
mortgages would be sold to a company based on the other side of the country, called 
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., while the official mortgagee listed in her paperwork was 
                                                                                                                                                 
Experience, 1900-2000 (Albany: State University of New York, 2002). David M.P. Freund, Colored 
Property: State Policy and White Racial Politics in Suburban America (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
2007). 
  
4 The disclosed APRs for the two mortgages were 11.52% and 11.317%. Even those prime borrowers 
arguably paid higher rates than they would have if housing finance had still enjoyed the protected status it 




neither Summit nor Countrywide, but rather the Delaware company with a Flint, 
Michigan P.O. Box, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.5 Miller walked away 
“owning” a home, what she considered part of “having the American Dream,” but only 
after paying almost $10,000 in broker fees and facing high and uncertain interest rates for 
years to come.   
 The contrast between Gillian Miller’s experience obtaining a loan in 2006 and a 
typical borrower’s experience in the 1950s highlights three major revolutions in housing 
finance over the course of the twentieth century. First, a wide array of federal 
interventions initiated just before and during the New Deal created a new institutional 
and regulatory system to provide abundant and affordable credit for housing, dramatically 
expanding homeownership for white male heads of household while systematically 
excluding women (as borrowers) and racial minorities. Second, in the 1960s and 1970s, 
civil rights and community reinvestment activists forced federal lawmakers and 
regulators to open up access to the New Deal-era system to previously excluded 
borrowers, and obliged banks and savings and loans to lend in previously excluded 
(redlined) neighborhoods. And third, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, policymakers 
reconfigured the institutional and regulatory structure of housing finance again, 
deregulating certain components of the New Deal System and restructuring others to 
perform new roles. The new system promised to make credit widely available, but also 
more costly and risky than under the New Deal-era regime.  
                                                 
5 “Mortgage,” Suffolk County Registry of Deeds, Book 38951, Page 276 (January 31, 2006), 
http://www.masslandrecords.com (accessed July 4, 2012). For more on Mortgage Electronic Registration 
Systems Inc., and its role as a “Nominee of the lender,” not an owner, servicer, or mortgagee in any real 
sense, see Christopher L. Peterson, “Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and the Mortgage 
Electronic Registration System,” University of Cincinnati Law Review 78, no. 4 (2010). Available at 





Three Revolutions in Housing Finance  
 
 
There was something of a golden era of American homeownership in the decades 
immediately following WWII.6 Buoyed by a booming post-war economy, many 
Americans enjoyed unprecedented prosperity, which increasingly included 
homeownership. While only 44% of households owned their own home in 1940, the 
percentage reached 55% in 1950, and 63% by 1970.7 Poor and working class households 
gained an increasing share of the nation’s economic growth as wages rose.8 Yet even 
with increased wages most Americans needed to borrow money to purchase a house. 
They needed credit. While many factors such as supply, income, and down payment 
requirements influenced the availability, affordability, and achievability of 
homeownership, financing was the key lever for increasing the rate of ownership.9 A 
regulatory and institutional apparatus to provide that financing, forged through public and 
                                                 
6 Gary Dymski, “Financial Globalization and Housing Policy.” 
 
7 U.S. Census Bureau, “Historical Census of Housing Tables,” Census of Housing. 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/historic/owner.html. 
 
8 Judith Stein, Pivotal Decade: How the United States Traded Factories for Finance in the Seventies (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 1. Stein notes, “the income of the lowest fifth increased 116 percent, 
while the top fifth grew 85 percent; the middle also gained more than the top.” 
 
9 See Dwight M. Jaffee, Kenneth T. Rosen, Benjamin M. Friedman, and Lawrence R. Klein. “Mortgage 
Credit Availability and Residential Construction.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1979, no. 2 
(1979): 333-386. Jaffe, et al., found the conventional wisdom was that credit availability was the primary 
determinant of cyclicality in housing starts and that “this explanation of the short-run housing cycle in 
terms of mortgage availability (and to a lesser extent, mortgage cost) has had a major influence on public 
policy toward housing markets.” Ibid., 335-6. In other words, policymakers identified the availability of 
mortgage credit as the best way to affect access to homeownership. Why they did this is not clear, it may 
simply have been more feasible to affect the flow of credit than increase wages or the supply of housing. 
For much of the twentieth century, Jaffe, et al., note, the availability of credit was closely related to the 
flow of deposits to banks and thrifts. Not surprisingly, this became less true as residential mortgage credit 
was increasingly raised through secondary markets. The relative importance of housing finance in making 
homeownership achievable also changed over time. It became more important, for example, during the 




private collaboration in the response to the Great Depression, hit full stride after the war, 
remapping the nation’s residential landscape and dramatically democratizing access to 
homeownership in the process.10 The creation of this complex of federal policies, which I 
will call the New Deal system of housing finance, was the first of the three revolutions in 
housing finance. It restructured the way that Americans accessed credit for 
homeownership, most significantly by standardizing the long-term, fixed-rate, fully-
amortized mortgage.11 This innovation reduced previously prohibitive down payments 
from as much as 50% to 20% or lower, and increased the maturity of mortgages, the time 
a borrower had to repay a loan, from three to five years to ten to twenty, and, eventually, 
thirty years. A host of federal agencies, including the Federal Home Loan Bank System, 
the Home Owners Loan Corporation, and the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), 
provided lenders with infusions of capital and insured lenders against default risk. 
Federal deposit insurance and interest rate ceilings, limits on the amount of interest that 
banks could pay on deposits, allowed lenders to raise funds at low cost which they could 
then lend at low but still profitable rates. In sum, the New Deal system of housing finance 
made credit for housing abundant and affordable and, in important ways, limited risk for 
both borrowers and lenders.12  
Yet this era was not equally golden for all Americans. The dramatic expansion of 
homeownership paradoxically thrived on exclusion. Although, in time, the New Deal 
system of housing finance opened up access to homeownership to previously excluded 
                                                 
10 See Freund, especially chapter 3. 
 
11 Jackson, 196. 
 
12 That risk, of course, was shouldered by the federal government as a guarantor of mortgages and deposits 




ethnic groups (helping to confirm their “white” identity in the process), it required 
exclusion of “inharmonious” racial minorities.13 Federal appraisal and underwriting 
policies codified and nationalized longstanding practices and assumptions that held that 
the presence of certain racial and ethnic groups, particularly African Americans, reduced 
the value of properties in a neighborhood.14 Consequently, both private lenders and the 
federal programs that subsidized them refused to extend credit to racial minorities or to 
any borrowers in racially heterogeneous neighborhoods. FHA policies directly excluded 
minorities from the residential mortgages the agency insured, and indirectly from 
mortgage finance in general, by spreading, sanctioning, and normalizing exclusionary 
practices throughout the “conventional” or non-federally insured market.15 Once the FHA 
had made the long-term, low-interest, self-amortizing mortgage into a viable form of 
home finance, the conventional market quickly followed suit, if for no other reason than 
to compete with the FHA-insured market. Along with its terms, the conventional market 
adopted the FHA’s underwriting and appraisal standards, privileging single-family 
suburban homes for white, male borrowers. This conventional market, though not 
federally insured, nonetheless benefited from federal policies, including the interest rate 
ceilings and deposit insurance that allowed banks and savings and loans to attract low 
cost funds that could be turned into home mortgages, and infusions of capital from a 
                                                 
13 “Inharmonious” or “incompatible” racial groups were among the “adverse influences” identified in the 
FHA Underwriting Manual. Federal Housing Administration, Underwriting Manual: Underwriting and 
Valuation Procedure Under Title II of the National Housing Act (Washington, DC: GPO, 1938), sec. 932-
940. 
 
14 Jackson, 198. 
 
15 Gregory D. Squires, “Community Reinvestment: An Emerging Social Movement,” in From Redlining to 
Reinvestment: Community Response to Urban Disinvestment edited by Squires (Philadelphia: Temple 




system of regional Federal Home Loan banks. Even through the portion of the housing 
market not directly insured by the FHA, then, the agency’s discriminatory policies, with a 
federal stamp of approval, disseminated racial inequality throughout the national housing 
market.16   
 Civil rights activists had long challenged the inequitable aspects of the New Deal 
system, with a handful of minor victories through the 1960s. Then in 1968, Congress 
passed the Fair Housing Act, banning discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, 
or national origin in the rental or sale of housing through a real estate broker, including 
lending and terms. Activists pressured the four federal financial regulators17 to issue and 
enforce fair housing regulations for the depository institutions (banks and savings and 
loans) that financed the overwhelming majority of residential mortgages. As activists 
waged this battle into the late 1970s, a parallel (and complementary) movement emerged 
to combat the practice of redlining, by which lenders refused to make loans in certain 
neighborhoods (often disproportionately affecting racial minorities). By 1978, the fair 
housing and community reinvestment movements had affected significant policy 
changes. The majority of mortgage lenders fell under the jurisdiction of fair housing 
regulations, were required to disclose lending data (including race of borrowers and 
location of mortgaged properties), and, under the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 
were obliged to lend money in the neighborhoods in which they collected deposits. This 
                                                 
16 For a detailed discussion of the relationship between the FHA-insured and conventional markets see 
Freund, 190-196.  
 
17 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the Comptroller of the 




second revolution in housing finance promised the expansive qualities of the New Deal 
system to those who had previously been excluded from it.  
Yet civil rights and community reinvestment activists’ success in finally 
beginning to open access to the New Deal system coincided with a third revolution in 
housing finance, this one, like the first, a major restructuring of institutions, instruments, 
and regulations. As the New Deal system began to buckle under the strain of 
macroeconomic developments including inflation and increasingly volatile interest rates 
coupled with competitive pressures from financial and technological innovations, 
regulators and lawmakers scrambled to aid lenders, borrowers, and savers, but struggled 
to balance their often competing interests.18  
At several critical junctures, policymakers privileged the interests of consumer-
saver/investors over those of consumer-borrowers, culminating in the deregulation of 
interest rate ceilings (allowing depository institutions to pay higher rates to savers). This 
class of Americans, who already owned their own homes and had amassed significant 
savings, became investors seeking market returns on those savings. The number of such 
saver/investors grew considerably over the middle of the twentieth century–in no small 
part due to the wealth created by the New Deal system of housing finance. As the 
material interests of this highly influential constituency changed, so did their relationship 
to the New Deal system, and indeed the process by which that system was constituted and 
sustained by policymakers. Once beneficiaries of the low-interest mortgages made 
possible by interest-rate ceilings, in the context of high inflation, these homeowner-
saver/investors turned against the ceilings because they held down the yield they earned 





on their savings. They demanded access to federally-insured market-rate savings 
accounts and/or removed savings from depository institutions to seek market rates from 
investment alternatives that did not channel money into housing. Proponents of further 
financial deregulation then leveraged concessions on interest rate ceilings to press for 
deregulation of bank and thrift asset powers, allowing depository institutions to issue 
adjustable-rate mortgages and divert money from residential mortgages into alternative 
investments.  
Out of the contentious debates, negotiations, policies considered, and paths taken 
and not taken during the late 1970s and early 1980s emerged, by 1985, a newly 
configured system of housing finance. The traditional leaders in mortgage origination, the 
savings and loans, and their protected source of low-cost funds had been marginalized, 
their origination function taken over by mortgage brokers, and their capital raising 
function taken by secondary market investors (led by the quasi-public/quasi-private 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), and various forms of variable-rate mortgages competed 
alongside the standard fixed-rate mortgage. Collectively, the policy changes more fully 
integrated both residential mortgage financing and household savings into broader capital 
markets, in which housing would compete with other investment options such as 
corporate debt. The federal government would remain integral to propping up the 
mortgage market, though less and less through deposit and mortgage insurance and more 
and more as a purchaser-of-last-resort and guarantor in the secondary market through its 
implicit backing of the rapidly expanding Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  
 




Each of the three transformations described above has generated a broad scholarly 
literature of its own.19 This dissertation reconsiders their relationship, with particular 
attention to the timing and sequence of policy developments, to demonstrate two main 
arguments.20 First, the restructuring of housing finance in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
resulted primarily from policymakers’ attempts to reconcile the New Deal system to the 
changing interests of middle-class21 homeowner-saver/investors22 in the face of inflation. 
                                                 
19 Each of these literatures is extensive. See the bibliography for a fuller list. On the New Deal system, see 
Jackson, Freund, and Ann Meyerson, “The Changing Structure of Housing Finance in the United States,” 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 10, no. 4 (1986): 465-497. On fair housing and 
community reinvestment, see Christopher Bonastia, Knocking on the Door: The Federal Government’s 
Attempt to Desegregate the Suburbs (Princeton: Princeton University Press), and Dan Immergluck, Credit 
to the Community: Community Reinvestment and Fair Housing in the United States (Armonk, NY: M.E. 
Sharpe, 2004). And on the 1970s and 1980s restructuring, see Anthony Downs, The Revolution in Real 
Estate Finance (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985), and Gary Dymski, “Financial Globalization 
and Housing Policy: From ‘Golden Age’ Housing to ‘Global Age’ Insecurity,” in Paul Davidson and Jan 
Kregel, eds. Full Employment and Price Stability in a Global Economy (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elger, 
1999): 139-165. 
 
20 On the utility of studying policy development “in time,” see Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, 
Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
 
21 As Meg Jacobs writes, “the question of membership in one vast amorphous middle class is hard to define 
and therefore subject to constant debate.” Here I use middle class as a broad category, to include both of 
Jacobs’ “routes to middle class formation,” the expansion of white collar corporate and government jobs 
between 1880 and 1930, and the expansion under the New Deal social contract of which housing policies 
were a piece. By the 1970s both “middle classes” would have been among the homeowning majority, well 
enough situated by income and wealth to be saver/investors, even if some percentage were net debtors 
because of their mortgages (which during that period would eventually be more than offset by rising home 
prices). As Jeffrey Hornstein argues, middle-class consciousness was an ongoing historical construction, 
which, for the whole of the period studied here, was deeply tied to, among other things, (suburban) 
homeownership. He writes that by the 1940s, “‘homeowner,’ became a virtual metonym for ‘middle class.’ 
To be middle class meant, at least, to own – or aspire to own – a home of one’s own.” The conclusion that 
middle-class saver/investors drove policy change is similar to that of Gary Dymski who argues that “the 
class interests of primarily white, husband-wife household units” was the “straw that stirred the drink of 
systemic change” in housing finance, but, unlike Dymski, I arrive at this conclusion through investigation 
of policy regarding interest rate ceilings rather than housing prices. Jacobs, “Inflation: ‘The Permanent 
Dilemma’ of the American Middle Classes,” in Oliver Zunz, Leonard Schoppa, and Nobuhiro Hiwatari, 
eds., Social Contracts Under Stress: The Middle Classes of America, Europe, and Japan at the Turn of the 
Century, (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002): 130-156, 131. Jeffrey M. Hornstein, A Nation of 
Realtors ®: A Cultural History of the Twentieth-Century American Middle Class (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2005), 10, quote from 202. 
 
22 The term saver/investor is necessary to describe the ambiguous and/or changing financial behavior of 
middle-class Americans. Increasing numbers of savers began to seek higher returns on savings through 
investment alternatives. Both by demanding higher returns on federally insured deposits and through new 
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Second, this restructuring significantly undermined the fair housing and community 
reinvestment policies of the 1960s and 1970s by largely removing housing finance from 
the financial institutions and regulators that those polices had targeted, and by making 
housing finance more costly and risky for all borrowers.  
The deregulation of housing finance in the late 1970s and early 1980s turned on 
the interests and influence (direct and indirect) of middle-class homeowner-
saver/investors. Alternative explanations of deregulation–the ascendance of deregulation 
as a policy solution or idea, the election of conservatives (especially Ronald Reagan) to 
national offices, the influence of powerful financial institutions, the failure of the New 
Deal regulatory regime to function under conditions of inflation and interest rate 
volatility, widespread insolvency of savings and loans–illuminate important contributing 
factors but fail to sufficiently explain when and how deregulatory policies were enacted 
in regulation and law.    
Placing the restructuring of housing finance of the 1970s and early 1980s in the 
context of the success of the New Deal system in expanding homeownership in the 
postwar decades, as well as its apparent failure to provide a steady flow of credit to 
housing during the high inflation and volatile interest rates of the 1970s, highlights the 
political and economic role of homeowner saver-investors in driving policy change.23 Of 
late-twentieth century politics Kim Phillips-Fein has written, “postwar federal 
government support for highways and mass homeownership helped create communities 
                                                                                                                                                 
investment accounts that blurred the line between savings and investment, this group placed pressure on the 
New Deal system and on policymakers to change it. 
 
23 Many scholars understand the restructuring of housing finance in the 1970s and 1980s as a reaction 
against the perceived failures of the New Deal system of regulations, but tend to treat the system as static, 




that would ultimately prove deeply hostile to New Deal liberalism.”24 Consistent with 
this general appraisal, I argue more specifically that federal support for mass 
homeownership created a constituency, homeowner-saver/investors, who proved deeply 
hostile to a particular New Deal policy, interest rate ceilings. That the ceilings themselves 
had contributed to the expansion of homeownership mattered little to those who had 
already benefited from them as borrowers and had come to see them only as punitive in 
their new role as inflation-battling savers. Whether by removing their deposits from 
savings and loans and banks in search of higher interest rates from alternative investment 
instruments, especially newly created money market mutual funds, or by demanding that 
depository institutions themselves pay higher rates, increasing numbers of Americans 
opted out of the New Deal system of housing finance in the 1970s. This forced 
policymakers to respond in order to both keep credit flowing to housing and keep 
depository institutions viable. Here, I emphasize, policymakers had a choice. They could 
have protected the New Deal system of housing finance by extending regulations to cover 
alternative investment instruments, or they could have removed interest rate ceilings for 
depository institutions (as they eventually did), allowing savers to earn higher returns 
wherever they might be found, and capital to flow to whatever institutions could compete 
to get it, without special regard for channeling capital to housing.  
First in 1976, and again in 1980-81, policymakers gave serious consideration to 
extending regulations to reduce the yields of money market mutual funds, and thereby 
protect lenders’ source of low-cost deposit funds. In both cases, concern for saver-
investors’ ability to earn higher returns ultimately trumped concern for borrowers and 
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financial institutions, as policymakers opted not to extend regulations. Confirming the 
influence of homeowner-saver/investors in these policy decisions, policymakers chose 
not to extend regulations to money market funds despite the support of Fed Chairman 
Paul Volcker, Bank Board Chairman Richard Pratt, the Consumer Federation of America, 
the National Associations of Realtors, Home Builders, and Mutual Savings Banks, the 
AFL-CIO, and an unlikely partnership between the American Bankers Association and 
the U.S. League of Savings Associations. Likewise, lawmakers chose to eliminate 
interest rate ceilings altogether, allowing savers to earn higher returns on federally 
insured deposits, despite the insistence of bankers and savings and loan officials that 
borrowers would have to pay higher rates on loans. Notably, policymakers also made this 
choice over the objections of representatives of organized labor, and the S&L, banking, 
and construction industries, all traditionally powerful interest groups. 
Framed as a populist measure to end discrimination against “small savers,” even 
lawmakers who remained deeply suspicious of other aspects of deregulation such as the 
authorization of adjustable rate mortgages, rallied around the push to end interest rate 
ceilings. By the late 1970s, a majority of lawmakers came to embrace a narrow 
deregulation agenda, the removal of interest rate ceilings, on behalf of consumer-savers, 
which then opened the door to further deregulation, the deregulation of thrift asset 
(lending and investment) powers. Once policymakers committed to the elimination of 
interest rate ceilings, proponents of broader deregulation leveraged concessions on rate 
ceilings for wider asset powers, arguing that if depository institutions had to pay market 
rates to savers, they would have to be freed to charge higher rates to borrowers and seek 
higher returns on non-housing investments. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
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liberalization of interest rate ceilings gradually became linked to authorization of 
flexible-rate mortgages, culminating in authorization of adjustable-rate mortgages with 
minimal consumer safeguards in 1981. And in 1982, Congress passed the Garn–St. 
Germain Act, including authorization of non-housing investment powers, in order to 
ensure that regulators could continue to phase out interest rate ceilings.  
As S&Ls pursued the new investment options granted by Garn–St. Germain, they 
largely abandoned their role as the traditional leaders in housing finance. Policymakers 
turned to secondary markets to replace the thrifts as the primary source of capital for 
housing with two critical consequences. First, the turn to secondary markets integrated 
housing finance into broader capital markets, meaning that residential mortgages would 
compete with other investment alternatives for capital. Instead of supporting the modest 
return to savers capped by Regulation Q, mortgages would have to support competitive 
returns on investment as well as profits for several additional layers of intermediaries. 
Second, the turn to secondary markets facilitated the rise of mortgage companies and 
brokers in taking over the thrifts’ leading role in mortgage origination.          
This transformation in housing finance, rooted in the push for market returns for 
consumer-saver/investors, significantly undermined the fair housing and community 
reinvestment policies of the 1960s and 1970s. The fair housing and community 
reinvestment movements emerged in opposition to the inequities of the New Deal system 
of housing finance and the racially segregated residential landscape it promoted. As fair 
housing and community reinvestment activists worked to open access to housing finance 
through the 1960s and 1970s, they very sensibly targeted the institutions that dominated 
mortgage lending at the time. But even as they achieved new laws and regulations 
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governing traditional lenders, policymakers began to implement a series of deregulatory 
policies that drastically reduced the role of those lenders in housing finance. Beginning in 
1978, the year that the FDIC finally adopted fair housing regulations, the year after 
Congress passed the Community Reinvestment Act, and the year that interest rate ceiling 
deregulation began, the share of mortgages originated by the depository institutions 
subject to fair housing and community reinvestment regulations steadily eroded, as the 
share of originations by comparatively less regulated mortgage brokers increased. The 
deregulation of thrift asset powers and the turn to secondary markets accelerated the 
emergence of mortgage brokers as the leaders in mortgage origination. The shift in 
mortgage origination away from the heavily regulated depository institutions had two 
critical impacts. First, it left the fair housing and community reinvestment apparatuses ill-
equipped to monitor mortgage markets, creating a regulatory blind-spot in which 
discrimination could flourish. Into the 1990s and 2000s, credit discrimination continued 
for some borrowers as exclusion, but also, for other borrowers, through inclusion at 
discriminatorily high rates and fees, including a burgeoning subprime market.25 Second, 
the restructuring of housing finance made credit widely available, but on more costly and 
risky terms for all borrowers compared to the New Deal system.26 The restructuring itself 
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was ostensibly color-blind or race neutral, but viewed in time, that is, following decades 
of systematic discrimination, the negative effects of that deregulation were especially 
pernicious for the previously excluded groups. Though the costlier terms created 
generational inequities among all borrowers (a significant unfairness in its own right) 
wealth and other less-tangible opportunities that had accrued to families who had access 
to homeownership in the post-war decades mitigated those inequities in ways that 
reinforced and perpetuated the racial disparities of the post-war era.27          
 
“Or Does it Explode?” 
 
 
By the mid-1980s federal housing finance policy held in tension contradictory 
policy goals: a stated commitment to equal access to homeownership and the “American 
Dream” for all and an imperative that the profitability of housing finance be competitive 
with and integrated into all other capital markets. In the short-term, the rising costs of 
credit for housing joined with stagflation, and particularly flat wages, stalled the then 
decades long expansion of homeownership, which plateaued at 64%, for the duration of 
the 1980s.28 Over the long term, into the 1990s and 2000s, the contradiction in goals 
created a market for new and often risky credit instruments in order to restart an 
expansion of homeownership rates and new-home construction in the face of an 
affordability gap. The transformation also facilitated the commoditization of what 
conventional wisdom deemed to be the additional risk that lenders took on in order to 
                                                                                                                                                 
Urban Institute press, 1991), 87. Alex F. Schwartz, Housing Policy in the United States: An Introduction 
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27 Oliver and Shapiro, 23, 27-8, 54. 
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of the Unites States Millennial Edition Online. Eds. Susan Carter et al. (Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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meet the requirements of fair housing and community reinvestment legislation into a 
premium paid by borrowers in the form of higher rates and fees.  
The restructured system of housing finance made Gillian Miller believe that she 
could and should achieve the “American dream” of homeownership. It gave a mortgage 
broker the incentive and opportunity to soak Miller with fees, sign her up for exorbitant 
adjustable interest rates, and sell her mortgages without taking on any risk. It made 
Countrywide eager to buy Miller’s mortgages and confident that it too could sell its stake 
in Miller’s debt to equally eager investors in a secondary market. Miller had access to 
homeownership, but under very shaky and costly terms. When Miller lost her job she 
struggled to keep up with her monthly payments. She took on temp jobs to maintain an 
income. It might have been enough to pay a more affordable mortgage, but not the two 
subprime loans she received from Summit Mortgage. Miller ultimately lost her home, and 
with it “her piece of the American dream.” The dream had been deregulated, making it 
simultaneously more attainable and less sustainable, a volatile combination borne of the 
fundamental structural changes to housing finance in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  
Out of the raw material of loans like Miller’s, ultimately resting on the ability of 
borrowers to repay and/or the value of the homes that collateralized them, bankers, 
investors, insurers, brokers, et al., had erected layer upon layer of complex financial 
instruments spread deep and wide throughout the global economy. For years this system 
created enormous profits, but when borrowers struggled to repay escalating rates and 
investors began to question the value of the various instruments, loans, and homes on 
which they were premised, the system came crashing down in a global financial crisis.  
 





 The dissertation is organized in a roughly chronological order, beginning with 
New Deal interventions in housing finance and ending with the emergence of the 
secondary markets as the primary source of capital for housing in the mid-1980s. Chapter 
One describes the institutions, laws, and regulations that made up the New Deal system 
of housing finance, then discusses its legacies and operation through the immediate post-
war decades that shaped later policy development. It argues that interest rate ceilings 
were an important component of housing finance, helping to keep interest rates low and 
lending profitable, and which became central to how policymakers, bankers and, 
especially, savings and loan officials understood how housing finance worked (as 
incomplete an understanding as it may have been).29 This overview of the New Deal 
system and what it wrought, an institutional and regulatory structure (including interest 
rate ceilings), racial inequality, and a homeowning majority, provides essential context 
for subsequent housing finance policymaking.  
Chapter Two documents the efforts of civil rights and community reinvestment 
activists to secure, in law and regulation, effective enforcement mechanisms to open 
equal access to housing and housing finance, and to oblige depository institutions to lend 
in the neighborhoods in which they collected deposits. Decades of protest and legal 
challenges finally resulted in significant legislation and regulations, including the 1968 
Fair Housing Act, 1974 Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 1975 Home Mortgage Disclosure 
Act, 1977 Community Reinvestment Act, and fair housing and community reinvestment 
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regulations issued by the FDIC and Federal Home Loan Bank Board. Significantly, 
activists targeted traditional depository institutions and their regulators, even as parallel 
debates and policy changes began to erode the role of those institutions in housing 
finance. Except in the case of authorization of adjustable-rate mortgages, issues of fair 
housing and community reinvestment rarely surfaced in debates over the restructuring of 
housing finance, despite their important implications for shaping opportunity and access 
to homeownership.  
The dissertation then turns to the politics surrounding the restructuring of housing 
finance in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Chapter Three focuses on the deregulation of 
interest rate ceilings. A small group of deregulation proponents challenged the ceilings 
beginning in the 1960s, but support for the ceilings among most bankers and savings and 
loan officials, representatives of organized labor, builders, and real estate brokers, as well 
as majorities in Congress made them remarkably resilient. A majority coalition in 
Congress did not form around removal of the ceilings until 1979, after their elimination 
had been successfully cast as an end to discrimination against “small savers” desperately 
fighting inflation. Even then, legislation to initiate a gradual phase-out of the ceilings did 
not pass until supporters hitched the initiative to authorization of popular bank accounts 
subject to expire at a court-designated deadline. Policymakers pursued this narrow 
deregulation of interest rate ceilings against the wishes of the majority of financial 
institutions, and despite claims that borrowing costs would rise, in order to appease the 
interests of (largely) homeowning savers. Proponents of ceiling removal argued that 
savers could earn market rates on their deposits, and depository institutions could better 
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compete against investment alternatives such as money market mutual funds, which were 
draining banks and savings and loans of their deposit base.   
Chapter Four explores policy alternatives to the deregulation of interest rate 
ceilings. Policymakers might have instead extended regulations to money market mutual 
funds, reducing disintermediation and protecting the New Deal system of housing 
finance. Focusing on the policymakers’ consideration of this alternative course serves to 
highlight why they ultimately chose to deregulate: concern for middle-class consumer-
saver/investors. In 1976, the FDIC and Federal Reserve considered regulations that 
would have severely limited the growth of money market mutual funds, thereby 
protecting the intent of interest rate ceilings and forestalling the competitive pressures 
that drained money from depository institutions in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
Though small in number at the time, money fund investors lobbied lawmakers who in 
turn asked the agencies not to regulate the money funds. In the early 1980s, as money 
funds grew rapidly and depository institutions suffered, a long list of regulators and 
interest groups called for federal regulation to contain the growth of money market 
mutual funds. But again, bowing to the interests of middle class investors, the federal 
agencies backed off and decided not to regulate the money funds.  
Chapters Five and Six, then focus on how bankers, savings and loan officials, and 
proponents of broad financial deregulation leveraged concessions on interest rate ceilings 
and the earnings problems that their removal induced to pursue further deregulation of 
bank and thrift asset powers. Chapter Five documents how interest rate ceiling 
deregulation became linked to authorization of adjustable rate mortgages and documents 
a shift from congressional opposition to congressional acquiescence to the instruments, 
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despite concern for borrowers, in order to ensure the end of interest rate ceilings and 
higher returns to savers. Chapter Six then examines the role of the Depository Institutions 
Deregulation Committee, the body charged with phasing-out interest rate ceilings, in 
asset deregulation, culminating in the 1982 Garn–St. Germain Act. The DIDC struggled 
to enact its mandate to achieve market rates for savers while still maintaining the viability 
of the savings and loan industry, ultimately refusing to proceed with rate deregulation 
until Congress loosened asset powers, allowing thrifts to invest in consumer loans, 
commercial real estate, and other alternatives to residential mortgages. These policy 
changes went a long way to restructuring housing finance, removing and/or willfully 
refusing to maintain the protected source of low cost funds for depository institutions, 
and removing much of the obligation of savings and loans to invest in residential 
mortgages. The final major piece of the restructuring, policymakers’ turn to secondary 
markets as the primary source of capital for housing, is the subject of Chapter Seven. 
This piece further facilitated the replacement of thrifts by mortgage brokers in mortgage 
origination, opened housing finance to capital investors, and maintained a heavy federal 
stake, via the quasi-public status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, in supporting the 





 This study bridges the literature on fair housing and community reinvestment with 
that on the transformation (deregulation) of housing finance in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. By investigating the two in relation to one another, the dissertation offers insight 
into the causes of continuing racial disparities in wealth (largely rooted in unequal access 
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to homeownership) despite a civil rights revolution. Though, as I argue, the deregulation 
of housing finance had a critical impact on fair housing and community reinvestment 
policies, both policymakers and scholars have tended to treat the two sets of policies 
separately. Most histories of the Fair Housing Act, for example, have focused on the 
enforcement efforts of the Departments of Housing and Urban Development and Justice, 
largely neglecting the federal financial regulators. I follow the lead of the civil rights 
activists themselves in arguing that the latter were just as important.30 An exception to the 
general trend of separating the two issues, Dan Immergluck, in both Credit to the 
Community and Foreclosed, argues that changes to housing finance do have implications 
for fair lending practices.31 I join Immergluck in emphasizing this relationship, but with 
greater attention to the deregulation of the late 1970s and 1980s (rather than the 1990s) 
and its causes. 
 Though typically not considering the implications for fair housing and community 
reinvestment, several scholars have examined the changes in housing finance in the late 
1970s and 1980s.32 Explanations of the changes have focused on the intellectual origins 
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and ascendance of deregulatory and free market ideas, implying a building momentum 
culminating in the application of those ideas to housing finance,33 the power and 
influence of large financial institutions,34 or the triumph of one set of financial 
institutions over another.35 Deregulatory ideas and the contending financial interest 
groups were indeed important in informing the shape of deregulatory policies, but I argue 
that it was the influence of middle-class saver/investors that created political openings 
and/or tipped the balance of competing agendas to allow those policies to be 
implemented. The various financial interest groups were often at odds with one another, 
and lawmakers routinely went against the wishes of even the most powerful among them.  
 This interpretation speaks also to the wider literatures on deregulation, the rise of 
conservatism, and the rise of neoliberalism. The deregulation of housing finance was a 
part of what Martha Derthick and Paul Quirk call the emergence of “deregulation as a 
policy fashion,” a short period in the late 1970s and early 1980s during which significant 
deregulation was achieved in a range of industries including telecommunications, energy, 
and trucking.36 Richard Vietor writes that across these industries, “sudden economy-wide 
performance problems undermined political faith in the prevailing systems of economic 
management,” opening space for deregulatory reform.37 But that space proved quite 
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narrow. The institutions and regulations of the old systems proved very resilient, even in 
the face of severe “performance problems.”   
  The basic argument for deregulation held that it would increase competition that 
would then result in better prices and services for consumers. With its consumer-centric 
justification, as Daniel Rodgers puts it, “Deregulation was a radical project before it 
became a conservative one.”38 Indeed, the impetus behind interest rate ceiling 
deregulation was an application of this idea. Policymakers such as Senator Proxmire 
thought that without Regulation Q, banks and thrifts would compete to give savers higher 
returns. But this logic did not translate so neatly to banking and housing finance, a 
regulatory regime in which consumer interests were uniquely divided and in many ways 
at odds, particularly the interests of consumer-savers and consumer-borrowers. Increased 
returns to savers, according to bankers, thrift officials, and regulators alike, would result 
in higher costs to borrowers. The consumer-centric rationale for deregulation simply did 
not apply to banking in the same way as it did to other industries. Furthermore, in the 
case of housing finance, explanations of deregulation have to account for two distinct 
stages of deregulation, the first of bank and thrift liabilities (the amount of interest they 
paid on deposits), and the second of thrift asset powers. I argue that the proponents of 
asset deregulation, in concrete and discernable ways, leveraged concessions on interest 
rate ceilings to secure broader powers. Lawmakers’ ultimate backing of both deregulation 
of interest rate ceilings and authorization of adjustable-rate mortgages and broadened 
thrift asset powers reflected less a wholehearted embrace of deregulation as a concept, 
philosophy, or ideology than an arduous negotiation of competing interests in which no 
                                                 




party, neither consumer advocates nor financial institutions, got everything they 
wanted.39 
      Vietor argues that “regulatory reform in the banking sector was little more than the 
political acknowledgement of de facto competition [from nonbank financial 
instruments].”40 But this account, typical of the literature, implies that regulators had no 
recourse to limit such competition.41 As discussed above, however, regulators could have 
extended regulation to money market mutual funds and other instruments that drew 
money from depository institutions, and they gave that option serious consideration. 
Taking the debates over the possible regulation of MMMFs seriously serves to highlight 
why policymakers ultimately chose to deregulate–to ensure market rates to savers.  
This dissertation joins a growing number of studies that emphasize developments 
in the 1970s as marking a critical shift or break in twentieth-century American history,42 
but also roots such changes in the internal contradictions of postwar liberalism.43 The 
deregulation of S&L asset powers (often attributed to the conservative and/or free market 
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leanings of the Reagan administration), grew directly out of the bargain struck by (mostly 
Democratic) policymakers in the late 1970s to reconcile the changing interests of 
homeowner-savers to the New Deal regulatory system in the context of inflation and 
financial innovation. Indeed, as Rodgers writes, “too sharp a sense of break at Reagan’s 
1980 election simplifies and distorts.”44 
And yet this study cautions against moving too far in the opposite direction, 
which risks missing what was different about the approach to deregulation by the Reagan 
administration. The case of adjustable-rate mortgage authorization is illustrative. On one 
hand, the bargain to allow flexible-rate mortgage instruments in exchange for the end of 
interest rate ceilings had been struck before Reagan and a Republican Senate majority 
came to power. On the other hand, if one looks at the consumer safeguards that 
accompanied flexible-rate mortgage proposals and authorizations from the early 1970s 
into the early 1980s, the arrival of the Reagan administration corresponds with an abrupt 
loosening of regulatory consumer protections. Similarly, the Reagan administration’s 
unquestioning assumption that secondary markets would reduce the cost of housing 
finance broke from the Carter administration, which remained more skeptical. In both 
cases, the Reagan regime exhibited a fuller faith in the free market to deliver desired 
outcomes without need of even minimal regulatory protections.   
The deregulation of housing finance was a significant piece of a broader shift in 
political economy that has been described as the rise of neoliberalism. On several 
defining characteristics of neoliberalism, including deregulation to reduce barriers to the 
free flow of capital, liberalization of capital investment, and privatization of state assets, 
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the newly restructured system of housing finance largely conformed.45 The deregulation 
of interest rate ceilings and thrift investment powers in particular functioned to integrate 
both household savings and residential mortgage credit into national and global capital 
markets. Only in privatization, where changes to the charter of Fannie Mae and the 
creation of Freddie Mac privatized profit but implicit federal backing continued to 
federalize (and socialize) risk, did the transformation in housing finance fall short of 
fulfilling the central aspects of neoliberalism. Critics have pointed out that neoliberalism 
has also included an assault on the welfare state and labor unions as impediments to 
efficient, free markets. Such policies shift risk to individuals, a characteristic shared by 
the new system of housing finance, especially in its authorization of adjustable-rate 
mortgages.46 Finally, critics argue that neoliberal policies have disproportionately 
benefited the wealthy. 
This literature has accurately captured how the post-deregulation system of 
housing finance functions and whose interests it best serves, but this study contributes a 
better understanding of the political developments that enabled the transformation of 
housing finance and how those developments related to structural change.47 It will add to 
the intellectual history of neoliberal ideas the historical contexts of the fair housing and 
community reinvestment movements, and the success (as well as the failure) of the New 
Deal system of housing finance. In the process, it offers a richer answer to the question 
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posed by David Harvey, “how was neoliberalization accomplished, and by whom?”48 
And it helps to explain the “construction of consent” to a neoliberal regime.49      
In the case of housing finance, the political processes that resulted in neoliberal 
policies, which indeed have had dubious benefits for most Americans (especially racial 
minorities), turned on the interests not of the financial elite, but of middle-class 
homeowner-saver/investors. Martin Gilens and Larry Bartels in separate studies 
beginning with data from the early 1980s and late 1980s, respectively, find little 
relationship between the policy preferences of low- and middle-income Americans and 
the voting records of elected officials, what Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson term 
“unrepresentative democracy.” In contrast, I argue that in the mid to late 1970s, 
policymakers were very much responding to middle-class Americans’ preferences 
regarding market rates on savings. It could be that this was one of the last times that 
middle-income voters held such sway, but at least in the pursuit of interest rate ceiling 
deregulation and the decision not to regulate money market mutual funds, policymakers 
had not yet turned their backs on the middling majority. The wealthiest Americans, those 
who Bartels and Gilens find were the only ones able to influence policy, had little stake 
in the decisions regarding rate ceilings or money funds as they already had access to 
market rates.50 
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 Finally, there is a rapidly growing literature and continuing commentary on the 
causes of the current economic crisis (also variously known as the subprime-, housing-
bubble-, foreclosure-, debt-, leverage-, or financial crisis, among other names).51 Much of 
the discussion has centered on the role of the federal government in regulating financial 
institutions. On one side of this debate, left-leaning pundits and commentators have 
pointed to deregulation as a major cause, citing in particular, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act of 1999, which ended the Glass–Steagall separation of commercial and investment 
banking, and the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, which reduced 
oversight of the development of financial derivatives. Others have looked back to the 
DIDMCA of 1980, or to the Garn–St. Germain Act of 1982, as Paul Krugman did in his 
New York Times column of May 31, 2009, titled “Reagan Did It.”52 On the other side of 
the debate, conservative commentators have pointed to the incomplete deregulation or 
privatization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, or to the requirements of the Community 
Reinvestment Act of 1977, as the primary causes of the crisis due their promotion of 
high-risk lending.53 While the deregulatory legislation of 1990s and 2000s is undoubtedly 
critical to understanding the recent crisis, I argue that the earlier period of deregulation, 
which made secondary markets the primary source of capital for housing and authorized 
                                                 
51 For a few examples, see Edward Gramlich, Subprime Mortgages: America’s Latest Boom and Bust 
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a variety of mortgage instruments, constituted a fundamental shift in housing finance that 
underlies the crisis.54    
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Chapter 1  
 




Federal policymaking regarding housing finance between 1968 and 1985 cannot 
be understood apart from the context of three and a half prior decades of the operation of 
the New Deal system of housing finance. It is necessary, therefore, to describe the basic 
features of the New Deal system and the ways that it shaped both residential patterns and 
the politics of opportunity in post-war America. Much of this story has become familiar 
to students of twentieth-century American history, but this account highlights two 
underemphasized aspects of the workings and consequences of New Deal-era housing 
policies. First, in addition to the now well-known host of New Deal housing agencies and 
policies such as the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA), and the FHA and Veterans Administration mortgage insurance 
programs, this account emphasizes the role of interest rate ceilings, known as Regulation 
Q, in creating and allocating affordable mortgage credit.1 The ceilings, which limited the 
amount of interest that commercial banks could pay to savers, gave savings and loans a 
competitive advantage in attracting deposits. In the immediate post-war decades, S&Ls 
greatly increased their share of the nation’s household savings, which they then turned 
almost exclusively into residential mortgage financing. Interest rate ceilings also 
                                                 
1 Neither Kenneth Jackson in his seminal suburban history, Crabgrass Frontier, nor David Freund in his 
sweeping treatment of New Deal housing policies, for example, include discussion of interest rate ceilings. 
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Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 195. 
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functioned to keep lenders’ cost of funds low, enabling lenders to issue mortgages at rates 
that were both profitable for themselves and affordable for borrowers.   
The emphasis here on Regulation Q and its legacies is a piece of a second, 
broader, point of reinterpretation of New Deal housing policies. As it succeeded in 
expanding homeownership to white households, the New Deal system, including 
Regulation Q, contributed to a transformation of the material interests of a growing 
middle class, altering the very political and economic contexts in which the system 
operated. Four legacies of the New Deal system, an inherited institutional and regulatory 
structure; a homeowning majority; a racially segregated residential landscape; and a 
culture of “colorblind individual meritocracy,” which largely erased the pervasive federal 
role in promoting homeownership and racial exclusion, cast a long shadow over 
subsequent policy development.2 Crucially, as the New Deal system expanded 
homeownership to white households in the post-war decades, it changed the material and 
political relationship of those households to the existing regulatory regime. Specifically, 
achieving homeownership made households less likely to support interest rate ceilings. 
While the ceilings helped lenders to profitably lend at affordable rates, they did so by 
limiting the amount of interest that savers could earn on deposits. Once a homeowner had 
secured a low-interest, fixed-rate mortgage, he (and then it was generally a he) had 
gained everything he could from interest rate ceilings as a borrower, and now only stood 
to “lose” interest income as a saver. As the majority of American households came to 
own their homes, and especially as inflation increased during the 1970s, the political 
                                                 
2 On a culture of meritocracy, see Matthew D. Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the 
Sunbelt South (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). On government officials’ active erasure of the 




pressure to end interest rate ceilings, and thereby help savers earn higher rates of return, 
eclipsed the political pressure to continue the ceilings to help would-be homeowners.     
 
The New Deal System of Housing Finance–Institutions and Regulations  
 
 
 A wide complex of laws, regulations, and institutions, some predating the New 
Deal and others new, coalesced in the 1930s to resuscitate and fundamentally restructure 
the nation’s mortgage markets. The product of a public-private collaboration of federal 
policymakers, industry representatives, and land-use experts, this restructuring innovated 
new mechanisms to create and allocate credit for housing.3 Emergency legislative and 
regulatory responses to the Great Depression, including the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Act of 1932, the Banking and Home Owners’ Loan Acts of 1933, and the National 
Housing Act of 1934, combined with existing policies such as the mortgage interest 
deduction to change both how residential mortgage credit was created and how borrowers 
accessed it, in ways that made that credit more abundant and affordable. The newly 
reconfigured system of housing finance, which I will call the New Deal system, governed 
the way that American home buyers accessed mortgage credit from the 1930s through the 
1970s.    
Created in 1932, the first of the new institutions that would shape housing finance 
over the decades that followed was a network of Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs) to 
provide supplemental capital to lending institutions.4 When lenders lacked sufficient 
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4 David Mason notes that by 1941, S&Ls representing 90% of total assets had become members of the 
FHLB System though a numerical majority had not joined until 1960. `Mason, From Buildings and Loans 




funds to meet local demand for mortgages or deposit withdrawals, they could turn to their 
regional FHLB for an advance, an infusion of capital, against the collateral of mortgages 
they held. After an initial capitalization of up to $125 million from the U.S. Treasury, the 
Federal Home Loan Banks raised funds by selling stocks to members and issuing its own 
debt offerings (bonds) to the public.5 The FHLB System was governed by a board (the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, or FHLBB) which became the principal federal 
regulator of the thrift industry (savings and loans and mutual savings banks).6 The thrift 
and real estate industries heartily endorsed the bank system. Morton Bodfish, an official 
of the thrift industry’s chief lobbying organization, the United States Savings and Loan 
League, wrote the legislation creating the FHLBs and ensured that they and the FHLBB 
would provide an institutional home for an on-going public-private partnership in 
housing finance.7 On its own, the FHLB system did little to stimulate new borrowing as it 
addressed the supply of credit but, without significantly altering mortgage terms, not 
demand for credit. Later, when subsequent interventions did liberalize mortgage terms 
and invigorate demand, the FHLBs ensured that lenders could meet that demand even if 
they lacked sufficient capital on hand. 
 The revolution in mortgage terms needed to induce greater demand came through 
a second institutional intervention–this one under the Roosevelt Administration. The 
Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) was established in 1933 as an emergency 
response to the alarming rate of foreclosures since the onset of the Depression, a number 
                                                 
5 Federal Home Loan Bank Act, 72d Cong. Chapter 522. 
 
6 Freund notes that under this arrangement, allowing thrifts to profit from increased lending backed by 
federal authority and Treasury funds, “the lines between the ‘public’ and ‘private’ home finance markets 
first began to blur.” Freund, 109.  
 




that reached nearly a quarter million homes in 1932.8 Congress initially capitalized the 
HOLC with $200,000,000 from the U.S. Treasury, and authorized the agency to raise an 
additional $2 billion by issuing 18-year bonds at 4% interest.9 Between 1933 and 1935, 
the HOLC refinanced roughly one million home loans, sparing both borrowers and 
lenders the costs and hardships of foreclosure.10 Important as this intervention was in its 
own right, the HOLC’s enduring significance derived from its development of the long-
term, low-rate mortgage instrument, and its systematic appraisal of neighborhoods 
including valuation based on racial composition.11 These two innovations outlived the 
institution itself to become essential components of the New Deal system of housing 
finance.  
 The HOLC’s experimentation with the long-term, low-interest, fully-amortized 
mortgage provided government backing to instruments that had been tried, on less liberal 
terms, by private lenders with minimal success. Federal capitalization, however, allowed 
the HOLC to refinance at terms manageable even for Depression-afflicted homeowners. 
Such positive experience with the liberal mortgage instrument set important precedents 
for subsequent federal policymaking. Longer maturities and lower interest rates promised 
to lead to expanded demand in ways that the exclusively supply-oriented FHLBs could 
                                                 
8 Kenneth A. Snowden, “Mortgage Foreclosures and Delinquencies, 1926 – 1979,” Historical Statistics of 
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2006). 
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not. The key to unlocking this potential would lie in developing a sustainable program to 
make such instruments profitable for traditional lenders.12   
Rivaling the development of new mortgage instruments in long-term impact, the 
HOLC instituted a set of appraisal practices that required racial exclusion. The agency 
most famously recorded its appraisal of neighborhoods in what were called Residential 
Security Maps, classifying areas hierarchically (in descending order) A, B, C, and D. The 
highly rated A neighborhoods tended to be low-density, racially-homogenous (white), 
and of newer or at least well-maintained housing stock. Reflecting the prevailing 
assumption of leading land-use experts and planners, neighborhoods with any presence of 
racial minorities received the lowest classification, designating those areas as high risk, 
and making many properties ineligible for HOLC refinancing. The maps systematized 
racial prejudice in lending, as local lending institutions embraced and employed the A, B, 
C, D classifications. “Even more significantly,” historian Kenneth Jackson writes, 
“HOLC appraisal methods, and probably the [residential security] maps themselves, were 
adopted by the Federal Housing Administration.”13 At a critical moment, the HOLC 
fused longstanding prejudicial lending and real estate practices with the transforming 
system of housing finance.14 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 111-113. 
 
13 Jackson, 203. Amy Hillier argues that the maps were not distributed widely to lenders and that lending 
practices after the adoption of the maps simply continued previous practices, indicating that the impact of 
the maps themselves has been overstated by Jackson and subsequent scholars. Regardless of the particular 
impact of the maps, the HOLC joined racial exclusion to the new and evolving, federally-underwritten, 
market for mortgage credit, setting important precedent as the same network of public and private actors 
would design subsequent policies. Amy E. Hillier, “Redlining and the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation,” 
Journal of Urban History 29, no. 4 (May 2003): 394-420. On the “public-private alliance that drafted 
federal housing policy and administrated its programs,” see Freund, 100-102. 
 




 Established by the National Housing Act of 1934, the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) built on HOLC precedent, not only using racially exclusive 
appraisal practices, but also adopting the long-term, amortized mortgage instrument. 
Rather than refinancing mortgages on the verge of foreclosure as had the HOLC, the 
FHA insured lenders against default on new mortgages (and home improvement loans). 
The FHA’s merging of racial exclusion and new mortgage instruments reduced payments 
and increased maturities for mortgages in A and B neighborhoods, but largely excluded 
the C and D neighborhoods that included most urban neighborhoods and neighborhoods 
with racial minorities. Because the federal government assumed the risk of default, 
lenders could offer lower interest rates (Jackson claims two to three percentage points). 
The FHA insurance program, augmented in 1944 by a comparable Veterans 
Administration (VA) program under the auspices of the GI Bill, insured 11 million homes 
by 1972. The FHA and VA insurance programs privileged single-family suburban homes 
of new construction, ensuring that new homeowners would most likely live in newly built 
and exclusively white suburbs.15 Even as the share of mortgages insured by the FHA 
declined, as they did into the 1960s and 1970s, the revolution FHA insurance had 
fostered continued to shape the politics of homeownership and opportunity throughout 
the postwar era. By establishing the long-term, low-interest, amortized mortgage as the 
standard instrument for both FHA-insured loans and the conventional (not federally 
insured) loans which had to compete with them, the FHA program’s influence extended 
far beyond the mortgages it actually insured. Indeed the entirety of the nation’s mortgage 
                                                 




markets (both federally-insured and conventional) had been revolutionized by federal 
policies.   
 In an additional effort to stimulate housing and related industries, the 1934 
Housing Act provided for a secondary market for mortgages, envisioning private 
investors who would purchase mortgages from lenders, who could then turn the proceeds 
back into more loans. As a private secondary market failed to materialize, Congress 
moved in 1938 to establish the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA or Fannie 
Mae). FNMA purchased FHA and, later, VA-insured loans, assuring lenders of the 
liquidity of such loans, and thus encouraging more lending. Even if FNMA did not 
purchase a particular loan, the fact that they likely would if needed made issuing the loan 
less risky for the lender. Though exceedingly modest compared to what FNMA and other 
secondary market activity would become by the close of the twentieth century, the 
agency played an important role in facilitating the standardization of mortgage 
instruments and in supplementing the amount of capital available for mortgage finance.16 
The FNMA proved to be a particularly important part of the institutional legacy of the 
New Deal system as policymakers turned to it and similar institutions (the Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation and the Government National Mortgage Association) to take 
the lead in making the secondary markets the primary source of capital for housing in the 
1980s. 
  Further subsidizing borrowers, the federal income tax, since its inception in 1913, 
had allowed taxpayers to deduct interest on all forms of consumer debt from their taxable 
income. Though not originally intended as a housing policy, this exemption proved to be 
                                                 




a major federal support for homeownership, especially after WWII, as the proportions of 
both homeowners and taxpayers increased.17 The benefit to borrowers was considerable. 
In 1962, for example, the mortgage interest deduction saved homeowners $2.9 billion.18 
This subsidy, as old as the income tax itself, gave special status to homeownership 
throughout the twentieth century. Rarely was the deduction questioned in discussions of 
housing policy, despite deregulation of many other aspects of housing finance.19 
  While the Federal Home Loan Banks and the Federal National Mortgage 
Association supplied traditional lenders with additional capital, FHA insurance protected 
lenders against default risk, allowing lenders to make more credit available to more 
borrowers, and the mortgage interest deduction made borrowing more affordable, 
regulations governing depository institutions further increased the amount and 
affordability of credit for residential mortgages. Created through the Banking Act of 
1933, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) guaranteed the safety of 
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deposits placed in commercial banks. A year later, the National Housing Act created a 
comparable program for savings and loans through the Federal Savings and Loan 
Insurance Corporation (FSLIC). As with FHA mortgage insurance, the federal 
government took on risk, making savers more willing to deposit their money and thus 
enabling depository institutions to attract more capital than they could have in the 
absence of the guarantee.  
A less well known provision of the Banking Act established interest rate ceilings, 
later known as Regulation Q, a limit on the amount of interest that banks could pay to 
depositors. Like the interest deduction, policymakers did not initially envision the interest 
rate ceilings as a housing policy. Rather, policymakers intended the ceilings to limit 
competition between institutions, preventing the bidding up of interest rates that would, 
in turn, lead banks into risky investments to cover their increasing cost of funds. In 
practice, the result of the ceilings was a protected source of low-cost funds for banks and 
thrifts, and the benefit for residential mortgages quickly became apparent. With ceilings 
limiting and increasing the predictability of their cost of funds, banks and thrifts were 
able to loan credit to borrowers at profitable, but still relatively low, and fixed rates. 
While the reality was much more complex, this became understood by lenders and 
policymakers as the “3-6-3 rule: pay 3 per cent on deposits, lend money at 6 per cent and 
be on the golf course by 3 o’clock.”20   
Until 1966, the interest rate ceilings did not apply to savings and loan 
associations, but only to commercial banks. The exemption gave S&Ls a competitive 
edge, as they could offer a slightly higher rate than that offered by banks to attract savers’ 
                                                 





dollars. Limitations on the products that S&Ls could offer offset this advantage 
somewhat. For example, a depositor could have a savings account at an S&L, but not a 
checking account. Despite these restrictions, this government intervention, an artificial 
ceiling on the interest rates offered by banks, allowed savings and loans to grow 
dramatically. The policy had the effect of channeling household savings into the 
depository institutions that were statutorily obligated to devote the overwhelming 
majority (80%) of their capital into residential mortgages. Interest rate ceilings, therefore, 
functioned to allocate credit towards housing. In just the decade and a half following 
World War II, the share of household savings deposited in the nation’s savings and loans 
increased from 8.7% to 28.7% (from $9.8 billion to $62.2 billion), virtually all of it 
backed by federal deposit insurance.21 These billions of dollars, supplemented by FHLB 
advances and FNMA purchases financed the greater part of the dramatic postwar 
expansion of homeownership.   
 The HOLC and FHA have received greater attention from historians than have 
interest rate ceilings. Yet, the interest rate ceilings were important for a number of 
reasons. First, they helped depository institutions attract low-cost capital, which they 
could then lend at low, but profitable rates. Accounts emphasizing the innovations of the 
HOLC and FHA tend to take the lenders for granted, but the rate ceilings, along with 
deposit insurance, helped lenders to thrive. As the dramatic increase in deposits raised by 
the S&Ls in the postwar decades indicates, the interest rate ceilings played a critical role 
in establishing the S&L industry as the nation’s primary housing lenders. Though FHLB 
advances augmented this capital base, allowing lenders to extend more credit than they 
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could if just relying on their own deposit-capital, that deposit-capital was no less 
important a piece of the creation of mortgage credit. Second, while FHLB advances and 
secondary market purchases allowed lenders to extend credit beyond the capacity of their 
own pooled deposits, S&L officials routinely cited interest rate ceilings as the reason that 
they could lend at low rates. These officials understood their profitability and ability to 
lend at low rates as a function of the spread between their cost of funds (which were kept 
in check by interest rate ceilings) and the rate on the mortgages they issued. Even if this 
was not strictly true, S&L officials’ widespread assumption that it was, made interest rate 
ceilings central to lending decisions, including mortgage rates. Third, as subsequent 
chapters will demonstrate, the restructuring of housing finance in the 1970s and 1980s 
began with a populist deregulatory agenda calling for the end of interest rate ceilings. 
This narrow push for deregulation was subsequently leveraged into a much broader 
restructuring of housing finance (and financial services more generally).   
  These essential components of the New Deal system of housing finance, a system 
of regional Federal Home Loan Banks to provide capital to lenders, the Federal National 
Mortgage Association to assure the liquidity of FHA and VA-insured loans, the long-
term, low- and fixed- rate, amortized mortgage instrument, deposit insurance, interest rate 
ceilings, specialized housing lenders (the savings and loans), and the mortgage interest 
deduction remained in place into the 1970s, bestowing an institutional and regulatory 
inheritance to federal policymakers in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. The New Deal 
system established an array of entrenched and powerful interest groups, as the public-
private partnerships forged during the New Deal flourished. The bank and thrift lobbies, 
including the American Bankers Association, the U.S. League of Savings and Loan 
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Associations, the National Savings and Loan League, the National Association of Home 
Builders, and the National Association of Real Estate Brokers, members of which had 
played an integral role in drafting the legislation that created the New Deal system, 
continued to weigh in on any policy initiatives concerning housing finance, each seeking 
to protect the regulations that benefited their constituents.22 In the postwar decades, the 
thrift industry became the dominant residential mortgage lender, affording a special claim 
to stewardship over the politically popular “American dream” of homeownership. The 
fixed-rate mortgage reached a similar, almost sacrosanct status, as an essential piece of 
making the dream achievable. Even the New Deal-era policies that would engender the 
greatest criticism in the 1970s, namely interest rate ceilings, exhibited considerable 
inertia; none would be easily overturned.23 
 
A Nation of Homeowners, and the Politics of Saving 
 
 
As long as interest rates remained relatively stable, as they did until 1966, the 
New Deal system functioned smoothly. New Deal-era housing policies, in fact, proved 
remarkably successful, both in expanding homeownership for white households, and in 
promoting racial segregation. In the wake of Depression-era foreclosures, the nation’s 
homeownership rate had dropped to 44% in 1940, and as late as 1945, housing starts 
numbered only 325,000. But by the late 1970s, 65% of households owned their homes, or 
at least held a mortgage, and housing starts between 1946 and 1980 averaged over 1.5 
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million per year.24 The impact of the success of the New Deal system on residential 
patterns, the vitality of construction, home finance, and related industries, and on wealth 
and opportunity cannot be overstated. Surprisingly, this substantial change in the material 
status of millions of American households, the achievement of homeownership, is 
overlooked in most accounts of the changes in housing finance in the later third of the 
twentieth century.25 The shift to majority homeownership, I argue, fundamentally altered 
the political context, the alignment of interests, surrounding housing finance policy. This 
proved to be especially true of interest rate ceilings. In the immediate postwar decades, 
potential homeowners, then in the majority, welcomed a “6%” mortgage rate (of the 3-6-
3 rule), which brought homeownership within reach. For most of the postwar period, 
borrowers largely remained unaware of the ceilings and the relationship between the 
“3%” they received on their savings deposits and a “6%” mortgage rate, and most 
depositors were perfectly satisfied with the 3% return. But by the late 1970s and early 
1980s, as inflation rose, and the majority of households already owned their home (or at 
least had already locked in that 6% mortgage), homeowners became much more 
concerned with the rates they could earn on their savings than with continuing a system 
that promoted low-interest mortgages. Once general interest rates rose above the interest 
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rate ceilings on deposits, savers began to become aware of the ceilings (often with the aid 
of a newspaper columnist), and those savers, by then a majority of them homeowners, 
increasingly found the ceilings to be an impediment to their prosperity. A system that was 
once understood (by policymakers, if not savers and borrowers) to allow borrowers 
access to low-interest loans was recast as a system in which savers unfairly subsidized 
borrowers.  
The shift to majority homeownership was accompanied by a parallel development 
in which increasing numbers of Americans, most of them middle-class homeowners, 
began to invest their savings outside of the traditional depository institutions that 
dominated mortgage lending, and in all likelihood had provided their own mortgages. 
Historian Edwin Perkins, writing on the widely successful efforts of Merrill Lynch to 
broaden participation in the stock market, observes that “beginning in the 1950s millions 
of middle-class households became regular investors in common stocks….”26 Perkins 
writes that Merrill Lynch’s revolution in middle-class investment pulled in households 
that had previously kept their savings in “bank savings accounts, U.S. savings bonds, and 
whole-life insurance policies.”27 Journalist Joe Nocera calls this “astonishing 
transformation of the financial habits of the middle class,” a “money revolution.”28 A 
1950 Merrill Lynch survey revealed that one-quarter of the firm’s accounts were held by 
investors with incomes under $5,000, and that twice as many customers under the age of 
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36 had opened accounts than those over 65.29 This shift of savings out of depository 
institutions, called disintermediation, reduced the capacity of the New Deal system to 
channel household savings into the mortgage market, making the supplemental 
stimulants, FHLB advances and FNMA purchases all the more important.30 Yet the scale 
of disintermediation in the 1950s and early 1960s paled in comparison to the intermittent 
bouts following a credit crunch in 1966, and the lengthy period of rising inflation in the 
1970s. The latter was severely exacerbated by the ready alternative investment instrument 
provided through the advent of the money market mutual fund, which regulators 
ultimately decided not to curtail, despite the threat they posed to housing finance. 
It was these middle-class homeowning saver/investors’ diversion of savings 
dollars from depository institutions, either by removing savings to seek higher returns 
elsewhere or, later, by demanding that interest rate ceilings be raised or removed, that 
ultimately made the New Deal system both politically and economically unsustainable. 
By all accounts, by the late 1970s, the New Deal system struggled to supply a steady flow 
of abundant and affordable credit for housing. Explanations of this development typically 
focus on the failure of the New Deal system to function in periods of rising interest rates. 
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FSLIC in 1950, and a new $1 billion revolving fund for FNMA in 1958. See Freund, 193. While these 
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policymakers did not appear to consider the increasing participation of middle-class savers in common 
stocks as a source of tightening credit conditions. See Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 




Indeed, inflation caused interest rates to rise above the interest rate ceilings that limited 
the returns paid to depositors on their savings, leading savers to seek higher returns 
outside of depository institutions. And innovation, the introduction of new investment 
instruments offering rates above the ceilings, especially the money market mutual fund, 
provided attractive outlets to those very savers. As savers diverted their deposits from 
banks and S&Ls to invest in money market mutual funds, the traditional depository 
institutions could not sustain profitable lending. But explanations of the failure of the 
New Deal system of housing finance in the 1970s tend to overlook the role of the New 
Deal system itself in contributing to the dynamics that led to its dysfunction. It was the 
success of the New Deal system in contributing to the creation of a majority class of 
homeowner investors who, by the 1970s, no longer needed or wanted a regulatory system 
designed to provide low-interest mortgages, at least not at the cost of limited returns on 
savings (even homeowners might want to refinance at low-rates under some 
circumstances).31 In sum, inflation and innovation were integral to the changing politics 
of housing finance, but only in the context of a growing number of homeowner-investors 
whose economic and political interests worked against the preservation of the New Deal 
system.  
 
Racial Segregation  
 
 
As New Deal policy revolutionized housing finance, creating a nation of 
homeowners, it built the imperative of racially homogenous neighborhoods into the DNA 
of the new market. Most important in this process was the FHA. Adopting the same 
                                                 




racially exclusive appraisal principles employed by the HOLC, the FHA endorsed racial 
restrictive covenants, contractual agreements prohibiting the sale of a property to 
designated races, and the underlying principle that neighborhood stability and property 
values required racial homogeneity. FHA appraisal forms required designation of 
neighborhoods’ racial composition and even an assessment of the possibility of 
“infiltration” of a neighborhood by racial minorities. Any presence of a racial minority, 
or the possibility thereof, could result in a neighborhood receiving a C or D rating and 
being excluded by the insurance program. These principles were codified in the early 
editions of the FHA’s Underwriting Manual, standardizing and popularizing them for 
public and private sector alike.32 Consequently, historian David Freund writes, “the 
government began to actively promote, indeed to help pay for, the systematic segregation 
of residential neighborhoods and to deny certain federally subsidized housing 
opportunities to minorities.”33 From 1950 to 1970, as FHA and VA policies facilitated a 
massive shift of white residents into growing suburbs, black residents moved in 
increasing numbers to urban centers, reaching a third of the population in cities such as 
Chicago, Detroit, and Cleveland, and more than half in Gary, Newark, and Washington, 
DC.34  
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The homeownership rate among African Americans also increased in the postwar 
decades, up 15% from 1940 to 1960, when the rate reached 39%.35 These gains occurred 
despite exclusion of African Americans from directly benefiting from federal programs, 
including FHA/VA insurance. Changes in mortgage instruments as well as the movement 
of whites to suburbs opened up some measure of opportunity for African Americans to 
achieve homeownership, albeit on decidedly unequal terms. Despite such dramatic 
upheaval in residential patterns, including rising black homeownership, sociologists 
Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton note the persistence of segregation and increasing 
“spatial isolation” (likelihood of living in a majority black neighborhood) of black 
residents in postwar America.36 In sum, the revolution in residential patterns fostered by 
the New Deal system ensured continuing racial segregation and created new racial 
inequality.  
 The import of this legacy of racial segregation and inequality for federal housing 
finance policies from the late 1960s to the mid 1980s are twofold. First, a counter 
mobilization emerged to redress the inequalities of the New Deal system and open that 
system up to all borrowers. Critics had protested the discriminatory aspects of federal 
policies from their inception and by the late 1960s and 1970s these protests coalesced 
into fair housing and community reinvestment movements influential enough to achieve 
federal legislative victories. The 1968 Fair Housing Act, 1974 Equal Credit Opportunity 
Act, 1975 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, and 1977 Community Reinvestment Act all 
represented significant, if ultimately inadequate, challenges to the machinery of 
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inequality at the center of the New Deal system. Yet despite these legislative 
interventions, and their promise to open up equal access to housing finance, segregation 
and racial inequality have proven stubbornly persistent. Racial discrimination in housing 
has changed form since the postwar decades, generally shifting to inequitable terms and 
costs rather than blocked access, but these new forms of discrimination are rooted in the 
New Deal system.37 Concern over racial equality and nondiscrimination at times came to 
the fore of debate over housing finance. In addition to the policies listed above, Congress, 
in 1975 emphatically rejected Federal Home Loan Bank Board regulators’ proposal to 
authorize adjustable-rate mortgages, largely due to objections raised by civil rights 
activists. And for some policymakers, enduring racial inequality in housing remained a 
nagging problem in search of a policy solution. Yet, most discussion of housing finance 
policy after 1977 oddly separated issues of discrimination and inequality from those 
concerning the institutional structure. 
The second critical piece of the legacy of racial segregation is that the inequalities 
wrought by the New Deal system of housing finance were, to some degree, self-
perpetuating.38 The exclusion of generations of African American families from the 
benefits of federal largesse disadvantaged subsequent generations compared to white 
counterparts who inherited the wealth created through homeownership. Sociologist John 
Henretta finds that intergenerational transfers of material wealth and socialization are 
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both important factors in the attainment of homeownership for younger generations.39 
The decline in homeownership rates for young minority families in the 1980s bears this 
out. While rising housing costs and stagnating incomes created generational gaps for all 
Americans in the 1980s, Dowell Myers and Jennifer Wolch find, “Hispanic and black 
homeownership rates became further differentiated from those of whites.”40 The 
“mounting problems of affordability” in the 1980s also hit racial minorities, “just over 12 
percent of white owners faced excessive payment burdens in 1980 and in 1990, whereas 
23 percent of blacks, 17 percent of Asians, and 17 percent of Hispanics faced payment 
burdens.”41 The legacy of inequality was also directly linked to the legacy of segregation. 
Due to the widespread belief in the positive correlation of racially homogenous 
neighborhoods and housing prices, segregation actually created wealth for white 
homeowners. That wealth then contributed to the intergenerational transfers that 
perpetuated inequality.    
 
Erasure of Federal Role in Housing Finance 
 
 
While the New Deal system of housing finance both fueled the expansion of 
homeownership and promoted racial residential segregation, the prevailing understanding 
of the federal government’s role in postwar metropolitan development held that it had 
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done neither.42 Suburban whites came to understand their economic success 
(homeownership in particular) as the result of hard work and astute market participation 
and not of federal intervention, while they increasingly identified supposedly “urban” 
problems of poverty, blight, and physical deterioration and their costs, taxes to support 
public services, welfare, and public housing, with black city residents. This narrative 
dovetailed with the contention of policymakers, realtors, and land-use experts that 
healthy property values depended on racial residential segregation. Tempered by the 
invalidation of scientific racism, and maintaining that government had not interfered, this 
account of post-war suburban expansion “naturalized” the notion of market-driven 
inequality and segregation by race and class. This understanding absolved both the 
government and individuals from responsibility for segregation and inequality, placing 
the onus on individuals to improve their socioeconomic status through judicious market 
participation and hard work.  
That the prevailing understanding of postwar metropolitan development largely 
erased the role of the federal government was hardly accidental. Freund writes that “most 
public officials and business leaders insisted, and apparently believed, that Depression-
era housing programs did not interfere with or alter the existing market for residence. 
They insisted that the stunning growth of suburbs and homeownership rates and the 
corollary segregation of neighborhoods and capital owed little if anything to state 
interference.”43 Both policymakers and private interests, including the National 
Association of Real Estate Brokers, urban planning experts, and developers, 
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characterized federal intervention into housing markets as a jump-start to a latent market 
rather than as a subsidy or an intrusion into the market. This dubious interpretation 
enabled private interests, policymakers, and homeowners to obscure the government’s 
involvement in suburban growth, and racial and class residential segregation.  
The long-term implications of this free market, non-interventionist interpretation 
of metropolitan development were many, deeply shaping postwar politics, especially, as 
Freund, Matthew Lassiter, and others have shown, in promoting racial inequality and 
obstructing efforts to ameliorate that inequality. The erasure of the federal role in creating 
wealth through homeownership exclusively for white households has very specific import 
for debates over fair housing and community reinvestment policies in the 1960s. As 
Chapter Two will explore in greater detail, the FDIC, as a regulator of member banks, 
delayed the adoption of fair housing regulations for a decade, claiming that the agency 
had nothing to do with housing finance. Only in the context of the decades-long 
mischaracterization of federal intervention could the FDIC deny a role in housing 
finance. After all, federal deposit insurance enabled depository institutions to raise capital 
for, among other things, residential mortgage lending. Similarly, the prevailing 
understanding of New Deal housing policies as unleashing market forces rather than 
creating credit and directing it to suburban mortgages enabled community reinvestment 
opponents to disparage reinvestment proposals by the label they meant pejoratively, 
“credit allocation.” Community reinvestment proponents’ efforts to point out (rightly) 
that federal policy had allocated credit (to suburban whites) since the 1930s failed to 
resonate widely among lawmakers. Instead community reinvestment proponents had to 
moderate their proposals to claim that they would not result in credit allocation. Finally, 
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homeowners’ beliefs that they did not benefit from federal intervention, particularly from 
interest rate ceilings, facilitated their opposition to the ceilings as savers. While thrift 
officials routinely credited rate ceilings for fostering homeownership, most borrowers 
remained unaware of the ceilings and the role they played in keeping their interest rates 
low. For most bank and thrift customers interest rate ceilings became visible only when 
inflation rose far above the ceilings, and even then, typically only when a newspaper 
columnist pointed out the savings “lost” due to the ceilings. The erasure of the federal 
role in housing finance during the postwar decades, then, figured both in the efforts to 





 The implications of these four legacies of the New Deal system, the institutional 
and regulatory structure, majority homeownership, racial segregation and inequality, and 
the erasure of the federal role in housing finance, underscore the main theoretical premise 
of this study: that the politics of housing finance must be viewed in time in order to 
understand how and why housing finance was fundamentally restructured in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. The New Deal system facilitated significant changes in wealth 
and residence which then altered the political and economic contexts in which the system 
operated. The emergence of middle-class homeowning saver/investors, in particular, 
drove the politics of financial deregulation via that group’s abandonment and opposition 
to interest rate ceilings, despite the role of the ceilings in helping many of them to 
become homeowners themselves.  
 
 56
As subsequent chapters will show, the increasing diversion of savings from 
traditional depository institutions strained the New Deal system. Opposition to interest 
rate ceilings then constrained policy options to maintain and/or reform the system in the 
1970s. After policymakers eventually moved to deregulate the interest rate ceilings, on 
behalf of middle-class investors and “small savers,” representatives of financial 
institutions and free market economists leveraged concessions on interest rate ceilings to 
achieve broader deregulation. This broader deregulation, in turn, consequently 
undermined the fair housing and community reinvestment movements designed to 
ameliorate the New Deal system’s legacy of racial inequality and segregation. 
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Chapter 2  
 




The New Deal system of housing finance, forged through public-private 
collaboration of federal policymakers and industry insiders, revolutionized the 
institutions, financial instruments, and markets that created and allocated residential 
mortgage credit in the United States. In the decades immediately following World War II, 
the newly restructured credit markets generated massive sums of wealth for financial 
institutions and households, not to mention the construction, real estate, and related 
industries. The legacies of this first revolution in housing finance–an entrenched 
institutional and regulatory structure, a (white) homeowning majority,1 racial 
discrimination and segregation, and an erasure of the federal role in housing finance– 
engendered and shaped a second, a series of laws and regulations aimed at opening up 
equal access to the opportunity, credit, and wealth created by the New Deal system for 
women and racial minorities.  
This second, civil rights revolution in housing finance policy responded to both 
the expansive and exclusionary aspects of the New Deal system. The inequities and 
exclusivity of the New Deal system elicited protest and calls for reform, coalescing into 
open housing and community reinvestment movements. These movements wished to 
deploy the expansive qualities of federal policies, the capacity to make homeownership 
more attainable, to the benefit of previously excluded women and racial minorities. 
Accordingly, and sensibly, the open housing and community reinvestment movements 
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sought reform legislation and regulation targeting the institutions at the center of the New 
Deal system, the savings and loans and commercial banks that, at that time, made the vast 
majority of residential mortgage loans. In addition to efforts to end discrimination by 
sellers and real estate brokers, activists aimed to enlist the federal financial regulators to 
ensure that lenders provided access and equitable terms to borrowers irrespective of sex, 
race, or location of property.   
The signature achievements of the civil rights revolution in housing finance were 
the Fair Housing Act of 1968, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974, the Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 (HMDA), the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 
(CRA), and just as importantly, the federal regulations to enforce these acts. Effective 
January 1, 1970, the Fair Housing Act banned discrimination on the basis of race, color, 
religion, or national origin in the rental or sale of housing through a real estate broker, 
including lending and terms. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act added sex to the list of 
categories that could not be considered in lending. Finally, the HMDA required public 
record keeping and disclosure of lending data that the CRA sought to utilize in holding 
depository institutions accountable to meet the credit needs of the communities in which 
they were chartered. In sum, these policies aimed at deploying the institutions and 
financial institutions that had successfully made homeownership accessible to millions of 
white Americans for the benefit of previously excluded borrowers.  
The legacies of the New Deal system also shaped the opposition to the fair 
housing and community reinvestment movements. The white homeowning majority had 
become deeply invested in the imperatives of the New Deal system, especially racial 
exclusion, and opposed open housing reforms that would, many argued, impinge their 
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rights as property owners. Because of prevailing assessment practices, racial residential 
segregation had created wealth for white homeowners, that is, a property was worth more 
precisely because it was in a racially homogenous, white neighborhood. The effective 
erasure of the federal role in housing finance too created obstacles to fair housing and 
community reinvestment efforts. Insisting that they played no direct role in housing 
finance, for example, the federal financial regulators stalled for years the implementation 
of fair housing regulations, well after the passage of the Fair Housing Act in 1968. 
Likewise, policymakers’ characterization of housing finance in the postwar decades as 
the product of market forces allowed for a baseless claim that affirmative community 
reinvestment credit allocation policies constituted something wholly different (and 
antithetical to American values), with the consequence of severely circumscribing the 
design and impact of the Community Reinvestment Act.  
Yet despite this opposition, by the late 1970s, activists had succeeded in bringing 
the overwhelming majority of mortgage lending depository institutions under the 
jurisdiction of nondiscrimination and fair housing regulations. Over the decade, these 
regulations were expanded to include prohibitions of discrimination on the basis of sex, 
new disclosure and recordkeeping requirements, and mandates for community 
reinvestment. This civil rights revolution in housing finance policy promised to open up 
equal access for all to the opportunity, credit, and wealth that had been created by the 
New Deal system only for white, male-headed households. Yet racial inequality in 
homeownership, racial segregation, and discrimination (though to some extent shifting 
gradually from outright exclusion to inclusion on inequitable terms) persisted long after 
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the passage of the Fair Housing, Equal Credit Opportunity, and Community 
Reinvestment Acts.2  
The reasons for the failure of the civil rights revolution in housing finance to 
translate into equal opportunity for racial minorities are many. This chapter does not 
attempt to address them all, but rather to draw attention to a few that have been 
underdeveloped in the scholarly literature, especially those related to the timing and 
sequence of policy development. First, as introduced above, the legacies of the New Deal 
system influenced the design of fair housing and community reinvestment policies in 
ways that limited their impact. The erasure of the federal role in postwar housing finance 
helped key federal regulators such as the FDIC to delay implementation of fair housing 
regulations a full decade after the Fair Housing Act was passed. Similarly, by denying 
that past policies had allocated credit to white, male-headed households in exclusively 
white suburban neighborhoods, opponents were able to cast the affirmative action 
proposals preferred by community reinvestment activists as undesirable credit allocation 
schemes, resulting in watered-down versions of the Home Mortgage Disclosure and 
Community Reinvestment Acts.3 Second, the sequence of fair housing legislation 
preceding community reinvestment legislation largely removed explicit reference of race 
from the debates over community reinvestment. Policymakers treated redlining as a 
separate issue from the racial discrimination already outlawed by the Fair Housing Act, 
despite the disproportionate (though not exclusive) impact of redlining on racial 
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minorities. The exclusion of race from the debate over redlining made it all the more 
difficult for policymakers to see redlining as a problem analogous to racial discrimination 
in employment or college admissions and thus suitable for a similar affirmative action 
remedy.4 Third, the fair housing and community reinvestment movements achieved 
legislation while the New Deal system remained intact, and designed regulation and 
enforcement mechanisms accordingly. But even as these policies were being 
implemented, a combination of market pressures, deregulatory policies, and regulatory 
inaction began to dismantle the New Deal system itself. Most significantly, these changes 
fostered a shift in mortgage origination away from the traditional lenders (savings and 
loans and commercial banks), which were targeted by fair housing and community 
reinvestment regulations under the supervision of the federal financial regulators. 
Increasingly, mortgage origination would be taken over by comparatively unregulated 
mortgage companies and brokers. While the regulatory actions and inactions that 
precipitated this change will be addressed in greater detail in subsequent chapters, this 
chapter documents how activists and cooperative policymakers painstakingly built a 
legislative and regulatory apparatus through the federal financial regulators to enforce 
nondiscrimination in lending and foster community reinvestment by traditional housing 
lenders. This chapter also places the civil rights revolution in housing finance in time, in 
the context of both the legacies of the New Deal system, and the beginning of the 
dissolution of that system. Even as nondiscrimination and community reinvestment 
policies were made, policymakers were engaging in a debate over the proper role, both 
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present and future, of traditional depository institutions in the financial marketplace. Two 
competing visions emerged, one that conceptualized depository institutions, the deposits 
they collected, and the loans they made as locally-oriented and obligated, and one that 
considered depository institutions as intermediaries of free flowing capital in national or 
global markets obligated only to the laws of supply and demand. The activists of the fair 
housing and community reinvestment movements, by and large, held to the former 
vision, and invested in policies that conformed to that model. But after the passage of the 
CRA, it was the latter vision that increasingly shaped policy, with, as subsequent chapters 
will show, disastrous consequences for fair housing and community reinvestment 
policies.     
 
The Fair Housing Act of 1968 
 
 
Federal legislation banning discrimination in housing lagged behind analogous 
laws concerning discrimination in public accommodations and voting. The landmark 
1964 Civil Rights Act, for example, had glaringly omitted the vast majority of housing 
from its purview.5 While it prohibited discrimination in some “federally assisted” 
housing, the act exempted the federal assistance most responsible for the post-war 
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expansion of homeownership, the FHA and VA insurance programs.6 Even as advances 
were made in banning discrimination in the “public sphere,” intervening in what many 
considered the more private realm of housing remained politically untenable. Public 
opposition, based on a range of objections, was widespread. Some directly objected to the 
prospect of “compelled [racial] amalgamation,”7 or even the implication of a fair housing 
law that “all humans” were equal.8 More commonly, white homeowners expressed their 
opposition in terms of their own rights as property owners.9 Of the fair housing bill 
proposed in 1966, for example, Dr. H. O. Yorke of Florida wrote, “it is legally and 
morally wrong to deprive any citizen of his God given right and privilege to choose his 
associates, in private life…. This dictatorial mandate would invade the privacy of every 
individual who owns or operates any property.”10 President Johnson and liberals in 
Congress kept fair housing on the agenda,11 but given white homeowners’ deep 
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investment in residential segregation, most supporters remained pessimistic about the 
chances of actually passing legislation. Even when proponents managed to pass a bill in 
the House, in 1966, it fizzled in the Senate under filibuster.12 
Given these continuing struggles, it is remarkable that the Fair Housing Act 
passed when it did in 1968. It is worth briefly recounting just how narrowly the bill 
journeyed through Congress to underscore both the continuing opposition it faced and the 
compromises necessary to navigate the legislative process. At several potential veto-
points, the fair housing title of the 1968 Civil Rights Act appeared doomed to the same 
fate as the unsuccessful attempts at open housing legislation in 1964 and 1966. Strategic 
maneuvering, discipline, compromise, and external circumstances (namely the release of 
the Kerner Commission Report and the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr.) 
combined to move the bill to passage.  
The substance of the Fair Housing Act originated in the Senate as part of a 
strategy to disaggregate the Johnson administration’s civil rights initiatives in order to 
improve the chances of passage of the separate measures.13 This approach held the 
advantage of sending the housing provision, isolated from other civil rights measures, to 
the Committee on Housing and Urban Affairs, which Jean Dubofsky points out, 
“includ[ed] more liberals than the normal birthplace of civil rights legislation, the 
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Judiciary Committee.”14 The fair housing bill proposed prohibition of refusal to sell or 
rent, or to discriminate in terms of sale or rental based on race, color, religion, or national 
origin. It took aim at real estate brokers, sellers, and lenders, recognizing that 
discrimination occurred at every step of the process of finding and purchasing a home. 
The bill empowered the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to administer the 
law, but also called on “all executive departments and agencies” to act “in a manner 
affirmatively to further the purposes” of the fair housing act.15   
The 1967 and 1968 debates and hearings echoed the themes of prior debate over 
fair housing, rehashing the objections that a fair housing law would reward the actions of 
urban rioters, create unrealistic expectations, and bring unwanted federal intervention into 
local affairs.16 However, as Mara Sidney shows, key differences in the rhetoric of fair 
housing advocates in the 1968 debate both helped enable the bill’s passage and 
constrained its impact. In 1968, she argues, fair housing advocates employed a strategy 
that leveraged urban riots to emphasize the need for open housing but at the same time 
evoked imagery of middle-class blacks, contrasted to rioters, as the likely beneficiaries, 
in order to assuage moderates. This rhetoric, she contends, “promised and delivered a 
modest fair housing law to help middle class blacks.”17 Supporters framed the fair 
housing provisions with free market rhetoric, Sidney continues, to assert that while the 
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law would promote equal opportunity, economic realities would preclude any radical 
changes in the racial residential landscape.18  
Senator Walter Mondale (D-MN), the bill’s chief sponsor, pioneered this 
rhetorical balancing act. He underscored the modest achievement of equal opportunity, 
“for those still condemned by poverty to remain in the ghetto, there will be at least the 
knowledge that it is poverty–and not their fellow citizens or their Government–that forces 
them to live in the slums.”19 Yet he also assured moderates, “dispersal and racial balance 
is not the goal and motivation of this legislation. If this were our goal, we would have to 
concede ahead of time that it is doomed to failure. It will simply not achieve dispersal 
and racial balance. The laws of economics will determine that.”20  
Significantly, this rhetoric reinforced the prevailing naturalization of racial 
segregation, alleging that residential segregation resulted from the operations of a free, 
and, following enactment of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, purportedly fair, market. The 
ostensibly racially neutral laws of economics, however, were anything but. Decades of 
public and private practices had so firmly infused the “laws” of housing economics with 
race that the association could not easily be undone. Language like Mondale’s effectively 
sanctioned continuing discrimination that remained submerged under, or could be 
explained away by, supposedly race-neutral economic considerations. 
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Dovetailing with fair housing proponents’ ostensibly race-neutral economic 
language, opponents employed similar, purportedly neutral individual rights and 
constitutional arguments to advance their case. Invoking aphorisms such as “a man’s 
home is his castle,” Senate opponents thundered against the bill’s infringement on the 
constitutional property rights of people of all races. On some occasions, however, what 
may have been an implicit assertion of white homeowners’ rights became explicitly so. In 
a 1967 hearing, Senator Sam Ervin (D-NC) argued with a witness, “don’t you think that 
white people also have a right to live where they want to live and select the schools for 
their children also? … this bill undertakes to destroy it.”21 Ervin, employing what would 
become an increasingly popular rhetorical attack on civil rights legislation, turned the 
logic of the legislation completely on its head saying, “the truth about the bill is that it 
gives to men of one race the freedom to deny men of other races their freedom.”22 A 
group of New York real estate agents similarly objected to the fair housing amendment, 
claiming that it violated the freedom of the seller to choose a buyer, and that the 
provision threatened the income of agents and thus constituted “reverse discrimination.”23 
But fair housing proponents persistently countered the notion that the bill was 
unconstitutional. Attorney General Ramsey Clark argued that the bill’s constitutionality 
rested in both the commerce clause as “the housing business is substantially interstate in 
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character,” and the Fourteenth Amendment, as “discriminatory housing patterns are a 
direct outgrowth of past illegal Government action and that those patterns impede State 
and local government in their ability to provide equal protection of the law.”24 
In February 1968, floor managers linked the “Fair Housing Act of 1967” to a bill 
to protect civil rights workers, which had previously been passed by the House.25 
Southern Democratic Senators had already engaged in a filibuster of the latter bill, but, as 
Joseph Rauh, counsel to the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, put it, “‘as long as 
the Southerners want a filibuster, we might as well give them something to filibuster 
about. We can beat a filibuster for two things as easily as one, perhaps easier.’”26 
Proponents of the bill failed on two cloture votes (which would have ended the filibuster) 
as Senate liberals prevailed upon Illinois Senator Everett Dirksen, who had opposed the 
bill and its predecessors, to negotiate the details of a compromise measure.27  Dirksen 
agreed to support cloture, but not until he had offered a compromise amendment that 
slightly reduced the powers of enforcement of the HUD Secretary (though increasing 
those of the Attorney General), and, affirming (white) property rights, removed single-
family dwellings sold without a real estate agent from the bill’s coverage (Mondale 
estimated this additional exemption to represent approximately 7 million housing units).28 
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A third cloture vote fell short despite the Dirksen compromise amendment, but on the 
same day, March 1, 1968, the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disobedience, 
commonly known as the Kerner Commission, issued findings that proponents hoped 
would garner additional support for the bill. The Kerner Report included the 
recommendation “that the federal government enact a comprehensive and enforceable 
open housing law to cover the sale or rental of all housing, including single-family 
homes.”29 Boosted by the report, three days later, a fourth cloture vote ended debate on 
the civil rights bill with the Dirksen version of the fair housing title intact.30 On March 
11, the bill passed the Senate by count of 71 to 20.31  
While the Kerner Commission report precipitated the bill’s passage in the Senate, 
the bill stalled in the House until the April 4 assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. 
and subsequent urban rioting gave it new life. The morning of the assassination, the 
House Committee on Rules began hearings on the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Opponents 
of the bill such as Bob Sikes, a Florida Democrat, found Title VIII, the fair housing title, 
“particularly objectionable.”32 James Henry Quillen (R-TN) protested that favorable 
action on the bill would send a dangerous message to rioters.33 The riots that broke out in 
the wake of the King murder elicited yet more pointed vehemence from opponents such 
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as Quillen and Representative Joe Waggonner (D-LA).34 Supporters of the bill likewise 
looked to the recurrence of riots to press their case. No one put the matter more starkly 
than Representative Tip O’Neill: “I think the American people will hold the Congress as 
a whole responsible for this legislation. I would hate to think what would possibly happen 
in the major cities of this country if this Congress does not act this week.”35  
Emphasizing the role of the King assassination, Representative Colmer (D-MS–
chairman of the Committee on Rules) lamented, “on Thursday evening [April 4] when I 
went home, in my humble judgment as well as that of many others, we had the votes to 
send the bill to conference. But now the situation is changed.”36 As it was, the bill 
narrowly made back to the floor, rather than to a Conference Committee where key 
provisions could have been altered or jettisoned, by an 8 to 7 vote by the Committee on 
Rules.37 In that sense, the bill narrowly passed through the legislative process. Yet, when 
the bill came to a vote in each house, it passed by relatively large margins: 71 to 20 in the 
Senate and a tighter 250 to 172 in the House.38 In the Senate, opposition came primarily 
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from southern Democrats (only three Republicans voted against the bill39), while in the 
House, southern Democrats and Republicans joined Republicans from elsewhere in the 
country (especially California, Indiana, Illinois, Ohio and Pennsylvania) against the 
legislation.40  
The 250 yeas in the House and the 70 affirmative votes in the Senate indicated 
widespread, though far from universal, accord that discrimination in housing violated 
some fundamental American principle. Like these lawmakers, over the next decade 
regulators, bankers, and S&L officials would learn to signal their assent to the objective 
of fair housing–even if they went on to protest various means of achieving that goal. The 
lesson was twofold, however, as these actors also learned the potency of an accusation of 
discrimination, and soon “small savers,” as well as commercial bank, Savings and Loan, 
and mutual fund executives would make claims that they too were victims of unfair 
discrimination. 
President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1968 into law on April 11, 
1968.41 The Fair Housing Act (Title VIII) prohibited discrimination in the sale or rental 
of housing based on race in three stages covering first government-supported housing 
(including mortgages insured by the FHA and VA), then multi-unit housing, and finally, 
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effective January 1, 1970, single-family dwellings sold through a real estate broker.42 The 
act banned discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin, but it 
did not, as did the 1964 Civil Rights Act, prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex. The 
act targeted discrimination on the part of real estate agents or brokers and, in Section 805, 
discrimination by lenders.43  
Even as the bill was passed, some lawmakers expressed their doubt that the law 
would have significant consequences. New York Representative Joseph Resnick’s 
pessimism stemmed both from the experience of his home state, which had boasted an 
open housing law for seven years with what he considered disappointing results, and 
from that of the South, where the 1964 and 1965 Civil Rights Acts still fell short of their 
aims. “It was easy enough for us,” said Resnick, “when the enemy was a Southern sheriff 
…. It is much more difficult when the enemy is not so clear–when we pass laws, yet 
conditions remain unchanged.”44 Resnick maintained that money and enforcement would 
have to follow for the legislation to be meaningful; “too many of us think that the bill we 
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passed today is a great victory…. But I say that it will be worth nothing but a hoax unless 
there is vigorous enforcement–block by block, town by town, county by county.”45 
The 1968 Civil Rights Act placed the onus of enforcing the Fair Housing title 
almost entirely on victims of discrimination. Petitioners could file a complaint with HUD 
up to 180 days after the alleged incident, at which point HUD officials would decide 
whether or not to try to resolve the complaint by “informal methods of conference, 
conciliation, and persuasion.”46  If HUD decided not to attempt to resolve the complaint, 
or if no resolution had been reached after 30 days, the complainant could then take civil 
action. The act affirmed that in such cases, “burden of proof shall be on the 
complainant.”47 The act also authorized the U.S. Attorney General to initiate civil action 
on “reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in a 
pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights.”48  
In a weekend strategy session immediately following the Civil Rights Act’s 
passage, HUD officials met with civil rights advocates to discuss the enforcement of the 
Fair Housing Act. The group focused on the need to emphasize action and results over 
study and information. George Culberson of Congressional Research Services argued that 
HUD did not need to conduct any studies since “discrimination is [known to be] almost 
universal,” and suggested that HUD “get at [the] villain–[the] real estate boards–[the] real 
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estate industry–top to bottom.”49 Clarence Mitchell, of the NAACP, urged that attention 
be on “getting people into housing–focus on results.”50 To turn his staff to this task, HUD 
Secretary Robert C. Weaver directed in an agency memo, “The Fair Housing title 
requires us not only to administer these provisions, but to administer all our housing and 
urban development programs so as to affirmatively further the purposes of the law,” and 
added, “it is particularly important that everyone in the Department recognize our firm 
policy against segregation of the races.”51 Striking a tone more conciliatory towards fair 
housing opponents, Weaver explained, “the goal is not a random mixing of peoples or the 
blotting out of social and cultural identities, but rather to allow every man the same 
opportunity to fulfill his potential.”52 
Weaver’s plans for vigorous enforcement of the Fair Housing Act suffered a 
major blow when a Conference Committee set the appropriation for administering 
HUD’s Fair Housing programs at $2 million. HUD had originally sought $11 million, 
and while the Senate had agreed to $7 million, the House countered with $1 million.53 
The shortfall meant a drastic reduction in the number of staff that could be devoted to fair 
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housing duties. Boris Shishkin, Secretary of the AFL-CIO Housing Committee, wrote to 
Secretary Weaver expressing his regret that the appropriations for HUD would reduce the 
effectiveness of Fair Housing enforcement, but also indicated his preparedness to educate 
the AFL-CIO membership of the law’s provisions and how to lodge a complaint.54 Due to 
the lack of adequate funding, HUD would have to rely on organizations like the AFL-
CIO, Urban League, NAACP, and local organizations to facilitate individual complaints. 
While such assistance would be critical for educating victims of discrimination of the 
complaint process, it would only exacerbate the challenge to the severely underfunded 
and understaffed HUD office of resolving and processing alleged violations.  
In the first decade after the law took full effect in 1970, HUD logged over 26,000 
complaints. By 1973, the understaffed agency carried a backlog of over 1,800 cases. By 
1979, the year-to-year carryover had been reduced to 500 cases, a number that, while a 
dramatic improvement, fell far short of the results-oriented approach mapped out at the 
first weekend strategy session. The majority of complaints dealt with rental properties, 
but “refusal to sell” complaints averaged over 200 per year, and “discrimination in 
financing” over 100 per year. Revealingly, the number of complaints categorized under 
“discrimination in terms and conditions” rose throughout the decade, averaging over 800 
per year, indicating that while, in some cases, access may have been expanded to 
minorities, it frequently came at a higher price.  
On one level, these statistics show that the fair housing act was working. Victims 
of discrimination could, and did, appeal to a federal agency that would attempt to resolve 
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their complaint voluntarily, or, if that failed, would refer cases to the Department of 
Justice. But the complaints, which surely represented only a small percentage of actual 
cases of discrimination in housing, also document the continuation of discrimination, 
showing that the fair housing act had not translated into open housing for all. Nor, given 
the backlog of cases, is it apparent that those who availed themselves of the system had 
their situations resolved before they had to make alternative housing plans for 
themselves.   
Most scholarly assessments of the efficacy of the Fair Housing Title have 
understandably been focused on these HUD and Department of Justice enforcement 
mechanisms.55 To the extent that the act explicitly delegated enforcement powers, it 
granted responsibility to those two cabinet level departments. However, Title VIII also 
made it illegal for lenders to discriminate and stated that “all executive departments and 
agencies shall administer their programs and activities relating to housing and urban 
development in a manner affirmatively to further the purposes of this title and shall 
cooperate with the Secretary to further such purposes.”56 This led some activists to see 
potential for more effective enforcement to come through the federal regulators of those 
lenders, the Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board, and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Effective supervision of 
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lending practices could curb abuses before they occurred, rather than waiting for legal 
action after the fact.  
Bill Taylor, first as the Staff Director of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights and 
then from the Center for National Policy Review, and others doggedly pursued this 
avenue for nearly a decade after passage of the Fair Housing Act.57 In July 1968, senior 
HUD official Jay Janis wrote to Secretary Weaver conveying Taylor’s recommendation 
that HUD take “an affirmative role with regard to FDIC and Federal Reserve Board 
Banks [and FHLBB] in connection with fair housing.”58 Taylor had first suggested in 
Senate testimony on the Fair Housing Title that the agencies make federal chartering and 
insurance for banks and thrifts conditional on compliance with the act.59 HUD 
Undersecretary Robert C. Wood indicated the Department’s receptivity to Taylor’s 
proposal to seek Fair Housing Act enforcement help through the financial regulators, 
replying to Taylor, “the passage of Title VIII and the specific language of section 808(d) 
call for serious reconsideration of any decision that may have been made at the time of 
promulgation of Executive Order 11063 not to apply it to the activities of FDIC and 
FSLIC.”60 Wood suggested that “termination or refusal of assistance,” to financial 
institutions, would be “a more effective means of enforcement than the private court 
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action provided for under sections 810 and 812 of Title VIII.”61 For his part, Secretary 
Weaver had long held the view that federally-insured institutions should fall within the 
reach of fair housing regulations.62  
Getting the financial regulators to accept Taylor, Wood, and Weaver’s 
interpretation of their responsibilities would be an uphill battle, however, as officials in 
those agencies had long subscribed to the myth that they had no direct role in supposedly 
“private” housing markets, and thus no authority or obligation to intervene in them.63 
Indeed, early signs from the Fed were not promising, as Fed Chairman William Martin Jr. 
replied to Weaver, “the Federal Reserve Act, under which this System operates, did not 
include provision for this type of supervision nor have we had any experience with 
problems of this nature.”64 FDIC Chairman K.A. Randall responded similarly that “this 
Corporation’s direct statutory responsibilities would almost never involve operations 
under the fair housing title.”65 And FHLBB Chairman John Horne simply referred 
Weaver to the Bank Board’s 1961 Resolution condemning racial discrimination by 
financial institutions, and indicated that compliance would be sought through the regular 
FHLBB supervisory processes. Horne relayed the FHLBB’s intention to use persuasion 
as a first tool, but that “cease-and-desist procedures, restrictions on bank advances, or 
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loss of membership in the system” could be employed if persuasion failed.66 Horne’s 
response carried the most promise, but even it fell short of issuing Fair Housing 
regulations, thus leaving considerable discretion to individual examiners. 
Despite the regulators’ cool initial response in 1969, HUD officials recommended 
an affirmative action program for the four regulatory agencies including fair housing 
regulations, data collection by lenders including information on race, training of 
examiners for civil rights compliance, a process for referral of violations to HUD and the 
Justice Department, requirement of a fair lending poster, and “development and use of 
sanctions against discriminating lenders.”67 When the agencies failed to respond, a group 
of civil rights organizations, including the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the Urban 
League, and others, formally petitioned the agencies “for the issuance of a regulation 
implementing section 805 of title VIII.” The petitioners requested regulations requiring 
record keeping on all loan applications including data on the “race, color, or minority 
group identification” of the applicant, reasons for denying an application, and data on the 
property including “racial and economic characteristics” of the area, a log of oral 
inquiries, requirement that institutions advertise that they are equal housing lenders, and 
lobby notice of the same. In response, the four agencies issued a policy statement 
requiring notice of nondiscrimination compliance in advertising, and the posting of a fair 
lending poster in an institution’s lobby, but only took the other recommendations under 
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consideration.68 The Federal Reserve, at least, indicated that it had also adopted the use of 
a civil rights questionnaire in its examination process and a fair housing component to its 
examiner training program.69  
While the federal agencies stalled, evidence of discrimination by lenders 
continued to mount. A HUD survey of lenders in 1972 revealed almost 1,000 institutions 
that admitted to considering racial composition of neighborhoods, and 90 that admitted to 
considering race of applicant, in lending decisions.70 Yet by April 1972, only the FHLBB 
had issued further fair housing regulations, including adoption of statements prohibiting 
discrimination in lending and applications (though with no explicit enforcement 
mechanism). The Bank Board retracted proposed regulations that would have required 
collection of racial data.71 The FDIC also proposed rules that included new record 
keeping requirements, and held public hearings that covered, among other things, the 
possibility of a prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex and a potential 
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exemption for banks “in areas of low minority concentration,” but after hearings declined 
to issue any new fair housing regulations.72  
In 1973, the FHLBB revisited its regulations to clarify that “activities of lenders 
which may not be intended to be discriminatory might still be so in their effects.” The 
rules sought to delineate what considerations might “achieve a sound business purpose,” 
and those that did not. In the former category fell a borrower’s prior credit history (but 
not solely whether or not a person had previously owned a home), and in the latter, age, 
sex, or marital status of an applicant, ability to speak English, excluding overtime pay or 
other supplemental income, and–anticipating the CRA–“age, income level, or racial 
composition of neighborhood.”73 The statement of policy constituted the fullest 
articulation of the spirit of the Fair Housing Title to that date, but still failed to 
incorporate the racial record keeping that many activists believed was necessary to 
monitor and enforce the law. As MIT professor Lester Thurow testified before Congress 
in 1976, “if you collect the right data and then analyze it in the right way, detecting 
discrimination is a perfectly straightforward problem.”74  
Getting the financial agencies to take responsibility for such data collection and 
analysis remained anything but straightforward. Not until 1974, five years after the 
passage of the Fair Housing Act, did continued agitation by the petitioning civil rights 
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groups succeed in pressuring the four agencies to begin a six-month pilot program 
including racial data collection in eighteen metropolitan areas.75 The pilot program 
revealed evidence of discriminatory lending, yet the agencies still balked at making such 
data collection permanent.76   
The petitioning tactic had yielded exasperatingly little in terms of substantive, 
enforceable regulations. Indicating the absence of real change, as late as 1974, Richard 
Platt Jr., FHLBB Director of the Office of Housing and Urban Affairs, requested 
counsel’s opinion on appraisal forms “which seek or include information relating to the 
‘ethnic composition’ of a neighborhood or information relating to whether ethnic 
composition is changing.’”77 FHLBB General Counsel Charles Allen responded that such 
questions were indeed illegal under the Fair Housing Act, and that use of the forms 
should be discontinued.78 Yet such uncertainty within FHLBB itself suggested the limited 
effectiveness of the law in the absence of clear regulations. 
While the fight to secure regulations to enforce the Fair Housing Act continued, 
activists sought to expand legal authority to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex. 
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Because the Fair Housing Act had omitted sex discrimination from its purview, this was 
first a legislative battle, which culminated in passage of the 1974 Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act. Senators Bill Brock (R-TN) and William Proxmire (D-WI) offered the 
title as an amendment to the Depository Institutions Amendments of 1974, after a prior 
Senate effort at an Equal Credit Act (S. 2101) had languished for a year with no action in 
the House.79 During conference negotiations on the Depository Institutions bill, the 
committee adopted the Senate provisions for Equal Credit Opportunity. The Conference 
Report passed in the House, with some controversy over the Equal Credit Opportunity 
title. The bill, which included, among other things, extension of Regulation Q interest 
rate ceilings and an increase in federal deposit insurance, passed with 355 yeas, 1 nay, 6 
present, and 72 not voting.80 The Senate agreed to the Conference Report without a roll 
call vote.81  
As Title V of The Depository Institutions Amendments Act of 1974, the Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act prohibited lending discrimination on the basis of sex or marital 
status. Title V directed the Federal Reserve Board to design the regulations that would 
then be enforced by the Fed, FDIC, OCC, and FHLBB accordingly.82 The Fed issued 
Equal Credit Opportunity rules, known as Regulation B, in October 1975. Among other 
things, the regulations prohibited discounting of income based on sex or marital status or 
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considering the likelihood of an applicant bearing children.83 FHLBB regulations also 
explicitly prohibited income discounting for women (done traditionally due to possible 
loss of income during and after pregnancy).84 
The petitioning avenue had borne little fruit for open housing advocates, and 
while the Equal Credit Opportunity Act demonstrated the possibility of new legislation, 
regulation of the private sector remained essential to giving legislation teeth. The courts 
provided an additional option to activists seeking greater leverage over the regulatory 
agencies. In April, 1976, the National Urban League, the National Committee Against 
Discrimination in Housing, the NAACP, the National Association of Real Estate Brokers, 
the Metropolitan Washington Planning and Housing Association, the League of Women 
Voters, and other civil rights organizations filed suit against the Federal Reserve, FDIC, 
FHLBB, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. The suit claimed that those 
agencies had failed to enforce fair housing legislation in accordance with Section 805.85  
The lawsuit by itself may or may not have achieved the desired results, but Taylor 
and the Center for National Policy Review added pressure on the agencies by requesting 
oversight from the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Taylor 
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found a sympathetic figure in the committee’s Chairman, William Proxmire.86 In March 
1976, the committee convened oversight hearings on the enforcement of the Fair Housing 
Act by the federal regulatory agencies with jurisdiction over mortgage lenders. Citing 
section 808(c), the committee report argued that the agencies had an obligation to 
“affirmatively further the purposes of the Fair Housing Act,” and that “clearly, if 
mortgage lending institutions discriminate, fair housing objectives of the 1968 Act are 
frustrated.”87  
By 1976, the committee found, only the Federal Home Loan Bank Board had 
begun to take positive steps in fair housing enforcement. The FHLBB had recently filed 
an amicus brief in the Laufman v. Oakley case stating that “‘the Board’s … regulations 
are not only a valid exercise of its authority, but are a necessary and wholly proper 
response to the mandate imposed on the Board by Title VIII’” (emphasis added in 
Committee Report).88 But the committee was generally displeased with the position of 
the other three agencies and the past efforts, or lack thereof, of all four. The report 
declared that encouraging voluntary compliance was not sufficient, and chastised the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which it charged with doing “nothing more 
than check[ing] to see whether the ‘Equal Lender’ poster is displayed.”89 In hearings, the 
FDIC representative argued that the Corporation was “not in housing programs as such, 
actively engaged in housing programs and in promoting and developing housing, [and 
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therefore] some certain provisions of the act are not applicable to us.”90 The committee’s 
report expressed a general sense of dismay that despite the overwhelming prevalence of 
discrimination, the agencies had not made a single referral to the Justice Department, nor 
one formal finding of discrimination. The committee recommended that lenders record 
demographic statistics and designate a fair housing compliance officer, and that the 
agencies include fair housing education in the training of bank examiners, set aside one 
full day during the examination process to investigate an institution’s fair housing 
compliance, and to adopt regulations similar to those recently adopted by the FHLBB. 
Reflecting increasing agitation on the issue, the committee also called on examiners to 
analyze data to determine if an institution had engaged in redlining–the practice of 
refusing to lend in particular neighborhoods due to racial composition.91 
The committee rejected the concerns of witnesses who contended that affirmative 
steps constituted credit allocation that endangered the financial soundness of depository 
institutions. “Obviously,” the report read, “the 1968 Fair Lending Act does not require 
depository institutions to make unsound loans….To assert that equitable treatment of 
minorities might somehow entail greater risk is itself a form of bigotry.”92 In a running 
dissention during the hearings, Senator Jake Garn (R-UT) repeatedly implied that the 
types of regulations that Senator Proxmire favored, what Proxmire would have 
considered merely enforcing the Fair Housing Act, would constitute a relaxation of credit 
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granting standards that would endanger the “rights of depositors.”93 Senators Garn and 
Helms (R-NC) issued dissenting remarks in the committee report, but its general tone, 
expressing that of Senator Proxmire, conveyed a strong recommendation that the 
agencies make a priority of fair housing regulations.  
The twin pressures of the Senate Hearings and the lawsuit finally began to bear 
fruit in 1977. The FHLBB came to an agreement with the civil rights organizations in 
March, the FDIC in May, and the Comptroller of the Currency later the same year, while 
the suit continued against the Federal Reserve until dismissed by the U.S. District Court, 
District of Columbia. The FDIC agreed to appoint a civil rights specialist to oversee fair 
housing enforcement, and to collect data on race and sex, if voluntarily given by loan 
applicants, in order to monitor possible discrimination.94 The settlements promised 
progress in fair housing regulation, but results were mixed. Using the settlement 
agreement with the Comptroller as a case study, Goering and Wienk argue that the 
plaintiffs achieved only a “hollow victory,” due to deficiencies in the OCC’s Fair 
Housing Home Loan Data System.95 Their assessment cautions against an overstatement 
of the achievement, yet the civil rights groups considered the cooperation of the financial 
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regulators, at long last, to be an essential weapon in the fight for equal access to housing 
and housing finance.96 
 As important as the cooperation of the financial regulators was the cooperation of 
the lenders themselves. In October 1977, the FDIC’s long awaited proposal of new fair 
housing regulations elicited a deluge of comment letters from a wide variety of 
depository institutions. These letters offer a window into the thinking of bankers from 
across the country, and likely are similar to the reactions of S&L officials to the fair 
housing regulations issued by the FHLBB.97 Opponents of the regulations largely did not 
challenge the goal of anti-discrimination directly; many in fact made special effort to 
affirm their commitment to equal opportunity. Instead their protest came in one or more 
of the categories of: objection to additional paperwork and resulting increases in 
operating costs, insistence that sufficient fair housing regulation existed already, 
predictions that consumers would resent being asked to identify by race and national 
origin or even to consider such questions as being, or likely to lead to, discrimination, or 
that discrimination was simply not an issue for a particular bank’s area and population. 
Collectively, the letters represent a strong repudiation of fair housing regulations as an 
unwelcome and unnecessary burden on lenders. These respondents did not believe that a 
social goal of nondiscrimination, whether they agreed with the goal or not, justified the 
costs associated with record keeping and compliance, as R.A. Lux wrote, “no rational 
person can oppose the aims of the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity 
Act, but the implementation of those acts has been more expensive and time-consuming 
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than the results may justify.”98 Other responses point to telling assumptions made by 
some bankers about discrimination, race, sex, and what they considered to be responsible 
lending.  
Of the bankers who protested the new regulations while affirming the goals of 
nondiscrimination, some, like William J. Rhodes objected solely on the basis of the costs 
imposed by additional record keeping, while maintaining, “we recognize that sex, color, 
etc. has no relationship on whether a loan should be granted or denied.”99 For others, 
however, that relationship blurred. Willis M. Hansen, President of the State Bank of 
Lawler (Iowa), for example, wrote, “we agree with non-discrimination based on color, 
sex, etc.,” affirming the goals of fair housing regulation, but then continued “it is difficult 
for us to understand why we should be told to whom we should make loans.”100 Hansen’s 
seamless transition from fair housing to being told to whom he must make loans betrayed 
a latent association of lending to minorities and unsound or risky business practice. Here 
Hansen was hardly alone. J.L. Savage, a bank president in Georgia likewise implied that 
fair housing regulations amounted to a weakening of lending standards.101 C.W. Mitchell, 
a loan officer in Texas warned, “this proposed regulation moves one step closer to 
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required allocation of credit according to governmental edict,” implying that fair lending 
was forced lending.102  
A few bankers expressed sympathy to the regulators, indicating that they 
understood “the current political and legal pressures that have forced you to propose 
these regulations,”103 implicating the “do-gooders,”104 “a few radicals,”105 and identifying 
“Senator Proxmire et al.”106 as the main culprits. The majority of respondents objected to 
the additional record keeping requirements. Several suggested that forms already in use 
such as those used with FNMA and FHLMC would provide all of the information 
required.107 Others objected to the idea that the financial regulators should have a role in 
fair housing enforcement at all, arguing that it was up to “those persons who have been 
discriminated against [to] report such incidences.”108 As W. Timothy Finn, II of the 
Deposit Bank of Pleasureville, KY put it, “in the case of a bank robbery, you don’t 
require robbers to take pictures of themselves; you make the bank do it.”109    
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 Several small, rural banks petitioned for exemption from additional record 
keeping requirements on the basis that their lending area had few or no minorities. Kent 
Simpson, President of Farmers-Citizens Bank in Salem, Indiana wrote, “in our rural 
community we don’t even understand the connotation of discrimination in lending.”110 
One New Hampshire banker protested that “blacks in our market area come to 7/10th of 
1% of the population,”111 another in West Virginia, “the geography and minority make up 
of our area is such that data furnished by us … would be useless,”112 and an Iowa banker, 
“we have a 100% white population in our town and there are no slum areas.”113 With 
revealing language, D.F. Baertsch of North Dakota wrote, “if we had any minorities in 
our area we would be more than happy to fill out a special form so that you could check 
on us to see that we were not discriminating against Indians, Negroes, or any other 
minority race.”114 The responses of the rural bankers revealed their association of fair 
housing problems with large cities, and, exclusively, with racial minorities. In petitioning 
for exemptions on the basis of an absence of racial minorities, these rural bankers appear 
completely oblivious to the possibility that record keeping requirements might be 
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necessary to monitor discrimination on the basis of sex. In their minds, it seems, either 
“fair housing” and/or lending itself did not apply to women.    
The more compelling objections included the legitimate concern that gathering 
demographic information could offend or arouse the suspicion of applicants, and the 
assurance of many bankers that increased costs would be passed on to consumers. Bank 
President Doris M. Tarrant reported that in a pilot program using the proposed form, 
“customer reaction ran from irritation of completing another government form to 
irritation with the bank for inquiring into areas that it was their understanding were 
prohibited by equal lending laws.”115 J. Denman Morrison of Washington Mutual 
Savings Bank wrote, “quite understandably, it is difficult to convince people who have 
perhaps experienced discrimination in the past, that having written down their race and 
sex in your loan file, you are not going to use that information in making your final 
determination.”116 The new questions likely did arouse skepticism from some applicants, 
but only because they were so new. Had the FDIC adopted such regulations in the 
immediate wake of passage of the Fair Housing Act, such confusion could have been 
avoided. Most civil rights activists had long since determined that collection of racial 
data, though not without its downside, was essential to efforts to monitor and enforce fair 
housing law. 
Second in frequency only to the objection to added paperwork, many bankers 
charged that additional record keeping would ultimately increase the cost of borrowing. 
Merle J. Prins warned, “[it is] the consumer who is ultimately the victim of all these 
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regulations.”117 Letter after letter promised that costs would be passed on to borrowers.118 
An Indiana cashier argued, “in the end the consumer you are trying to protect will bear 
the costs of all this legislation in the form of higher rates and closing fees, as well as in a 
slower, more complex, more rigid mortgage process.”119 Disingenuous or not, such 
concern for “the consumer” actually elevated the interests of borrowers, in general, over 
those borrowers who might become victims of discrimination. Though framed in the 
most generous terms, it was yet another way to say that the possible social benefits did 
not justify the costs.  
A few of the opponents sought to turn the language of nondiscrimination to their 
advantage. In a particularly angry letter, C.V. Smith, President of Tennille Banking 
Company in Georgia fumed, “your people are not satisfied unless they are writing some 
regulations concerning discrimination. But, the fact of the matter is, they are creating 
wholesale discrimination against businesses by making it more and more difficult to 
show a black bottom line.”120 Others charged, “this is discrimination against bankers,”121 
and “I feel sometimes like we’re the people who are being discriminated against.”122 
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The letters indicate a link between fair housing policies and a rising chorus in 
favor of deregulation.123 For most bankers, the fair housing, equal credit, disclosure, and 
community reinvestment policies constituted yet another layer of red tape that imposed 
additional costs and burdens. Some objected specifically to the social objectives of these 
particular regulations, and even those who did not do so explicitly, did place the fair 
housing regulations into a category of unnecessary or unbeneficial regulations, as 
opposed to the beneficial ones, such as Regulation Q. In reacting to the fair housing 
regulations, the bankers adopted a rhetoric calling for deregulation generally, “NO 
MORE PAPERWORK, PLEASE…,”124 “we are regulated to death,”125 fair housing 
regulations are “a sledgehammer being used to kill a mosquito,”126 and “it would be nice 
if we had time to do some banking business, rather than just fill out forms.”127 But these 
bankers would also have been among the vast majority that greatly valued FDIC 
insurance, not to mention Regulation Q. The deregulatory impetus that grew in response 
to the fair housing and reinvestment regulations did not amount to universal support for 
any and all types of deregulation, but rather remained selective and self-interested.   
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Depending on one’s perspective, the Equal Credit Opportunity, Home Mortgage 
Disclosure, and Community Reinvestment Acts either added to the regulatory burden or 
to the toolbox to fight discrimination in housing. Gregory Squires locates the origins of a 
social movement for community reinvestment in “the civil rights movement of the 1950s, 
the antipoverty campaigns of the 1960s, and a range of populist struggles of the 
1970s.”128 He argues that the glacial response of the federal financial agencies to the Fair 
Housing Act led to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) in 1975 and the 
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) by animating activists into continuing agitation.129 
Senator Proxmire, a key figure in the efforts to lean on the financial regulators for fair 
housing enforcement, collaborated with Gale Cincotta of National People’s Action, an 
umbrella organization that coordinated grassroots community activism, to become the 
chief proponent of HMDA and CRA in Congress.130 Cincotta rose to the forefront of the 
reinvestment movement through her activism in Chicago, which then became a model for 
efforts in other cities. Beginning in 1969, Cincotta had led the Organization for a Better 
Austin (OBA) to fight the consequences of redlining in a Chicago neighborhood using 
tactics such as picketing, opening and immediately closing accounts, and depositing large 
amounts of pennies. The OBA joined with other community groups to form larger 
coalitions to span the city. The groups’ persistence brought lenders to the negotiating 
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table where they promised to renew efforts to lend to previously underserved 
neighborhoods.131 In 1974, one of these negotiations, between the Bank of Chicago and 
the Organization of the NorthEast, culminated in an unprecedented formal, written 
community reinvestment agreement. The agreement required the bank to prioritize 
lending in previously redlined neighborhoods and to provide semiannual reports of the 
geographic distribution of both loans and deposits. This settlement served as a test case 
for the types of disclosure that could be required of the nation’s banks and thrifts.132 That 
year, Cincotta and National People’s Action began meeting with Senator Proxmire and 
his staff to work toward federal legislation requiring disclosure of lending patterns, and 
later, community reinvestment.133 
Scholarly attention to the problem of redlining bolstered the activists’ case. 
Proxmire requested a Congressional Research Service study of lending in Washington, 
DC during 1973, which found that DC Savings and Loans made only 10.8% of their total 
lending within the District.134 In 1974, a literature review on redlining circulated within 
the FHLBB with the conclusion that “the bulk of evidence supports the hypothesis that 
overt discrimination on the basis of race and sex is still practiced widely, in spite of 
federal mandates to the contrary.”135 The paper contended that while redlining was no 
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longer formally practiced in most cases, that disinvestment by area continued, and that 
ostensibly neutral underwriting practices had a greater negative impact on women and 
minorities. “The evacuation of conventional capital from a neighborhood,” the report 
argued, “results in a fall of the area into ‘the underworld of real estate finance,’ 
characterized by the presence of mortgage brokers, shorter terms, lower ceilings, higher 
payments, second and third mortgages, low amortization, and such instruments as land 
installment contracts.”136  
The preponderance of evidence notwithstanding, the FHLBB took no proactive 
steps in response to the 1974 report. Not until almost a year later, in September 1975, did 
FHLBB Acting Chairman Garth Marston write that the issue of redlining “is building to 
still another crescendo. Our efforts must be focused on what is in the best interests of the 
public, including the borrower, the saver, and the general. This means that the savings 
and loans must be making proper efforts to make economically sound home loans 
available to a broad spectrum of the American people.”137 The banks and financial 
regulators had likely hoped that the issue would simply go away. In May 1975, Steven 
Doehler of the National Association of Realtors wrote to FHLB Board Member Grady 
Perry that the banking and thrift industries were joining forces against Proxmire’s 
disclosure bill (S. 1281) and indicated that the bill would not likely be passed, 
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“Proxmire’s Nader-like bills always have a tough time!”138 But ongoing pressure from 
community activists, coupled with Proxmire’s political clout, precipitated the 
introduction of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act. Proxmire’s hearings on the act 
occasioned debate not only over the issue of urban disinvestment, but also over the 
proper function of depository institutions as financial intermediaries. At the center of the 
debate over disclosure and community reinvestment rested competing visions of the role 
of depository institutions: one emphasizing an ethical obligation to the community of an 
institution’s charter, and another that emphasized the market obligation to direct capital 
to its most efficient (and profitable) use. Critically, the activists and cooperating 
policymakers behind HMDA and CRA held to the former, more traditional view, and 
designed the legislation accordingly. But increasingly, the latter viewpoint was winning 
out, facilitated by deregulatory policies that made deposit capital more mobile than ever, 
and thus more difficult to harness for purposes of local reinvestment. 
HMDA hearings featured witnesses representing community advocacy groups 
from Chicago, Milwaukee, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, and Providence. In his opening 
remarks, Proxmire cited the damning study of redlining in DC, while subsequent 
witnesses offered evidence of redlining in each of their cities every bit as stark as the data 
from DC. For example, Cincotta testified that National Security Bank in Chicago 
invested only $172,000 of its $33 million in savings in the neighborhoods that shared the 
zip code of the bank’s branches.139 In addition to such evidence, which highlighted the 
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virtual absence of lending in particular neighborhoods, Illinois Governor Dan Walker and 
Cincotta both stressed the subtler forms of redlining, including higher rates and/or down 
payments, and shorter mortgage terms.140 In other words, while discrimination and 
redlining could still mean exclusion from access to housing or financing, more and more, 
it meant access on unequal terms.  
The community activists all explicitly or implicitly expressed the conviction that 
depository institutions had an obligation to issue loans where they collected deposits. 
Cincotta pleaded “we are not asking for handouts. All we are asking for is a fair return on 
our savings into our communities.”141 Senator Sparkman (D-AL) agreed with this view of 
the role of depository institutions, “I have the old time feeling about a savings and loan 
association that it is a community affair and ought to serve the community from which it 
gets its savings.”142 Governor Walker argued that depository institutions, by virtue of 
their charter had a “limited form of monopoly” and thus, an obligation to serve their 
community.143 But others challenged this vision, indicating that Sparkman’s “old time 
feeling” was exactly that, one that no longer conformed to the imperatives of a modern 
economy.  
Countering the traditional view, Fed Chairman Arthur Burns wrote to Proxmire of 
the proposed HMDA, “one of the main functions of financial intermediaries is to provide 
greater mobility for the economy’s savings and investments…. To insist that capital 
should not normally flow out of a lender’s market is to risk inhibiting the flow of capital 
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that is essential to support vigorous economic growth in the nation as a whole.”144 
Senator Garn also challenged the premise that local deposits should be used for local 
credit, positing instead that intermediaries properly functioned to divert capital from areas 
of surplus to areas of deficiency.145 FHLBB Chairman Garth Marston likewise noted that 
there was no statutory duty for S&Ls to invest in particular neighborhoods, “rather this is 
left to be determined by the institutions themselves in the exercise of sound business 
judgment.”146 
Debating the HMDA in the House, Representative John Rousselot (R CA), too, 
questioned the notion that depository institutions should reinvest locally, arguing that 
such a practice would “undermine more than forty years of Federal effort to assist in the 
development of effective secondary mortgage markets for the express purpose of 
facilitating the transfer of money from areas where funds are plentiful to other areas 
where they are needed.”147 Proxmire anticipated such an objection in Home Mortgage 
Disclosure hearings, conceding, “admittedly, we need to recognize the importance of 
maintaining a flexible secondary mortgage market and a national pool of mortgage credit. 
But how can we tell a citizen of Boston, for example, whose neighborhood is redlined, 
that Massachusetts is considered a ‘capital surplus area’ and that his savings have gone to 
build condominiums in Arizona?”148 
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Theodore Snyder of the Alliance of Concerned Citizens in Milwaukee indicated 
that Proxmire’s redlined Boston resident was not merely a hypothetical example. He 
testified, “I have been told straight out that it’s much more attractive to resell mortgages 
to FNMA or GNMA that are out in Brookfield or in some other suburban area of 
Milwaukee than it is to sell a mortgage that is on 23d and Vine down on the West Side. 
So in a way the Government has sort of helped this along too with the extra money-
raising scheme of the secondary mortgage market.”149 Proxmire walked a fine line, 
wanting both the additional capital that could be raised for residential mortgages in a 
national market, but desiring greater accountability to particular localities. 
Echoing earlier debates on the Fair Housing Act, HMDA opponents claimed that 
any intervention in the free flow of capital embroiled the government in the decidedly un-
American activity of “credit allocation.” John Perkins, testifying for the American 
Bankers Association, grumbled “I have an increasing concern about the tendency to write 
into law ways and processes which will allocate credit. America was built on the free 
market system which has been highly productive and efficient in developing the highest 
standard of living in the world.”150 Garn warned that the bill was “the first step toward 
credit allocation,” though conceding that mere disclosure did not constitute credit 
allocation by itself.151 Following Garn’s “first step” logic, proposed anti-redlining 
regulations in California contributed to concern over where disclosure requirements 
might eventually lead. An internal FHLBB memo reviewing the California rules 
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concluded that their proposed “Boards of Inquiry” and “a ‘shared-risk pool of mortgage 
money… goes far beyond simple disclosure, with its notion that the public can decide 
what to do with its own money when it has enough information, and clearly involves a 
form of credit allocation which will prove uneconomic and counterproductive.”152 
The invocation of the specter of “credit allocation” by HMDA opponents rested 
on and enhanced the complementary argument that activists intended to use disclosure to 
force banks into unsound lending. Governor Walker, like other proponents, countered 
that “there really is no evidence that we are talking about a higher risk in these [redlined] 
neighborhoods.”153 Rather, as Proxmire argued, the reluctance of lenders to enter 
particular neighborhoods based on increased risk became “a self-fulfilling reality.”154 
Others insisted that valid economic considerations indeed constituted a higher risk in 
some neighborhoods.155 Senator Taft (R-OH) argued, “in most cases the credit 
‘discrimination’ probably results from a good-faith business judgment concerning the 
lending risks involved. Rather than blatant intentional discrimination as we usually use 
the term … the financial institution may feel that it can afford to be extremely 
conservative because it has plenty of business in the suburbs or wealthier 
neighborhoods.”156 As long as lenders could claim that sound business practice and 
objective assessments of risk dictated lending patterns, they could argue that geographic 
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and racial disparities resulted only incidentally to purely market-driven business 
imperatives: this as they affirmed their compliance with the Fair Housing Act as equal 
housing lenders. 
The disclosure title’s detractors mounted a serious challenge to the scope of its 
provisions. Garn, along with Senators Sparkman, Tower, Helms, Morgan, and Stone, 
offered an amendment that would have reduced the bill to a three-year, twenty 
metropolitan area pilot program, but the amendment was defeated 41 to 40.157 The Senate 
then passed the nationwide disclosure initiative by a count of 45 to 37.158 In the House, an 
amendment to delete the HMDA altogether failed, 152 to 191.159 A second amendment, 
which would have reduced the act to an experimental program encompassing no more 
than twenty metropolitan areas, came just shy at 165 to 167, with three representatives, 
Joe Skubitz (R-KS), Butler Derrick (D-SC), and Bill Cohen (R-ME), changing their votes 
from “no” to “aye.”160 The full bill, which also included a two-year extension of 
Regulation Q, passed 177 to 147.161 The Committee of Conference merged the 
Regulation Q extension, though reduced to 14 months, with the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Title, including a House amendment stating, “nothing in this title is intended 
to, nor shall it be construed to, encourage unsound lending practices or the allocation of 
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credit.”162 Both houses agreed to the Conference Report without roll call votes in mid-
December, and President Ford signed the bill into law on December 31, 1975. 
The enacted version of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act responded to the 
finding that “some depository institutions have sometimes contributed to the decline of 
certain geographic areas by their failure pursuant to their chartering responsibilities to 
provide adequate home financing to qualified applicants on reasonable terms and 
conditions.”163 It required depository institutions within standard metropolitan statistical 
areas to disclose lending data broken down by census tract or zip code (as determined by 
the Fed) and allowed public officials to consider an institution’s lending record to 
determine the placement of public sector investments. Senator Proxmire characterized the 
intent of the act, “citizens and public officials will be more successful in discouraging the 
practice of ‘red-lining’ or the refusal to lend mortgage money in older urban 
neighborhoods if they are armed with the facts.”164 Proxmire called disclosure the “least 
painful remedy” to the problem of urban disinvestment.165   
Attentive to the act’s express prohibition of “credit allocation,” the financial 
regulators interpreted the scope of the law narrowly. In November 1976, Franklin L. 
Wright, an attorney in the FHLBB’s Legislative Division wrote to Stephen Ege, 
Associate General Counsel that the legislative history of HDMA did not indicate that the 
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act required the regulatory agencies to compile HMDA data, but rather “the Act was 
intended to provide citizens with the information they need to determine whether 
depository institutions are fulfilling their obligations and to assist local public officials in 
their determination of the distribution of public sector investments.”166 “The intent of 
disclosure,” Wright explained, “was to allow the use of the power of market competition–
competition for the savers’ dollar and for the business of potential homeowners–to 
encourage lenders to do a better job in their local service area.”167 Proxmire himself had 
endorsed this market-mechanism approach saying, “‘I have proposed a simple disclosure 
law that would give local citizens the right to know where their neighborhood banks and 
savings and loan associations are making their mortgage loans, and I would expect an 
informed citizenry to do the rest.’”168 
Despite the shared origins of the fair housing and community reinvestment 
movements and continuity in key Congressional advocates like Proxmire, once at the 
level of federal policymaking, implementation diverged in important ways that were 
related to the sequence of their passage. By the time that debate over redlining of urban 
neighborhoods commenced in Congress, non-discrimination on the basis of race had 
achieved reflexive, if hollow, acquiescence, despite the persistence of discrimination in 
practice and the delay in issuance of fair housing regulations. In large part, this removed 
explicit consideration of race from the debate over urban disinvestment. Civil rights 
advocates such as William Taylor and Clarence Mitchell, and even Senator Proxmire, 
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noted the disproportionate effect of disinvestment on racial minorities,169 but consensus 
over non-discrimination facilitated opponents’ separation of the issue of urban 
disinvestment from race. Exemplifying this deliberate disconnection, FDIC Chairman 
Frank Wille wrote to Proxmire:  
to blame the degeneration of certain neighborhoods principally on the reluctance 
of financial institutions to invest in these neighborhoods is to ignore the realities 
of crime, poverty, delinquency, vandalism, and all the other social problems 
prevalent in today’s world. This is not meant in any way to condone 
discrimination based on race, color, religion, or national origin, but rather to 
emphasize that there are legitimate economic considerations which banks should 
be permitted to assess in the granting of real estate loans, particularly in declining 
neighborhoods.170 
  
Of course, Wille could argue, discrimination on the basis of race was wrong, but urban 
disinvestment was a separate issue, one based in “realities,” in “legitimate economic 
considerations.” But by relating the two issues, feeling the need to state that he was not 
condoning discrimination, he betrayed the deep association between race and ideas about 
neighborhood decline. On one hand, Wille’s separation of the issues acceded to a central 
contention of fair housing advocates, that race had no inherent relationship to 
creditworthiness. On the other hand, insisting that “real,” “economic considerations” had 
nothing to do with race robbed reinvestment proponents of a powerful argument, that the 
economic conditions of declining neighborhoods had everything to do with the 
consequences of past and continuing racial discrimination. This elision made nonsensical 
talk about credit allocation seem sensible. How else could legislators rail against 
impending credit allocation that would result from disclosure and reinvestment policies 
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except to continue to ignore the fact that the previous 40 years of federal policy had been 
exactly that: credit allocation–to white, male suburban homeowners?  
In his signing statement for the HDMA, President Ford tied together affirmation 
of nondiscrimination and opposition to new regulation and what he considered 
unacceptable credit allocation. Ford objected to the potentially costly and burdensome 
requirements of the title, though being sure to add, “I firmly believe, as do most people, 
that discrimination on racial or ethnic grounds is a practice which is abhorrent to our 
American way of life.”171 Ford also cautioned of a capital shortage and urged, “rather 
than support capital allocation, my Administration is committed to improve and 
strengthen the free market mechanisms used for raising and investing capital–particularly 
for housing.”172 Though capital allocation had worked against racial minorities in the 
postwar decades, Ford sought free capital markets that would foreclose the possibility of 
credit allocation that worked for racial minorities in neglected urban neighborhoods. 
 In this context, reinvestment proponents had to bend to the objections against 
credit allocation. There would be no affirmative mechanism to redress the decades of 
credit allocation away from both cities, and, not coincidentally, minority households. 
Instead, policies would include explicit prohibition of credit allocation, and muster only a 
mechanism to provide depositors with more information to weigh in making decisions 
about where to place their money. Community activists would make the most of this tool, 
using data from disclosure to expose institutions that, the groups claimed, did not fulfill 
                                                 
171 Gerald R. Ford, “Legislation Concerning Financial Institutions, the National Commission on Electronic 
Fund Transfers, and Home Mortgages,” January 1, 1976, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 






their obligation to meet local credit needs. As they did, they continued to advocate for yet 
greater leverage over the financial institutions. Again led by Cincotta in cooperation with 
Proxmire, these efforts focused on legislation that would become the Community 
Reinvestment Act. 
There would not have been a Community Reinvestment Act without the backing 
of Senator Proxmire. Activists might have found another sympathetic ear in Congress, 
but not one so favorably positioned as the Chairman of the Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. While Proxmire’s receptivity and position made 
him the optimal partner to National People’s Action and other community and consumer 
advocacy groups, his conception of an effective community reinvestment law fell 
somewhat short of the proactive program envisioned by Cincotta and other activists. 
Whether due to his assessment of what was politically feasible, or to his own reluctance 
to wield too heavy a government hand in the private sector, Proxmire steered the CRA 
away from the affirmative action model used in equal employment policy (and that 
favored by Cincotta) towards a more modest program in which regulators would merely 
encourage lenders to meet local credit needs. 
Proxmire’s reluctance to create an intrusive federal mechanism for community 
reinvestment grew out of his self-fashioned political identity as a taxpayer watchdog. To 
the extent that he had a national reputation, Americans knew Proxmire for his “Golden 
Fleece” award, which he periodically bestowed on government programs or policies that 
he found to be particularly wasteful. Though not an extremist, Proxmire leaned towards 
containing government spending whenever possible, whether he considered the cause 
wasteful or, as in this case, worthy. The community groups largely agreed with Proxmire 
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that community reinvestment should come from the private sector. For her part, Cincotta 
believed that conventional lenders considered a direct government financing presence in 
a neighborhood a sign of high credit risk and instability, thereby precipitating redlining 
by the private sector if it did not exist already. For somewhat different reasons, then, both 
Proxmire and Cincotta sought to harness the considerable capital resources of private 
lenders to revitalize America’s inner cities. 
The obstacles to a community reinvestment act became apparent as soon as 
Proxmire floated the proposal to the regulators at the end of 1976. Echoing criticism of 
HMDA, FHLBB economist Donald Kaplan questioned the very premise of the CRA, “at 
what point does preferential treatment of local market area loans become non-economic? 
Even aside from the fact that at some point, local market loans may not be the most 
profitable available, there is the issue of safety and soundness–that is the possibility that 
investment in unsound loans may be forced on lenders.”173 Another FHLBB staffer, 
Richard C. Pickering, wrote to Kaplan, the CRA “makes the unlikely (and 
undemonstrated) assumption that the primary market area of an institution is coterminous 
for deposits and loans.”174 As had become evident in debate over the HMDA, the 
community groups’ vision of locally oriented and obligated financial institutions diverged 
from that of many policymakers who viewed the institutions as primarily oriented 
towards a national or even global capital market. 
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Despite this icy initial reception, Proxmire forged ahead, introducing the CRA (as 
S. 406) on January 24, 1977. The bill required regulated depository institutions to 
demonstrate that they served the “convenience and needs,” of their communities, 
explicitly including a “continuing and affirmative obligation to help meet the credit needs 
of the local communities in which they are chartered.”175 The bill called on the four 
financial regulatory agencies to use their chartering, examining, supervising, and 
regulatory authority to encourage institutions to meet those needs.176 On the occasion of 
application for expanded authority, financial institutions would have to provide evidence 
of their efforts to delineate their primary service area, the deposit and credit needs of that 
area, the proportion of deposits from that area that would be reinvested there, and their 
actions to meet local credit needs. The bill also contained provisions to ensure that 
community involvement would be facilitated through hearings, and a requirement of 
periodic reports including data on deposits collected and credit extended.177 
In preparation for hearings on the bill, Proxmire solicited comments from the four 
financial regulatory agencies. The FHLBB’s response indicated agreement with the 
general objectives of the law, but declared that FHLBB policies already addressed those 
concerns, and maintained that “competition in the financial marketplace [is] the best 
mechanism to assure that diverse community needs are satisfied.”178 Arthur Burns 
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responded to Proxmire similarly that the Federal Reserve already considered an 
institution’s record on meeting community credit needs and that no additional legislation 
or regulation was required. Burns went further, however, to caution Proxmire that CRA 
regulations could be counter-productive if they restricted the flow of credit from capital-
surplus areas to credit deficient communities, and that freely flowing capital with 
minimal restraints would better improve credit allocation. “We recognize, of course,” 
Burns continued, “that markets do not always work in ways that maximize social 
priorities, and that thus there may be particular credit needs that public policy will need to 
encourage. But we should proceed more carefully and cautiously in imposing public 
policy objectives on private lending institutions since the effects on our present private 
competitive credit market system could be profound.”179 Burns reasoned that credit 
funneled to a particular use by law simply meant that some other credit need went unmet. 
He concluded, “indeed as long as depositors are free to move their funds where they 
perceive the highest return or the greatest safety, it may not be possible to mandate flows 
of credit into particular channels.”180 While the New Deal system of housing finance had 
long mandated the flow of credit into residential mortgages in exclusively white suburbs, 
deregulatory policies coupled with financial innovation and regulatory inaction were 
indeed enabling depositors to move their funds more freely. Burns and others could see 
financial markets moving in this direction, facilitated by federal policies, but activists 
continued to shape their policy initiatives to fit the traditional system. 
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Representatives of the private sector such as California Federal CEO Robert 
Dockson assured CRA proponents that freer markets would benefit neglected 
neighborhoods: “Of all financial markets, the mortgage market has been the most 
afflicted by imperfections and barriers … the broader and freer the market, the better the 
… terms for borrowers and savers alike.”181 Dockson reasoned that communities needed 
to draw capital from any source and would benefit from the competition between local 
and non-local sources, which the CRA would limit. The CRA, he argued, “would make 
good guys out of institutions who both raised their money and lent it out in Beverly Hills, 
and bad guys out of Beverly Hills institutions who made all their loans in the Central City 
and East Los Angeles.”182 FHLBB economist Marshall Kaplan likewise observed the 
possibility of restrictions on institutions in high-income areas that sought to lend in low-
income areas and noted, “Congress itself has enacted an institution designed to facilitate 
secondary market operations in mortgage markets that shift funds from capital surplus to 
capital deficient areas.”183 But Dockson and Kaplan defended hypothetical institutions 
that, as far as CRA proponents knew, did not exist. Which banks and savings and loans, 
exactly, took deposits from Beverly Hills to invest in East Los Angeles? 
Mindful of these early reactions as well as the debates over the HMDA, Proxmire 
sought to squash the line of objection that contended that the CRA would require credit 
allocation. Though not commenting on historical credit allocation for suburban housing, 
Proxmire countered:  
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We already have credit allocation… for the fortune five hundred…. We already  
have numerous structural forms of credit allocation the form of specialized credit 
intermediaries such as the farm credit banks, FNMA, Ex-Im Bank, and so on, 
which have preferential access to Treasury borrowings. We have structural credit 
allocation in the form of a specialized home loan bank system, mortgage 
insurance, and guaranteed small business loans.184  
 
Proxmire’s incisive assessment of the endemic credit allocating mechanisms within 
capital markets contrasted starkly to the more common view that erased the federal hand 
in structuring credit markets altogether.185 This preemptive strike failed to curb 
accusations of legislative over-reach into private business affairs, however. Senator 
Tower, who had literally been out of the room while Proxmire made his case, charged “if 
Government sponsored credit allocation is used to channel credit to other borrowers, it 
necessarily will use the credit for less productive purposes [than borrowers ‘willing to 
pay the highest interest rates after allowance for risks’] and the economic well-being of 
the Nation as a whole will suffer.”186  
Senator Garn had also been absent for Proxmire’s lecture on the pervasive role of 
the federal government in allocating credit. In an angry outburst following Proxmire’s 
testy exchange with a witness from the American Bankers Association, Garn took the 
opposing position. “Damn it to hell,” Garn ranted, “we have had 200 years of the private 
sector building the greatest country…. The answer isn’t more rules and regulations. 
Piecemeal, we are heading for credit allocation and Government bureaucrats sitting back 
here interfering with the private sector. I’m sick and tired of the antibusiness attitude of 
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this committee.”187 Referring to the ABA witness, Garn continued, “you are insulted day 
after day, treated rudely, but the Kathleen O’Reillys, the Ralph Nader’s have their asses 
kissed every day and are told how wonderful their testimony is over and over again, 
while we are building up a regulatory burden that is going to destroy the housing industry 
in this country.”188  
 Community reinvestment and consumer advocates challenged Tower and Garn’s 
assumption that local credit needs targeted by the CRA represented unproductive 
purposes. They articulated a vision of financial institutions cooperatively obligated to the 
communities in which they had been chartered. Echoing Proxmire, Ralph Nader testified 
that the CRA embodied the principle that “if the Federal Government is going to extend a 
whole array of benefits, privileges and subsidies to banking institutions, that the same 
government should condition these privileges and subsidies on the grounds of some 
general criteria of responsiveness to the community where the subsidized institution is 
operating and receiving its deposits.”189 He added, “for too long the Federal Government 
has looked on its chartering responsibility as a mechanical clerical function, instead of 
asking what kinds of performance should be obtained within the market structure, so that 
these charters can have some sort of recompense in terms of the public interest.”190 
Proxmire argued that by virtue of accepting a charter to a “semiexclusive franchise” with 
limited entry of competitors, deposit insurance, low cost credit via the Federal Reserve 
and Federal Home Loan Banks, and low cost funds, protected by interest rate ceilings 
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(Regulation Q), the institutions obliged themselves to serve the “‘convenience and 
needs’” of their local community. Proxmire sought through the CRA to emphasize that 
convenience and needs included credit needs.191 
Though encouraged by the general thrust of the bill, several of the witnesses 
called for a more forceful community reinvestment law than what Proxmire had 
introduced. Cincotta argued that all financial institutions must be obligated to undertake 
affirmative steps to meet local needs, not merely those in the process of applying for 
charter, branching, or merger.192 She further argued that the act should take account of 
historical neglect of particular neighborhoods and require affirmative action to meet the 
needs of those areas. Cincotta, in calling for an affirmative obligation to “historically 
neglected neighborhoods,” reasoned, “it wasn’t good enough to say we will hire 
minorities, you had to put a program together and have disclosure to see how your 
program was working.”193 Cincotta, in particular, indicated a preference for a more 
proactive policy, as Proxmire put it, “like the affirmative action we have in the civil 
rights program.”194  
Henry Schechter, an economist representing the AFL-CIO, pushed for a more 
comprehensive assessment of the financial institutions’ reinvestment records. 
Recognizing the ambiguity between “legitimate economic considerations,” and the 
discriminatory practices they sought to end, he argued, “there is a need for a record that 
would enable a Federal financial supervisory agency to judge whether the individual 
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institutional assessment of risk is or is not reasonable.”195 To accomplish this, he 
recommended that every applicant who was refused a loan be provided with a written 
explanation that would also be available for the review of the financial regulators.196 
Conrad Weiler, the Chairman of the Alliance for Neighborhood Government, based in 
Philadelphia, too called for additional reporting requirements. He recommended a 
“Neighborhood Reinvestment Impact Statement” to ensure that community reinvestment 
did not cause displacement by facilitating an inflow of middle income homebuyers, as he 
put it, “re-suburbanizing the city.”197 Schechter and Weiler believed that the additional 
information would be essential to an effective community reinvestment policy, but the 
requirements would undoubtedly elicit protest from lenders who felt they were already 
overburdened with regulation. Proxmire proved reluctant to push in the direction of 
additional reporting requirements, seeking to deprive opponents of the objection that the 
CRA paperwork would be unduly arduous.  
 The CRA hearings again revealed the divergent visions of the role of depository 
institutions as capital intermediaries. The CRA reflected the position that the institutions 
should have a local orientation. Yet even some proponents of the law indicated that 
institutions had long been trending away from a community-centered mission. Nader 
noted that the savings and loans and mutual savings banks had lost their original 
character in which “they were to be controlled by depositors in fact, not just in law. And 
they were to be responsive to the local community, because of that local control.”198 
                                                 




197 Ibid., 218-9. 
 
198 Ibid., 163. 
 
 117
Nader prophesied “an increasing sophistication of international [capital] flight,” that 
would make it ever more difficult to provide for local needs.199 Edwin Brooks, 
representing the U.S. League of Savings Associations, insisted that financial institutions 
should not be bound by community boundaries. He argued, “the markets for savings and 
for loans are distinct and separate. They cannot be linked as S. 406 suggests. Loans may 
be needed by younger families in bedroom neighborhoods and suburbs; savings may be 
available in downtown locations near jobs or in retirement communities.”200  
The competing views, and the challenge their divergence posed for reinvestment, 
were especially apparent in an exchange between Senator Sarbanes (D-MD) and FHLBB 
Chairman Garth Marston.  
Sarbanes: “if market forces are working won’t they put the money clearly where 
they can get the greatest return?”  
Marston: “Sure, I think they should.”  
Sarbanes: “Don’t they have other places where they could put the money where 
they will get an adequate return? We’re not asking them to lose their money or 
lend it out at no return, but where they will get an adequate return. Yet the push 
will always be to go to the top end of the spectrum, will it not?”  
Marston: “Yes sir.”  
Sarbanes: “How do you get them, then, to service areas from which they are 
drawing their money?”201  
Marston: “I think the approach to that is to make those loans less risky.”202  
 
Marston had returned, then, to carrots, not the relatively soft stick of the CRA, indicating 
that this might occur through government insurance of loans.203  
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Proxmire’s star witnesses, more so than Cincotta and Nader, were two bankers, 
Ronald Grzywinski of Chicago, and Todd Cooke of Philadelphia who testified of their 
positive, and profitable, experiences lending in previously redlined neighborhoods in 
their respective cities.204 They offered proof that reinvestment could be carried out by the 
private sector and that it could be done profitably and without increased risk to the 
lenders. Grzywinski and Cooke could not be easily dismissed by Garn and Tower. 
Grzywinski, Chairman of the Executive Committee, South Shore National Bank of 
Chicago testified that since the bank had committed to investing in South Shore, home 
values had increased by 50%. In its reinvestment orientation, however, he found his bank 
to be an exception in Chicago, “the unfortunate conclusion I have come to is that bank 
managers may be well-intentioned on [reinvestment], but the simple fact of the matter is 
that the system rewards earnings, and development or reinvestment in neighborhood is an 
additional short-term cost…. It seems as though nothing much is going to happen, if we 
don’t do something.”205 
Like Grzywinski, Cooke argued that financial institutions had a “primary and 
continuing responsibility to the community in which it is authorized to operate.” He went 
on to support the use of the regulatory agencies’ “chartering, examining, supervising and 
regulating authority,” to encourage lenders to meet that obligation.206 Cooke cautioned, 
however, against “permitting socially desirable constraints to overbalance [the] vital 
economic role [of transferring funds from areas of surplus to those of shortage],” which 
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he claimed, “will cripple financial institutions and their ability to function effectively in 
the public interest in either capacity.”207 He also warned that excessive rulemaking by the 
financial regulators could create undue burdens for institutions without corresponding 
benefit to the public.208 
In committee mark-up, Proxmire and the rest of the committee bent toward the 
warnings of Cooke and compromise with the bill’s opponents rather than to the calls of 
Schechter and Cincotta for a more aggressive law. Instead of the additional reporting 
requirements that Schechter had advocated, the marked-up CRA relied primarily on the 
data already required by HMDA. And despite Proxmire’s argument that markets already 
contained structural mechanisms of credit allocation, the CRA, like the HMDA, had to 
meet a double standard requiring explicit prohibition of credit allocation. This put 
Cincotta’s call for affirmative action in the vein of equal employment programs outside 
of future debate over the CRA. 
 The committee report explained that while the financial regulators had the 
authority to encourage financial institutions to meet local credit needs under existing law, 
“the need for new legislation arises because regulating agencies lack systematic, 
affirmative programs to encourage lenders to give priority to the credit needs of the home 
areas.”209 Eager to curb cases in which “local lenders export savings despite sound local 
lending opportunities,” the report argued that the regulatory agencies, without any new 
data collection requirements, could make a more affirmative effort to encourage local 
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lending. Specifically, it urged the regulators to leverage approval of merger and 
branching applications to ensure that institutions met local credit needs.210 The committee 
rejected the possibility of setting percentage targets of local lending, as its explanation of 
the title concluded, “the Committee rejects the assertion that this Title allocates credit. It 
simply underscores the long-standing obligation to an institution’s local service area 
implicit in existing law.”211 In a dissenting view, Senators Morgan, Lugar, Schmidt, 
Tower, and Garn argued that the CRA “would have adverse effects upon the free flow of 
capital within our economy, and ‘a rose by any other name’ is still ‘credit allocation’.” 212 
They contended that increased record keeping requirements would ultimately reduce the 
amount of credit available in communities in need.213  
Compared to the Fair Housing Act and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, the 
CRA had a stealthy journey through Congress. Proxmire added the CRA to the larger 
Housing and Community Development bill during committee mark-up. Surviving an 
effort to remove it from the bill,214 the CRA passed along with the full housing and 
community development bill by a count of 79 to 7, with 14 not voting.215 In Conference, 
the House acceded to the Senate provisions that required the financial regulators to weigh 
an institution’s community reinvestment record in decisions regarding applications with 
an amendment narrowing consideration of the credit needs of “‘the entire community, 
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including its low and moderate income neighborhoods’,” to those of its “‘primary service 
area’.”216 Though the latter designation implied a more restricted geographical scope, 
neither offered an unambiguous definition of community. On October 1, the Senate 
agreed to the conference report by a vote of 55 to 19, with 26 senators not voting. The 
House followed suit a few days later, and President Jimmy Carter signed the bill into law 
on October 12, 1977. 
The lesson learned from the decade long struggle to force the federal regulators to 
issue fair housing regulations, the CRA included the statutory requirement that 
regulations take effect within 390 days of enactment of the CRA. The agencies issued 
proposed regulations early in 1978 and collected public comments. Predictably, bankers 
responded strongly against proposed CRA regulations. They lodged familiar objections to 
additional “red-tape”217 and “another batch of paperwork,”218 that would increase costs. 
As they had with fair housing regulations, some rural bankers complained that the issue 
was a problem for big city banks, but did not concern them.219 Thomas J. Aron, a 
President of a bank in Nebraska, wrote, “one can not consider making a loan to every 
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would-be applicant. Fortunately, our community does not have a color or ethnic problem. 
We will continue to serve the community to the best of our ability.”220 
 Many charged that the language of the regulations was too vague, particularly on 
defining “community.” Wisconsin bank president L.L. Riley mused, “if and when we 
have a second coming of Christ, perhaps we could get a good definition and in the 
meantime I doubt that any earthly human being could properly define ‘entire 
community’.”221 Riley argued that “credit needs” could no more easily be defined, 
especially against credit demands. The regulators sought to allay the concerns over 
defining community while still allowing some flexibility to the institutions. They 
suggested using existing boundaries, such as county lines, or the area from which the 
institution drew over half of its deposits and contiguous neighborhoods, so long as neither 
redlined low-income neighborhoods. The regulations did little however, to help 
institutions negotiate the determination of credit needs versus demands. 
 The bankers saved their most virulent comments to charge that the CRA 
constituted “credit allocation,” and would invariably lead to lenders being forced to make 
unsound loans. “Government dictated credit allocation,” Edwin M. Bergsmack wrote, “is 
the ultimate fear of the banking community. If great care is not taken in drafting 
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regulation to implement compliance with the act, this fear may be realized.”222 L.J. 
Herbert, Jr., agreed, “it seems to me that this is a move on the part of Congress to allocate 
credit on a social basis rather than credit allocation according to market needs and 
demands.”223  
The four financial agencies used nearly all of their 390 day allotment, issuing 
final rules on October 12, 1978, with an effective date of November 6, 1978. The 
regulations required each institution to map its community, with explicit direction not to 
exclude low- and moderate-income neighborhoods. The lenders had ninety days to adopt 
a community reinvestment statement that would be available both to regulators and to the 
public. The agencies indicated that an institution’s record of meeting the credit needs of 
its community would be taken into account when considering applications for charter or 
change in charter, branching, merger, or membership, and that an application could be 
denied on the basis of a poor record. Affirmative attempts to discern credit need, 
affirmative marketing, allegations of discrimination or attempts to discourage loan 
applications, the geographic distribution of credit extension, applications, and denials, 
origination of residential mortgage loans in its community, and participation in 
government insurance programs could be considered as part of an institution’s record. 
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The agencies also increased the frequency of public notifications required to announce 
applications, in order to facilitate greater public participation in the process.224 
An April memo to the Chairman outlined the FHLBB’s recommendations for 
CRA enforcement. The Office of Community Investment recommended defining “local 
community” as both the geographic area in which an institution makes the majority of its 
loans and the areas proximate to an institution’s offices. The OCI urged that local 
government officials and representatives of community groups be included in CRA 
compliance examinations.225 A second memo later that month recommended that FHLBB 
urge S&Ls to proactively formulate “Community Investment Plans” to allow the 
institutions to set their own reinvestment standards and suggested “defusing future 
potential protest by involving local government and community groups in the planning 
process.”226 The memo outlined two separate review protocols depending on the 
existence of CRA-related protest. In the case of substantial protest, the memo 
recommended hearings that “at least initially, …should facilitate strong community 
involvement,” including oral testimony from community members.227 
 An internal FHLBB memo set the following criteria for assessing an institution’s 
record for meeting local credit needs:  
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The extent of the institution’s marketing and special credit-related programs to 
make community members aware of the credit services the institution offers. The 
institution’s participation, including investments, in local community 
development or redevelopment projects or programs. The institution’s 
participation in government-insured guaranteed or subsidized loan programs for 
housing, small business or small farms.228 
 
CRA enforcement was effectively envisioned as a market mechanism–given information 
about where institutions invested, consumers could decide where to put their deposits. A 
January 1979 press release by the Federal Reserve on behalf of the financial regulatory 
agencies urged institutions to follow the “spirit of the [CRA] legislation, and try to avoid 
narrow, legalistic interpretations.”229 Richard Marisco argues that up to mid-1997, CRA 
enforcement, in accordance with the prohibition on credit allocation, focused on 
institutions’ efforts to market their services in local communities, rather than their actual 
lending.230 The FHLBB did consider any record of formal complaints of discrimination 
or other consumer complaints when reviewing a community service record in conjunction 
with an application.231 Mobilization by community organizations could gain the attention 
of the regulators and potentially block branch openings and mergers. As imperfect as this 
mechanism remained, community activists finally had recourse to fight redlining.     
*** 
 By the close of the 1970s, fair housing and community reinvestment advocates 
could look back on a decade of hard-won legislative and regulatory achievements. The 
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overwhelming majority of mortgage lending depository institutions operated under the 
authority of fair housing regulations that prohibited lending discrimination on the basis of 
race, national origin, age, sex, and location and age of property. Furthermore, the 
regulatory agencies required those institutions to record and report data that enabled both 
the regulators and the public to monitor lending patterns and with some recourse to 
enforcement mechanisms that promised to hold institutions accountable. Advocates were 
acutely aware of the limitations of these tools, but nonetheless sought to employ them to 
achieve a truly equal market for housing and the revitalization of the nation’s cities. 
 Critically, the proponents of fair housing and community reinvestment had failed 
to shift debate over credit allocation. Despite Proxmire’s efforts, most of the actors 
involved refused to acknowledge the pervasive role of the federal government in 
allocating credit towards certain types of housing. Even Proxmire failed to acknowledge 
the consequences of past government credit allocation in building a dual, racialized 
housing market and a residentially segregated nation. While past credit allocation 
remained largely invisible to most, any hint of credit allocation towards inner cities and 
their residents elicited quick and harsh repudiation from opponents. That both the HMDA 
and CRA contained explicit prohibitions against credit allocation indicate the 
considerable sway of the arguments against what had long been an endemic feature of 
U.S. housing markets, just with different beneficiaries. In this climate, activists such as 
Gale Cincotta had little hope of advancing the case for affirmative financing programs 




 Yet even a more aggressive, affirmative policy like that envisioned by Cincotta, 
so long as it depended on the authority of the financial regulators, would have been 
severely undercut by the policy changes that would occur in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. Both the decade-long battle for fair housing regulation of lenders and the 
Community Reinvestment Act hinged on vigorous enforcement by, or at least, the 
authority of, the four financial regulatory agencies. During the 1970s, as advocates waged 
these battles, the majority of mortgage lending originated in institutions regulated by 
those agencies. Yet, as documented above, the debates over fair housing regulation and 
community reinvestment revealed an underlying debate over the role of financial 
intermediaries. Though the battle had not been settled by the end of the 1970s, those 
advocating freer capital markets, with depository institutions fully integrated into national 
or global markets and obliged to the highest return rather than to any local responsibility 
had, by the mid-1980s, won the debate. This left community reinvestment grounded in a 
view of depository institutions that increasingly diverged from reality. By the mid-1980s, 
mortgage brokers and secondary market investors would increasingly dominate mortgage 
markets, largely outside the reach of the regulatory agencies. A small handful of the 
witnesses who testified in hearings on HMDA and CRA urged lawmakers to extend the 
reach of the acts to cover the activities of mortgage brokers and the government-
sponsored enterprises in the growing secondary markets, but those recommendations fell 
on deaf ears.232 The debates over the deregulatory policies that would so severely 
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undermine the fair housing and community reinvestment regulatory regime seldom 
considered the possibility. In fact, the deregulation of interest rate ceilings, which would 
precipitate further deregulation, found its champion in Senator William Proxmire, who 
seemed to see no contradiction in his advocacy for both deregulation and community 




                                                                                                                                                 






The Fight to End Regulation Q, 1971-1980 
 
Howard Healy of Milwaukee wrote to Senator Proxmire in 1979, “Why does the 
government limit the interest paid by banks on savings accounts? Inflation is far ahead of 
interest. How can I save for retirement? My earnings are being confiscated by a greedy 
government. We are angry.”1 Healy’s interest rate was limited by Regulation Q. A ceiling 
on the amount of interest that banks and, eventually, thrifts could pay on deposits, 
Regulation Q helped ensure a source of low-cost capital for housing. If banks and savings 
and loans paid 3% interest on the deposits they collected, the logic went, they could issue 
relatively low interest mortgages at 6% and still clear a profit. While the savings and loan 
industry credibly argued that this system made homeownership more widely attainable, 
some critics argued that the rate ceilings distorted the efficient flow of capital, and others, 
like Healy, argued that it was just unfair.  
As early as the 1961 Report of the Commission on Money and Credit, 
modification of Regulation Q had been part of a wider agenda to reorganize the nation’s 
financial structure. This broader deregulatory agenda sought to erode the specialization of 
financial institutions–or at least ensure that specialization resulted from choice and not 
statute–in order to foster greater competition among all types of financial institutions. 
The underlying philosophy, that competition in a free market would achieve the most 
efficient allocation of resources, flew in the face of the then decades old New Deal 
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system of housing finance that employed law and regulation to allocate credit to achieve 
the social goal of homeownership for an increasing number of white Americans. 
This chapter documents the protracted and contentious process by which 
Regulation Q was challenged through proposed legislation, financial innovations, 
regulatory actions, and a critique on behalf of, and eventually by, “small savers.” 
Structural weaknesses in the regulatory regime, including competition from unregulated 
financial services firms and a dual-banking system in which regulatory responsibility was 
split between state and federal authorities, made Regulation Q vulnerable. This chapter, 
along with chapter four, seeks to demonstrate how decisions made by regulators early in 
the 1970s shaped but did not determine subsequent policy options. It argues that 
deregulation of interest rate ceilings was not inevitable. Rather, a strong defense of 
Regulation Q by many bankers, nearly all thrift officials, organized labor, and for most of 
the decade, the majority of lawmakers, made Regulation Q exceedingly resilient.  
Recovering the contingency and contentiousness of the debate over Regulation Q 
serves to highlight the process by which proponents of deregulation and restructuring of 
the New Deal system of housing finance (and the financial services industry more 
broadly) struggled to advance their agenda until they were joined by supporters of the 
comparatively narrower push to deregulate interest rate ceilings. In the latter group were 
lawmakers such as Senator Proxmire, who while eager to eliminate interest rate ceilings 
remained dubious about, or deeply opposed to other elements of the broader deregulatory 
agenda of the former group.  
I argue that the critical development in the advancement of the narrow agenda of 
deregulation of interest rate ceilings was advocates’ framing of liberalization of 
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Regulation Q as essential to allowing consumer-savers to battle soaring inflation. Even 
then, Regulation Q might have persisted if not for deft legislative maneuvering that 
linked a phase-out of interest rate ceilings to authorization of popular consumer accounts 
already in use. The push to achieve market rates of return for small savers merged with a 
defense of the accounts to break the logjam of competing interests that had fought over 
Regulation Q throughout the 1970s, tipping the balance toward deregulation of rate-
ceilings.  
The small saver emerged first as a theoretical construct, briefly, but symbolically 
significantly, as a protest movement, and, most importantly, as an inapt but effective 
phrase employed by policymakers to describe the group of saver-investors who were not 
particularly small and who disrupted the New Deal system by pulling their savings out of 
depository institutions to seek higher yields through alternative investment instruments. 
Increasing numbers of savers opted out of the New Deal regulatory structure or 
demanded that the structure be changed to yield them market rates, and lawmakers 
responded. Remarkably, in adopting the cause of the “small saver,” policymakers 
privileged the interests of consumer-savers over those of consumer-borrowers. 
Borrowers, as regulators and lenders alike repeatedly assured lawmakers, would bear the 
costs of “fair,” market rates of return for savers, through higher interest rates and fees 
(that savers would also pay). Finally, this chapter shows how advocates of broad 
deregulation linked the deregulation of interest rate ceilings to deregulation of the 
investment powers of banks and thrifts to a limited extent in the DIDMCA. Chapters five 
and six will demonstrate how this leveraging resulted in further deregulation of bank and 




A Brief History of Regulation Q 
 
 
 In response to the Great Depression, policymakers devised a complex of new laws 
and regulations that they hoped would restore the safety and soundness of the nation’s 
financial system. The Banking Act of 1933, more famous for its establishment of federal 
deposit insurance, authorized the Federal Reserve to set a ceiling, which came to be 
known as Regulation Q, on the rates of interest paid by Federal Reserve member 
commercial banks to attract deposits. Further solidifying the new regulatory regime, the 
Banking Act of 1935 extended this authorization to cover nonmember commercial banks 
through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).2 Lawmakers intended the 
ceilings to limit competition for deposits and thereby boost bank profits. They hoped that 
this profit protection would make banks less likely to pursue the types of risky (and 
potentially profitable) investments that had contributed to the Depression and would 
offset the cost of newly created deposit insurance premiums.3 Policymakers also believed 
that Regulation Q would make rural banks more prone to reinvest locally than to direct 
their deposits to large, money center banks.4   
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 The consequences of the interest rate ceilings, however, were much wider than 
policymakers had intended, particularly in promoting housing finance. Commercial banks 
could not offer more than the Regulation Q ceiling on deposits, but savings and loans, 
institutions singularly focused on residential mortgage lending, could. By offering rates 
slightly higher than the Regulation Q ceiling, S&Ls could enjoy a competitive advantage 
over the commercial banks, but still have a predictably low cost of funds. As Leon T. 
Kendall of the U.S. Savings and Loan League would argue in 1962, the higher returns 
offered by thrift institutions were “the primary reason that savings association growth in 
savings volume exceeds that at other deposit-type institutions,” and could thereby support 
the residential mortgage market.5 From 1947 to 1960, while commercial banks held 
steady at around 30% share of household savings, S&Ls increased their share from 8.7% 
to 28.7% (from $9.8 billion to $62.2 billion).6 If Kendall’s attribution was correct, the 
ability of S&Ls to outbid commercial banks for savings had dramatically expanded the 
volume of capital attracted by the institutions statutorily obligated to support housing.    
This system operated with minimal controversy until 1966. That year, believing 
that competition between banks and thrifts (mutual savings banks and savings and loans, 
both of which specialized in residential mortgage lending) for household deposits had 
contributed to a sharp rise in general interest rates, Congress extended Regulation Q 
authority again, this time to include the nation’s thrift institutions. In order to assure the 
flow of credit to residential mortgages, Congress mandated that the ceiling for the latter 
institutions would be slightly higher than that for commercial banks.7 This slightly higher 
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rate, which came to be called “the housing differential,” or just, “the differential,” 
became a persistent point of contention between commercial bankers who charged that 
the differential was discriminatory and thrift officials who maintained that the differential 
was essential to the vitality of the housing market. Lawmakers justified the differential 
based not only on the desirability of funneling capital toward housing, but also on the 
competitive advantage enjoyed by commercial banks to offer check-writing, a power 
denied to the thrifts.  
In July 1970, following another period of rising interest rates and 
disintermediation–the transfer of deposits from one financial intermediary into other 
investment outlets–the Federal Reserve exempted deposits of over $100,000 with 
maturities between 30 and 90 days from Regulation Q ceilings.8 Like the differential, this 
latter change too would cast a long shadow over subsequent debate over Regulation Q. 
The exemption of large denomination CD’s created a two-tiered system of deposits, 
separating corporations and wealthy depositors whose savings did not fall under 
Regulation Q ceilings from the majority of individual savers whose savings did. Prior 
regulations had already established different, and higher, ceilings for deposits over 
$100,000,9 but the July regulations created a ceilingless category available only to those 
who could meet the $100,000 minimum. In 1973, the Federal Reserve eliminated 
Regulation Q ceilings on certificates over $100,000 of any maturity, thereby completing 
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the differentiation of deposit accounts above and below that amount.10 These early 
actions by Federal Reserve regulators created crucial context for subsequent political and 
economic developments that precipitated further, ultimately complete, deregulation of 
interest rate ceilings. First, the regulatory distinction between rates of return available to 
savers with over $100,000 to invest and those without that amount gave meaning to the 
claim that Regulation Q discriminated against small savers. This claim, in turn, provided 
the basis for a populist, pro-consumer argument in favor of deregulating interest rate 
ceilings. Second, the exemption of account categories over $100,000 from rate ceilings 
directly led to the development of money market mutual funds, funds that pooled money 
from many depositors in order to reach the $100,000 minimum. Competitive pressure 
from these accounts then prompted regulators to loosen Regulation Q ceilings on several 
categories of thrift and bank accounts. Though the regulators’ actions in 1970 and 1973 
proved critical in the eventual elimination of Regulation Q, both the political (the 
discrimination against small savers argument) and economic (money market mutual 
funds) challenges to interest rate ceilings developed slowly over the course of the 
1970s.11     
 The prevailing understanding of Regulation Q throughout much of the decade 
remained that the interest rate ceilings promoted housing finance. Bank and, especially, 
thrift executives came to understand Regulation Q as a vital tool in keeping their cost of 
money low, thereby enabling them to lend money at relatively low rates and still make a 
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profit. This became a sort of conventional wisdom, captured by some variation of the “3-
6-3 rule,” as Niall Ferguson has written, the “3-6-3 rule: pay 3 per cent on deposits, lend 
money at 6 per cent and be on the golf course by 3 o’clock every afternoon.”12 Though, 
as noted above, the original reasons for the ceilings were not explicitly related to housing, 
Deputy Treasury Secretary Stephen Gardner, for example, could (inaccurately, but 
sincerely) testify in 1975, “Regulation Q ceilings on deposit rates were initially intended 
to assure funds for housing by protecting thrift institutions from competition for savings 
deposits.”13 By limiting lenders’ cost of funds and by making that cost relatively stable 
and predictable, Regulation Q joined a host of other New Deal interventions to create a 
distinct and privileged capital market for owner-occupied housing in the United States.14 
Eager to promote homeownership and the health of the construction and real estate 
industries, Congress routinely reauthorized the financial regulatory agencies’ power to set 
Regulation Q and related ceilings from 1966 to 1980. 
 Congressional reauthorization, however, became less reflexive and more 
contentious over the course of the 1970s. Increasing volatility in interest rates created 
more frequent periods of disintermediation. When market rates rose above Regulation Q 
ceilings, some depositors would remove their savings from thrift institutions, tightening 
the availability of credit for housing. Consequently, residential construction alternately 
boomed and busted over the decade. As rising inflation during the late 1970s widened the 
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difference between market rates and the Regulation Q ceilings on deposits, more and 
more policymakers argued that the rate ceilings discriminated against small savers. Given 
the recent record of instability in the flow of credit to housing, many of those 
policymakers believed that the trade-off, protected, low-cost capital for housing, no 
longer justified the low returns to savers. Others, especially those in the thrift industry, 
clung to the older model, claiming that if inflation could be contained, the system could 
continue to function well, and that in any case, removal of Regulation Q would hasten the 
demise of the thrift industry and the availability of credit for housing with it. 
 
Challenges to Regulation Q 
 
 
 Despite its remarkable success in expanding homeownership, the New Deal 
system of housing finance had its critics from its inception and a critique of certain 
aspects, including Regulation Q, became formalized at several points through the postwar 
decades.15 Some economists supported the case against Regulation Q, arguing that 
interest rate ceilings stood in the way of the efficient operations of the market, failed to 
adequately provide a stable source of capital for housing (especially during periods of 
inflation), and discriminated against “small savers.” Two national commissions, the 
Commission on Money and Credit (CMC) in 1961, and the Hunt Commission in 1971, as 
well as the 1975 Financial Institutions in the Nation’s Economy (FINE) Study by the 
House Banking Committee, called for modification or outright removal of Regulation 
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Q.16 Financial innovations also challenged the integrity of Regulation Q. Unregulated17 
non-bank financial institutions created new instruments including money market mutual 
funds and variable-rate debt offerings that competed with banks and thrifts for household 
savings, but were not subject to the same rate ceilings. This left regulators with the option 
to seek broader authority to extend Regulation Q to cover the new instruments, to loosen 
restrictions on regulated institutions to permit them to compete with the deposit-
alternatives, or to do nothing, allowing the innovators to circumvent and undermine 
Regulation Q. For their part, the financial regulators appeared increasingly ambivalent or 
conflicted towards Regulation Q. Both Republican and Democratically appointed 
regulators jockeyed with Congress and with their constituent institutions to balance 
various parochial interests against contested national social and economic goals. Finally, 
by the late 1970s, consumer groups and advocates including Consumers Union, the Gray 
Panthers, and Ralph Nader began to actively protest Regulation Q ceilings as a grievous 
injustice against savers. Under assault from these various fronts for over a decade, 
Regulation Q proved remarkably resilient until the late 1970s. Not until elimination of 
Regulation Q became identified as a populist measure to aid inflation-embattled small 
savers did a majority coalition of lawmakers back the end of interest rate ceilings over the 
objections of the majority of bank and thrift officials.   
In the 1960s and 1970s, two national commissions, the Commission on Money 
and Credit and the Hunt Commission, and the House Banking Committee (through the 
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FINE study) convened to comprehensively study the workings of the financial structure 
of the United States, and issue recommendations for reform. Though a pervasive 
deregulatory impulse is less clear in the case of the CMC, both the Hunt Commission 
and, later, the FINE study, endorsed broad deregulation of financial institutions and the 
system of housing finance. These early articulations of a case for financial deregulation 
offer important insight into the intellectual tradition that informed debate on deregulation 
in the late 1970s. Much of the substance of what financial deregulation did take place in 
the late 1970s and 1980s emerged from these commissions and studies. Yet most of the 
deregulatory recommendations of the CMC, Hunt Commission, and FINE Study, 
including those regarding Regulation Q and variable-rate mortgages, failed to gain 
majority support in Congress until the early 1980s. The intellectual force of the ideas 
regarding deregulation was not sufficient to alter federal policy. Only when political 
circumstances allowed, namely once these ideas became fused with an agenda on behalf 
of consumer-savers, did they become the basis for broad financial restructuring.  
The first of these, the Commission on Money and Credit (CMC),18 a privately 
funded group charged with making general recommendations for the U.S. economy, 
suggested a modest modification of Regulation Q. The CMC recommended that 
Regulation Q authority be revised to make the regulation a “stand-by authority rather 
than continuous regulation,” engaged only in cases when competition for deposits posed 
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a threat to the public interest.19 It also suggested that this stand-by authority should apply 
to mutual savings banks and savings and loans as well as commercial banks. Stanley 
Ruttenberg, one of two representatives of the AFL-CIO on the Commission, dissented, 
arguing, “the interest rate ceiling has served an exceedingly useful purpose in relieving 
the pressure for increased earnings which lead to imprudent loans and investments.”20 
Ruttenberg did concede that thrift institutions should have the same ceiling as 
commercial banks.21 This latter concession indicated that the labor representative, at this 
time, did not see the ceilings primarily in relation to housing, but rather, in terms of the 
general safety and stability of the financial system. Neither lawmakers nor regulators 
acted on the CMC’s recommendations. When lawmakers did, in 1966, extend the ceilings 
to cover the thrift industry, they gave the S&Ls a higher ceiling (the differential), and 
subsequent reauthorizations of this authority made the regulations effectively continuous, 
not stand-by, as the CMC had proposed.  
A decade after the report of the CMC, President Nixon convened a Commission 
on Financial Structure & Regulation, known as the Hunt Commission, to again assess the 
condition of the nation’s financial structure. The commission brought together 
representatives of various financial institutions, academics, and Lane Kirkland as the sole 
representative of organized labor. Notably, Kirkland refused to sign the completed report, 
offering a dissent instead. The general thrust of the report moved “as far as possible 
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toward freedom of financial markets and [to] equip all institutions with the powers 
necessary to compete in such markets … [to] work more efficiently in the allocation of 
funds.”22 The Commission aimed especially to dissolve all statutory and regulatory 
distinctions between financial institutions, while recognizing the need to do so gradually, 
in order to allow institutions to adjust to new competitive conditions. The Commission 
reported a preference for direct subsidies or tax credits to achieve social goals unmet by 
the market, arguing “financing through control of the portfolios of financial institutions 
[such as the requirement that S&Ls invest in residential mortgages] is a costly and 
inefficient means of allocating resources.”23 
Reform of Regulation Q topped the list of the Commission’s recommendations. 
The report called for the immediate removal of rate ceilings for all deposits over 
$100,000 (as regulators did in 1973), and, like the CMC, recommended that ceilings on 
other accounts be used only on an emergency, stand-by basis when needed to prevent 
disintermediation. This stand-by authority, the report continued, should be removed after 
ten years. In its explanation, the report argued that disintermediation during periods in 
which market rates exceeded Regulation Q ceilings had led to a contraction of mortgage 
funds, leaving consumers with higher borrowing rates. The Commission also claimed that 
“interest rate regulations have discriminated against small savers.”24  
In tandem with their recommendation to phase-out Regulation Q, the Commission 
proposed a broadening of investment authority for savings and loans including power to 
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issue mortgages of any kind, consumer loans (up to 10% of total assets), some types of 
equity securities, checking accounts, and credit cards. The report advocated the removal 
of any geographic limitations on lending, implicitly abandoning the notion advanced by 
community reinvestment advocates that an institution had a special obligation to serve its 
local community. In a separate section on “Housing and Mortgage Markets,” the 
Commission also proposed the authorization of variable-rate mortgages. Significantly, 
the report suggested several consumer safeguards for such instruments “including full 
explanation of the terms to borrowers, the offer of an alternative fixed rate mortgage, 
limits on the permissible rate change, a publicly announced index on which rate changes 
are based, and, after an initial period, opportunities for ‘no penalty’ refinancing.”25 The 
Commission’s final housing recommendation stated “in the event that mortgage financing 
is not adequate to achieve national housing goals, Congress should provide direct 
subsidies to consumers,” explaining “direct subsidies avoid the warping of financial 
institutions, they are visible, and they are less inflationary than agency borrowings.”26  
The Hunt Commission Report informed debate over financial regulation for the 
next decade. It provided a baseline for a deregulatory agenda, though political 
considerations led proponents to pursue the various recommendations at different times 
rather than as a package. A cynical reading of the Commission’s admonition that social 
goals, if not met by the free market, should be pursued through direct subsidy might 
conclude that the members expected that making subsidies more visible would also make 
them less politically palatable. Yet it is also feasible to conclude that the commission 
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members simply believed direct subsidies would be more efficient and cost-effective. In 
either event, a later generation of deregulation proponents, those ushered into power by 
the election of Ronald Reagan, would largely abandon this position, instead reasoning 
that if the market did not provide capital for a particular use, it was not only inefficient, 
but not a worthwhile social goal.     
Though Regulation Q authority rested with the federal financial agencies, 
Congress had created the ceilings, and subsequently reauthorized them, with the 
expectation that they be enforced. Whether they agreed with the idea of ceilings or not, 
the regulators dared not eschew their authority to set Regulation Q unless the Congress 
specifically directed them to do so. Likewise, federal law dictated the specialization of 
financial institutions and governed the broad outlines of deposit and asset powers. 
Though a vision for a deregulated financial structure solidified by 1970 in the Hunt 
Commission Report, realization of that vision would require action by Congress. The 
Nixon and Ford administrations attempted to implement most if not all of the Hunt 
Commission recommendations through comprehensive financial legislation, but faced a 
resistant legislature. To the enduring frustration of reformers, not until 1980, in the form 
of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA), did 
some semblance of the broad financial deregulation envisioned by the Hunt Commission 
garner sufficient support to become law. 
 The Hunt Commission offered a slate of recommendations that, it urged, should 
be adopted as a package. The report warned that “piece-meal adoption of the 
recommendations raises the danger of creating new and greater imbalances.”27 The 
                                                 




political realities of the day, namely the Democratic majority, as well as divided 
committee jurisdiction over the various proposals, however, made such comprehensive 
reform unfeasible. In October 1973, the Nixon Administration proposed The Financial 
Institutions Act of 1973.28 The proposal reflected the general thrust of the Commission 
recommendations, but the Administration cherry-picked the initiatives that it felt stood 
the best chance of Congressional approval. The streamlined version left out the Hunt 
Commission recommendations on variable-rate mortgages, removal of state usury 
ceilings, and an end to restrictions on statewide branching, and proposed a five and a half 
year phase-out of Regulation Q (while the Hunt Commission had recommended ten 
years). Finally, responding to the innovation of a Massachusetts Savings Bank to join 
third-party payment (essentially check-writing) to an interest-bearing savings account 
called a Negotiable Order of Withdrawal (NOW) account, the bill proposed authorization 
of NOW accounts for all banks and thrifts. The 93rd Congress held extensive hearings on 
the proposal but took no action, despite the bill’s selective scope.29   
Greta Krippner writes that this legislation “pleased almost no one.”30 Displeasure 
stemmed from either objection to the particulars of the bill or the fact that it did not 
encompass the full range of reforms outlined by the Hunt Commission.31 The federal 
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financial regulators dutifully voiced support for the bill, though FHLBB Chairman 
Thomas Bomar expressed regret that it did not include variable-rate mortgage 
authorization,32 and Federal Reserve Governor Robert Holland indicated that the Board 
of Governors feared that “proposed new investment powers for S.&L.’s might well not be 
sufficient to assure that thrift institutions could compete effectively for deposits during 
periods of high interest rates.”33 Robert Shay, a professor of banking, and representative 
of Consumers Union, the publishers of Consumer Reports, opposed the legislation for 
doing too little, urging a speed-up in the phasing out of Regulation Q, from five and a 
half years to two.34 
Critics of the bill included ABA President and former Hunt Commission member 
Rex Morthland and AFL-CIO representative Nat Goldfinger. Morthand voiced the 
ABA’s opposition to the Financial Institutions Act, including his admonition that “we do 
not believe that the public interest would be best served by eliminating Regulation Q 
ceilings now or in the foreseeable future,” and that NOW accounts should not be 
authorized for either thrifts or banks.35 Goldfinger too testified against the bill, though 
ironically in a way consistent with the Hunt Commission report’s recommendation of 
direct subsidies to meet social goals, suggesting instead “a method of mandatory [credit] 
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allocation based upon social priorities,” including housing.36 Norman Strunk of the U.S. 
Savings and Loan League supported the expansion of thrift asset powers such as 
consumer lending, but added, “the proposals relative to Regulation Q ceilings could 
rather swiftly bury our business.”37 Like Bomar, Strunk faulted the bill especially for the 
absence of provisions allowing variable-rate mortgages. The rocky reception of the bill 
portended the myriad obstacles to comprehensive financial reform. The various vested 
interests, even if enthusiastic about deregulation in general, clung tightly to those 
regulations that afforded them competitive advantage or protection. Lawmakers risked 
offending one or more of several powerful lobbies (commercial banks, thrifts, organized 
labor) representing those interests by acting on the bill, and neither house brought the bill 
to the floor for a vote.   
 The Ford administration renewed reform efforts via the Financial Institutions Act 
of 1975. The bill again called for a five and a half year phase-out of Regulation Q, but 
with the additional caveat that at the end of that period, the administration would conduct 
an investigation to ensure that thrift institutions had indeed been able to adjust their 
portfolios sufficiently to be able to weather the removal of the protective ceilings.38 The 
respective support and opposition of the regulatory agencies and industry groups lined up 
as they had during the previous Congress. Notably, consumers received fuller 
representation in 1975 than during the previous Congress when only Robert Shay of 
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Consumers Union testified specifically for consumers. In 1975, Jonathan Brown of the 
Public Interest Research Group testified, “regulation Q has, in effect, generated a hidden 
transfer of income from small savers to homeowners.”39 He added that many small savers 
would never be able to afford homeownership and thereby benefit from the subsidy. 
When Senator McIntyre asked Brown about variable-rate mortgages, however, Brown 
refused to link his opposition to Regulation Q to an endorsement of VRMs, saying “we 
are very much opposed to them.”40 This time the Senate passed the bill, which, like the 
1973 bill, did not include authorization of variable-rate mortgages (VRMs).41 
Senate passage of the bill indicated an increasing consensus among members of 
that body that Regulation Q should eventually be eliminated, but did not demonstrate an 
accompanying acceptance of the asset powers that thrifts insisted would best enable them 
to adjust to a post-Regulation Q environment, particularly the authority to issue VRMs. 
The House took no action on the bill, instead inaugurating its own comprehensive study 
of the financial system, and thereby stalling any significant legislative change governing 
regulation of financial institutions. A comprehensive bill was again proposed in 1976, but 
the only significant legislation passed regarding Regulation Q until DIDMCA in early 
1980 were extensions of Regulation Q and related ceilings. 
 Within the authority bestowed by Congress to establish interest rate ceilings and 
maintain the differential, regulators at the Federal Reserve and FHLBB exercised 
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discretion in setting the level of the ceilings and determining which accounts and 
instruments should be subject to them. During the 1970s, the presidentially appointed 
regulators were largely sympathetic to the Hunt Commission recommendations and the 
legislative proposals to implement them. Both in their adjustments of existing regulations 
and decisions regarding market innovations, at several points during the decade, the 
actions of the regulators challenged the very premise of Regulation Q. Yet, owing to their 
accountability to Congress and their responsibility to the overall health of the economy, 
on other occasions regulators defended Regulation Q. Through the 1970s, tension 
persisted within the agencies between defenders of the New Deal regulatory regime with 
its rate ceilings and specialized lenders and those seeking the competitive environment 
envisioned by the Hunt Commission. 
 Regulators’ first serious challenge to interest rate ceilings came in 1973, when 
they extended the exemption of ceilings on thirty to eighty-nine day maturity CDs over 
$100,000 to all CDs over that amount, as the Hunt Commission had recommended. 
Acknowledging that this move would be of little help to small savers, and hoping to 
prevent disintermediation as interest rates rose, regulators authorized a $1,000 minimum, 
four year or higher maturity, ceiling-less (exempt from Regulation Q) CD, effective July 
1, 1973.42 These instruments were called “wild-card” CDs due to their varying rates. 
Initially, banks could offer as many of these accounts as they wished, while the FHLBB 
limited S&Ls to having no more than 5% of their total deposits in wild-cards (in order to 
contain the increase in their cost of funds as depositors invested in the certificates). Freed 
to offer higher rates, the banks bid up interest rates seeking to enlarge their market share. 
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Fearing the consequences of a bidding war, less than a month after the authorization, 
regulators extended the 5% limit to banks.43  
 Authorization of the wildcard certificates generated tremendous controversy. S&L 
officials bombarded Congress and regulators with letters and telegrams of protest. Mrs. 
Helen O. Martin, for example, wrote to Fed Chairman Arthur Burns, “The long term four 
year category with no maximum rate is creating havoc in our area, since Commercial 
Banks are paying 8% or 8½%.”44 Martin pointed out the special problem this posed for 
lenders in Alabama, which had an 8% usury limit. When lenders had to pay at or near 8% 
to attract deposits, an 8% mortgage offered no profit, and extension of mortgage credit 
came to an abrupt halt. S&L President B. R. Bonds implored Burns, “Please sir, use your 
powers to stop this foolish ‘Rat race’ between the commercial banks …. I am sure it was 
not your intention to attempt to destroy the savings and loan industry.”45 Reflecting the 
same logic behind Congress’s extension of Regulation Q to the thrifts in 1966, others 
charged that the banks’ bidding war contributed to inflation.     
 California Representative and member of the House Committee on Banking and 
Currency Clair Burgener reported to Burns, “I am besieged by complaints from the 
industry in my District as well as from prospective home purchasers who find themselves 
in limbo…. Mortgage money at the new and higher interest rates will increase the 
monthly payments to a point where many prospective buyers are priced out of the 
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market.”46 Borrowers were not the only unhappy consumers, however. In order to ensure 
that depositors would not simply move money from one account to a higher yielding 
wild-card account within the same institution or from one depository institution to 
another (the idea was to attract new savings money), regulators had established 
withdrawal penalties punitive enough to discourage such transfers. This drew the ire of 
depositors like Leo Ricker, who wrote to his Congressman, “Rates are NOW 
skyrocketing–but I don’t dare remove the money [from a 6% certificate] or I’ll lose 3 
months interest which is MORE than I’d gain at 8 ½ % … why should they make money 
on me?”47  
During the second half of 1973, as the Wild Cards proliferated, thrift institutions’ 
lending dropped to 500,000 new mortgages compared to 700,000 in the first half of the 
year.48 Amid the uproar from S&Ls, homebuyers, and even some savers, Congress passed 
a Joint Resolution in October (PL 93-123) calling the regulators to “take action to limit 
the rates of interest or dividends which may be paid on time deposits of less than 
$100,000.”49 To Regulation Q advocates, the wild-card experience definitively 
demonstrated the perils of interest rate ceiling removal. Congress’s swift reaction to re-
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impose Regulation Q protection gave the thrift industry reason to believe that lawmakers 
would continue to protect the housing lenders against competition for deposits.  
 For five years, regulators and lawmakers indeed backed away from ceilingless 
accounts. But into the late 1970s, as inflation continued to rise, money market mutual 
funds50 proliferated, and a larger group of policymakers positioned themselves as 
defenders of the “small saver,” regulators moved to give depository institutions a more 
competitive instrument to stem disintermediation. Effective June 1, 1978, regulators 
authorized a six-month, $10,000 minimum denomination “Money Market Certificate” 
(MMC), with a rate tied to that of six-month treasury bills. As depositors moved savings 
into the new accounts, the MMCs shifted thrift portfolios toward higher-cost, short-term 
deposits, precipitating an acute earnings crunch for the thrifts.51 By the end of the year, 
10.1% of S&L deposits ($42.8 billion) were in MMCs, a figure that rose to 27.6% 
($127.3 billion) in December 1979.52 The MMCs did allow thrifts to retain deposits that 
might otherwise have been lost to the money market mutual funds or Treasury offerings, 
but did so at increasing, and unsustainable, costs. S&L profitability plummeted. Thrifts’ 
net income as a percentage of average assets fell from just over 0.8 in 1978 to less than 
0.2 by 1980.53 Regulators cautiously trod the fine line of balancing the competing 
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pressures to give savers a market return, keep money flowing to housing, and maintain 
the solvency of thrifts–all while attempting to contain inflation. 
Pressure from key lawmakers, however, tipped heavily towards assuring market 
returns to savers over competing concerns. This despite the almost debilitating costs 
borne by the thrifts, and the fact that no one could credibly argue that the MMCs (with a 
$10,000 minimum denomination) met the needs of small savers. Senator Proxmire sought 
to rectify this latter injustice through Senate Resolution 59 that called for a reduction of 
the minimum denomination of MMCs to $1,000. The proposal elicited a backlash from 
the thrifts reminiscent of the reaction to the Wild Card Certificates. Some thrift officials 
claimed the MMCs had forced them to drastically cut mortgage lending,54 while others 
simply called the proposal to reduce the MMC minimum to $1,000 “horribly inflationary 
and unnecessary.”55  
To the thrift industry and its regulators, Proxmire’s rush to aid the small saver 
endangered the survival of the nation’s primary home lenders, and threatened to put 
homeownership out of reach for borrowers.56 Thrift officials accused Proxmire of 
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abandoning the logic of the New Deal system, as one argued, “Mr. Proxmire should not 
overlook the fact that for every saver earning low rates on savings accounts there is a 
mortgage borrower who is still paying a low rate of interest on a home loan.”57 
Proxmire’s proposal seemed especially galling in light of his vociferous opposition to 
variable-rate mortgages, which thrift officials claimed would help them to adjust to the 
higher cost of funds induced by MMCs.58  
Chairman McKinney and the FHLBB likewise argued that a reduction in the 
MMC minimum denomination would do more harm than good. “Little would be gained,” 
wrote one FHLBB staffer, “by increasing returns to small savers if the cost of this 
involved insolvency of savings and loan associations.”59 While the Carter Administration 
had linked increased returns on savings to expanded asset powers, including VRMs, 
Proxmire’s resolution sought higher returns for savers without giving any expanded thrift 
asset powers in return.60 In other words, Proxmire fully endorsed a particular, saver-
friendly deregulation of interest rate ceilings, but not widespread financial deregulation, 
especially of thrift asset powers. The regulators undoubtedly got Proxmire’s message, 
and many of them were already sympathetic to his concerns for small savers. Ultimately, 
however, the regulators took a moderate stance, instead of lowering the minimum 
denomination of MMCs, the Fed eliminated the $1,000 minimum denomination on 
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higher yield certificates with maturities of 4 years or more. At the same time, the Fed 
created a no-minimum, 4-year or longer maturity, nonnegotiable certificate tied to the 
yield on 4-year Treasury securities.61 Small savers still could not participate in the short-
term MMCs, but theoretically, the longer-term (over 4 years) certificates made higher 
yields more widely available. Practically, however, the longer maturities prohibited 
savers who also valued or required liquidity, and small savers were those least able to tie-
up their savings for years at a time. Though unintended, the MMCs nonetheless 
contributed to the achievement of ceilingless accounts for the truly small savers because 
they created urgent earnings problems that increased the likelihood of a legislative 
response.  
Rex Duwe, the President of Farmers State Bank in Kansas, testified before 
Congress in 1974, “it is my personal belief that pressure from the unregulated sector of 
the money market will eventually force the relaxation of restrictions imposed by 
regulation Q and related deposit rate ceilings, and indeed perhaps their removal.”62 A 
series of financial innovations indeed placed considerable pressure on the viability of the 
interest rate ceilings. Yet just as decisive as the market innovations that drove changes in 
housing finance were policymakers’ responses. Policymakers did not have to 
accommodate the regulatory apparatus to new financial instruments, but could, and 
sometimes did, ensure that new products fit within the existing regulatory structure or 
restrict them when they did not. Congress had sent an emphatic message to the regulators 
in the wake of the Wild-Card “experiment” that they should uphold the spirit of 
                                                 
61 Federal Reserve System, “Interest on Deposits; Early Withdrawal Penalty and Maximum Rates of 
Interest,” Federal Register 44, no. 111 (June 7, 1979): 32647. 
 




Regulation Q. FDIC Chairman Frank Wille, however, indicated that this would be a 
difficult feat, “Whenever rate ceilings have significantly impaired the ability of insured 
institutions to compete against an open market rate structure for the savings dollar,” he 
argued, “the incentives for circumventing rate ceilings increase proportionately, and 
effective enforcement of the spirit and intent of regulation Q-type ceilings becomes more 
and more difficult.”63  
Throughout the 1970s, financial innovations emerged to circumvent interest rate 
ceilings. In each instance regulators chose how to respond, in some cases moving to 
contain the new instruments and in others allowing them to go unchecked. This pattern of 
ambivalence reflected the difficulty of balancing the competing interests of different 
financial institutions and different types of consumers, the differing scales of the impact 
of various instruments, and disagreement among policymakers over the appropriate 
response. Consistent in each response, however, was some measure of a “wait and see” 
approach to regulation. Each of the innovations had a chance to take hold among 
consumers, making regulatory constraint more difficult.   
The first innovation to pose a serious threat to Regulation Q was the 1974 
Citicorp debt offering. Citicorp, a bank holding company, not First National City Bank, 
its subsidiary, announced an offering of “‘floating interest rate notes’” with an initial rate 
of 9.7%.64 Well above the Regulation Q ceiling, the notes promised to appeal to savers. 
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Representative Wright Patman (D-TX) called the notes “an obvious attempt to 
circumvent the interest rate ceilings imposed under Regulation Q,” while AFL-CIO 
President George Meany charged that the administration’s failure to stop the issue 
compounded a series of actions “that are clubbing residential construction into a 
depression.”65 Representative James Hanley (D-NY) suggested that the notes would 
divert capital from S&Ls, and housing, into international corporate investment.66 Bearing 
out these predictions, in late June, a California broker telegrammed Fed Governor 
Andrew Brimmer that he “would definitely recommend many accounts to withdraw their 
savings [from S&Ls] and receive at the present and possibly for a lengthy time a much 
higher rate of interest via this new investment vehicle.”67 The broker warned that other 
bank holding companies would likely issue their own debt offerings. 
At the urging of Patman, coupled with pressure from the U.S. League of Savings 
Associations and National Association of Mutual Savings Banks, Fed Chairman Arthur 
Burns requested that Citicorp Chairman Walter Wriston postpone the issue until the 
regulatory agencies could study their potential impact.68 Fed Vice Chairman George W. 
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Mitchell had already concluded that due to the threat of disintermediation and the impact 
on housing that, “it is not clear, therefore, that an offering of this type is in the public 
interest at this time.”69 In the meantime, Chase Manhattan worked on a comparable 
instrument,70 while a group of savings banks filed a lawsuit to stop the Citicorp issue.71 
Citicorp did delay its release date as the SEC considered approval, and eventually agreed 
to modify the instruments to make them redeemable after two years rather than every six 
months.72 This satisfied Burns and the Fed, who had concluded that present law did “not 
authorize it either to prevent or regulate the terms of the Citicorp issue,”73 but Patman and 
Proxmire and others in Congress sought to close the loophole that had given Citicorp its 
opening to circumvent Regulation Q.74 
Estimating that as much as $5 billion of similar debentures would be issued by 
U.S. companies, and thereby posing a substantial threat to the flow of housing credit, 
Patman described “an emergency situation,” that could have been avoided with foresight 
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and decisive action by the Federal Reserve.75 Instead, Fed officials had waffled, even 
though they recognized the potential threat to housing credit. Mitchell, reversing his 
initial caution, now claimed that the notes should be left alone as they offered “improved 
opportunities for individual savers and investors to get better yields.”76 
Ultimately Congress passed a Senate bill that made explicit the authority of the 
regulatory agencies to restrict debentures issued by bank holding companies.77 The Act 
granted “authority to the financial institutions regulatory agencies over obligations issued 
by bank holding companies and their affiliates… in order to respond to the highly 
competitive floating rate notes which were beginning to come on the market at that 
time.”78 Representative Fernand St. Germain indicated that the law should enable the 
regulatory agencies to “deal effectively with these debt issues and prevent any destructive 
competition with either banks or thrift institutions.”79 The House report stated “while this 
innovative approach may well be commendable, [the debt offerings’] appearance in the 
money market at a time when interest rates are at a all time high and mortgage money 
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virtually nonexistent presented sufficient cause for grave and serious concern by the 
6,000 thrift institutions….”80  
Though Citicorp reduced its offering from $850 million to $650 million, it sold 
that value of notes in one day.81 In addition to Chase, Mellon National, Crocker National, 
and Standard Oil Company of Indiana82 offered similar notes.83 Fearing that the Citicorp 
and related issues only signaled a beginning, Benjamin Blackburn (R-GA) observed that 
attempts to curb evasions of Regulation Q would be “like trying to keep water in a bag 
under pressure. [Money] is going to find a way out….”84 Blackburn offered a feeble 
reconciliation of the problem for housing, “It may be unpleasant to pay higher interest 
rates on our homes, yet if we allowed our savings institutions to pay higher rates, our 
young people would be encouraged to save more money so they could pay more down on 
their houses.”85 Despite Blackburn’s skepticism over the regulators’ ability to effectively 
enforce Regulation Q, the directive of Congress clearly stated that the regulators should 
exercise their authority to prevent evasions like the Citicorp offering in the future.  
 The $650 million raised by the Citicorp offering paled in comparison to the 
capital attracted by another financial innovation of the 1970s, the Money Market Mutual 
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Fund (MMMF). The funds grew slowly in the early to mid-70s, but in the early 1980s 
topped an astounding $100 billion dollars. In 1976, regulators gave considerable thought 
to extending Regulation Q to cover pooled deposits, a move that observers believed 
would significantly curtail the growth of money market mutual funds. Out of concern for 
ensuring market returns for investors, however, the Fed and FDIC ultimately decided not 
to issue the regulations. Like the liberalization of rate ceilings on accounts over $100,000 
that gave rise to the MMMFs, this relatively early decision constrained subsequent 
options. The MMMFs continued to grow, keeping persistent pressure on the traditional 
depository institutions to compete for savings money and concretely representing the 
difference between Regulation Q ceilings and “market rates.” As more and more savers 
invested in MMMFs, action curtailing them became less politically feasible, even as 
pressure from regulators, banks, and thrifts to do something to limit the funds grew in the 
early 1980s. This critical development and its relationship to the politics of financial 
deregulation will be covered in greater detail in Chapter Four.  
 While the MMMFs remained the most substantial threat to the efficacy of interest 
rate ceilings, other innovations continued to present regulators with opportunities to 
defend the integrity of Regulation Q or let such innovations flourish. In 1977, Person-to-
Person Financial Center, a Citicorp subsidiary, offered small denomination debentures, 
starting at $500, with a rate that would rise from 6½ % to 9½ % over five years.86 The 
“rising rate” notes, which were issued by Person-to Person branches in Arizona and 
Colorado, caught the notice of the US Savings League as well as the Fed and FHLBB. 
FHLBB staffer Rebecca Laird wrote to Daniel Goldberg of the FHLBB Counsel’s office 
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that although the thrift lobby recognized that the instruments were not a financially 
significant threat at that time, officials believed that for “the Federal Reserve to let the 
Citicorp action go unchallenged would set a precedent which would in the future make it 
much more difficult to halt such ‘extra curricular fund raising’ by bank holding 
companies.”87 Laird urged that the Fed should exercise the power Congress granted it in 
1974 and “take action to maintain the continued integrity of Regulation Q.”88 Fed 
regulators, however, chose to simply monitor their impact,89 while developing regulations 
establishing Fed guidelines on determining what issues qualified as deposits for future 
cases.90 
 The rising rate notes did not make the same impact as the 1974 Citicorp issue, or 
the MMMFs, but the episode revealed the continuing tension among regulators regarding 
Regulation Q. Some, like Laird, in this case, felt that regulators should “maintain the 
integrity” of interest rate ceilings, while others erred on the side of allowing innovations 
to sink or swim in the market before ruling. The occasion also exposed a divide over 
whether action should be triggered by principle (if an innovation undermined existing 
regulation, it should be checked), or by the scale of the problem an innovation posed (act 
only if it turned out to cause significant disintermediation). The latter course tended to 
win out, and while not an issue in the case of the rising rate notes, had the potential 
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danger of allowing a product to gain a popular (political) foothold as it became a 
problem, making it more difficult to curb once it did pose a threat to the public interest.   
 The innovations of bank holding companies and their subsidiaries that fell outside 
of the jurisdiction of the Fed, FHLBB, FDIC, and Comptroller of the Currency 
represented one weak spot in the regulatory structure; the so-called dual-banking system 
that split regulation between state and federal regulators according to their charter was 
another. Though many state-chartered institutions came under some measure of federal 
control due to their participation in federal deposit insurance, state regulations dictated 
their asset powers. Differences in asset and investment authority between state- and 
federally-chartered institutions in the same markets created competitive imbalances. 
Anytime state-regulated institutions’ powers outstripped those of their federal 
counterparts, the latter would plead for equal authority. Similarly, while institutions could 
not open branches across state lines, consumers could deposit in neighboring states, and 
disparities in services in contiguous states led to calls for equalization of powers.  
 One instrument that entered the market through this hole in the regulatory 
structure was the negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) account, a savings account that 
allowed a withdrawal payable to a third-party, arguably in violation of the statutory 
prohibition of payment of interest on checking accounts. NOW accounts originated in 
Massachusetts in 1972 under state regulation before incrementally being authorized for 
federal institutions. In 1968, Ronald Haselton, a former commercial banker, became 
president of Worcester Five Cent Savings Bank, later Consumers Savings Bank. 
Frustrated with the more restricted services that a savings bank could offer, Haselton 
petitioned the Massachusetts Banking Department to approve third party payment 
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accounts. When the state regulators refused authorization, Haselton appealed to the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, which in 1972, ruled that the accounts were 
legal.91  
 The first federal authorization of negotiable order of withdrawal accounts, for 
institutions in Massachusetts and New Hampshire only, was folded into the 1973 
extension of Regulation Q (P.L. 93-100). The authorization corrected the competitive 
imbalance between the state- and federally-chartered institutions in those states, but 
reinforced the imbalance between the depositors of those states and those of the rest of 
the nation. The act’s conferees intended the authorization as “an experiment for this type 
of service to see whether it should be extended on a national basis.”92 Yet, by giving 
savers in two states access to services not available elsewhere, lawmakers again 
discriminated against a group of savers. This particular feature of the experiment made 
expansion of NOW accounts all but certain, as it would be much more politically feasible 
to give than to take away. By November 1974, sixty-five savings banks in Massachusetts 
and fourteen in New Hampshire offered NOW accounts. The success of the accounts in 
those states left institutions in neighboring states clamoring for similar powers, and in a 
sort of falling domino pattern, federal authorization followed incrementally for the rest of 
New England and New York in 1976,93 and New Jersey effective January 1980,94 before 
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national authorization through the Depository Institution Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act of 1980. 
 The expansion of NOW accounts, however, did give policymakers pause, as it 
promised to increase costs for depository institutions. Paralleling the debate over 
loosening or eliminating Regulation Q, NOW accounts offered higher (but still limited) 
returns for savers, but also posed a threat to the profitability of banks and thrifts, and, by 
extension, the flow of credit. Ultimately, regulators erred on the side of favoring services 
for consumer-savers. FDIC Chairman Frank Wille wrote to St. Germain in 1973, “‘I am 
personally convinced that the payment of interest to depositors on accounts against which 
third-party orders may be drawn is almost inevitable and in the public interest…there is 
no inherent virtue in a rigid separation between traditional checking and savings accounts 
in the banking system.’”95 Wille’s assumption of the inevitability of interest-bearing 
checking accounts, coupled with the “experimental” piecemeal extension of NOW 
accounts, made national authority a more likely, if not certain outcome. The prolonged 
deliberation over national authorization kept NOW accounts in the middle of the debate 
over financial restructuring into the late 1970s. Along with elimination of Regulation Q, 
NOW accounts remained on the table as a consumer (saver)-friendly initiative and 
bargaining chip for expanded asset powers. National NOW account authorization 
ultimately proved pivotal in the legislative back and forth that led to passage of the 
DIDMCA.  
In 1977, FDIC Chairman Robert Barnett quoted former ABA president Rex 
Duwe, “if Regulation Q is phased out, it won’t be because banks want it or because they 
                                                 




don’t want it, or because thrifts want it or don’t want it, or because thrifts want it or don’t 
want it. It will be because consumers want it.”96 Critics of Regulation Q had long noted 
that the interest rate ceilings could unfairly prevent savers from earning market rates of 
return on their deposits. As early as 1971, the Hunt Commission Report had charged that 
“interest rate regulations have discriminated against small savers,”97 an indictment 
repeated publicly by President Nixon.98 Yet these early protests failed to resonate widely 
in Congress, where most lawmakers reflexively accepted Regulation Q as a component of 
the unassailably popular cause of promoting homeownership. 
By the close of the decade, however, ending “discrimination against small savers” 
had become an unassailable position of its own, and something of a crusade for some key 
lawmakers (especially Senators Thomas McIntyre and William Proxmire), ultimately 
gaining consensus in Congress. Several developments contributed to this turnabout. 
Acute periods of inflation caused unprecedented spreads between Regulation Q ceilings 
and market rates, making the “injustice” to small savers that much more visible. A small 
handful of scholars attempted to quantify these spreads, which they described as “lost” 
savings. Placing that figure in the billions of dollars, these studies caught the attention of 
policymakers, and, usually when cited by a newspaper columnist, that of a broader public 
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as well.99 Savers themselves drew attention to the issue when they withdrew their 
deposits from banks and thrifts to seek higher yields of the uninsured money markets 
(though the majority of savers did not do this). As market interest rates continued to rise 
into the late 1970s and thrifts struggled to sustain deposit growth, it became less clear to 
policymakers that the rate ceilings were achieving the presumed trade-off for the low 
returns, a cheap source of capital for housing. If Regulation Q was not providing a steady 
stream of credit for housing, policymakers found the lower returns to savers indefensible. 
Finally, though all of these developments preceded any discernible popular public protest 
against Regulation Q, when disgruntled savers did take to the streets in 1978, they gave a 
public face to the small savers that policymakers had begun to champion.  
The small saver, both real and rhetorical, imbued the push against Regulation Q 
with a righteousness sufficient to make a position that could be viewed as inimical to 
homeownership into a populist one. Invoking the interests of small savers, policymakers 
opposed traditionally powerful interests including the thrift and construction lobbies. 
Lawmakers who remained deeply suspicious about some of the items of the broad 
deregulatory agenda laid out by the Hunt Commission, especially variable-rate 
mortgages, came to embrace the particular deregulation of interest rate ceilings. Still, 
until the ceilings were completely eliminated, the actions on behalf of small savers did 
not benefit the smallest of savers. When regulators gradually allowed traditional 
depository institutions to offer higher yield instruments, they did so at minimum 
denominations that were prohibitive to most savers. The major beneficiaries, then, of the 
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campaign to achieve equity for small savers, were middle class saver/investors, those 
with enough money to reach the $10,000, $5,000, or, at best, $1,000 minimum 
denominations of higher yield savings instruments.    
A few critics attempted to point out the mismatch between rhetoric and policy. In 
1974, during debate over the Citicorp debt offering, Congressman Frank Annunzio (D-
IL) mused, “I hear all of you talking about small depositors, and what a great break they 
are apparently going to get. What is your definition of a small depositor? I do not know 
anybody in my district who has $5,000 or $1,000. What is a small depositor?”100 A 1971-
72 survey of consumers by the Survey Research Center at Ann Arbor estimated that only 
about 16½ % of American families could afford to even consider buying an instrument 
with a $5,000 minimum.101 Yet the idea of a small saver weighed more heavily in debates 
than such numbers would indicate and remained an important symbol. Representative 
Henry Reuss (D-WI), revealed who he imagined as the small depositor: “Archie 
Bunker.”102 Despite the constant evocation of the “small saver” in arguing against 
restrictions on the investments, unless he had $5,000 he would not have to touch for 
several years, Archie Bunker had little to gain from the Citicorp debt offering or other 
high minimum instruments.  
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Small saver rhetoric notwithstanding, through the early 1970s, the real threat of 
disintermediation came from “big savers,” corporations and wealthy individuals.103  
Policymakers and bank officials conceptually separated depositors with over $100,000, 
which they considered “sophisticated investors who are extremely yield conscious,”104 
from the “consumer deposits” under $100,000 that were “more concerned with 
availability and safety than yield.”105 Yet by the mid-1970s, observers began to note the 
increasing sophistication and interest rate sensitivity of consumer depositors below the 
$100,000 line.106 In 1973, for example, FHLBB Chairman Thomas Bomar remarked, 
“over the long-run the typical saver is becoming increasingly more sophisticated.” 
Attempting to explain this phenomenon, Bomar added, “the more the average saver is 
exposed to certificates, the more willing and able he becomes to search out other savings 
opportunities.”107 In other words, the proliferation of financial innovations that 
circumvented Regulation Q, such as the MMMFs, Citicorp notes, or even the Wildcard 
certificates, served to educate the saving public about higher yield alternatives.  
 Sensitivity to discrimination against small savers among both policymakers and 
savers heightened due to a sustained academic critique of interest rate ceilings. In 1970, 
Boston College Economics Professor Edward J. Kane published an article that argued 
that the federal government, through interest rate ceilings on time deposits and high 
                                                 
103 As ABA President Clausen wrote, “funds held in large deposits immediately flow out of the banking 
system into higher yielding investments.” Letter, A.W. Clausen to Arthur Burns, September 21, 1970, 






106 On this phenomenon, see Joseph Nocera, A Piece of the Action: How the Middle Class Joined the 
Money Class (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994). 
 




minimums on other investment instruments including U.S. savings bonds, systematically 
kept lower income Americans from receiving market rates of interest in order to prop up 
the thrift and construction industries. These “small savers” largely unwittingly subsidized 
those industries in collusion with federal policymakers. Kane rejected the idea that the 
ceilings and high minimums were necessary to prevent disintermediation, offering 
alternatives such as expanding the asset powers of the thrifts or providing a more explicit 
(visible) subsidy to ailing thrifts.108 Kane charged that only the disproportionate influence 
of the thrift lobby allowed the continuation of a “system of mortgage subsidization and 
deposit-rate ceilings [that] imposes a regressive tax on interest income and a perverse 
subsidy on interest expense.”109  
Kane contributed to a growing counter narrative that sought to expose the quaint 
3-6-3 rule as a scheme to deprive “the nation’s least-wealthy (and especially its older and 
unlanded) citizens of the savings opportunities that the market would give them if it were 
free to operate without government interference.”110 According to this logic, savers had 
effectively “lost” money that they would have earned in the absence of Regulation Q. 
This created something of a puzzle for interested economists: exactly how much interest 
earnings had depositors lost? David H. Pyle, a professor at the University of California, 
Berkeley took up the challenge, and his findings quickly became ammunition for 
opponents of Regulation Q. Pyle devised a model to estimate the rates that savers would 
have earned between 1968-1970, subtracted the amount savers did earn in that period, 
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and came up with a staggering figure: $5 billion.111 Pyle updated this research in 1978 to 
estimate losses of $22 billion from 1968-1975.112 In a similar study, Bruce Morgan, of 
Golembe Associates for the ABA in 1978, estimated losses to deposits of under $100,000 
to have reached as high as $6 billion annually.113 Readily citable amounts of savings lost 
to Regulation Q bolstered the case that the interest rate ceilings unfairly discriminated 
against savers. Senator McIntyre argued, “Why should the younger generation, young 
people of today, be subsidized at the expense of older people, when the older generation 
does not even realize they are doing it?”114 Ignoring, for the moment, that the market 
might value larger sums of money more highly, observers like McIntyre compared the 
plight of the “little guy” unfavorably to the options available to the wealthy investor. 
Through the mid-1970s, the small saver remained largely invisible. The small 
saver invoked by the Hunt Commission report had been little more than a theoretical 
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construct. In some instances, as when the Fed and FDIC proposed regulations prohibiting 
pooling of deposits to circumvent Regulation Q ceilings, a handful of savers wrote letters 
of protest to Congress and directly to the regulators. And some savers made their 
presence felt by withdrawing their deposits from banks and thrifts to pursue higher yields 
elsewhere. Yet until 1978, the small saver lacked a public face, and even then the vast 
majority of savers played at most a passive, though critical, role in the crusade against 
Regulation Q carried out in their name. An exception to this general rule, a small group 
of mostly elderly savers took an active role in protesting against interest rate ceilings. On 
October 19, 1978, a group from the San Francisco chapter of the Gray Panthers, along 
with the California Legislative Council for Older Americans, petitioned the federal 
regulators of depository institutions to ensure that savings rates kept up with inflation, or 
else require depository institutions to post cigarette package-style warnings saying 
“savings deposits may be dangerous to your wealth.” Members of the groups picketed 
outside of the Federal Reserve Building in San Francisco as a copy of the petition was 
hand delivered there.115  
 The petition, reinforced by the protest, garnered the attention of policymakers in 
Washington, and both Houses of Congress invited representatives of the Gray Panthers to 
testify on Regulation Q. The attorney representing the group, Robert Gnaizda, called 
Regulation Q “the largest government-led consumer fraud in American history.”116 
Thelma Rutherford, another Gray Panthers representative, testified to the Senate:  
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The family units who did not own any real estate assets at all and who are the big 
losers in regulation Q are namely the black, the female, the poor and the young… 
We, who are in the aged category, feel with the disadvantaged, but we, too, are 
disadvantaged when our interest rates are held to a minimum while others may 
obtain the maximum rates.117 
 
Rutherford acknowledged that liberalization of Regulation Q could raise the barriers to 
homeownership through higher borrowing rates, but reasoned that potential homeowners 
could save up for the higher rates and down payments, and continued to argue that the 
ceilings were unfair to the elderly. The President of the San Francisco Chapter of the 
Gray Panthers, Hilda Cloud, fumed, “We, the elders of this country, helped to build it, 
and we helped to make this country great. Is this how we are being repaid?”118 That 
Cloud could assert that her generation had made the country great without reference to 
the federal interventions that aided them, including Regulation Q and the New Deal 
housing finance regime, reflected the prevailing culture of meritocracy, which reigned in 
no small part due to the efforts of federal officials to erase the government’s role in 
“making the country great.”119 The Gray Panthers’ formal proposal did include a direct 
government subsidy to savings and loans with “an unduly large number of low interest 
mortgages,” indicating that they had no aversion to subsidy of mortgages so long as the 
government, not the depositor, paid the price (eliding, for the moment, the role of the 
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depositor-tax payer).120 Though not active in picketing, the American Association of 
Retired Persons and the National Retired Teachers Association joined the Gray Panthers 
in testifying against Regulation Q.121  
Policymakers took notice of the protests. Even those who had long spoken of the 
small saver, like Congressman St. Germain, felt the added pressure of a vocal and active 
group of sympathetic, largely elderly, savers marching in the streets. He remarked, “We 
have the Grey Panthers attacking us. They want more money for their savings, and they 
are a formidable group. We have the Consumer Federation of America, they want more 
money for their savings and they are a formidable group.”122 Other savers wrote directly 
to their Congressional representatives, crying for help.   
“Equity for the small saver,” an imperative all the more urgent in light of 
increasing inflation and grassroots protest, became the issue that broke the legislative 
logjam that had held up financial reform for a decade. Lawmakers who had hesitated to 
embrace the deregulatory agenda proposed by the Hunt Commission, had come around 
on at least the issue of deregulation of interest rate ceilings. The consensus behind the 
commitment to eliminate “discrimination against small savers” solidified in Senate 
Concurrent Resolution 5 on February 8, 1979. The resolution directed the federal 
financial agencies to “provide an appropriate method under which the interest rate on 
small savings deposits and accounts is increased equitably in order to reduce the adverse 
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impact of such Regulation [Q and related ceilings] on the holders of such deposits and 
accounts.”123 This was easier resolved than done, as Garth Marston reminded Proxmire 
that the FHLBB was aware of the need to improve returns for small savers but that this 
must be balanced “with the need to ensure the continuing financial viability of the 
nation’s primary source of mortgage credit.”124 Additionally, once committed to ending 
rate ceilings, lawmakers found themselves engaged in a negotiation that pulled them 
deeper and deeper into a broader deregulatory agenda, even as many remained deeply 
suspicious of some of its features, none more so than the variable-rate mortgage.   
 
In Defense of Regulation Q 
 
 
 The deregulationist critique of the New Deal regulatory regime (and interest rate 
ceilings in particular), the emergence of financial innovations to circumvent Regulation 
Q, and protest from small savers combined to challenge the New Deal system of housing 
finance, yet Regulation Q proved doggedly persistent. In 1971 Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia President David Eastburn wrote, “All the political pressures seem to work in 
the direction of continuing and strengthening the ceilings. If the [Federal Reserve] 
System is to disengage, it will have to do so by conscious and deliberate effort.”125 The 
remarkable fact about the various commission recommendations to eliminate Regulation 
Q and the decade of legislative attempts to implement them was that Congress repeatedly 
rejected them. The thrift industry and the majority of small commercial banks steadfastly 
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clung to Regulation Q as their lifeblood. Regulators at the various federal financial 
agencies displayed greater ambivalence–with factions for and against strict enforcement 
of Regulation Q, but even those philosophically against it sometimes stood up for the 
ceilings at least temporarily.  
 Eastburn’s assessment that “all political pressures” remained behind continuance 
of rate ceilings largely held through mid-decade. The most vociferous defenders of 
Regulation Q and the differential were, of course, the thrifts and their regulators. In large 
measure, this position reflected self-interest. Many thrift officials believed that the rate 
ceilings ensured low cost-funds, allowing their portfolios of long-term mortgages to 
remain profitable and that the small competitive advantage they enjoyed over banks 
through the differential allowed them to attract more capital than they otherwise could. 
As the nation’s foremost housing lenders, this self-interested defense merged with a 
broader defense of homeownership. Thrift officials and FHLBB regulators made a 
credible case that Regulation Q and the differential played a substantial role in the 
historic expansion of homeownership in post-World War II America.   
John Horne, a former chairman of the FHLBB and then chairman of the board of 
Investors Mortgage Insurance Co., testified in 1973, “Unquestionably, without 
Regulation Q as now structured the almost unbelievable growth of the savings and loan 
and the mutual savings banks industries would not have been possible. And neither would 
it have been possible to reach the unprecedented volume of more than 2 million housing 
units annually.”126 Even before Congress extended the ceilings to thrifts in 1966 and 
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instituted the differential, Regulation Q protection had allowed thrifts to increase their 
share of household savings by 20% between 1947 and 1960. And even during the height 
of anti-Regulation Q sentiment, S&L official Donald Lotrich maintained, “Everyone in 
the industry and the bankers throughout the country recognize that Regulation ‘Q’ has 
given the Savings and Loans the opportunity to obtain funds and make thousands of 
residential loans for American families that they could never do without Regulation 
‘Q’.”127 Horne and other thrift industry representatives continually asserted that the future 
of homeownership depended on the health of the thrifts, which, in turn, depended on 
Regulation Q.   
Raleigh W. Greene of the National League of Savings Associations, charged that 
Regulation Q opponents had no viable alternative for delivering long-term, low-interest 
mortgages.128 By protecting a source of predictable, low-cost funds, Regulation Q 
enabled S&Ls to accept the risk of making long-term mortgages (they could make a 30 
year loan at 6% if they could be reasonably sure that the cost of their deposits would be 
around 3%). Greene implied that without Regulation Q and the other statutory protections 
and advantages for the specialized lenders, no private institution would take on such 
interest risk. In 1977, a somewhat more objective observer, Lawrence Simons, Assistant 
Secretary for Housing, Federal Housing Commission, HUD, similarly concluded, “We 
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must have a sound alternative method of promoting housing production before we 
abandon the structure that we have in place.”129  
As the critique of Regulation Q developed, the extensions became more and more 
contentious, but even for those who wanted to eliminate Regulation Q, “now” was never 
the time.130 Though lawmakers continued to reauthorize the extension on a temporary 
basis, they did so eleven times between 1966 and 1980.131 Regulation Q authority lapsed 
once, between June 1 and August 16, 1973, pending conference negotiations on 
legislation to extend the ceilings. During that period the Federal Reserve “called on 
member banks to observe existing rate ceilings…notwithstanding a temporary hiatus in 
that authority.”132 Similarly, following the lead of the Hunt Commission 
recommendations, calls for removal of interest rate ceilings always came in the form of a 
gradual phase-out in order to give the thrifts time to adjust.  
The first sign of a break in the pattern of nearly automatic Congressional 
reauthorization came in 1976. In a speech to the National Savings and Loan League, 
Senator McIntyre (D-NH) warned, “There are not likely to be such things as ‘simple’ 
extensions of Regulation Q anymore.”133 McIntyre, who had supported the successive 
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attempts at financial reform by the Nixon and Ford administrations, considered 
Regulation Q both “anti-competitive and anti-consumer.”134 He warned his audience of 
thrift officials to begin preparing for life after Regulation Q. McIntyre attempted to make 
due on his threat, but Congress again reauthorized the ceilings through December 15, 
1980.  
Defenders of Regulation Q understood that of the many arguments against interest 
rate ceilings, the premise that Regulation Q discriminated against small savers held the 
greatest potential to undercut their contention that theirs was the populist position–the 
one that defended homeownership. Some proponents of Regulation Q weighed the 
ceilings in the context of savers and borrowers, arguing that lower returns to savers made 
widespread homeownership possible. During 1973 hearings, Senator Proxmire, who 
would later lead the charge against Regulation Q, questioned the lone representative of 
the consumer “victims,” Robert Shay of Consumers Union. The Senator asked, “Who are 
your members though? I heard, maybe this unfair, that they represent, by and large, a 
professional middle-class group that already owns their homes, are savers and aren’t too 
concerned, by and large, about the young people who are forming families now and 
buying homes.”135 Proxmire implied that the interests of the consumer-borrower too, 
should be considered in debates over the ceilings. Mike Sumichrast, an economist with 
the National Association of Home Builders made the case concrete in his response to 
calls for higher returns for small savers, “You are suggesting that we should pay [the 
                                                                                                                                                 









small saver] over and above what we are paying him now, and he should be the 
beneficiary of the high dividends. So you pay him a percentage, 1½ percent more, in 
order that his son might buy a house and pay a 12-percent mortgage rate.”136 Rather than 
viewing Regulation Q as a system that unfairly forced savers to subsidize homeowners, 
AFL-CIO economist Henry B. Schechter argued, “What we have been doing is one 
generation helping another become homeowners.”137 Schechter acknowledged the 
potentially under-market rates of return on savings, but viewed this “cost” as the price 
paid for a system that promoted homeownership, a system that must continue so that 
subsequent generations could reap the same benefits.  
Others, instead of arguing that the good outweighed the bad, took on the very 
premise that ceilings discriminated against small savers. In 1974, Gilbert Roessner of the 
National Savings and Loan League argued, “This business with the small saver getting 
the rap is getting a lot of publicity [but] I talk to a good many of our depositors. They are 
very happy with our 7½ percent certificate. They never dreamed they would earn 7½ 
percent. Now they are getting restless because they are paying greater and greater prices 
at the grocery store, but the small saver does not think he is taking a rap.”138 Depository 
institutions offered convenience, liquidity, and safety, in the form of federal deposit 
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insurance. Regulation Q defenders suggested that savers quite reasonably accepted lower 
rates in exchange for those benefits.139  
 Ultimately, small savers were best served, Tom Scott of the U.S. Savings and 
Loan League, and Morris D. Crawford of the National Association of Mutual Savings 
Banks argued, by a viable thrift industry. Scott testified, “The truth of the matter is that 
over any given period of time the thrift institutions have done much better for the small 
saver, if this is the proper term, than the security market has and can do.”140 The 
President of the National Association of Home Builders, George C. Martin, added that 
the idea of the system was that people “left their money in a place that was federally 
insured and guaranteed, and deposited at a reasonable rate of interest…. Now, the whole 
concept of the wheeler-dealer, chasing the fastest buck and putting your money where 
you can get it, is all right to pursue if you want to destroy the system that has created 
savings and created our basic financial structure.”141 Martin argued that the consumer-
saver earning higher interest would pay for that rate through inflated rates and prices 
across the board, concluding, “it is going to cause your children to pay more for 
housing.”142   
In 1979, S&L President Max Johnson charged, “Senator Proxmire refers to small 
savers subsidizing us. We also have what is called a small borrower. I don’t really know 
                                                 
139 Ibid., 386. See also, House Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and 
Insurance, Regulation Q, 2561, House Committee on Banking and Currency, The Credit Crunch and 
Reform of Financial Institutions, 407, Leary to Garry Brown, October 19, 1973, ibid., 486, and “Second 
Draft, April 5, 1979, Statement of Robert H. McKinney, Chairman, FHLBB”; Community Reinvestment 
Act; Legislative Files, 1949-1988; Records of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board; RG 195; NACP. 
 
140 House Committee on Banking and Currency, The Credit Crunch and Reform of Financial Institutions, 
204. 
 






how this borrower can afford the interest rates we now have to charge.”143 Throughout 
the decade of debate over Regulation Q, critics warned and advocates soberly assented 
that the removal of interest rate ceilings would result in higher costs for borrowers. 
During 1973 hearings, AFL-CIO representative Nat Goldfinger responded to Senator 
McIntyre, “The small saver may get some benefit from an increased interest rate on his 
savings. But he gets hit to a much greater degree, Mr. Chairman, by the high cost of 
interest that the has to pay on his own loans, on mortgages, on consumer loans, 
installment loans, and also by the increase in prices, by the inflationary impact of high 
interest rates.”144 ABA President Rex Morthland put it more succinctly, “if the user gets 
it, the borrower pays for it.”145 The expectation that increased cost of funds would mean 
increased costs to borrowers was repeated again and again from bankers, thrift officials, 
regulators, and other observers. Law professor John Spanogle argued, the small saver 
“has been discriminated against, and that’s wrong. But you should look at the side effect 
that it will have if these [deposit] interest rates are allowed to rise. The interest rates, the 
cost of money to the thrift institutions, will also rise as the interest rates to savers go up, 
and therefore, the interest rates charged to borrowers will have to rise.”146 Given the 
overwhelming consensus and logic of the case that borrowers would pay the cost of any 
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benefits to savers, such costs cannot be considered unintended consequences.147 Though 
they might have been undesirable consequences, lawmakers had every reason to believe 
that if they helped savers, then they would hurt borrowers, and they decided to so 
anyway.  
As long as housing finance came from depository institutions, it seemed that the 
interests of consumer savers and consumer borrowers would continue to conflict. FHLBB 
Chairman Garth Marston explained, “There are about five savers to every one borrower. 
They are the ones who put up the funds for the home-purchase borrower. In turn, the 
borrowers provide the income to the savers. There is no other way around the fact they 
both need the help of each other.”148 Opponents of Regulation Q proposed a recalibration 
of the balance of those competing interests, arguing that it was only fair to tip the balance 
toward the consumer-saver. This appraisal failed to account for the fact that many savers 
themselves were also borrowers, and the temporal measure of fairness; changing the 
system meant borrowers prior to the change enjoyed terms that would not be available to 
borrowers after the removal of the ceilings. 
S&L V.P. Warren Bain wrote in 1979, “What Senator Proxmire does not address 
or state is that many home purchasers are also small savers, and in the event that the 
small saver is able to obtain a greater yield on his/her savings of say $1,000 or $2,000, 
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how much more will it cost that same small saver to purchase a home!!?”149 Bain argued 
that is was not savers who subsidized borrowers, but current homebuyers subsidizing the 
past low rates of earlier homebuyers. Bain concluded, “Too many of the ‘small savers’ 
Senator Proxmire has so eloquently spoken about will be effectively priced out of the 
housing market for good….”150 Consumers were savers and borrowers, and often both at 
once. Even if a consumer-saver was not and did not become a borrower, that customer 
could still bear the cost of increased rates through new fees and service charges. Lloyd 
Bowles of the U.S. League of Savings Associations warned in 1977, “frankly, we fear 
that without Regulation Q, the big banks will eventually ‘gobble up’ the smaller banks 
and the thrift institutions and we will end up in this country with a dozen or so super 
banks. There is no guarantee that the consumer saver will prosper under such a free 
savings environment.”151  
 
Deregulatory Quid Pro Quo 
 
 
Over the course of debate over financial restructuring, elimination of Regulation 
Q became wedded to asset deregulation for thrifts. During hearings on the Nixon 
Administration’s Financial Institutions Act of 1973, Senator Proxmire observed, “it might 
have been a political judgment on the part of Mr. Simon and others who drafted this [bill] 
that if they’re going to get regulation Q changed, there would have to be some kind of a 
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quid pro quo; otherwise, you will get the S. & L.’s, who are strong and represent a 
vigorous and effective force up here.”152 The Hunt Commission recommendations had 
anticipated as much, outlining a ten year period to phase-out Regulation Q that it argued 
should be adopted in tandem with broadened asset powers. But the offer to the thrifts 
would have to be very sweet, as while many thrift officials eagerly sought new asset 
powers, they proved extremely reluctant to make concessions on Regulation Q to achieve 
them. The reforms of the 1973 legislative proposal did not go far enough, as AFL-CIO 
economist Nat Goldfinger noted, “It would be a bad bargain for the thrift institutions to 
accept the tax changes and increased investment powers as a quid pro quo for the 
removal of Regulation Q. The net effect would be a greater competitive advantage for 
commercial banks than they now have.”153  
For the most part, policymakers remained convinced that removal of Regulation 
Q had to be joined by new asset powers to allow the thrifts to survive an increase in their 
cost of funds and a loss of the competitive advantage afforded by the differential. Fed 
Secretary Tynan Smith wrote to then Deputy Secretary of the Treasury William Simon in 
1973, “The Board supports the general goal of eventually eliminating interest rate 
ceilings on time and savings deposits, but only as the portfolios of thrift institutions have 
become sufficiently adjusted to permit them to compete effectively for funds even during 
periods of credit restraint.”154 Consensus over just what asset powers would be necessary, 
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however, was harder to achieve. ABA President Rex Morthland argued, “to make 
feasible elimination of deposit rate ceilings, State usury ceilings on loan interest rates 
must be removed, raised, or preempted. We cannot pay higher rates on time deposits if 
we cannot earn the higher rates of interest on our assets.”155 Yet thrift officials continued 
to be suspicious of recommendations like those from the ABA that promised changes that 
would apply to all financial institutions, offering no continued competitive protection.  
Speaking to the National Savings and Loan League in 1976, Senator McIntyre 
scolded his audience for allowing themselves to be held hostage to the differential, 
declining to advocate for enhanced asset powers for fear that the differential be taken 
away in exchange. McIntyre challenged, “Forget about the Hunt Commission, forget 
about the Financial Institutions Act, forget about the Financial Reform Act. Decide for 
yourselves what will best serve the needs of your industry and the public as well… stand 
up and be counted.”156 FHLBB Chief Economist and Director of the Office of Economic 
Research, Donald Kaplan reinforced this message, speaking to the same group that fall. 
Kaplan warned that Senator McIntyre had indicated that piecemeal financial reforms 
were more likely than comprehensive legislation. In such an event, Kaplan contended, 
“The savings and loan industry will face some real risks with regard to what many of you 
feel are the ‘quid pro quos’ for Reg. Q and the differential. We can be sure that as soon as 
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one broadened power is achieved, there will be those that will argue that the differential 
should be narrowed and/or the ceiling raised, immediately.”157 Given a piecemeal 
approach, Kaplan suggested that the savings and loans would find it difficult to win all of 
the asset powers they sought, as they would be “in the awkward, and unfortunate, 
position of arguing against new powers that you want, and need, and which some of you 
sought as part of a package of powers only a short time ago,” because they will be 
opposed to the concomitant liberalization of Regulation Q ceilings and/or the 
differential.158 The differential, Kaplan asserted, would be in danger anytime that thrift 
earnings rose, and “in the long run, it is new financial services such as NOW accounts 
and consumer loans, that the public will want, not a quarter of one percent 
differential.”159 Some thrift officials began to sense that Regulation Q and the differential 
would not survive in the long-term. While they continued to fight tooth and nail to hold 
on to both as long as possible, they heeded McIntyre’s advice and upped the ante on 
pressing for the expanded powers they would want in a post-Regulation Q environment. 
First and foremost, that meant variable-rate mortgages. Lloyd Bowles, of the U.S. 
League of Savings Associations, referring to a resolution recommending authorization of 
some type of flexible-rate instrument, said, “if that were permitted, Mr. Chairman, then 
I’m saying to you–as an individual savings and loan operator–and you give us 7 or 8 
years with some protection, then I will assure you that our outlook on regulation Q will 
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be entirely different.”160 This presented a problem for lawmakers like Senator Proxmire, 
who, for the same kinds of reasons that they desperately wanted to see that small savers 
earned market returns, wanted consumer protections against usury and variable-rate 
mortgages.161  
While House Democrats hesitated to proceed with expansive deregulation, a 
presidential task force on Regulation Q recommended deregulation of both the assets and 
liabilities of depository institutions. The task force included representatives from 
Treasury, HUD, OMB, CEA, FDIC, FHLBB, OCC, the National Credit Union 
Administration, the Federal Reserve, and the Special Assistant to the President for 
Consumer Affairs.162 The report highlighted three main problems, arguing that 
Regulation Q, caused disintermediation, leading to a contraction of funds available for 
housing, unfairly penalized savers who get below market rates on deposits, and made the 
market inefficient.163 The task force recommended a gradual phase-out of Regulation Q 
coupled with the loosening of regulations on the assets of savings institutions, including 
the authorization of VRMs, allowing federally chartered S&Ls to make consumer loans 
(up to 10% of their portfolios), and the authorization of negotiated order withdrawal 
(NOW) accounts (the interest-bearing transaction accounts).164   
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The task force reasoned that given the fact that Regulation Q failed to stop the 
cyclicality of housing markets and was contributing to disintermediation, the costs, the 
below market return to depositors and “market inefficiency,” no longer justified an 
attempt to secure a cheap pool of housing credit through Regulation Q. Without 
Regulation Q, they argued, savings institutions would be free to compete for money 
against unregulated instruments such as money market mutual funds, and therefore could 
ensure the flow of credit for housing.165 The task force recognized that if savings 
institutions were to compete for funds they would need broader investment powers in 
order to survive.166 The task force, then, firmly linked the deregulation of savings 
institutions’ liabilities to the deregulation of their assets, with the qualification that a 
gradual phase-out of Regulation Q would offer the thrifts a period of adjustment. 
As they made their case, the task force repeatedly underscored the unfairness of 
Regulation Q to small depositors, “the current system of rate ceilings is manifestly unfair 
to small depositors [whereas] large depositors can receive market rates because of the 
exemption from the ceilings of CDs of $100,000 or more.”167 In fact, all of the regulatory 
efforts to stem disintermediation targeted large depositors, as all of the new instruments 
designed to compete with unregulated savings/investment instruments had high minimum 
buy-ins, often $10,000 or more. It is likely however, that disintermediation was caused by 
medium to large depositors, not the small depositors the task force seemed to be suddenly 
championing. The report cited the studies of economists David H. Pyle and Edward J. 
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Kane estimating the “loss” to small depositors. Kane’s most recent calculation estimated 
that between 1968 and 1979, the figure was close to $42 billion.168 Consequently, the task 
force argued that Regulation Q, “cruelly discriminates against our older citizens, many of 
whom depend in part on the income from savings for their livelihood. It discourages 
saving, preventing many Americans from improving their standards of living in the future 
through this traditional means.”169   
At the same time, however, the task force also maintained that Regulation Q 
“fostered the development of new institutions and markets ready to meet the demands of 
the customer.”170 Though bemoaning the lack of saving, they argued that consumers were 
becoming increasingly sensitive to interest rates, and therefore were quite responsive to 
the new markets and their services and comparatively high-interest instruments. Perhaps 
the most popular of such investment options were money market funds with check 
writing options. The task force noted that once such instruments were available it would 
be exceedingly difficult, meaning politically untenable, to retroactively regulate or 
prohibit them. They predicted that consumers were likely to divert their savings into these 
unregulated (and thereby uninsured) instruments in greater and greater numbers. “Such a 
development,” they argued, “would not portend well for either the overall safety and 
soundness of our financial markets, including our savings institutions, or the maintenance 
of an adequate flow of funds to the housing sector.”171 This assessment pointed toward 
policy changes that joined higher yields to deposit insurance. 
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Around the time that the Carter Administration began to receive attention from 
the media for its recommendation to eliminate Regulation Q, Citibank took a more 
aggressive public position against the ceilings. In a full page advertisement, the nation’s 
second largest bank cleverly addressed members of Congress. The ad read, “‘Deposit 
$500 with us today, and we’ll give you back $475 next year.’” With no apparent fear that 
the ad would be misunderstood by consumers, the text went on to explain:  
If a bank ran an ad like the one above, imagines the reaction of the Congress. 
Imagine the public reaction. But an American who puts $500 into a regular 
savings account today loses about $25 a year in purchasing power. That’s because 
the law won’t let banks pay more than 5 or 5¼ percent interest on regular savings 
accounts, while inflation keeps reducing the value of the money in these accounts. 
 
The ad signaled the cleavage between the very largest banks, Bank of America, Citibank, 
and a few others, and the great majority of depository institutions over Regulation Q. The 
largest banks felt confident that they could compete against the money funds, and 
weather the increase in cost of funds that such competition would engender. And the 
largest banks had learned that the best way to pressure Congress for the elimination of 
interest rate ceilings was to enumerate the benefits to inflation-battling savers. “If banks 
are given an opportunity to compete among themselves and with others who offer 
financial services,” that ad concluded, “the consumer will end up the winner.”172   
 
The Beginning of the End of Regulation Q: The Depository Institutions Deregulation and 
Monetary Control Act of 1980 
 
 
The seemingly conflicting goals of achieving equity for small savers, assuring the 
financial vitality of the thrifts, and maintaining a stable flow of credit for housing came to 
a head in the legislative battles culminating in passage of the Depository Institutions 
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Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA). The process by which this 
far-reaching legislation ground through Congress underscores the pivotal role of an 
ostensibly consumer-centered politics in providing an entering wedge for broader 
financial deregulatory reform. Since the Hunt Commission, proponents of reform had 
attempted to advance comprehensive deregulation of both interest rate ceilings and the 
asset powers of banks and thrifts, but Congressional ambivalence and outright resistance, 
especially in the House, stalled progress on either front. That the largest commercial 
banks had come to back the elimination of Regulation Q helped the cause of lawmakers 
like Proxmire, but the conflicting interests of the overwhelming majority of depository 
institutions remained a significant counterweight. As the following narrative 
demonstrates, proponents of financial deregulation succeeded in achieving concessions 
on interest rate ceilings and modest expansion of asset powers only after they hitched 
their initiatives to consumer-oriented legislation with broad support and urgent, court-
imposed deadlines. Highlighting the contingency of the passage of the DIDMCA serves 
to cast the politics of the small saver as the glue that held broad reform together and, at 
long last, pushed the deregulation of interest rate ceilings through both houses of 
Congress.173  
What eventually became the DIDMCA emerged out of at least three separate bills 
(two in the House and one in the Senate). The primary House bill (H.R. 4986) and the 
primary Senate bill (S. 1347) overlapped only on the issues of the authorization of 
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Negotiable Order of Withdrawal accounts, accounts with automatic transfers and/or 
remote service unit withdrawals, and share draft accounts for Federal credit unions. All of 
these accounts in some way attempted to circumvent the prohibition of interest-bearing 
checking accounts. These were the critical, purportedly pro-consumer initiatives that 
carried the other, more controversial, portions of the DIDMCA, such as the phase-out of 
Regulation Q, through Congress. Legislation on the common issues of NOW accounts 
and share draft accounts became necessary in response to a decision of the District of 
Columbia U.S. Court of Appeals on April 20, 1979 that ruled that such accounts were 
illegal under current law. In its decision, the Court stayed prohibition of the accounts 
until January 1, 1980, giving Congress time to legally authorize the popular accounts. 
Lawmakers of both houses and parties eagerly sought to meet the court imposed deadline, 
but while the House bill focused exclusively on authorizing the expiring accounts, the 
Senate bill joined the narrow issue of authorization of these interest-bearing checking 
accounts to the long-standing and wider debate over financial reform. Gambling that the 
Congress would not dare to let the accounts disappear, the Senate bill’s managers sought 
to break the logjam on interest rate ceilings by linking the elimination of Regulation Q to 
the issue to the virtually unassailable NOW and share accounts.    
 In addition to addressing the authorization of the accounts set to expire January 
1st, the Senate bill, S. 1347, named the Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of 1979, 
included authorization of reserve requirements for all institutions offering NOW 
accounts, federal pre-emption of state usury ceilings, and the paired initiatives of 
expanding thrift asset powers and a ten year phase-out of regulation Q.174 Senator 
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Proxmire, who along with Alan Cranston (D-CA) sponsored the bill, set the consumer-
oriented tone for support of the bill, saying it would correct “one of the great inequities 
and injustices in our country today,” the Regulation Q limitation on interest paid on 
deposits.175 Making the case against Regulation Q, Proxmire argued that the interest rate 
ceilings were not achieving their purpose of ensuring the flow of funds to housing. Only 
the Money Market Certificates had staved off a mortgage credit crunch, he argued, and 
those, because of their $10,000 minimum denomination were “blatantly discriminatory 
against the small saver.”176 Proxmire argued that the Regulation Q barrier to market rates 
for savings would be particularly galling in light of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board’s 
recent approval of limited authority to issue certain types of variable-rate mortgages.177 
Yet even Proxmire allowed that thrifts would require expanded powers (other than 
VRMs) in order to adjust to a phase-out of Regulation Q, which the bill offered in the 
form of authorization of consumer lending and investment in commercial paper of up to a 
total of ten percent of assets.178 By joining asset power deregulation, though modest, and 
liability (interest rate ceiling) deregulation, the bill offered something to proponents of 
broad financial deregulation while still being palatable to those who, like Proxmire, were 
primarily concerned with ending Regulation Q.   
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 While the Senate continued its consideration of the sweeping reforms contained in 
S. 1347, the bill’s much narrower House counterpart, H.R. 4986, the Consumer Checking 
Account Equity Act of 1979, remained strictly directed at authorizing the accounts that 
the Court of Appeals had declared illegal.179 Free of the more controversial deregulatory 
reforms of the Senate bill, H.R. 4986 had the support of the U.S. League of Savings 
Associations, the Credit Union National Association, the National Association of Federal 
Credit Unions, the National Association of Mutual Savings Banks, the Public Interest 
Research Group, the Grey Panthers, the Consumer Federation of America and the AFL-
CIO, and over 250 co-sponsors.180 
 Despite the long list of supporters, there were some critics of the bill, of whom 
Representative Frank Annunzio (D-IL) proved the most persistent and outspoken. 
Pointing to an effort by the bank lobby to attach an amendment to remove the housing 
differential in favor of thrifts, Annunzio revealed his primary concern that the bill would 
either include such an amendment or that the authorization of NOW accounts (for both 
thrifts and commercial banks) could be used as leverage against the differential in the 
future. In other words, if the thrifts and banks could offer the same services, the banks 
could argue that as a matter of fairness, they should be subject to the same interest rate 
ceilings. Annunzio, of course, was also well aware that the checking accounts already had 
been tied to the phase-out of Regulation Q (and with it, the differential) in the Senate, and 
sought assurance from St. Germain that no such yoking of NOW accounts to the 
differential would occur under H.R. 4986. St. Germain obliged, adding that he had 
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spoken with members of the Senate in order to make clear that such a “trade off [of] the 
most innovative consumer benefit in recent memory [interest bearing checking accounts] 
in the name of so-called financial reform [removal of the differential]” would be 
considered non-germane and would not be accepted by the House.181  
 Beyond his concern for the thrift industry and the fate of the differential, 
Annunzio questioned the merits of the NOW accounts themselves. During mark-up of the 
1979 Consumer Checking Account Equity Act, he sought to expose what he saw as 
disingenuous arguments used to support the bill. Annunzio argued that “under the guise 
that they are helping the small saver,” supporters of the bill were actually doing nothing 
to help the over 35 million depositors with less than $200 in their checking accounts.182 
Annunzio offered an amendment that would allow no greater than $100 as a minimum for 
any type of NOW account in order to give “everybody a chance to get a piece of the 
action, rather than making the bill a vehicle for those that are wealthy or rich.”183 In 
return for the low minimum, and in a concession he begrudgingly added to the previous 
version of the amendment that he had offered in the subcommittee, Annunzio’s 
amendment would allow banks to make service charges on accounts with low balances 
and high activity. The exclusion of the truly small saver was particularly unjust, 
according to Annunzio, because they would not be able to earn higher returns on their 
money, but would bear the cost of NOW accounts through higher fees and interest rates. 
He warned, “you have got to remember…when you start paying these interest rates, that 
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somebody is going to have to pay for it, and it is the American public that is going to 
have to pay.”184 Representative St. Germain deflected this argument about unfairness 
with one of his own. The injustice that had to be righted through the bill was to allow 
consumers in the rest of the nation to enjoy the same kind of NOW accounts that 
depositors in New England and New York already enjoyed. Annunzio’s amendment 
mandating a maximum $100 minimum on NOW account balances fell in a twenty-two to 
ten vote. 
 While Annunzio failed on this front, his efforts to ensure that NOW authorization 
would not be traded for the elimination of the differential resonated more widely. Several 
members of the committee, including the chairman, made clear that their endorsement of 
NOW accounts came entirely separate from any consideration of Regulation Q and the 
interest rate differential. Emblematic of the continuing ambivalence that many in the 
House held on Regulation Q, Representative Jerry Patterson (D-CA) argued for the 
decoupling of the issue from the NOW accounts, “I cannot view the differential and 
Regulation Q in term of one class of consumers. The argument has been made by some 
that [authorization of NOW accounts] means an additional power, therefore you give up 
Regulation Q. We should think of the consumer not only as a depositor but also as a 
homeowner, as a person who makes loans for the purchase of homes.”185 Both Annunzio 
and St. Germain reiterated Patterson’s comments emphasizing that the committee’s 
intentions were to authorize NOW accounts but, in St. Germain’s words, “We’re taking 
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no position with regard to the differential or other Regulation Q matters.”186 In short, as 
late as 1979, key members of Congress remained unconvinced that Regulation Q should 
be eliminated. The House passed H.R. 4986, with no mention of Regulation Q, with 367 
yea votes on September 11, 1979.  
 As the House considered and passed a bill that merely responded to the Court of 
Appeals’ decision, Senators Tsongas, Lugar, and Morgan proposed comparably narrow 
bills as alternatives to S. 1347. 187 With Proxmire at the head of the Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, however, such initiatives stood little chance of 
seeing the Senate floor as a true opportunity to move on the expiring accounts without 
also acting on Regulation Q. Put simply, the urgency of the expiring accounts gave 
Proxmire leverage to push for the elimination of Regulation Q. He would not risk losing 
that opportunity even if a majority in the House and least some in the Senate were 
prepared to authorize the accounts without addressing any other financial reforms. 
In late October, when the Senate began debating the House bill, still technically 
H.R. 4986, Proxmire offered an amendment in committee, substituting the text of S. 
1347, thus yoking the phase-out of Regulation Q along with a host of other reforms to the 
House’s narrow Consumer Checking Equity initiative. The House bill, a “NOW Account 
bill,” Proxmire argued, was “incomplete because it does not address the gut issues of 
survival of thrift institutions and their commitment to housing over the long haul.”188 In 
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order to address those concerns, he concluded, Regulation Q had to be phased out. The 
full Senate never had the chance to debate a bill that authorized the expiring accounts 
without also beginning the elimination of interest rate ceilings.  
 In addition to authorizing the expiring accounts, the Senate substitute bill 
provided for a ten-year, gradual phase-out of Regulation Q ceilings,189 the pre-emption of 
state usury ceilings, authorization of reserve requirements on the new transaction 
accounts for Fed member banks and non-member banks, as well as expanded asset 
powers for thrifts (which would be permitted to hold up to ten percent of assets in 
commercial paper and consumer loans). Proxmire bolstered his case against Regulation Q 
by citing the recent authorization of variable-rate mortgages by the regulatory agencies. 
“I would oppose as unconscionable variable-rate mortgage authority for the thrifts if not 
coupled with a phase-out of regulation Q,” Proxmire asserted.190 With a phase-out, and 
with stringent consumer safeguards, however, the long-time VRM opponent implied that 
he could tolerate the instruments. 
 Senator Robert Morgan, a North Carolina Democrat, took it upon himself to 
mount a counteroffensive to the Senate bill. Though, like Annunzio, Morgan’s positions 
reflected his close association with the savings and loan industry, he offered a prescient 
critique of the implications of deregulation. Morgan sought to strip the bill of the Senate 
additions and return it to a form closer to that passed in the House.191 He objected to the 
“homogenization” of financial institutions that would result from the proposed 
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legislation, particularly the erosion of the special role for thrifts in housing finance. The 
thrift industry, he predicted, would disappear through a combination of bankruptcies, 
mergers, and reallocation of assets to non-housing consumer loans (he also predicted that 
the thrifts would soon come to Congress asking for an increase in the ten-percent limit on 
non-housing assets). Morgan believed, and he thought that the bill’s co-sponsor Alan 
Cranston also believed, that the reforms would inevitably lead to a government bailout of 
the thrifts.192 Unlike pro-deregulation economists, Morgan foresaw the bill leading to a 
future in which “the only financing that will be available for homeownership will be that 
provided by the Federal Government.”193 
 Morgan credibly argued that any bill that went beyond the House version would 
doom the bill’s chances of passage, thereby endangering the authorization of the 
checking accounts prior to the court-imposed deadline on January 1, 1980. St. Germain 
had explained to Proxmire and Cranston that House votes for H.R. 4986 the previous 
month had hinged on the “firm and often repeated commitment” that the bill dealt with 
the “share draft- NOW account issue [and was not] a stalking horse for other issues.”194 
But Proxmire countered that all of the additional issues addressed by the Senate version 
of the bill had been thoroughly studied and debated in the House.  
A few points of Morgan’s critique gained some ground among fellow Senators. A 
provision to lower the minimum denomination on MMCs, though it would fulfill 
Proxmire’s admonition to stop discriminating against small savers, remained 
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controversial under strong opposition from many in the thrift industry. Senators Bentsen 
(D-TX) and Garn (R-UT) pushed an alternative measure that would have substituted a tax 
exemption for savings interest in place of a lowered minimum denomination for MMCs. 
Morgan also gained some support in attacking federal pre-emption of state usury ceilings 
as a violation of states’ rights. Morgan asked if there would be any limit on mortgage 
rates if the usury pre-emption passed. Proxmire replied that there would indeed be a limit, 
the limit set by the market. Calling Morgan a “solid free-enterpriser,” Proxmire suggested 
that surely Morgan would agree that “letting the market work” would be the proper 
course. Though throughout the debate Morgan appeared happy to accept the title of “free 
enterpriser,” he retorted, “there have to be some exceptions in the marketplace [and] I 
believe there should be some limitations on interest no matter where they come from.”195  
Morgan thus revealed some measure of ambivalence towards the marketplace and 
in favor of regulation. Indeed, Proxmire himself remained weary of deregulation of asset 
powers, but accepted it as a necessary trade-off to achieve the phase-out of Regulation Q. 
In light of the threat that Morgan’s amendments could strip some (and maybe not all) of 
the various measures in H.R. 4986, Proxmire sought to make explicitly clear that 
expanded asset powers for thrifts remained on the table “only on the condition that 
regulation Q be phased out.”196 What appeared to Morgan to be a series of “extreme 
measures” tacked on to the core issue of authorizing the expiring checking accounts, was 
to Proxmire a carefully balanced package of compromises designed to protect the core 
issue of phasing out interest rate ceilings.  
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 The proposed phase-out came under scrutiny from Senators Tsongas (D-MA) and 
Ford (D-KY) who pressed Proxmire on the question of whether or not higher ceilings 
would mean higher interest rates for borrowers. Proxmire responded that the cost of funds 
was but one of many factors that determined interest rates for borrowers and that “the 
decisive factor is what happens to interest rates generally and what the opportunity cost 
of money is.”197 Inflation then, remained the central issue to Proxmire, even as he ignored 
or explained away any possible contribution that higher rate ceilings might make to 
inflation.198 
 An exchange between Tsongas and Ford revealed a central dilemma. Tsongas 
argued for equity for the depositor while Ford focused on the borrower. Ford argued, 
“what I see us doing here is a phased-in increased interest rate which is now at 13 ¼ to 13 
¾, and it is almost impossible for young people to borrow money to buy a home 
with…”199 As Tsongas summed it up, “you have, in essence, the small saver subsidizing 
the mortgage rate now being paid out by the borrower, so there are inequities on both 
sides.”200 Ford went on to argue that the truly small savers would be hurt by NOW 
accounts, “The only people who are going to get hurt with the NOW accounts are those 
who have no money. They are going to absolutely be hurt… because they are having to 
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pay through their noses.”201 To Proxmire’s argument that Regulation Q simply was not 
working (preventing disintermediation), Ford responded, “in my state we just want to be 
left alone.”202 Proxmire retorted, “Regulation Q is unfair to small savers which we have 
been trying to establish and there are small savers in Kentucky, North Carolina, Utah, 
Massachusetts, and elsewhere. Regulation Q is responsible for inefficiencies in the 
marketplace. For all these reasons we are trying to end this kind of bureaucracy, this kind 
of determination, not by the marketplace, but regulation by bureaucratic fiat. It just is not 
working well.”203 
 Senator Garn, rising to support Ford on his questioning of the reduction of the 
MMC minimum denomination to $1,000 argued, “In the name of the small saver we get 
these populist things going on, and that is the big thing in the Banking Committee lately, 
let us do something for the small saver as long as it looks like it will be helping the small 
saver, without regard to the costs and how that will be translated back … in higher 
interest rates.”204 Garn said of MMCs in particular, “I realize how politically popular it is 
to stand up and yell, ‘I’m trying to help the small saver,’ [but] I do not really believe that 
it will.”205 Morgan suggested the ultimate beneficiary, instead of the small saver, would 
be the big banks. Mentioning Citibank, Chase Manhattan, and Bank of America by name, 
Morgan ruminated about the possibility of those banks moving into his hometown of 
Lillington, NC, “I wonder if my banking friends down in North Carolina would be so 
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enthusiastic about this bill then.”206 Morgan again predicted that the bill would lead to 
some combination of government bailouts and large bank buyouts of the thrifts. 
 Morgan’s attempt to amend the Proxmire bill, substituting a version closer to that 
already passed by the House, failed by a margin of fifty-seven to thirty-eight.207 Unable 
to stop the broader bill, Morgan zeroed in on one of the more controversial proposals, the 
so-called “small saver provision” that would cut the minimum denomination of MMCs to 
$1,000. Joining Morgan, Senator Donald Riegle (D-MI) said of the proposal, “while it 
has a very popular ring to it, we have to really evaluate what the consequences are to 
these same people when they come in to seek money to finance a home.”208 A reduction 
of the MMC minimum would come at enormous cost to the thrifts, as more savers 
qualified for uncapped rates of return. The pinch on the thrifts would translate to 
increasing borrowing costs and/or severe tightening of credit. But against this legitimate 
concern for the thrifts and for borrowers, Proxmire pressed the case of the small saver as 
the more sympathetic victims, going as far as claiming, “Borrowers in many cases are 
better off financially than savers.”209 Citing an estimate of $20 billion in lost interest rates 
over the last 13 years due to Regulation Q, Proxmire then imagined the story of a retired 
couple with $6,000 of savings that lost $22.50 per month, or, as he put it, enough for a 
hot breakfast every day for a month. Framing the issue for the Senate, Proxmire 
concluded, “A vote against the small saver provision is a vote against the small saver … 
the small saver is entitled to fair rate of return. The small saver should not be required to 
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subsidize borrowers.”210 Despite the concerns raised by Morgan over the possible 
negative consequences for borrowers and for the survival of the thrift industry, 
Proxmire’s bill carried the day, approved by a vote of seventy-six to nine.211 
 The conference committee met in early December to reconcile two wildly 
divergent bills, but failed to agree on a bill to return to the respective Houses for passage. 
This left the Congress under the looming January 1 deadline upon which the account 
types struck down by the Court of Appeals would expire. With no hope of a bill out of 
conference, legislators sought a stop-gap solution. Proxmire hijacked an unrelated bill 
that had been passed by the House and awaited hearing in his committee, repurposing it 
by amendment to temporarily authorize the expiring accounts until the end of March.212 
Both Proxmire and Senator Jake Garn expressed regret that they were not voting on H.R. 
4986 and indicated that the more comprehensive legislation had been held up by the 
House Conferees’ insistence that they hold hearings on the Senate-proposed phase-out of 
Regulation Q.213 Yet, by making the authorization temporary, the bill would force the 
House to take up the phase-out of Regulation Q in the new year. Garn urged quick action 
by the House to ensure that the deadline on the expiring accounts would be extended and 
thus allay the concerns of depository institutions and consumers alike.214  
The House agreed to the temporary extension. Though many, including St. 
Germain and Wylie, preferred permanent authorization, they dared not test the Senate and 
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risk allowing the accounts to expire.215  St. Germain turned the blame for the failure of 
the Conference Committee to return H.R. 4986 for a vote onto the Senate, first for having 
loaded the bill with “unrelated [to the original, House-passed bill] financial measures,” 
and for then refusing to move on any compromise bill that did not include a phase-out of 
Regulation Q.216 The compromise meant that St. Germain and Stanton’s assurances to 
Annunzio and others that the NOW and share accounts would not be linked to Regulation 
Q would be broken.217 The expiring accounts were extended to the end of March 1980, 
assuring that Congress would have to revisit the issue. President Carter signed H.R. 4998 
into law on December 28, 1979. 218 Carter expressed his hope that more comprehensive 
financial reform legislation, including the phase-out of Regulation Q, measures to bolster 
Federal Reserve membership, and expanded thrift powers, would reach his desk early in 
the following year.219   
 A December 13, 1979 Treasury Department legislative report noted that though 
Congress would pass something to comply with the Court-imposed deadline, “the Federal 
Reserve Proposal and Reg Q reform will await next year when much will be expected 
and because of election year demands, much will be difficult to deliver.”220 Yet conferees 
slogged through negotiations in early 1980 despite the election concerns and in late 
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March, just before the deadline of the extension of the expiring accounts, returned a bill 
to Congress. When H.R. 4986 returned to the Senate floor, Proxmire referred to “sharp 
and heated” disagreements in the committee, but heralded the compromise-laden bill that 
emerged as “the most significant banking legislation … since the passage of the Federal 
Reserve Act of 1913.”221 The modernized system, Proxmire extolled, “relies more on the 
forces of the marketplace and less on the forces of regulation in shaping the structure of 
our financial system.”222 Proxmire pointed to the “historic departure from past efforts to 
lower the cost of credit at the expense of the saver,” as a major victory for “saver 
equity.”223 Yet even Proxmire, after the many compromises struck in Conference 
Committee, found many distasteful aspects of the resulting bill. Proxmire particularly set 
out to clarify the relationship between expanded thrift asset powers and the Regulation Q 
phase-out, namely that they had to happen in tandem, and that a requirement in the bill 
for a study on the possibility of federal subsidization of low-yielding mortgages should 
not signal that depository institutions should expect a government bailout in the event of 
thrift insolvencies. Proxmire stated unequivocally, “Let us give the message loud and 
clear: No bailouts. This is a free and competitive economy. There is no guarantee of 
survival in a free economy.”224    
 St. Germain indicated that the conferees had struck a number of compromises, 
and as did a few others, expressed the sentiment that the bill fell short of perfection but 
remained deserving of support. St. Germain freely admitted, however, that the bill left 
                                                 










several “imponderables” including the question of housing affordability.225 He conceded 
that new solutions would be necessary to ensure an adequate supply of affordable 
housing credit and began to outline possible tax-based incentives to encourage mortgage 
lending. Despite the inclusion of the Regulation Q phase-out that many had insisted that 
conferees assure would not become part of the bill, the expiring accounts required 
immediate action and the bill passed with 380 yeas.226 
 On March 28, 1980, the final day of debate of the bill in the Senate, a small 
handful of senators expressed their concern about both the substance of the bill and the 
procedures by which it was amended and would be acted upon. Senator Exon (D-NE) 
decried the pre-emption of state usury ceilings as “a gross violation of states rights” and a 
“centralization of control of money into Federal hands.”227 Senator Armstrong (R-CO), 
who had voted against the bill in committee, reiterated his objections and added that the 
changes made in conference only gave him greater reason for concern. Armstrong 
opposed the extension of reserve requirements to all depository institutions offering 
NOW accounts, which he characterized not as deregulation but as “further 
concentrat[ion] of economic decisionmaking in Washington.”228  
Armstrong directed his main objection, however, to procedural issues. The 
Conference Report, he argued, represented, “a very significant policy decision being 
made without consultation of the Senate, in a way which is contrary to the express will of 
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the Senate Banking Committee, made behind closed doors in a conference committee by 
a handful of people operating against a deadline and in a high-pressure environment.”229 
Even more troubling to Armstrong was the unanimous consent agreement struck by the 
majority and minority leaderships that would preclude a roll-call vote on the Conference 
Report. Senator Morgan, the bill’s primary Senate opponent during the previous fall, 
joined Armstrong in accusing Proxmire of the “arrogance of power” to go to conference 
to get everything in the bill that he had wanted, disregarding debate and even a vote of 
the Senate [in favor of a Morgan amendment to strike reserve requirements on NOW 
accounts].”230 Morgan continued his criticism of several aspects of the bill that, he 
claimed, would “expedite the demise of the savings and loan institutions,” which, he 
hinted, “would need that $100,000 . . . insurance very badly.”231 Proxmire defended the 
bill, including each compromise struck by the conference committee. He argued that both 
Houses had been debating financial regulatory overhaul for a decade, that while the 
Senate bill had not included the Conference version’s provisions for Federal Reserve 
membership, neither had the House version contained provision for the phase-out of 
Regulation Q, and, using his trump card, that the nation urgently needed both policies to 
combat inflation.232  
 The reasoning behind the unanimous consent agreement never emerged explicitly 
from the exchange, but Senator Robert Byrd’s reference to “extenuating circumstances” 
suggests that his explanation would have emphasized the time crunch, the 28th being a 
                                                 
229 Ibid. 
 
230 Ibid., 7068. 
 
231 Ibid., 7067, 7072. 
 




Friday, and the expiration of authorization of NOW Accounts, credit union share draft 
accounts, and remote service units at midnight the following Tuesday, and the custom of 
not holding votes on Fridays. A more cynical interpretation would highlight the 
convenience of not having a record for the review of a long list of powerful interest 
groups opposed to various as parts of the bill. With unanimous consent, the Senate passed 
the bill, which President Carter eagerly signed into law. 
President Carter’s remarks during the signing of the DIDMCA focused on its 
promise to fight inflation, strengthen financial institutions, and help small savers. Carter 
credited the efforts of Bill Miller (as Fed Chair, then Treasury Secretary), Proxmire, 
Reuss, St. Germain, Stanton, and Garn for ushering the bill to passage. Among its many 
provisions, the Act created the Depository Institution Deregulation Committee (DIDC) 
and charged it with the task of overseeing the gradual phase-out of Regulation Q, with a 
deadline of 1986 for the complete removal of interest rate ceilings. Congress gave the 
DIDC a great deal of flexibility in determining the pace of deregulation within these 
broad parameters so that the committee could give the depository institutions sufficient 
time to adjust to the increasing cost of deposits. The “Statement of Managers” indicated 
the legislators’ intent, “The conferees felt that the small saver needs to be accorded equity 
in the marketplace as quickly as feasible. Accordingly the conferees adopted provisions 
to phase-out Regulation Q just as soon as is feasible. The [DIDC] retains sufficient 
flexibility to ensure that thrift earnings suffice to enable them to survive in a market 
environment and enable them to pay competitive rates for funds.”233 To reiterate the latter 
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point, the report went on to state, “The conferees also agreed that the phase-out must be 
handled with due regard for the financial condition of depository institutions.”234 
 The dual charges to the DIDC, to secure the small saver a market rate and to 
ensure the “safety and soundness” of the depository institutions that would pay that 
market rate, were not inherently contradictory. In theory, as deregulation proponents 
would later argue, depository institutions that paid market rates for funds could 
compensate for the increased cost of funds by attracting more deposits. However, during 
the life of the DIDC, the spread between “market rates” offered by MMMFs and the 
regulated cost of funds was so great that increased cost could easily outpace increased 
deposits. In such an environment, the DIDC, from its inception, faced a fundamental 
dilemma as its responsibility to the “small saver” contradicted its obligation to the 
depository institutions. The solution to this dilemma was not clear. To some, like Fed 
Chair Paul Volcker, it was imperative to maintain the institutions’ access to low cost 
funds as long as they needed them. For others, especially new regulators appointed by 
President Reagan, the answer was to let the institutions compete for funds by offering 






 The long and tumultuous road to legislation initiating the phase-out of Regulation 
Q demonstrates the deep ambivalence of lawmakers toward deregulation. The special role 
that thrift institutions had played in financing home ownership in post-war America and 





their unflagging insistence that they needed Regulation Q protection, made many 
lawmakers hesitant to remove rate ceilings. But other lawmakers became insistent on 
achieving market rates for savers despite the costs that would be borne by thrifts and new 
borrowers. Though the argument that Regulation Q unfairly barred savers from market 
returns dated back to the early 1970s, it gained sufficient traction only in the context of 
historically high inflation at the end of the decade, particularly in the light of the higher 
returns offered by financial instruments beyond the reach of Regulation Q. Decisions 
made by regulations early in the decade aroused little fanfare when they were made, 
including exemption of CDs over $100,000 and not bringing various new financial 
instruments under Regulation Q ceilings, but made the discrimination against small 
savers seem all the more punitive during high inflation. Even then, only legislative 
maneuvering overcame the hesitation of many members of the House who as late as 1979 
tried to keep action on Regulation Q separate from pro-consumer initiatives to legalize 
interest-bearing checking accounts. 
 Whether by demanding higher interest rates on bank and thrift deposits, as did the 
Gray Panthers along with countless unorganized depositors, or by seeking higher rates 
outside of the traditional banking structure, increasing numbers of savers, small and 
otherwise, simply refused to continue to play along with the rules of the New Deal 
system of housing finance. The first 3 in the 3-6-3 rule (by the late 70s, a 5% return on 
savings) was not enough, they reasoned, and by then, a majority of American households 
had already locked-in the 6, the low-rate mortgage, and had little use for maintaining the 
system, even if it meant that future borrowers would have to pay higher rates for their 
mortgages. AFL-CIO economist Henry Schechter’s view, that depositors accepted lower 
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than market returns on savings in order to help another generation become homeowners, 
found less and less support among depositors desperately attempting to stay ahead of 
inflation. These homeowning saver-investors through letter-writing, picketing, and most 
significantly withdrawing money from banks and thrifts, got the attention of 
policymakers like Proxmire, and compelled them to respond by pursuing deregulation, at 
least narrowly.  
 Along with the deregulation of interest rate ceilings, the DIDMCA contained 
limited deregulation of thrift assets. While some, like Senator Morgan, felt that these 
powers would lead to homogenization of financial institutions, leaving no institutions 
devoted to residential mortgage financing, deregulation could have ended there, with 
S&Ls enjoying modest consumer lending powers, but otherwise remaining primarily 
housing lenders. But in the coming years regulators and thrift officials would leverage the 
deregulation of interest rate ceilings, which proved much more difficult than the 
DIDMCA conferees had anticipated, for further deregulation of assets, claiming that the 
future of the industry hung in the balance. The result would be a system of housing 
finance that looked and operated much differently than the New Deal system that had 
facilitated the post-war expansion of homeownership and that had only recently been, 
ostensibly, at least, opened to all borrowers through the Fair Housing, Equal Credit 















To Regulate or Not To Regulate–Money Market Mutual Funds, 1975-1982 
 
“WILD! CRAZY! …I disagree totally with all the alleged facts and every single 
policy recommendation in this testimony.” 1  Hand-scrawled in red ink, these words 
belonged to Marshall Kaplan, Acting Director of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board’s 
Office of Policy and Economic Research. What had so exasperated Kaplan was a draft of 
congressional testimony, scheduled for delivery by the Bank Board chairman in April 
1981. The draft, written by Randall McFarlane, called for increased regulation of money 
market mutual funds (MMMFs). McFarlane argued that reserve requirements, liquidity 
requirements, community reinvestment obligations, and/or deposit rate controls 
(Regulation Q) should be considered for the money funds.2 But to Kaplan the idea of 
regulating the money funds was “so incredibly wrong in every respect… and completely 
insensitive to anything having to do with the reasons consumers want the high yields of 
[Money Market Funds] in a highly inflationary economy.”3  
 Underlying this passionate exchange over proposed congressional testimony were 
divergent visions of the financial marketplace. In arguing for regulation, McFarlane 
sought to protect the community-oriented depository institutions and insulated source of 
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low-cost funds central to the New Deal System of housing finance. This arrangement, he 
argued, “should not be jeopardized by allowing relatively unregulated competitors to 
drain away the deposit base upon which the system depends.”4 Consistent with the design 
of the Community Reinvestment Act, McFarlane viewed local banks and thrifts as the 
best intermediary of household savings, drawing in deposits and reinvesting that capital 
through mortgage and business loans into the community in which it was based. Though 
offering savers the safety of insured deposits, the convenience of local branches, and the 
liquidity of easy withdrawals and checking, this vision leaned towards concern for 
borrowers, especially would-be homeowners. In contrast, Kaplan advocated leaving the 
funds unchecked, allowing savers to earn higher returns wherever they might be found, 
and capital to flow to whatever institutions could compete to get it, without special regard 
for channeling capital to housing or to local communities. 
 These competing views were the same that divided perspective on Regulation Q 
and the New Deal system of housing finance more generally, but the money market 
mutual funds raised the stakes for all concerned parties. For savers, the funds were an 
attractive alternative to Regulation Q-capped savings accounts at depository institutions. 
MMMFs offered market rates with many of the conveniences of a bank or thrift account, 
often including check-writing privileges. In comparison to a bank or thrift account, all the 
MMMF lacked was federal deposit insurance. As MMMF yields reached double digits in 
the late 1970s, twice as high as Regulation Q-limited accounts, the difference between 
interest rate ceilings and MMMF rates became a concrete representation of the “market 
rate for savings” and the money “lost” to savers due to “discriminatory” ceilings. This 
unfavorable comparison of Regulation Q ceilings to much higher market rates on 




MMMFs fueled both the demands for higher rates at insured depository institutions and 
disintermediation, or transfer of money, from depository institutions to the money funds. 
For borrowers, the funds tightened the availability of credit and increased its cost as 
lenders struggled to retain funds and/or paid more to keep them. The increasing flow of 
household savings to money funds based in cities like New York and Chicago 
undermined the very premise of community reinvestment.    
 MMMFs raised the stakes for depository institutions because, unlike the other 
financial innovations designed to circumvent Regulation Q such as the 1974 Citicorp 
offering,5 MMMFs attracted savings money on such a scale as to challenge the actual 
underpinnings of housing finance. Saver/investors diverted tens, eventually hundreds, of 
billions of dollars into the funds, creating a severe threat to the viability of depository 
institutions and to housing finance. So great was the danger posed by competition with 
the funds that a range of influential interest groups and policymakers, including some 
who generally favored deregulation, came together to support the extension of regulations 
to cover MMMFs. Between the springs of 1980 and 1981, Fed Chairman Paul Volcker, 
Bank Board Chairman Richard Pratt, the Consumer Federation of America, the National 
Associations of Realtors, Home Builders, and Mutual Savings Banks, the AFL-CIO, and 
an unlikely partnership between the American Bankers Association and the U.S. League 
of Savings Associations all called for federal regulation to contain the growth of money 
market mutual funds. Both Houses of Congress held hearings to consider the imposition 
of restrictions on the funds and several state legislatures debated increased regulation and 
limitations for the funds.   
                                                 




Yet the stakes were not always so high. In the mid-1970s, when MMMFs still 
measured under $4 billion, regulators saw the funds both as a violation of the spirit of 
Regulation Q and as a potential threat to depository institutions and housing finance. In 
1976, regulators at the Federal Reserve and the FDIC formally proposed regulations to 
curb the growth of the money funds. It would have been much easier to impose 
restrictions then, before so many American households had invested in the funds. But 
regulators ultimately did not impose the proposed restrictions. Instead they bowed to 
pressure from a few influential lawmakers who sought to keep access to market rates 
through MMMFs open to middle-class investors.  
With MMMFs left unchecked, by the late 1970s and early 1980s, the potential 
threat was becoming real, and regulators responded by authorizing banks and savings and 
loans to issue ceilingless Money Market Certificates and continued to liberalize interest 
rate ceilings that depository institutions could compete with the money funds. But the 
competition created severe earnings problems, especially for the thrifts, as the cost of 
funds rose dramatically. As banks and S&Ls struggled to keep funds into the early 1980s, 
regulators again considered imposing regulations on the money funds. Yet as in 1976, in 
the interest of protecting access to market yields for middle-class investors (and over the 
calls of the long list of powerful policymakers and interest groups above), policymakers 
opted not to extend regulations to cover MMMFs. With investors’ stake in the funds then 
over $100 billion, too many middle-class Americans had too much to lose for lawmakers 
to take a stand against them.  
Had policymakers imposed regulations to restrict MMMFs in 1976, the politics of 
financial deregulation would have played out much differently. Without competition 
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from MMMFs, there would have been no market rate alternative to Regulation Q-capped 
accounts that offered the same convenience, liquidity, and checking privileges. 
Disintermediation would likely have been considerably less severe, high-cost funds such 
as MMCs would have been unnecessary, and, consequently, depository institutions would 
have been in much better financial condition. And even if policymakers had left the funds 
untouched in 1976, but had imposed restrictions later, in 1980 or 1981, subsequent policy 
likely would have been different. Reduced competition from MMMFs might have bought 
enough time for the thrifts, in particular, to ride out the high interest rates of the early 
1980s without needing expanded asset powers (though S&L officials would undoubtedly 
have asked for expanded powers, lawmakers would have been under less pressure to 
acquiesce). But the point here is not to imagine an alternative past that never happened, 
rather, it is to highlight that policymakers made a choice, among alternative possibilities, 
to follow the path that they did.6   
 The explanation offered here is that the influence of middle-class saver/investors, 
through direct pressure on lawmakers to ensure higher yields on savings and through the 
problems that disintermediation created for depository institutions, pushed policymakers 
to pursue first liability (interest rate ceilings), and then asset (lending powers), 
deregulation, even if deregulation of both sides of the ledger meant higher costs and risks 
for borrowers and the erosion of the protected status of housing finance. Time after time, 
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when various financial interest groups were pitted against one another, policymakers’ 
responsiveness to the interests of saver/investors tipped the balance toward deregulatory 
policies. Those deregulatory policies, in turn, steered housing finance away from the 
vision expressed by Randall McFarlane and community reinvestment activists of locally-
oriented and obligated depository institutions channeling deposits to affordable 
mortgages.    
 
Money Market Mutual Funds 
 
 
Historically, when interest rates in money markets rose well above the rates 
offered by depository institutions, most depositors had no way of accessing those higher 
rates. Consequently, disintermediation typically meant that depository institutions lost 
high-minimum deposit accounts, not low-cost passbook savings (the savings deposits 
earning the proverbial 3%). The average passbook savings depositor lacked the 
knowledge and connections to invest in short-term money markets and, most likely, an 
amount of money necessary to do so (most instruments had minimum denominations of 
$1,000 and higher when in 1974, for example, the average savings balance was $1,200).7 
Money market mutual funds solved both of these problems as brokers with ready access 
to money markets pooled the funds of hundreds, eventually thousands, of small investors 
to invest in money market instruments including certificates of deposit, government 
securities, and commercial paper.8 Whereas large investors had long been able to avail 
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themselves of such investment opportunities directly, the MMMFs opened these outlets 
up to smaller investors. As many policymakers would later say, the money market funds 
filled a market need by connecting small depositors to the money markets and their 
(typically) higher interest rates.9 
The funds grew slowly at first, as depositors/investors learned more about the new 
investment opportunity. The first fund became available to the public in 1972, when the 
SEC approved the prospectus for the Reserve Fund of New York. The innovation of two 
pension fund managers, Henry B. R. Brown and Bruce R. Bent, the Reserve Fund took 
off when short-term interest rates rose over Regulation Q ceilings in 1973. In 1974, the 
Dreyfus Corporation offered its version of the MMMF, called Dreyfus Liquid Assets, and 
in June of that year, Fidelity Investments followed with the Daily Income Trust. By the 
end of the decade, Paine, Webber, Shearson, and Merrill Lynch too had offered MMMFs. 
These larger investment firms, though later entrants, used their infrastructure and 
resources to dominate the market. Merrill Lynch, in particular, capitalized on its existing 
network of brokers and customers to make first its Ready Assets fund and then its Cash 
Management Account into the leading funds, amassing hundreds of billions of dollars by 
the 1990s.10   
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As late as the end of 1977, MMMF assets totaled only between $3 and $4 
billion.11 But as inflation increased in the late 1970s and early 1980s, banks and thrifts, 
the mutual savings banks, credit unions and savings and loans, experienced declines or 
even loses in deposits, while money market mutual funds experienced exponential 
growth. By March 1981, the value of MMMF assets topped $101 billion.12 Precisely how 
much of that capital made its way back into depository institutions via MMMF purchase 
of bank certificates of deposit remained uncertain, but most policymakers, bankers, and 
thrift officials assumed that the incredible growth of the MMMFs came at the expense of 
traditional depository institutions.13   
 
A Case for Regulating Money Market Mutual Funds 
 
 
 Under the authority of the Investment Company Act of 1940, the SEC initially 
assumed responsibility for the regulation of MMMFs.14 According to their charge, the 
SEC regarded money placed with a money market fund to be an investment, not a 
deposit. The line between deposit and investment blurred, however, as MMMFs began to 
offer check-writing privileges. As money funds’ services increasingly resembled those 
offered by traditional depository institutions, the case for subjecting the funds to banking 
regulations grew stronger. If the MMMF was a transaction account subject to banking 
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regulation, it would be covered by Regulation Q rate ceilings, reserve requirements, and 
the Community Reinvestment Act, among other regulations. As it was, the checkable 
money funds likely breached Glass-Steagall, the 1933 law that separated deposit 
functions from investment banking. A logical case, then, could be made that the MMMFs 
violated existing regulations.    
On March 8, 1976, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the 
Federal Reserve Board of Governors (FRB) made that case through proposed 
amendments to Regulation Q.15 Pooling funds for the purpose of meeting minimum 
amounts for high-yield CDs, the Board argued, “act[s] contrary to the spirit of the interest 
rate limitations,” and constituted a threat to housing finance.16 The proposal explained, 
“in light of the potentially adverse effects that pooling may have on member and 
nonmember financial institutions due to potentially disruptive shifts of funds, the Board 
believes it appropriate to amend Regulation Q to specifically prohibit the payment of 
interest in excess of the rate established for deposits of less than $100,000 on pooled 
deposits.”17 The FDIC and FRB identified exceptions to the proposed rule including 
banks or attorneys combining trust or escrow accounts, and the implications for mutual 
funds remained ambiguous under an additional exception for “mutual funds which have a 
stated investment objective of investing in other than deposit obligations and whose 
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deposit obligations normally constitute a minimal percentage of the fund portfolio may be 
offered a large denomination Certificate of Deposit by a member bank.”18 But in case any 
ambiguity remained, Fed Chairman Arthur Burns clearly indicated that the prohibition 
would apply to “the so-called ‘money market funds’ that are engaged in obtaining funds 
for the purpose of pooling.”19    
Like the overwhelming majority of federal regulations, these proposed rules 
would have gone unnoticed by anyone, much less the average money fund investor. But 
in a letter published on March 10, 1976, Princeton Economics Professor Lawrence J. 
White wrote to the New York Times that the regulations proposed by the Federal Reserve, 
FDIC, and FHLBB promised to “put the money market mutual funds out of business and 
relegate the small saver to low-interest yields.”20 White advocated looser regulation to 
allow more competition for the benefit of the small saver and called both the proposed 
regulations and Regulation Q itself, “regulatory outrage.”21 Highlighted by this and other 
news items, the proposals elicited a torrent of comments from depository institutions, 
MMMF firms, and individual investors.22 In direct correspondence with the FDIC, 
individual investors uniformly railed against the proposed curbs, calling them blatant 
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discrimination”23 against the small saver who would be “kept a prisoner of Regulation 
Q.”24 “We, the middle class, feel threatened,” one commenter wrote, “if the banks are to 
be kept solvent, all Americans should be asked to bear the sacrifice of lower interest 
rates….”25 Economics Professor J. Huston McCulloch defended the MMMFs as “a 
wholesome, all-American means of negating the pernicious effects of Regulation Q.”26 
The comment letters from individual investors captured their anger about inflation and 
their opposition to any action perceived to inhibit an investor’s ability to fight it. Their 
comments appealed to principles of justice and fairness to argue that they had a right to 
the same returns available to those with over $100,000 to invest.27   
For their part, most thrift officials supported the idea of the curbs but did not yet 
feel especially threatened by the funds. Representing the National Association of Mutual 
Savings Banks, P. James Riordan wrote, “the purpose of deposit interest rate ceilings are 
being substantially undermined [and the Association] supports the proposed amendment 
as an attempt to prevent avoidance of federal deposit rate regulations and as a probable 
aid to the development of funds for housing.”28 Minnesota banker Clifford Zaffke added 
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that pooling of funds threatened to draw funds from rural areas into money centers, 
leaving local banks unable to meet local credit needs.29 Commercial bankers gave a more 
varied response than the thrift officials. Some argued that the regulations could not be 
effectively enforced,30 while others suggested that cutting off access to certificates of 
deposit would just prompt investors to find other instruments, and potentially, to invest 
funds overseas.31 While the regulations promised to check the growth of MMMFs and 
thus reduce competition against depository institutions, they did so only by limiting 
MMMF investments in bank-issued CDs. The banks that received this business, typically 
the larger, money-center banks, did not wish to lose this business and consequently 
opposed the regulations.  
Predictably, the MMMF industry lobby, the Investment Company Institute (ICI), 
also strongly opposed the proposed regulations. ICI President Robert L. Augenblick 
wrote that the rules “involve unfair discrimination between financial institutions, are 
probably beyond the legal power of the Board and the FDIC to promulgate, [are] devoid 
of economic justification, and would be harmful to small corporations and individual 
investors as well as to banks.”32 Many consumer advocates agreed. Helen Nelson, 
Director of the University of Wisconsin-Extension Center for Consumer Affairs, called 
the proposed regulations, “discriminatory and inimical to consumer interest,” and claimed 
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that they would “‘ghettoize’ the consumers’ options.”33 Nelson’s view of consumer 
interest remained narrowed to that of the investor, however, and did not consider the 
possible implications for the credit needs of, or costs to, borrowers.   
Angry investors, who feared that the regulations would take away a rare hedge 
against inflation, also directed a barrage of letters at lawmakers. In late March, Senator 
William Proxmire, a Wisconsin Democrat and Chairman of the Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, forwarded a constituent letter to Federal Reserve 
Chairman Arthur Burns requesting that he report back to the committee: 
(1) What adverse effects has the Board documented that are directly attributable  
to purchases of negotiable certificated of deposit by pooled funds? (2) What is the 
justification for treating trust departments of member banks differently from 
investment advisors or broker-dealers who desire to pool customers’ idle 
balances? (3) What request or events prompted the Board to publish this 
proposal?34 
 
To Proxmire, the Fed’s assessment that banks pooled funds for the express purpose of 
evading Regulation Q did not, in itself, justify an attempt to enforce the regulation. 
Proxmire’s constituent, Dorothy Lichty, who likely learned of the proposed changes from 
Professor White’s letter to the Times, wrote to Proxmire that the proposed regulations 
“will only hurt the small investors.”35 Lichty explained that she “didn’t happen to have 
$100,000 lying around,” but through a mutual fund, she could earn “11 or 12% on [her] 
money, just like the big guys.”36 Like Proxmire, Senator Harrison “Pete” Williams (D-
NJ) pressed Burns for an explanation for the proposed regulations, indicating that he was 
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“disturbed … [by their] significant discrimination against small investors and substantial 
anti-competitive effect on non-bank financial institutions.”37 Republican Senator John 
Tower of Texas wrote to the FDIC Chairman, “small savers deserve the same right as 
wealthier individuals and corporations to earn a market-determined rate of return on their 
savings.38  
Chairman Burns responded that “the market conditions in 1974 resulted in 
increased interest in pooling as a means of avoiding the existing deposit interest rate 
limitations [and] during that year money market funds began their pooling activities on a 
large scale.”39 The increased scale meant that the funds might pose a real threat to the 
viability of depository institutions and thus, the federal regulators, who began to receive 
pressure on the issue from bankers, felt compelled to intervene. To explain the timing of 
the release of the proposed regulations, Burns noted that the high interest rate pressures 
that caused the rapid growth of deposit pooling had abated and “the current environment 
thus was viewed as an appropriate time to obtain public comments on these activities.”40  
Through the summer and into the fall, the regulators took no action on the 
proposal. In an October speech to the National Savings and Loan League, FHLBB 
economist Donald Kaplan noted that the proposed regulations were “a very emotional 
issue,” and indicated that “because of many strong public comments, including one by 
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the Council on Wage and Price Stability, the Fed and FDIC have moved slowly on it.”41 
The Council on Wage and Price Stability had suggested that the prohibition of pooling 
might be inflationary.42 Amidst such pressure from Congress and having drawn the ire of 
investors across the country, the Fed and the FDIC backed off and did not impose the 
regulations as proposed. The agencies stalled in taking any action until June 6, 1979, 
when they issued a much weaker prohibition ruling that banks could accept pooled 
deposits but could not advertise or announce higher rates through pooling.43 By the time 
of this ruling, what Burns had referred to as “so-called money market funds” in 1976 had 
become one of the “well-established practices” not included in the prohibition.44  
 Given the slow early growth of the MMMFs, the political costs of limiting the 
funds in defense of Regulation Q and traditional depository institutions would have been 
much lower earlier in the 1970s than they would become later in the decade and into the 
early 1980s. As late as May 1976, the Council on Wage and Price Stability concluded 
that the funds “have not thus far been quantitatively important.”45 The regulators’ 
attempts to keep the funds from becoming a threat to depository institutions, however, did 
not resonate with depository institutions that had not yet experienced substantial ill-
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effects from the MMMFs, but did elicit a strong response from the relatively few 
investors who had experienced the benefits of MMMFs. Proxmire, Tower, and other 
policymakers proved unwilling to risk offending those investors. Five years later, after 
the funds had topped $100 billion, depository institutions cried for just the kind of 
regulations the FRB and FDIC had proposed in 1976, but by then the interests lined up in 
favor of the funds had only grown stronger. Lichty’s response to the regulations in 1976, 
as well as White’s and Proxmire’s, anticipated those of the battles over the money funds 
in the early 1980s. Had the FRB and FDIC enacted the proposed regulations in 1976, the 
MMMFs likely would have grown more slowly than they did, placing less stress on 
depository institutions through either lost or higher-cost deposits. Some observers, then 
and since, would argue that regulating the MMMFs would only prompt a new innovation 
to fill what they understood as a demand for market rates of interest.46 Early, decisive 
action, however, would have signaled the regulators’ resolve to enforce Regulation Q, 
and subsequent innovations could have been subjected to the same level of scrutiny and 
regulation. Failing to act early only raised the political stakes and the economic costs of 
later action. The decision to leave the funds unchecked both demonstrated that MMMF 
investors had already become politically influential, and ensured that the number of 
investors would continue to grow. The more the funds grew in popularity, the more 
difficult it would become to change course by imposing stricter regulations on the 
funds.47    
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After the March 1976 proposal, regulators tabled the possibility of regulating the 
MMMFs. But by the end of the decade, the funds’ awesome growth and their threat to 
traditional depository institutions forced the issue back into debate. A 1979 article in the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond’s Economic Review reported that money market 
funds grew at a pace of $2 billion per month during the first five months of that year.48 
The report cited a survey by the Investment Company Institute that found that individual 
investors held 46% of MMMF asset value in 1979. FHLBB Chief Economist Kenneth 
Biederman projected that MMMFs would gain an even greater share when they began to 
advertise on television, “‘once these funds start using television to advertise their yields, 
people aren’t going to leave their money in passbook accounts.’” 49 As late as September 
1979, a Senate Banking Committee staffer said that the committee had not been pressured 
to regulate the money funds, but by the end of the year, signs of a Congressional inquiry 
began to appear.50 
The first sign that Congress had taken notice of the tremendous growth of 
MMMFs came in the form of a request for a Congressional Research Services report on 
the impact of the funds in December 1979. The report, authored by Roger S. White, 
concluded that one possible restriction on money market funds, reserve requirements, 
would reduce their earnings and their returns to investors, but that the implications for 
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depository institutions would depend both on just how much the requirements would 
reduce the return to investors and whether that reduction would be enough to make them 
comparable to the return on savings deposits.51 White added that the impact would also 
depend on the motives of depositors/investors. Depositors who valued the money market 
funds for their high yields and transaction features would be more prone to move their 
funds to depository institutions than would investors, who would more likely seek out 
investment alternatives that did not have reserve requirements. With such an inconclusive 
recommendation, policymakers had little reason to think that they could have much 
impact on the funds via increased regulation. Federal Reserve Chairman William Miller 
wrote to Proxmire that reserve requirements should be placed on all transaction accounts 
whether held in a bank or non-bank institution. Miller added, “aggregate transactions 
balances at nonbank depository institutions are presently relatively small, and the 
opportunity should be taken to apply reserve requirements to them now, while the impact 
of required reserves on the institutions would still be relatively slight.”52  
 Despite the increasing spread between the interest rates offered by MMMFs and 
the Regulation Q-capped rates of small time deposits and passbook savings, some 
bankers remained unworried. Chicago Tribune reporter Bill Barnhart wrote in October 
1979, that despite recent publicity of record-high interest rates, “many community 
bankers in the Chicago area are confident their savings-account customers won’t start 
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demanding that those rates be paid to them.”53 These “small bankers” remained skeptical 
of the warnings that without the removal of Regulation Q, the banks would face 
debilitating disintermediation. Three local bankers reported strong growth in deposits 
over the past year. One of them, C. Paul Johnson of Colonial Bank and Trust, a Chicago 
area bank, said, “‘we don’t rely on hot money, so we’re not paying the same rates the big 
banks are.’”54 Countering their optimism, New York banking analyst Harry Keefe 
retorted, “‘your community bankers have got their heads in a bucket… the worst 
competitor they’ve got is the Merrill Lynch Ready Asset Fund.’”55 Irwin A. Goodman, 
President of Deerbrook State Bank, observed that though his bank’s deposits had not 
been yet been hurt by competition with the money market funds, that the funds could 
present a problem in the long run because “people who were not sophisticated are 
becoming sophisticated.”56 Others did not think that investing in the funds required any 
particular sophistication. As Senator Jake Garn would later say, “savers are going to take 
their money out of savings deposits and put it where they can earn 15 percent. They 
would be foolish not to.”57 To underscore the point Garn continued, “even a senator is 
smart enough to understand the difference between 5 and 15 percent interest.”58  
Concern over the growth of the funds grew sufficiently that in January 1980, the 
Senate Subcommittee on Financial Institutions, chaired by California Senator Alan 
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Cranston,59 convened hearings on the regulation and impact of MMMFs. Cranston 
explained that he called the hearings “because of the potential negative impact of these 
funds on the regulated financial marketplace, legislative proposals pending in Congress 
on Regulation Q, and the increasing consumer interest in them.”60 Senator Proxmire, then 
deep in his battle to win passage of what would become the DIDMCA, did not pass up 
the opportunity to take a shot at Regulation Q and offered a ringing endorsement of the 
money market funds, which he hailed as a “positive development [that] will work toward 
the ultimate demise of both Regulation Q and the prohibition of interest on demand 
deposits [and] will benefit the small saver….”61  
Regulators and interest groups aired their views on MMMFs at the hearings. 
During the first of two days of testimony, the Committee heard from the SEC regulators 
responsible for oversight of MMMFs, bank, thrift, and credit union regulators, industry 
representatives, and one academic selected by the industry’s trade lobby.62 SEC 
Chairman Irving Pollack explained that his agency already regulated money market funds 
sufficiently. Though he affirmed that the check writing privileges offered by many funds 
operated just like any other check writing, he argued that the instruments should not be 
regulated as banks, because as investment instruments they were legally distinct from 
deposits.63 Pollack allowed, however, that while he did not recommend increased 
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regulation, that “where there are diverse and possible competing social objectives and 
economic goals, the Congress is expected to weigh and balance very complex elements of 
public policy.”64 Pollack thus acknowledged that the public interest was not clearly 
defined, but that competing interests might be at stake. 
 In what Investment Company Institute President David Silver would later 
describe as “a miracle,” the other major financial regulators, including FHLBB Chairman 
Jay Janis, largely agreed that increased regulation of money market funds were not 
necessary at that time.65 The Comptroller of the Currency, John Heimann, and the 
Administrator of the National Credit Union Administration, Lawrence Connell, like 
Proxmire, turned the issue of regulating the Money Market Mutual Funds into an 
opportunity to argue for deregulation of depository institutions, particularly the phase-out 
of Regulation Q.66 Similarly, Federal Reserve Governor Charles Partee argued that “to 
limit yields on money market funds … would be anti-consumer–and inconsistent with the 
Nation’s need to encourage savings.”67 Janis would not join his colleagues in attacking 
Regulation Q, but rather focused his attention on deregulation of thrift assets, “the growth 
of MMF’s underscores even more importantly the ability of savings and loans to provide 
a full package of consumer finance powers….”68 With new powers, Janis assured the 
Subcommittee, “savings and loans need not fear the competition from MMF’s, nor would 
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the availability of mortgage money be threatened by MMF’s.”69 The chief thrift regulator 
suggested that reserve requirements, even if they reduced the yield of the money market 
funds, might in fact make them more popular by appearing less risky, cutting into the one 
advantage the banks and thrifts still had, federal deposit insurance.70  
The testimony of the regulators underscored the fact that much about the funds’ 
impact remained uncertain. Heimann, in his submitted testimony, allowed that “existing 
data on MMF investors is incomplete,”71 and Janis conceded that the FHLBB estimate 
that the money market funds “may have helped divert $5 to $6 billion from the mortgage 
market,”72 was only a “rough estimate.”73 The most comprehensive information came 
from the money market funds’ lobby, the Investment Company Institute. Quoting a recent 
Institute study, Silver testified that at the end of 1979, individuals held 53.5% of MMF 
assets, the remainder being institutional investors.74 Among the unknowns regarding the 
MMFs was exactly how much of the money that seemed to be leaving banks for the funds 
returned to banks when the funds purchased CDs. Janis indicated that he wanted to see 
more of that money being invested in S&Ls.75 Heimann expressed great concern over the 
concentration of MMF investments in “the top 25 to 50 banks and to very few, if any, 
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savings and loan associations.”76 He went on to predict, “if acceptance of money market 
funds spreads from the major urban areas to the smaller cities and communities, funds 
from local savings and time deposits may move from community and regional institutions 
to the large urban banks and thrifts.”77 Such movement of capital would threaten both the 
solvency of the institutions and the ability of borrowers to meet their credit needs.78 
Silver argued that increased restrictions on MMFs that lowered yields would simply force 
those who could afford to do so to invest directly in money markets, leaving smaller 
investors, as he put it, as victims of “Government-Sponsored discrimination.”79   
 Representatives of the major depository institution lobbies were divided on the 
question of regulation. Harry W. Albright Jr., in behalf of the National Association of 
Mutual Savings Banks, argued that the funds hampered the Federal Reserve’s anti-
inflation policies, diverted money from thrifts into large commercial banks, thereby 
hurting housing, and that “MMFs have engaged in certain practices which are 
questionable under existing federal law … [such as] the check writing feature offered by 
many funds.”80 A representative of the U.S. League of Savings Associations, James 
Cirona, echoed that the MMMFs, “are reallocating credit out of the communities of 
America into the giant money-center commercial banking institutions,” and ultimately 
overseas.81 Both Lee Gunderson of the American Bankers Association and Richard 
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Lawton of the National Savings and Loan League indicated a preference for broad 
deregulation, but argued that extensions of regulation, such as prohibition of checking 
privileges were necessary at least in the short term.82 Lawton specifically noted that 
MMMFs were not subject to “redlining statutes and regulations and other laws such as 
the Community Reinvestment Act.”83 The Independent Bankers Association of America 
representative also complained in a letter to the committee of the MMMF’s redistributive 
effects,84 and The Bowery, a New York Mutual Savings bank submitted a letter to the 
committee pointing out that MMMFs “have no responsibilities to make mortgages; invest 
in certain acceptable investments that are perceived to be safe, sound, and in the public 
interest; nor comply with the Community Reinvestment Act.”85 The letter from the 
Bowery went on to argue that regulators should allow banks and thrifts to invest in 
MMMFs, instead of phasing out Regulation Q, to avoid the “unanticipated dangers of 
deregulating Regulation Q.”86    
To many policymakers, the logical solution became apparent: either the MMMFs 
had to be regulated, or the regulation of the banks and thrifts (Regulation Q, at least) had 
to be relaxed.87 Representatives of the MMMF industry did not invite regulation, though 
they did not particularly favor loosened regulations of banks. Banking regulations, after 
all, had created the market that MMMFs filled, and they were not eager to invite 
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competition with banks with their large institutional apparatuses, roots in local 
communities, and existing pools of customers. Most small banks and thrifts wanted 
stricter regulation of MMMFs and did not favor the rescission of Regulation Q. If not for 
the competition from the funds, they reasoned, Regulation Q could continue to function 
to ensure a cheap source of capital. Other banks, and fewer thrifts, especially the largest 
ones, initially favored regulation of the MMMFs, but reached a tipping point at which, 
confident in their ability to compete with the MMMFs, they dropped their calls for 
regulation of MMMFs and instead used the unregulated status of the funds to leverage 
their arguments for bank deregulation, insisting on a “level playing field.”88 
By spring 1980, the money market funds had grown into enough of a threat to 
depository institutions that thrift and banking lobbies set aside their long-standing 
differences over competitive equality between them, to focus their efforts on curbing the 
funds. In March, The Washington Post reported that the presidents of the American 
Bankers Association (ABA) and the United States League of Savings Associations (US 
League) had agreed that the time had come to join forces against the “virtually 
unregulated” money funds.89 ABA President C.C. Hope Jr. suggested, “‘If we are to be 
realists, the regulated industries need to make certain that we work together with the 
Congress to level out the playing field…’.”90 Additional reports confirm that the ABA 
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had indeed taken aim at the money funds into the following spring.91 An ABA “Money 
Market Mutual Fund Strike Force” concluded that while a deregulated marketplace 
remained a goal, the ABA’s “action program must include immediate unfair competitive 
imbalances favoring the money funds.”92 Against concern for depository institutions and 
responsiveness to their influential lobbies, however, weighed concern for small investors. 
Representative of those with misgivings about the possibility of regulating MMMFs, Bob 
Edgar (D-PA) wrote that though he recognized that they increasingly pressured savings 
institutions, he “would be concerned about proposals to restrict these funds since they 
benefit so many ‘small savers’ who are unable to invest in certificates requiring $10,000 
deposits.”93 
For the most part, consideration of additional regulations for money market 
mutual funds was confined to the possibility of imposing reserve requirements or 
prohibiting third-party checking. A more drastic measure would have been to extend rate 
ceilings to MMMFs, which could have been billed as an anti-inflationary measure as well 
as an effort to “level the playing field” between the regulated and unregulated 
institutions.  
One such proposal, although it was never seriously considered, is illustrative 
because it demonstrates how concern for small investors, more so than the truly small 
savers, defined the parameters of debate over MMMF regulation. The extension of rate 
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ceilings to the MMMFs figured centrally in the creative compromise deregulation 
proposal pitched to the Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee (DIDC–the body 
charged with overseeing the phase-out of Regulation Q) by a Savings Bank Official in 
Springfield, Massachusetts named Daniel F. O’Gorman. O’Gorman suggested what he 
considered to be a “saner and fairer” plan for deregulation that would raise the passbook 
savings rate ceiling to 9%, eliminate all other types of accounts (such as the 
congressionally created Money Market Certificates that after being uncapped by DIDC 
were paying a rate of 17-18%), and extend the 9% ceiling to the MMMFs, all for a period 
of 5 years. O’Gorman’s proposal would increase costs to thrifts on passbook savings, but 
offered the benefit of eliminating the uncapped accounts that increasingly dominated 
their portfolios. The proposal was kicked from O’Gorman’s Representative to the 
Department of the Treasury, and ultimately to the DIDC.94 There, DIDC secretary Steven 
Skancke dismissed O’Gorman’s suggestion of rate ceilings for MMMFs, or otherwise, 
saying “artificial rate ceilings, whether set at 5 ½ percent or 9 percent just won’t work 
anymore. Savers are becoming more and more interest rate sensitive.”95 Skancke 
reasoned that savers would more likely save less than save at lower rates (though the 9% 
rate would have been considerably higher for the truly small denomination savers). He 
imagined that rate ceilings on MMMFs would simply force investors to seek still other 
investment possibilities, not to return their money to depository institutions.96 
Furthermore, Skancke maintained that regulating the money funds “may give rise only to 
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other unregulated instruments.”97 Skancke’s reply exhibited an increasingly popular 
assumption, that regulation could not, aside from the question of whether it should or not, 
contain market forces. 
 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, money market mutual funds represented the 
possibilities for a deregulated financial industry, the future that the Hunt Commission and 
other free market advocates had envisioned. The funds raised their capital primarily in 
small denominations from individual depositors/investors, just like traditional depository 
institutions, but unlike the banks and thrifts, the money funds could then invest that 
money with little to no restrictions or regulations. Some bankers and thrift officials, 
especially those of the largest institutions, saw great potential in a deregulated 
environment. But while they were still subject to regulation, and unfairly, they cried, 
competing with the unregulated MMMFs, they were among the first to point out how the 
unregulated funds undermined the goals of the Community Reinvestment Act. Banker 
Kenneth Nelson raised questions about the accountability of the MMMFs to local 
communities. “It is disheartening and of great concern to us to see the money flow from 
our community,” Nelson wrote. He continued, “Is Merrill Lynch concerned with South 
St. Paul Minnesota? What is the Community Reinvestment program for money market 
mutual funds? That is the question that needs to be addressed.”98 The problem of 
redistribution of capital alarmed many in states far a field of the major money centers. In 
1981, several state legislatures, including those in Utah, Georgia, Oklahoma,99 Arkansas, 
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Massachusetts,100 Kansas,101 and North Carolina,102 considered restrictions on the 
operation of MMMFs in their states. Time magazine reported “in Massachusetts, a 
proposal has been made that would require money market funds to make investments 
wherever depositors live,” and editorialized, “that would be like asking General Motors 
to set up a factory in each shareholder’s hometown.”103 
 However, state officials’ concern for stemming the flow of capital from their 
states appeared to be pitted against the interests small investors who sought the “market 
rates” of the money funds. John Malarkey, representing the Conference of State Bank 
Supervisors, testified before Congress, “even though some citizens gained [from 
MMMFs], the cost to the public at large has been very high…. Money market mutual 
funds are bleeding numerous state and local communities of their economic lifeblood.”104 
To the extent that regulators concerned themselves with protecting the “public interest,” 
it was not entirely clear how the public interest should be defined. Malarkey noted that a 
market rate on savings, safety and soundness of depository institutions, and borrowing 
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needs were three competing public interests; the question was one of balancing the 
three.105   
 As state legislatures took up the question of regulation of MMMFs, the money 
funds and their lobby, the Investment Company Institute, fought back. In A Piece of the 
Action, Joe Nocera recounts a particularly important legislative battle in Utah in March 
1981, in which the bankers narrowly lost their bid to impose stricter regulations on 
MMMFs amidst protest from MMMF investors and deft legislative maneuvering by 
money fund proponents.106 In Kansas, an amendment to restrict MMMFs passed the 
House, but, according to the amendment’s sponsor, Representative Jerry Andre, “was 
defeated in the Senate through a massive, misleading advertising blitz by the MMMF 
industry.”107 Emblematic of this campaign, United Cash Management, Inc. President 
Benjamin C. Korschot had written to United Fund shareholders “the high yield of United 
Cash Management may soon be unavailable to YOU. Recent legislation has been 
introduced by the Kansas banking and savings and loan industries. This bill could… 
eliminate United Cash Management from being offered in Kansas.”108 Korschot 
implored, “don’t let special interest groups take away one of your best hedges against 
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inflation… call, or send a telegram to your state legislator….”109 For his part, Andre 
denied that he had introduced the measure on the part of any interest group and that the 
amendment would prohibit the fund from being offered in Kansas.110 Andre pleaded to 
Senator Garn for federal help, both because he felt that state legislators could not 
withstand the pressure of the MMMF lobby, and because “problems relating to MMMF’s 
and their impact on the economy and individual investors transcend state boundaries.”111 
Andre had been sent scrambling to assure voters that the restrictions he had proposed 
would not have eliminated MMMFs, as he perceived that many of his constituents had 
been convinced by the Investment Company Institute to believe.112 The Kansas Bankers 
Association likewise pressed Garn for action, claiming that the Investment Company 
Institute had “instill[ed] unnecessary alarm and fear in the minds of many citizens,” and 
that instead of patchwork, state-by state legislation, the problems posed by interstate 
money market fund companies “MUST BE ADDRESSED AT THE FEDERAL 
LEVEL.”113   
In a public statement, the Kansas Bankers Association claimed that the money 
market funds had raised $755 million from Kansas and railed “THE PROBLEM IS 
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THAT THESE MUTUAL FUND COMPANIES ARE INVESTING LITTLE, IF ANY, 
MONEY BACK INTO THIS STATE!”114 Though acknowledging the inflation-hedging 
benefits to savers, the association argued that the money funds had crossed the line from 
investments to a checking account, without the regulations placed on depository 
institutions. Rural states like Kansas, the statement suggested, bore the brunt of capital 
loss, while money center states remained unaffected. The KBA insisted that either curbs 
be placed on the money funds, or the banks be allowed to offer money market fund 
accounts (by amendment to Glass-Steagall). In the case of the latter, the statement said of 
the Investment Company Institute, “perhaps their ringing defense of free enterprise will 
carry as far as the U.S. Congressional hearing rooms and Kansas financial institutions 
will be given the ability to compete on a level basis.”115     
 In early 1981, as battles raged in state legislatures, federal policymakers seemed 
as close as ever to imposing restrictions on the Money Market Funds. In March, Walter 
Fauntroy introduced H.R. 2591, a bill to place reserve requirements on MMMFs with 
check writing privileges. The bill also included language authorizing the DIDC to 
“establish the maximum rate of return which is payable on funds invested in a money 
market mutual fund.”116 On the Senate side, Senator Garn convened hearings on 
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“competition and conditions in the financial system,” of which MMMFs were a central 
topic of discussion. The arrival of Reagan appointees, and the ascension of Senator Garn 
to the chairmanship of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
heightened, rather than dampened, discussion of regulation for MMMFs. Columnist Jane 
Bryant Quinn commented, “it is ironic that in today’s ‘new’ political atmosphere, one of 
the first actions by conservatives may be to impose new, costly and unnecessary 
regulations on a rapidly growing industry that has found a way of paying high interest 
rates to small savers.”117 Generally speaking, deregulation had long since been embraced 
by policymakers across the political spectrum, from Ted Kennedy and Jimmy Carter, to 
Ronald Reagan, for a range of industries, including telecommunications and trucking. 
Certainly the ascendance of Reagan only strengthened that trend, but the increasingly dire 
condition of the thrift industry made even those most committed to deregulation to pause 
and consider at least temporary restrictions on MMMFs. Policymakers had to decide 
whether to curb the funds, or hope that the depository institutions, with possible 
loosening of regulation of their assets, could survive the competition.   
Policymakers’ ambivalence regarding regulation is evident in the FHLBB’s 
internal planning for the House hearing that included the exchange between staffers 
Kaplan and MacFarlane cited above. A strong case was being made by some regulators 
that regulations should be extended to cover the funds, while others reflected the 
ascending free market ideology that erred on the side of deregulation. The draft version 
of FHLBB Chairman John H. Dalton’s testimony to be delivered to the House 
Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy on April 8, 1981, included the following:  
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Because of the competitive inequities that exist between money market funds and 
depository institutions, I will recommend in my remarks today that consideration 
be given to subjecting money market funds to regulations similar to those 
covering depository institutions….118 
 
The draft testimony argued “money market funds have a governmentally created 
advantage over depository institutions,” and suggested that in the interest of competitive 
equity, reserve requirements, liquidity requirements, community reinvestment 
obligations, and/or deposit rate control should be considered for the money market 
funds.119 Of the four options, the draft placed emphasis on the imposition of reserve 
requirements, but also suggested the possibility of placing regulation of money market 
funds under the authority of the DIDC. 
 Here competing visions of the financial marketplace came to a head. The lead 
author of the draft, Randall H. McFarlane, sought protection for the specialized function 
of thrifts as the primary mortgage lenders, while Marshall A. Kaplan, Acting Director of 
the FHLBB Office of Policy and Economic Research, eviscerated McFarlane’s draft. To 
the drafted suggestion that Congress grant the DIDC authority over money market funds, 
Kaplan wrote, “Were you ordered to put this in? This is the most horrible policy 
recommendation that I have ever seen espoused in any Bank Board testimony, is it in 
addition to imposing reserve requirements?” McFarlane’s draft struck a tone of urgency, 
and while expressing reluctance about the idea of creating new regulations, concluded, 
“under the circumstances, we no longer can afford to turn a blind eye to the monumental 
end-run around rate control represented by money market fund yields.” Expressing his 
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utter dismay, Kaplan noted, “the end-run is the result of consumers’ desires being met by 
MMFs….This would completely destroy the MMF industry & is the wildest thing I’ve 
ever heard.”120  
The divide between McFarlane and Kaplan ran deeper still, over the very role of 
the savings and loan industry. McFarlane wrote, “we believe [the] case-by-case, 
community-oriented approach to credit generally offered by banks and S&Ls is an 
extremely valuable one” that should be protected.121 Kaplan retorted, the “bulk of bank 
credit is not community-oriented, but is made without regard to location by money 
market and large regional banks.”122 Amid the controversy generated by the draft 
testimony, Dalton wrote to Chairman Fauntroy to decline the invitation to testify on 
money market mutual funds. Dalton explained that the issue required more study before 
the FHLBB could testify. Dalton’s letter carefully pointed out the “competitive 
inequities” between the money funds and traditional depository institutions, arguing that 
“money market funds have a governmentally-created advantage over depository 
institutions,” but did not suggest that the solution to that inequity would be to increase 
regulation of the money funds as the draft testimony had.123 For the moment, at least, 
Kaplan’s view of deposit capital flowing freely to its most efficient use had triumphed 
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over MacFarlane’s contention that regulation should protect the ability of local 
depository institutions to attract low-cost deposits for local credit needs.   
 But the incoming FHLBB chairman had indicated his own leaning toward 
restrictions for the funds. Just the day before Dalton’s scheduled appearance, Reagan 
appointee, Richard T. Pratt sat before the Senate Banking Committee for his nomination 
hearing to become the new chairman. In a remarkable exchange, two avowed free market 
champions, Pratt and Committee Chairman Garn, made the case for at least temporary 
restrictions on MMMFs. Indicative of the grave threat the funds posed for the thrift 
industry, even these great deregulation proponents recognized the necessity of restraining 
the growth of the funds. Pratt told the committee that he believed that deregulation of 
depository institutions remained the best long-term direction for the economy, but that 
“in the short run, [protecting the interests of the thrift industry and housing] means 
considering some additional regulations of money market funds, such as the imposition 
of reserves on transaction balances.”124 Though he preferred the end goal of a 
deregulated, competitive financial services sector, Pratt could stomach, and even favor 
additional regulation of the money market funds to ensure that the thrifts survived the 
process of deregulation. In the meantime, Pratt felt that the money funds “provide[d] an 
end-run around Public Law 96-221 [DIDMCA] and [the] depository institution 
deregulation committee,” which Congress had charged to ensure an orderly transition to a 
deregulated environment.125 “To the extent that [money funds] are providing the same 
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services as regulated financial institutions,” Pratt argued, “it would seem that competitive 
equity would require that they be subject to some of the same restrictions.”126 Pratt 
reiterated this stance later that month, “as a free-market economist, I am not happy to 
make this recommendation. But, there are periods when controls are necessary, and this is 
one of them.”127  
Senator Garn, who chaired the nomination hearing, agreed, and went to great 
pains to clarify his position on the issue of regulation of money market mutual funds. He 
did not, as he indicated many of his constituents had concluded, favor “trying to do away 
with the money market funds.”128 He did oppose, however, the third-party check writing 
privileges that many of the funds offered, arguing, “they are unfairly involved in 
transaction accounts. And I don’t like that kind of dishonesty.” Not only did Garn find 
the money market funds’ bank-like services to be unfair competition, he also still stung 
from what he considered the unfair fighting that the industry engaged in during the battle 
over restrictive legislation in Utah. Garn, who refused to take a side on the Utah bill, had 
nonetheless been painted as an opponent of the funds. Garn fumed, “the nature of my 
mail indicates that the campaign to defeat that bill [to impose limitations on MMMFs in 
Utah] was based primarily on telling all of securities firm customers that, if those third-
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party check writing privileges were removed, that they would remove the money market 
funds. And that is a bunch of boloney.”129  
Policymakers’ recognition of the need for MMMF regulations in order to protect 
the thrifts, weighed against the interests of saver/investors. Garn believed that he was, 
and wanted to be perceived as being, on the side of the small saver or small investor. His 
defense of his stance revealed some ambivalence, however, regarding the interests of the 
small investor: 
I certainly am bright enough to understand the difference between 5 ¼ percent 
and 15 percent. I certainly can understand why they are popular in an inflationary 
cycle, particularly for small savers to have that opportunity. I would doubt very 
much though, that the average saver who is realizing those benefits looks at the 
more overall implications of this disintermediation that is taking place; what the 
effects could be in the longer term, as far as where they are going to get their 
mortgage loan in the future. Certainly not from the money market funds.130 
 
Momentarily taking a broader view of consumer interest, Garn saw the virtue of 
questioning the impact of the money market funds on credit cost and distribution. 
Echoing John Malarkey of the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, Garn identified 
investors’ right to a market return as only one of many competing interests, including the 
interests of borrowers. 
 Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker added to the chorus calling for 
restrictions on the MMMFs. Both out of consideration of equity for depository 
institutions and to facilitate monetary policy, Volcker (like Miller before him) favored 
reserve requirements for all transaction accounts. Volcker wanted to be able to 
differentiate between MMMFs funds that investors thought of as savings, and those that 
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investors considered liquid. The reserve requirements, he reasoned, would create enough 
of a spread in returns that investors would commit what funds they intended as savings 
into the higher yield, no reserves, no checking, accounts. Volcker argued that this would 
greatly enhance the effectiveness of the Federal Reserve’s anti-inflation policies.131  
Support for restrictions on MMMFs had never been stronger than in the spring of 
1981. If the banking and thrift lobbies, the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, and 
regulators including Richard Pratt and Paul Volcker had their way, either reserve 
requirements would have been imposed on MMMFs, or check-writing privileges on 
MMMFs would have been prohibited. Supporters of curbs on the MMMFs argued 
sensibly that the regulations would help states and local communities to stem the drain of 
capital to money-centers, the Federal Reserve would be better able to conduct anti-
inflation monetary policy, and banks and thrifts would be able to adjust to the phase-out 
of Regulation Q without fear of insolvency due to disintermediation. But on the other 
side of this debate stood the relatively new and small lobby, the Investment Company 
Institute, and legions of small investors. It was the legions of small investors, not just the 
ICI, that tipped the balance in favor of leaving the money funds alone. As an unnamed 
House Banking Committee staffer told the Bureau of National Affairs, “‘people who have 
their money invested in money market mutual funds are solid citizens… they’re the kind 
who keep in contact with their congressman, who are good contributors, and who vote 
every time. No congressman wants to tangle with them.”132 Even if the funds themselves 
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were inflationary, limiting their returns could only be framed as policymakers taking 
away one of the few opportunities that the average consumer had to stay afloat. Learning 
from the constituent backlash over proposed regulation of MMMFs at the state level, 
none learning better than Garn, Congress backed off the idea of additional regulation of 
the funds.  
It would have been more politically tenable to have restricted the funds before so 
many Americans became invested, like in 1976, when fund assets remained under $4 
billion. But then, even though the Fed projected that the funds would later create 
problems for depository institutions, and, by extension, housing, the institutions had yet 
to feel the pain of competition with the funds and thus offered only tepid support for 
regulations. Yet once the problem had become acute for banks and thrifts, and they 
pleaded for intervention, far too many investors had bought into the funds, making action 
too politically costly. The more the funds grew, the harder it would be to restrict them. As 
late as the summer of 1982, when the peak of Congressional attention to MMMFs had 
passed, Volcker was still urging some kind of action on the funds, arguing, “you’re not 
going to have a fully competitive instrument with a money market fund so long as banks 
have reserve requirements and money markets do not … and I would suggest that is an 
area that someone ought to address themselves to.”133 FDIC Chairman William Isaac 
concurred, “its high time Congress took up that issue and treated banks and money 
market funds and thrifts alike with respect to reserves.”134 But the moment to impose 
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restrictions on the funds without eliciting the ire of thousands of fund investors had long 
since passed.  
Figure 1 
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States: Annual Flows 
and Outstandings, 1975-1984, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/annuals/a1975-1984.pdf 
(accessed March 26, 2012). 
 
Policymakers had every reason to place at least minimal restrictions on MMMFs, 
but ultimately could not side against the (short-term) interests of inflation-weary middle-
class saver/investors. During a period in which nearly everyone agreed that inflation 
posed the greatest threat to the American economy, Volcker and others argued that 
reserve requirements on the funds would enhance the Federal Reserve’s ability to control 
inflation through monetary policy. The funds themselves, with their double-digit yields, 
likely contributed to inflation.135 Existing regulations including Glass-Steagall, the 
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McFadden Act that prohibited interstate banking, Regulation Q, and the Community 
Reinvestment Act arguably applied to the funds, or at least those offering bank-like 
services. Finally, powerful interest groups, including the American Bankers Association 
and the AFL-CIO favored the curbs. Yet, Congress instead turned its attention to 
“leveling the playing field” by allowing banks and thrifts to compete directly with the 
money funds. The benefit to the small saver, or at least, the desire to avoid being tagged 
as siding against the small saver, tipped the balance away from even modest restrictions 
on MMMFs. The logic of competitive equality then pointed towards allowing depository 
institutions the ability to compete with MMMFs for deposit-capital.  
Unchecked by regulation, the growth of the money funds, and the 
disintermediation they facilitated, fueled arguments for both the elimination of interest 
rate ceilings and relaxation of thrift investment powers. While the debates and policies 
leading to these two phases of deregulation are explicated more fully in other chapters,136 
it is important to note here that the 1982 Garn–St. Germain Act directed the DIDC to 
authorize an account “directly equivalent to and competitive with money market mutual 
funds…” and that had “no limitation on the maximum rate or rates of interest payable on 
deposit accounts.”137 On November 15, 1982, the DIDC issued for comment a deposit 
account with no rate ceiling, unless the account balance fell below $2,500, and that 
allowed three drafts per month.138 The Wall Street Journal heralded the policy changes, 
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arguing that “the consumer will be the winner….”139 The consumers of the new account, 
and of the still unregulated MMMFs would win, in the short term at least, but whether 
consumers as borrowers, and that other public interest, the safety and soundness of the 
depository institutions, would be “winners” remained to be seen. As it turned out, and as 
bank and thrift officials incessantly promised lawmakers, borrowers would have to pay 
higher rates and all customers would pay higher fees in order for the institutions to cover 
their increasing cost of funds (and still, they hoped, turn a profit).  
The authorization of a competitive account, named a Money Market Deposit 
Account (MMDA), stemmed the tide of disintermediation to MMMFs, but came at 
substantial cost to the depository institutions. In January 1983, the Wall Street Journal 
reported, “the estimated $21.8 billion deposited in the new accounts in the week after 
their Dec. 14 introduction included only $3.2 billion from money-market mutual funds,” 
while the remainder “came from existing S&L accounts.”140 In other words, for the most 
part, they were paying more interest on deposits they already had. The increased costs to 
the depository institutions for the funds that they kept in MMDAs and other ceilingless 
accounts had their own fairness implications, according to the thrift and banking 
industries. Richard Pratt summed up this position in his nomination hearing,  
Given the public policy decision, which I understand has been made, and which I 
share, that savers should earn a full market rate of interest on their savings; the 
unavoidable concomitant is that borrowers will be paying a full market rate for 
their mortgages. I think mortgage instruments should be designed to reflect and 
pass through the cost of funds which exists in the economy…. I believe if we are 
                                                 
139 Jill Bettner, “Your Money Matters: New Money-Market Deposit Accounts Will Spur Competition for 
Funds and Benefit Consumers,” Wall Street Journal, November 15, 1982. 
  




going to pay market rates for savings, that market rates for mortgages must be 
charged… the borrowing public is also the savings public.141 
 
The right of the small saver to a market return, a right championed by Senator Proxmire 
and other members of Congress and cited by regulators such as Comptroller of the 
Currency John Heimann among others, became joined, in a long protracted process, to 
broader deregulation of depository institutions and housing finance. Along with powerful 
financial interests, and academic economists committed to deregulation and free markets, 
the politics of deregulation featured, and as the question of regulating the MMMFs 
shows, turned on, the influence and interests of middle class investors.  
The decision to leave the MMMFs unregulated had ambivalent implications for 
opportunities for homeownership and for the Community Reinvestment Act. On one 
hand, the MMMFs remained unaccountable to the intent of the Community Reinvestment 
Act, and the funds continued to draw money from across the nation, which they then 
invested primarily in the largest banks or in capital markets distant from the communities 
from which the investments originated. On the other hand, by deregulating banks and 
thrifts and enabling them to compete with MMMFs without interest rate ceilings, the 
depository institutions that remained subject to the Community Reinvestment Act 
diverted some investments from the MMMFs and retained them in community-based 
institutions. However, even where deposits remained in local institutions to be reinvested 
within the community, the broader implications of deregulation meant that banks and 
thrifts retained deposits at higher cost, in competition with the MMMFs and other capital 
markets. To offset those costs, the institutions employed their newly won asset powers, 
those changes negotiated as companionate measures to the deregulation of deposit 
                                                 




ceilings and the lack of regulation of MMMFs, including adjustable rate mortgages and, 
for thrifts, the leeway to invest in outlets other than housing. Adjustable rate mortgages, 
which shifted interest rate risk from lenders to borrowers, comprised an increasing 
portion of mortgages as it competed against the traditional 30 year fixed credit 
instrument. The savings and loans used their expanded asset powers to invest in 
commercial real estate and other speculative investments, which ultimately resulted in the 
S&L crisis of the late 1980s, at enormous cost to taxpayers who footed the bill of an 
industry bailout. As the S&Ls became less and less devoted to housing, an increasing 
share of home mortgages were originated by largely unregulated mortgage brokers who, 




 Leveraging Deregulation–Adjustable-Rate Mortgages  
 
Said one borrower who had unwittingly signed on for a variable rate mortgage, 
“As one who bought one of these babies, I can tell you that it is no picnic.”1 Compared to 
a fixed-rate mortgage, the mortgage instrument that fueled the massive post-war 
expansion of homeownership, adjustable-rate mortgages shifted interest rate risk to 
borrowers. The added risk did not always mean escalating rates for borrowers–rates could 
fall as well as rise–but if rates did rise, so would monthly payments. Sudden rate hikes 
could be debilitating for borrowers, potentially leading to default and foreclosure. The 
borrower quoted above, Senator William Proxmire, was able to manage what he 
nonetheless termed a “very cruel” increase, but less well-off borrowers might not fare so 
well.2 Jon Brown, Staff Attorney of the Public Interest Research Group, argued that the 
risk shift posed an unacceptable burden, concluding, “Any widespread change from the 
standard, fixed-rate mortgages to a variable-rate mortgage tied to interest rates would 
have a detrimental impact on the availability of mortgage credit for low- and moderate-
income families.”3 The stakes seemed especially high for minority borrowers, as Steven 
                                                 
1 Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Markup [on Declining Membership in the 
Federal Reserve System], unpublished, September 28, 1978, 64. ProQuest Congressional (accessed 
January 3, 2012). “Having been victimized once, I can testify that it is not a happy experience.” Ibid., 66. 
 
2 Ibid., 64. 
 
3 House Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance, Variable-rate 
Mortgage Proposal and Regulation Q: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions 




Rohde of the Center for National Policy Review put it, “In sum, I think the purposes of 
the Fair Housing Act would be subverted by a variable-rate mortgage plan.”4 
 The decade-long process by which flexible-rate mortgage instruments (including 
variable-rate mortgages, renegotiable-rate mortgages, and adjustable-rate mortgages) 
were proposed, rejected, and ultimately authorized supports the two main arguments of 
this study: that the pursuit of a narrow agenda of deposit rate ceiling deregulation opened 
the door to broader deregulation of housing finance, and that this broader deregulation 
undermined fair housing and community reinvestment policies. This chapter will show 
that authorization of various forms of market sensitive mortgage instruments became 
tacitly linked to the loosening of interest rate ceilings. Each time federal regulators 
proposed or authorized new mortgage instruments, they were directly responding to a 
liberalization of interest rate ceilings. Lawmakers, who vehemently opposed variable-rate 
mortgages (VRMs) in 1975 on the grounds that they were unfair to borrowers, gradually 
accepted VRMs and other flexible-rate instruments as a necessary concession in the 
bargain to secure market rates for savers.  
That both liability (deposit rate ceilings) and asset (mortgage instruments) 
deregulation came to pass reflected a negotiation in which lawmakers acceded to the 
former to ensure the latter. Financial deregulation was not uniformly supported or 
subscribed to, even among representatives of financial institutions. This chapter 
introduces the alignment of interests for and against the deregulation of mortgage powers 
(authorization of alternative mortgage instruments), which, alongside the alignment of 
interests for and against the deregulation of interest rate ceilings as discussed in chapter 
                                                 




three, shows just how selectively all but the most ideologically committed parties adhered 
to deregulation as a policy course. The most ardent supporters of variable-rate mortgages, 
the lenders, deeply opposed the elimination of Regulation Q, while champions of the 
small saver who advocated deposit ceiling deregulation like Senator William Proxmire, 
were most suspicious of variable-rate mortgages.  
That the authorization of flexible-rate mortgage instruments undermined fair 
housing policies was not immediately apparent. It was clear that adjustable-rate 
mortgages shifted interest rate risk from lenders to borrowers. From the variable-rate 
mortgage proposal by the Hunt Commission in 1972 through the FHLBB’s authorization 
of adjustable-rate mortgages in 1981, all parties conceded this point. But because the 
instruments were introduced as interest rates peaked in the early 1980s, borrowers did not 
experience any ill effects from this additional risk. That risk remained latent, however, 
perhaps all the more dangerous because the relatively painless early period allowed 
borrowers and policymakers alike to forget about it. 
Flexible-rate mortgage critics who opposed the instruments on fair housing 
grounds rightly predicted increased discrimination against minority borrowers, but 
proved entirely wrong about how that discrimination would manifest. In the 1970s, civil 
rights and consumer advocates argued that lenders would exclude minority borrowers 
from VRMs (that they thought would soon dominate the market, replacing the fixed-rate 
option) whom the lenders would not consider “upwardly mobile” and thus able to afford 
the potentially increasing payments of a VRM. But because of parallel changes in 
housing finance, primarily the separation of mortgage origination and servicing from 
asset ownership (the subject of the following two chapters) that freed mortgage 
 
 262
originators from the risk of default, exclusion was not the problem. Instead, ARMs 
increased access, but facilitated discrimination in mortgage terms, flourishing in the 
subprime market that developed beginning in the mid-1990s. Both the discriminatory 
terms and the underlying risk of escalating rates contributed to the construction of an 





In the immediate post-war decades, the fixed-rate mortgage had served the thrifts, 
and millions of homebuyers, well. As explained in Chapter One, the innovation of the 
long-term fixed-rate mortgage made homeownership accessible to more buyers by 
spreading the otherwise prohibitive cost of a home into regular, affordable monthly 
payments. Because banks and thrifts enjoyed a low and predictable cost of funds as a 
result of Regulation Q rate ceilings (limits on the amount of money paid to savers for 
their deposits), this arrangement benefited lenders too. As long as the interest rates that 
thrifts paid on deposits remained relatively stable over the 20 to 30-year maturity of the 
loans they issued, thrift assets (the mortgages they held, earning income through 
borrowers’ monthly payments) remained profitably matched with thrift liabilities (the 
savings accounts on which they paid interest to depositors). In 1959, for example, when 
an S&L paid 3.25% on savings to raise funds, the 4.5% interest it earned on a fixed-rate 
mortgage it had issued in 1944 still netted the institution a profit. More recently issued 
loans returned even higher rates to the lender, around 6% for a mortgage issued in 1959, 
leaving the S&L with a healthy and profitable portfolio. It was a good time to run a 
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savings and loan, when the “3-6-3” rule of paying 3% on deposits, lending at 6% on 
mortgages, and being on the golf course by 3 o’clock closely resembled reality.  
But these “good times” would not last forever. In the mid-1960s, tight money 
conditions, and an accompanying spike in interest rates, shocked the thrift industry out of 
its reflexive trust in the 3-6-3 rule. Regulation Q ceilings had helped protect banks and 
thrifts from the inherent risk in “lending long,” issuing loans at 20 to 30-year maturities, 
while “borrowing short,” raising money by paying interest on deposits that could be 
withdrawn at any time, or at some interval such as one a one year CD. But prior to 1966, 
Regulation Q only indirectly protected the thrifts by limiting competition with banks; the 
ceilings did not apply to the thrifts themselves. Then, in 1965, the Federal Reserve Board 
voted to increase the Regulation Q ceiling, shaking lenders’ faith that Regulation Q 
would insulate them from sudden increases in interest rates.5 Though rates quickly 
returned to the levels of the immediate post-war decades, the 1966 experience prompted 
thrift officials and their regulators to seek policy changes that would better protect the 
S&Ls against similar rate volatility in the future. One response, the extension of 
Regulation Q to S&Ls and mutual savings banks (with the housing differential) sought to 
stabilize thrifts’ cost of funds. But since the Fed had demonstrated that it would increase 
Regulation Q ceilings when market rates rose, thrift officials, and their regulators, also 
desired broader asset flexibility to weather tight money periods. Authorization of a 
flexible mortgage instrument tied to changes in market rates topped their list of coveted 
powers.  
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The possibility of sudden increases to lenders’ cost of funds reintroduced the risk 
in borrowing short and lending long, and lenders eagerly sought to mitigate that risk. 
Variable-rate mortgages, they argued, would do just that. Instead of being locked into a 
fixed-rate for up to 30 years, a variable-rate mortgage would allow the revenue paid to a 
lender to fluctuate along with the rates it paid to depositors. Beginning in 1969, during 
another “credit crunch,” thrift officials and FHLBB regulators pursued authorization of 
variable-rate mortgages for federally-chartered S&Ls. Finding members of the relevant 
congressional committees unreceptive, the regulators tabled their 1969 proposal, but the 
continuing volatility of interest rates in the late 1960s and early 1970s kept the variable-
rate concept alive.6 For the thrifts, the urgency for flexible instruments only became more 
acute as their assets and liabilities became increasingly mismatched. By 1979, when an 
S&L was paying 7.5% to savers to attract funds, the 5.75% interest it earned on a fixed-
rate mortgage it had issued in 1964 was no longer profitable. “The fixed-rate option is a 
bad concept,” an S&L official complained in 1979. Advocating authorization of an 
adjustable-rate alternative, he pleaded to FHLBB regulators, “give us a chance to 
survive!”7 Not only were market rates rising in the late 1970s, but as the two previous 
chapters documented, policymakers increasingly insisted that depository institutions pay 
those higher market rates to savers. The Money Market Certificates [MMCs], which 
regulators authorized in 1978 to allow banks and thrifts to better compete with money 
market mutual funds, helped the depository institutions to attract and retain funds but 
                                                 
6 House Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance, Variable-rate 
Mortgage Proposal and Regulation Q, 1. 
 
7 Marshall Graves, to Anita Miller, August 21, 1979; Consumer Checking Account Equity Act of 1979; 




drove their cost of funds ever higher, up to 7.47% for the thrifts, from 6.44% in 1977.8 
Rates on newly originated mortgages kept pace with increasing costs, but the larger 
portion of thrift portfolios consisted of older mortgages earning substantially lower rates.  
 It is easy to see, then, why lenders would desire authorization of market sensitive, 
variable-rate mortgages. This chapter traces the attempts of FHLBB regulators to 
authorize federally-chartered savings and loans to issue flexible-rate mortgage 
instruments through the 1970s and into the early 1980s. It documents a shift from 
emphatic congressional opposition to ambivalence and eventual embrace of flexible-rate 
instruments. It argues that congressional insistence on market returns for savers both 
emboldened regulators to seek flexible-rate authority and made congressional opponents 
reluctant to continue their fight against what they still considered potentially dangerous 
products. Furthermore, policymakers approved flexible-rate instruments over the 
objections of consumer and civil rights advocates who argued that the loans would 
unfairly shift interest rate risk to borrowers and would largely exclude borrowers whom 
underwriters did not consider to be upwardly mobile, likely the very groups of borrowers, 
women and racial minorities, who had been barred from housing finance in the past. For 
their part, regulators conceded that flexible-rate mortgage instruments would not be 
appropriate for some borrowers, but insisted that market-sensitive assets were essential to 
the very survival of the thrift industry. They argued that under conditions in which 
institutions had to pay market rates for savings, borrowers would increasingly have to 
bear the cost.   
                                                 




 After the regulators’ abortive attempt to propose VRMs in 1969, the most 
significant of the early flexible-rate mortgage proposals came in the report of the Hunt 
Commission. Included in its broad deregulatory agenda, the Commission’s general 
endorsement of variable-rate mortgages9 set two critical precedents. First, it linked VRM 
authorization to the phase-out of Regulation Q. If depository institutions were to pay 
market rates to savers, as the Commission recommended, those institutions, it held, 
should be allowed to charge market-sensitive rates to borrowers. The more that thrift 
portfolios could take on this flexibility, the better the thrifts would manage periods of 
inflation and rising interest rates. Second, recognizing that “the variable-rate mortgage 
shifts interest rate risk from the lender to the borrower,” and that borrowers were least 
able to understand and evaluate that risk, the commission’s report outlined several 
consumer safeguards.10 In order to protect individual borrowers as well as the financial 
system as a whole, the report recommended “full explanation of the terms to borrowers, 
the offer of an alternative fixed-rate mortgage, limits on the permissible rate change, a 
publicly announced index on which rate changes are based, and, after an initial period, 
opportunities for ‘no penalty’ refinancing.”11 For VRM opponents, these suggested 
consumer protections represented the minimum standard for acceptable safeguards 
should variable-rate instruments be approved.  
                                                 
9 To expand market acceptance and usage of VRMs, the Commission recommended that HUD authorize 
variable-rate options on FHA-and VA-insured mortgages and that FNMA and FHLMC include variable-
rate mortgages in their secondary market purchases. 
 
10 President’s Commission on Financial Structure and Regulation, The Report of the President’s 
Commission on Financial Structure & Regulation (Washington, DC: GPO, 1971), 82. 
 




While the Hunt Commission report formed the basis of much of the Nixon 
administration’s Financial Institutions Act of 1973, the proposed legislation did not 
address VRMs. Asked about the omission later, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury 
William Simon responded that after consideration, he decided to work with the FHLBB 
on developing a proposal, but not to include authorization in the FIA.12 This decision may 
have reflected both sensitivity to the negative response to the 1969 proposal and 
recognition of the fact that VRMs did not strictly require congressional approval–FHLBB 
regulators had the power to authorize VRMs simply by issuing new regulations. The 
Bank Board did advance a proposal in 1972, but despite support from policymakers such 
as Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns, 13 “the Board… backed off at that time 
because of the extreme political pressure to do so.”14 Senator William Proxmire, for 
example, called VRMs “imaginative,” but dismissed them as a useful policy option.15 
                                                 
12 Simon, in Senate Subcommittee on Financial Institutions, Financial Structure and Regulation: Hearings 
before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1973), 94. 
 
13 In December, testifying before a Senate subcommittee, Burns stated that authorization of variable-rate 
mortgages could go a long way toward leveling the “feast or famine” cycles in the housing industry. He 
suggested that limited variation in interest rates could be achieved by altering the maturity of the loan term, 
while keeping monthly payments fixed. Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government, Joint 
Economic Committee, Housing Subsidies and Housing Policies: Hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Priorities and Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee, 92d Cong., 2d sess., 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1973), 340-341. FHLBB Chairman Thomas Bomar would testify in 1975 that 
Burns’s maturity adjustment approach would not work under circumstances in which the initial payments 
of a 30-year mortgage were already 100% interest. House Subcommittee on HUD and Independent 
Agencies Appropriations, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Independent Agencies 
Appropriations for FY76, Part 4: Hearings before the Subcommittee on HUD and Independent Agencies 
Appropriations of the Committee on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 1st sess., (Washington, DC: GPO, 1975), 
125. 
 
14 House Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance, Variable-rate 
Mortgage Proposal and Regulation Q, 248. 
 
15 Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government, Joint Economic Committee, Housing 




The majority of lawmakers remained wedded to the fixed-rate mortgage and considered 
VRMs unfair to consumers.  
Congress, or at least the relevant figures with control over financial committees, 
clearly was not receptive to the idea of broadening beyond the fixed-rate mortgage. And, 
for the moment at least, FHLBB officials were not prepared to issue regulations without 
explicit congressional support. Yet the regulators, at the behest of thrift officials, would 
keep VRMs on their agenda, particularly in light of on-going debate over the elimination 
of interest rate ceilings. Though it did not include the Hunt Commission’s VRMs 
recommendation, the Nixon administration’s Financial Institutions Act (FIA) did call for 
the gradual phase-out of Regulation Q. While desperate to keep Regulation Q protection, 
thrift managers were equally determined that without the ceilings, they would be freed to 
issue variable-rate mortgages. Some observers specifically sought to head-off such an 
exchange. Testifying on the possibility that a phase-out of Regulation Q as proposed by 
the FIA would promote the case for variable-rate mortgages, State University of New 
York Law Professor John Andrew Spanogle, Jr. warned:  
Any final legislation [phasing out Regulation Q] should have a section which just 
clearly bans such mortgages. Either that, or you should have provisions which 
very closely regulate them, and make them tolerable to the general public which 
will find these mortgages crammed down their throat. If you know of this 
potential abuse, which will be brought on by the abolition of regulation Q, and 
you do not regulate this potential abuse, then you have not dealt with the complete 
problem as you can see it.16  
 
Spanogle’s testimony, along with opposition from organized labor, attuned FHLBB 
regulators to the importance of consumer safeguards in making any VRM proposal 
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politically palatable, but in no way diminished the regulators’ resolve to secure the 
coveted asset power.17  
In 1974, in the wake of the Fed’s inaction on the Citicorp floating note, FHLBB 
Chairman Thomas Bomar would in fact be emboldened to resuscitate the VRM 
proposal.18 If the Fed was allowing the effective relaxation of rate-ceilings to the 
detriment of the thrifts, he reasoned, thrifts should have every power to compete and 
survive. During his testimony on the Citicorp note in 1974, Bomar indicated the agency’s 
intention to authorize variable-rate mortgages. Sensitive to the concerns of skeptics such 
as Proxmire and Spanogle, he added that such an action would come only, “with adequate 
consumer protection,” and after consultation with key members of Congress.19   
The following spring, the FHLBB published proposed regulations to allow 
federally chartered savings and loans to issue variable-rate mortgages. The new 
instruments were warranted, the regulations read, in order to “provide a larger and more 
stable flow of funds for home mortgage lending… to enable associations to pay more 
competitive rates of return on savings accounts… [and] to reduce the extent to which 
savers and new borrowers in effect subsidize the lower rates paid by existing 
                                                 
17 Nat Goldfinger, of the AFL-CIO, testified in 1974, “we are opposed to variable-rate mortgages. We feel 
that the mortgages would rise during inflationary periods, subjecting home buyers to higher outlays at the 
same time that other costs are rising. Second, we believe that home buyers would be forced to demand 
higher wages and salaries to meet the increased demands on their incomes, under those circumstances.” 
Goldfinger, in Senate Subcommittee on Financial Institutions, Reform of Financial Institutions – 1973, 604. 
 
18 See Chapter 3. 
 
19 Bomar, Thomas, in U.S. House, Committee on Banking and Currency, To Provide for the Regulation of 
the Issuance and Sale of Debt Obligations by Bank Holding Companies and their Subsidiaries, Hearing 
before the Committee on Banking and Currency, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress, 2nd 




borrowers.”20 Consistent with the precedent set by the Hunt Commission 
recommendations, the proposal outlined several consumer safeguards including a cap of 
2.5% on the overall rate increase and no more than 1% per year, a limit to adjustments of 
no more often than every six months, mandatory rate decreases (increases were optional), 
and a FHLBB approved index for rate adjustments.  
The most significant aspect of this proposal, however, was the response it elicited 
from Congress: explicit and emphatic opposition. Whereas the FHLBB’s first two 
proposals were swiftly headed off by Congressional opponents, the third attempt received 
formal hearings in both chambers of Congress. In both houses, voting majorities 
supported bills expressly prohibiting VRMs.21 Though no law emerged from these bills, 
the message to the FHLBB that VRM regulations would not be welcomed was clear. The 
hearings revealed three key aspects of the debates surrounding VRMs as they stood in 
1975. First, the majority of lawmakers agreed with VRM critics that the instruments 
unfairly shifted risk to borrowers. Second, most lawmakers similarly agreed that VRMs 
posed a particular threat to minority borrowers, and they cited this concern prominently 
in their opposition to VRMs. Third, even as they rejected VRMs on these grounds, key 
figures such as Fred St. Germain (D-RI) and Senator John Tower (R-TX) implied that 
they would be more receptive to future VRM proposals if Regulation Q ceilings were 
loosened.  
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Federal Register 40, no. 32 (February 14, 1975): 6870-6874. 
 
21 The House passed a bill by a vote of 291 to 104, while the Senate passed a similar concurrent resolution 
by voice vote. Congressional Record, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, 121: 13631. ProQuest Congressional 
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It is worth recounting the legislative debates concerning VRMs in 1975 both to 
document the critique of VRMs made on behalf of the interests of borrowers and 
minorities and to emphasize just how far policymakers had strayed from their defense of 
those interests when they acceded to authorization of various forms of flexible-rate 
mortgages in 1979, 1980, and 1981. Between 1975 and the ultimate authorization of 
adjustable-rate mortgage instruments, I argue here, policymakers struck an implicit 
bargain, allowing thrifts and banks to issue variable- and adjustable-rate mortgages in 
exchange for the loosening and eventual elimination of interest rate ceilings. This about-
face underscores the central arguments of this study: that the narrow agenda of interest 
rate ceiling deregulation on behalf of consumer-savers opened the door to further 
deregulation (in this case, of mortgage instruments), to the detriment of consumer-
borrowers and fair housing policies.  
Debate in the House centered on a bill (H.R. 6209) sponsored by Representative 
Fernand “Fred” St. Germain, which would prohibit VRM authorization for federally-
chartered institutions.22 The three days of hearings on the resolution before the 
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance 
showcased the opposing views on VRMs. FHLBB Chairman Thomas Bomar and 
industry representatives, mainly from the state of California, testified in favor of the 
proposed regulations. They argued that VRMs were essential to the survival of the thrift 
industry, and, by extension, to the availability of residential mortgage credit. Witnesses 
                                                 
22 Wright Patman (D-TX) had offered a bill that would prohibit any depository institution, regardless of 
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from consumer groups and organized labor countered that the instruments unfairly shifted 
risk unto borrowers who were ill-equipped to understand it. Finally, civil rights leaders 
argued that as lenders moved towards VRMs, they would become less likely to issue 
mortgages to racial minorities (because, they argued, lenders would tend not think of 
those minorities as being upwardly mobile and thus able to afford the potentially 
increasing payments of a VRM).  
Following the lead of the rationale outlined in the published proposal, proponents 
claimed that VRMs would help stabilize the flow of capital to housing, and pointed to a 
series of issues of unfairness that VRMs would rectify. First, they argued that under the 
current system savers subsidized borrowers by earning lower than market rates of return 
on their savings. Second, VRM proponents reasoned that current borrowers generally 
subsidized the low rates of earlier borrowers, or as happened during erratic swings of 
interest rates, people who borrowed when rates were highest subsidized those who 
borrowed when rates were lower. VRM advocates claimed that the market sensitive 
instruments would spread the burden of the low-rate mortgages more evenly across 
borrowers regardless of when in the housing cycle and at what rate a mortgage was 
originated. Finally, VRM supporters argued that federally-chartered S&Ls in states in 
which state-chartered institutions could issue VRMs should be allowed to compete on a 
level playing field.     
The hearings, titled, Variable-rate Mortgage Proposal and Regulation Q, 
unapologetically linked VRM authorization to the elimination of deposit rate ceilings 
(and, thus, higher returns to savers), though witnesses both for and against VRMs refused 
to support the idea of a strict quid pro quo. The thrift industry representatives who sought 
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VRMs insisted that they needed continuing Regulation Q protection while some, though 
not all, VRM opponents hoped for higher returns for savers without expanded asset 
powers.23 Yet continued insistence on the necessity of retention of Regulation Q did not 
stop some proponents from leveraging the promise of eventual higher returns to savers in 
return for the immediate power to issue VRMs. Raymond D. Edwards, the chairman of a 
large California S&L, argued,  
The management of Glendale Federal Savings and Loan Association would like 
nothing more than to be able to pay our savers a higher rate of return on their 
funds–if we could be assured that sufficient changes will be made in our 
investment capabilities so as to ensure the higher earnings necessary to pay a 
higher savings rate…. We simply cannot generate the extra income needed to 
compete effectively without variable-rate mortgages.24  
 
Edwards emphatically maintained, however, that Regulation Q protection must remain in 
place for at least five and half years while thrifts sought to build the proportion of VRMs 
in their portfolios.25  
To St. Germain’s frustration, other thrift representatives refused to commit even 
to a five and a half year timetable for removal of Regulation Q. “In return for your 
variable-rate program,” he asked Dean Cannon of the California Savings and Loan 
League, “would you be willing to give up immediately the protection you now enjoy 
under regulation Q, the tax subsidy program, and the insurance premium you make in 
FSLIC to more accurately reflect the actual exposure of the fund?”26 Cannon replied, 
                                                 
23 Most consumer groups, including Consumers Union and the Consumer Federation of America, opposed 
VRMs but called for the elimination of interest rate ceilings, whereas the AFL-CIO opposed both VRMs 
and the elimination of interest rate ceilings. 
 
24 House Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance, Variable-rate 
Mortgage Proposal and Regulation Q, 40. 
 
25 Ibid., 41. 
 
26 Ibid., 115. 
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“Mr. Chairman, it sounds like you are even more convinced of the variable-rate as the 
answer to all the ills, or the problems that the thrift institutions have–probably even to a 
greater extent than I am.”27 Like Cannon, most VRM proponents at once argued that the 
more flexible instruments were both vitally necessary and insufficient to address the 
problems facing the thrift industry. William Mortensen, President of First Federal 
Savings and Loan Association of Santa Monica, added, “The variable-rate is absolutely 
not a panacea to the problems that we face. The only real solution, it would seem to me, 
is to have a reduction in inflation and a more stable economy.”28 Mortensen elided the 
logic that his “real solution,” would eliminate the primary justification for VRMs: 
inflation and instability of interest rates. The slippage allowed him to argue for the 
indefinite continuation of interest rate ceilings, and the differential, leaving the 
exasperated chairman to remark to his colleague, “the variable will not remove regulation 
Q, Mr. [Henry] Hyde. That is the problem.”29  
Taking the pro-Regulation Q position to its extreme, Edward Johnson, Chairman 
and President of Financial Federation, Inc., Los Angeles, CA, testified, “if you are going 
to give VIR [variable interest rates] in the name of destroying regulation Q. I think that is 
immoral, and I think it is dangerous…. Regulation Q is still a private enterprise function 
to protect the homeowner. It is a special arrangement. [It] may well be the homeowner’s 
last stand….”30 Johnson warned that in the absence of Regulation Q protection, even the 
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promised low initial rate on VRMs would be pushed higher, likely to a level prohibitive 
for many borrowers.31 He thereby merged a pro-deregulation defense of VRMs and an 
anti-deregulation defense of Regulation Q, cloaking both under a defense of 
homeownership. 
Chairman Bomar offered the committee little additional hope that VRMs could 
lead to elimination of Regulation Q in the near future, predicting, “with variable-rate 
mortgages alone, if they were used exclusively by all the lenders in the country, 
beginning today, I would presume it would be at least 5 years before the mortgage 
portfolios of the institutions would allow them sufficient income flexibility to do without 
some kind of rate ceilings.”32 Only VRM opponents claimed that the instruments would 
rival fixed-rate mortgages in thrift portfolios; Bomar and the thrift representatives assured 
the committee that lenders would not use VRMs exclusively. Stephen Gardner, Deputy 
Secretary of the Treasury, supported this assessment, arguing, “market forces will 
eventually determine the place of the variable-rate mortgage… I am convinced that fixed-
rate mortgages will continue to be readily available as long as there is any consumer 
demand for them.”33 If they were correct that variable-rate instruments would not 
dominate thrift portfolios, then Bomar’s five year projection represented a minimum 
estimate of the thrifts’ continued need for Regulation Q. Bomar did indicate, however, 
that VRMs constituted an essential part of the push to achieve higher returns for savers 
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and made that promise, however far off, a central argument in support of the proposed 
regulations. This did not impress St. Germain any more than the equivocations of the 
industry witnesses. He concluded, “So, frankly, we are no closer now if we were to adopt 
the variable to the removal of regulation Q and an increased rate to the depositor.”34  
Though thoroughly convinced that savers should get higher returns, and thereby 
implicitly buying the argument that savers unfairly subsidized borrowers, St. Germain 
offered less sympathy to VRM proponents’ argument that current borrowers unfairly 
subsidized past borrowers. He asked a witness,  
The borrower who bought a car and financed it for 4 years… at a lower rate, he 
therefore is subsidizing all of the borrowers who bought a car later on, and are 
paying a higher rate of interest? …if you both live in the same community and 
you are paying taxes in that community, you are subsidizing [fellow witness] Mr. 
Mortensen by paying the taxes that pay for the schooling of his children, are you 
not? The point is that the American way of life is that people are subsidizing other 
people at all times are they not?35  
 
Simultaneously holding that subsidizing other people was an “American way of life” and 
that savers should get higher returns, St. Germain implicitly privileged one set of 
consumers–savers, who should not be asked to subsidize borrowers, over another–new 
homebuyers, who should, by his logic, subsidize past borrowers simply because that was 
how the system worked.  
The California delegation of industry witnesses and their congressional 
representatives argued that federal S&Ls in their state must be freed to compete fairly 
with state-chartered thrifts that could already offer VRMs. Others, such as Ohio 
Republicans Willis Gradison and Chalmers Wylie, argued that the truly fair course would 
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be to authorize all institutions to offer the choice of VRMs and let the consumers in the 
market decide what should be allowed.36 Short of a national authorization like that 
favored by Gradison and Wylie, the California delegation sought a more limited 
provision that would apply to federally-chartered institutions in states that explicitly 
allowed state-charters to offer VRMs, or at least in California. Congressman Thomas 
Rees (D-CA) proposed an “experimental” authorization: “what I would like to ask this 
subcommittee to do would be to do the same thing we did with the NOW Accounts. Let 
us try them out in California.”37 As with NOW accounts, the dual banking system by 
which institutions were chartered and regulated by either state or federal authorities 
provided an entering wedge for arguments about fair and free competition between 
institutions of state- and federal-charter. Reflecting a concern for consumer protection, 
however, Congress would prove less receptive to such arguments in the case of VRMs 
than it had with NOW accounts.   
 The AFL-CIO led the opposition to the FHLBB’s proposed regulations. Their 
criticism represented two constituencies that VRM proponents claimed would be most 
helped by the new instruments: consumers and construction workers. Bob Georgine, 
President of the Building and Construction Trades Department of the AFL-CIO argued, 
“Variable interest rate mortgages would not solve the problem of sharp cyclical declines 
in homebuilding every few years. In fact, it would probably make the fluctuations and 
instability in homebuilding worse.”38 Instead, Georgine suggested, VRMs would 
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contribute to inflation. As monthly mortgage payments of a VRM increased, he reasoned, 
homeowners would be pressed to fight for higher wages to offset the new costs. Looking 
at past experience in which workers had struggled to cope with inflation-induced wage 
erosion, AFL-CIO President George Meany too saw VRMs as a potentially exacerbating 
factor. He wrote to St. Germain, “during 1974, for example, real gross average weekly 
earnings of workers declined by almost 5 percent. Interest rates on variable-rate 
mortgages linked to corporate bond yields could have been raised a full percentage point 
in 1974.”39 Under such conditions, and predicting a continuation of the long history of 
rising interest rates, Georgine concluded, “The average workingman would have much 
more to lose than to gain from variable-rate mortgage interest rates.”40 Both John 
Sheehan, Legislative Director of the United Steelworkers of America, and George Miller, 
Executive Vice President of the Communications Workers of America, reiterated that an 
increase in monthly mortgage payments would leave the average worker cutting back on 
other expenses such as food and clothing and would lead to greater wage demands at the 
bargaining table.41 Chairman Bomar’s written statement had anticipated the labor 
representatives’ inflation argument and countered with a curious rebuttal, “When 
inflation is high and interest rates are rising, more of the homeowner’s income will be 
used to make mortgage payments and less will be used for other purposes. Thus, inflation 
can more easily be brought under control.”42 St. Germain later remarked, “My note in the 
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margin for that is, ‘Wow!’ is this the way we think we ought to control inflation, and 
determine what people are going to spend their money on?”43 Bomar backed off this 
particular line of argumentation, but continued to deny that VRMs would be inflationary. 
 Nearly all parties involved in the debate recognized that variable-rate mortgages 
shifted interest rate risk from lenders to borrowers. St. Germain noted that the Hunt 
Commission had said as much in its report recommending their use, but some observers 
found this shift more problematic than had the commission. 44 Consumer Federation of 
America witness Kathleen O’Reilly argued that “clearly, the borrower is the party least 
able to analyze and assess the risk entailed in fluctuating rates.”45  
VRM opponents believed that, given the choice, lenders would seek to reallocate 
their portfolios predominantly to VRMs. The proposed regulations did not, as had the 
Hunt Commission recommendation and the FHLBB’s 1972 proposal, include a 
requirement that a fixed-rate mortgage be offered alongside a VRM. Even with such a 
requirement, O’Reilly did not think consumers would truly have a choice. Financial 
institutions, she argued, “could make the fixed mortgage rates so onerous that, practically 
speaking, there would be no option…. Likewise, the savings and loan institutions could 
wait to offer the fixed-rate until the interest rate is at a high point, when it is to their 
advantage to allocate a percentage of their funds for the fixed-rate.”46 Proponents 
countered that lenders would have to make VRMs attractive enough, through lower initial 
rates, for borrowers to accept the additional interest risk. Consumer advocates like 
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O’Reilly feared that lenders would hold all the bargaining leverage and could manipulate 
even a mandated fixed-rate option to suit their interests.   
 St. Germain shared the position that borrowers would be at a disadvantage, “How 
I can expect the consumer to understand enough about it in order to make an intelligent 
decision as to whether or not he or she–the consumer–should opt for a VRM as opposed 
to a fixed-rate mortgage.”47 Complicating the concern over the consumers’ ability to 
understand the terms of a variable instrument, the regulations, as yet, had not named the 
index to which adjustments would be pegged. O’Reilly argued that there was no such 
index that met the criteria laid out in the regulations of “proven reliability in moving with 
market interest rates, is beyond the influence of the Federal savings and loan association 
using it, and is explainable in clear and simple terms to borrowers with the aid of publicly 
available information.”48 The absence of a named index contributed to a general distrust 
of the regulations. Rev. Msgr. Geno Baroni, President of the National Center for Urban 
Ethnic Affairs, especially objected to the fact that the regulations required Congress to 
intervene before the index was named.49 
Civil rights advocates argued that some borrowers would likely be hurt more than 
others. While the debate over the transformation of the New Deal system of housing 
finance remained almost entirely separate from those concerning fair housing and 
community reinvestment, the spirited opposition to VRMs represent the lone exception. 
Civil rights advocates charged that lenders would employ underwriting standards for 
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VRMs that would further isolate the traditionally excluded from home financing. Rev. 
Msgr. Baroni argued, “Underwriting standards will be more conservative and will place 
an additional burden on those who already have been excluded by the lenders–the 
working class and the poorer groups.”50 If, as advocates claimed, VRMs would entice 
borrowers through lower initial rates that could then escalate, and would be best suited 
for homebuyers who expected their incomes to increase over the term of the loan, then 
lenders would have to figure the likelihood of upward mobility into their risk assessment. 
Of this prospect, Gale Cincotta of National People’s Action observed, “When they talk 
about upwardly mobile people, I do not know exactly who they are talking about, but 
they certainly are not usually talking about the people in our cities and in our inner-ring 
suburbs who are hit by the economy right now.”51 NAACP Washington Bureau Director 
and long-time fair housing advocate Clarence Mitchell put it more bluntly, “This is 
geared to appeal to a market that does not include most of the black people of this 
country and would not include most of the blue-collar white people.”52  
O’Reilly predicted, “The underwriting policies which would result from VRM’s 
would institutionalize discrimination against minorities, including the elderly, women, 
and those seeking loans in older neighborhoods…. Years of effort to guarantee equal 
opportunity in housing could crumble under the guise of sound business judgment.”53 
O’Reilly and others feared that “sound business judgment” evaluations of risk would 
allow “upward mobility” to function as a stand-in for the types of discrimination that had 
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been made illegal under fair housing law. Rev. Baroni added that borrowers in racially 
heterogeneous neighborhoods too might be labeled as higher risks, amounting to red-
lining of those neighborhoods.54   
Under this barrage of criticism, Bomar conceded, “This proposal does not go to 
the very legitimate needs of the low-income borrowers or the underlying problems of our 
cities.”55 Bomar stressed that the VRM should be optional, noting in particular that 
VRMs would not be appropriate for “people who operate on modest incomes and are not 
upwardly mobile.”56 For the FHLBB chairman, the question of thrift asset powers and the 
stability of the flow of mortgage credit could be addressed separately from the problem of 
urban disinvestment. Yet for the community activists, this bifurcation of policy issues 
was itself part of the problem facing borrowers, particularly those who had been excluded 
in the past. Mitchell thundered,  
The Government working in partnership with the lending institutions has 
subverted the intention that we had many years ago, to provide homes for the ill 
housed, to preserve the neighborhoods that might be preserved and to make it 
possible for people of modest means to acquire housing as owners and to live in 
decent neighborhoods. I would say that this proposal on variable interest rates is 
but another link in the chain that has held back progress in this country.57  
 
Few, if any of the committee members would have gone as far as Mitchell, yet the 
majority did find that the VRM proposal posed a threat to consumer interests. In 1975, at 
least, the consumer and civil rights advocates carried the day. Though in limited use in 
                                                 
54 Ibid., 213. 
 
55 Ibid., 253. 
 
56 House Subcommittee on HUD and Independent Agencies Appropriations, Department of Housing and 
Urban Development, Independent Agencies Appropriations for FY76, Part 4, 125. 
 
57 House Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance, Variable-rate 




some areas of the country by state-chartered S&Ls, the VRM was still largely an 
unfamiliar instrument, particularly in comparison to the fixed-rate mortgage, considered 
by many to the be the bedrock of the “American dream” of homeownership.  
The House Committee on Banking, Currency, and Housing considered the 
testimony and reported its interpretation that the FHLBB’s “primary constituency [is] the 
borrowing public [and that] the majority of the committee believes variable-rate 
mortgages could have a built-in pro-lender, anti-borrower bias.”58 Reflecting the 
influence of the testimony of VRM opponents, the committee report indicated a 
skepticism that fixed-rate mortgages would survive if VRMs were authorized, and 
expressed a particular concern over the potential changes in underwriting principles that 
would especially harm “working class families and minorities who do not have the 
‘upward mobility’ to support a VRM loan.”59 The House report concluded, “An approach 
of this nature, dealing only with a part of the overall problem, simply should not be 
permitted until the problem of enabling the saver-depositor to receive a greater return on 
his investment is faced squarely.”60 While soundly rejecting the FHLBB’s VRM 
proposal, this concluding language signaled that movement on Regulation Q could 
provide an entry-point for a reconsideration of VRMs.  
 The Senate made its own repudiation of the FHLBB variable-rate proposal. 
Senator Proxmire, emerged as the most vocal opponent of VRMs in the Senate, 
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introducing a bill to prohibit their authorization.61 Proxmire warned, “I, for one, am quite 
skeptical of the desirability of variable-rate mortgages in general and even more skeptical 
of the Bank Board’s specific proposal. I believe the benefits of variable-rate mortgages 
have been greatly exaggerated.”62 Proxmire objected to the shifting of interest rate risk to 
borrowers, discrimination against “working-class families whose incomes are relatively 
fixed,” the absence of a mandated fixed-rate option, and what he predicted to be 
inflationary implications of VRMs.63 Proxmire challenged the VRM proponents to 
convince him otherwise, but after four days of hearings he remained unmoved. Though 
continuing to express his doubt of the merits of VRMs, Proxmire left the door open to the 
possibility of VRMs with more palatable safeguards, given statutory, not merely 
regulatory, authorization.  
On June 16, 1975, the Senate agreed to Senate Concurrent Resolution 45 by voice 
vote, “expressing the sense of the Congress that the Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
shall refrain from authorizing variable-rate mortgages unless and until authorized by the 
Congress.”64 Reiterating that the resolution did not necessarily signal the death of the 
VRM, Senator John Tower (R-TX) added, “One thing that must be considered here is not 
just the welfare of borrowers, but also the welfare of savers, particularly small savers.”65 
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Proxmire seconded, “As long as we have regulation Q limiting the amount that can be 
paid to the saver, of course, we are in a position where the variable-rate mortgage is 
unlikely to do him much good.”66 
The accompanying Senate report noted the lack of consensus that VRMs would 
be in the public interest, citing the objections of labor and consumer organizations as well 
as some scholars. The report summarized the main objections to VRMs: risk is 
disproportionately shifted to borrowers; lenders, with superior market knowledge, will 
push VRMs when they expect rates to rise, and push fixed-rate mortgages when they 
expect rates to fall; VRMs will favor households considered to be upwardly mobile, and 
exclude working class and moderate income households; that VRMs would be 
inflationary; and that the proposed safeguards would be insufficient to protect 
consumers.67 
The House did not act on the Senate Concurrent Resolution, but the resolution, 
coupled with the House’s resounding vote in favor of H.R. 6209 sent a clear message to 
Bomar and the FHLBB to rescind the proposed regulations. Bomar complied, and the 
labor, civil rights, and consumer advocates scored a victory in blocking federal 
authorization of VRMs. The absence of a passed law prohibiting VRMs, however, left the 
door open for the FHLBB to revise their proposal, and for Congress to consider VRMs as 
part of the on-going debates over financial reform. Both houses had hinted that VRMs 
might be more acceptable if savers earned market rates on their deposits. For the moment, 
at least, neither supporters of deregulation of interest rate ceilings nor supporters of 
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deregulation of thrift asset powers could cobble together a majority. The thrifts were 
winning their battle to protect Regulation Q, but not their bid to achieve broader asset 
powers, including VRMs. Complicating the issue, some legislators, like Proxmire, badly 
wished to remove the rate ceilings while insisting that VRM authorization not be granted 
in exchange. Whereas deregulation in the name of the free market obliged support of both 
initiatives, deregulation in the name of consumer interest, for some, could mean only 
support of the elimination of rate ceilings, and even then, astute observers recognized that 
consumer-borrowers’ interests were at stake too.  
Despite the third congressional rejection of VRM authorization in six years, 
FHLBB regulators began a renewed push for broadened asset powers the following year. 
In the spring of 1976, the FHLBB initiated a comprehensive study of a wide range of 
alternatives to the fixed-rate mortgage (the AMIR study). In addition to variable-rate 
mortgages, the study examined a “rollover” instrument, for which the interest rate would 
be renegotiated at a set interval (a version used in Canada was renegotiated every 5 
years), a graduated payment instrument with low initial rates that gradually increased, a 
“flexible-payment” instrument that moved all interest payment to the first five years of 
maturity, a “deferred-interest” instrument under which a borrower received a low, fixed-
rate and in return, the lender would be paid deferred interest and a fee when the home 
was sold,68 and an “escalator” instrument, which functioned as a VRM after an initial 
three year period. The study surveyed borrower preferences, considered secondary 
market implications, projected implications of various instruments for borrowers and 
lenders, and assessed consumer safeguards.  
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FHLBB regulators used the extensive study as the basis of a revised and expanded 
regulatory proposal that would maximize the ability of thrift institutions to experiment 
with market sensitive instruments. Bolstering the competitive equity case for federal 
authorization of alternative instruments, the AMIR study found that as of 1976, state-
chartered institutions had issued over 200,000 alternative mortgage instruments valued at 
over $8.5 billion, concentrated in California, New England, Wisconsin, and Ohio. The 
majority of these loans, 160,000 and $7.4 billion respectively, were variable-rate 
mortgages.69 Yet these alternative instruments amounted to little more than 1% of the 
total mortgage debt outstanding.  
In 1977, some members of Congress began indicating to Marston that the time 
had come to revisit VRM authorization. In February, Senator Tower along with Alan 
Cranston (D-CA), sponsored Senate Concurrent Resolution 9, which urged the FHLBB to 
authorize “a wide variety of flexible mortgage instruments (including variable-rate 
mortgages) in States where State-chartered savings and loan associations are permitted to 
offer variable-rate or other types of flexible mortgages to the public,” and in other states 
on an experimental basis.70 The resolution languished in Senator Proxmire’s Banking 
Committee, but nonetheless indicated limited bipartisan interest in revisiting the variable-
rate concept. Senator Thomas McIntyre (D-NH) too signaled to the FHLBB regulators 
and the thrift industry that Congress might reconsider a VRM proposal, sponsoring 
legislation drafted by the U.S. League of Savings Associations that included a title 
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modeled on Senate Concurrent Resolution 9.71 Like Proxmire, McIntyre was committed 
to achieving higher returns for savers. Unlike his colleague from Wisconsin, however, 
McIntyre was willing to consider offering thrifts VRM authorization in order to get them.  
Seeking a different outcome for the FHLBB’s fourth flexible mortgage proposal, 
regulators sought to address the major objections to the 1975 version (that risk would be 
unfairly shifted to borrowers, borrowers would not be able to chose a fixed-rate 
alternative) without compromising on what they considered the essential needs of the 
thrift industry (an increasing portion of market sensitive mortgages in portfolio). 
Convinced that thrift portfolios would have to become more responsive to interest rate 
volatility through some form of flexible rate instrument, regulators focused on making 
the consumer safeguards more acceptable to lawmakers and VRM critics. The AMIRS 
paper on consumer safeguards, written by Maurice Weinrobe, concluded “It is 
appropriate to constrain the movement of debit rates on a periodic and on an overall 
basis,” thus reaffirming the rate caps that had been included in previous FHLBB 
proposals.72 Rather than hoping that the Weinrobe study would lead regulators to the best 
mix of consumer protection and thrift flexibility, however, FHLBB Chairman Garth 
Marston sought direct guidance from Congress. He wrote to Senator Proxmire, “It is 
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essential that Congress clearly indicate what kinds of consumer safeguards are 
appropriate for a full range of flexible mortgage instruments.”73  
 The FHLBB cast its renewed push for market sensitive mortgage instruments in 
pro-consumer terms. Donald M. Kaplan, Chief Economist and Director of the FHLBB 
Office of Economic Research, argued that AMIs offered a choice to consumers with 
different financial needs. Citing the increasing costs of homeownership, Kaplan argued 
that AMIs, including graduated payment mortgages (GPMs) as well as variable-rate 
mortgages, might better fit the needs of young, first-time home buyers who expected their 
incomes to increase over time. Kaplan’s framing of AMIs in consumer-centric language 
emphasizing the financial needs of various points in their “life cycle” represented a new 
approach for FHLBB regulators’ pursuit of flexible-mortgage instruments. Not until his 
fifth reason for the necessity of AMIs did Kaplan mention what had previously been the 
primary rationale for VRM authorization: the needs of lenders to have greater flexibility 
to combat problems of disintermediation and high interest rates.74 In part, this change 
reflected the relative calm of interest rates at the time, but the shift in strategy also sought 
to counter the challenges raised in previous debates by consumer advocates by casting the 
regulations as pro-consumer. 
Kaplan outlined five proposed consumer safeguards that included limits on the 
amount and frequency of annual payment increases, prohibition of balloon payments, and 
featured what FHLBB regulators called “documented choice.” Answering the objections 
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to the absence of such a provision in the 1975 proposal (despite the recommendations of 
the Hunt Commission), documented choice mandated that federally chartered institutions 
that offered VRMs would also offer the option of a fixed-rate alternative and that the 
maximum liability for various mortgage options be disclosed to consumers.75 Though 
otherwise expressing great confidence in the “free market place” to regulate prices and 
ensure that lenders would not induce consumers into taking on mortgages they could not 
afford, Kaplan conceded that the market alone would not guarantee that the fixed-rate 
option would be made available to all borrowers.76 Kaplan maintained that with the 
documented choice safeguard, however, traditional fixed-rate, fixed-payment mortgages 
would remain the principal form in use.77 
The consumer-centric framing did little to appease consumer advocates. Kathleen 
O’Reilly of the Consumer Federation of America criticized Kaplan for lumping various 
mortgage instruments together under the name alternative mortgage instruments, noting 
in particular the differences between GPMs and VRMs, implying that the catch-all 
“AMIs” was a Trojan horse designed to divert scrutiny from VRMs. VRMs, she argued, 
echoing her 1975 testimony, unfairly shifted risk onto consumers, and “pose[d] 
discriminatory effects on women, racial minorities and the elderly who do not 
traditionally have the upward economic mobility to demonstrate to cautious underwriters 
that not only can they meet the current monthly payment but that additionally, they can 
absorb future increases.”78  
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When pressed by Senator Proxmire on the question of who would bear the 
cost of VRMs, Kaplan answered, “First, it is in all of our interests to make sure 
we keep a viable financial institution system in this country to keep mortgage 
credit flowing and to hopefully keep that credit flowing on as stable a basis as 
possible….”79 Kaplan’s second response, that documented choice would protect 
consumers from having alternative mortgage instruments forced on them, 
similarly elided Proxmire’s question, but revealed something of the parameters of 
possible policy. Questions of cost and affordability were ultimately subservient to 
the question of the survival of financial institutions in a changing economic 
environment. Sen. McIntyre made this point even more starkly, “While interest 
rates and monthly payments are certainly important, is there not also a strong 
consumer objective to be served in guaranteeing a stable flow of mortgage 
money? In this regard, are not VRM’s better than no mortgage money at all?”80  
When the FHLBB formally unveiled its proposed slate of “alternative mortgage 
instruments” (AMIs) in July 1978, it did offer consumer safeguards that had not been 
included in the 1975 proposal.81 Among these, the most important was the requirement 
that any type of AMI be offered alongside a standard fixed-rate mortgage and that the 
borrower be shown a detailed comparison of the instruments including a “worst case” 
payment schedule. Significantly, the proposal was also measured in geographical scope. 
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Instead of a national authorization, the implementation would follow the lead of the failed 
1975 Rees amendment by which AMIs could be offered only in states in which state-
chartered institutions already offered comparable instruments. An additional portfolio 
restriction limited the number of AMIs that could be offered to no more than half of the 
loans made and purchased by an institution in a calendar year. 
The July proposal conveyed an entirely different rationale than its 1975 
predecessor. Gone was the language promising higher returns to savers, greater 
stability in the flow of capital for housing, and a healthier thrift industry. In its 
place, the FHLBB had constructed a consumer-centric justification. As had been 
suggested by Kaplan’s testimony, the regulations claimed that AMIs would offer 
greater choice for consumers and “better meet the needs of homeowners during 
different phases of their financial life cycles.”82 Yet, nothing about the FHLBB’s 
consumer-centric framing of VRMs had diminished the concern of consumer 
advocates. The fundamental premise that VRMs shifted risk to borrowers 
remained at the heart of VRM opposition. But from the perspective of some 
policymakers, at least, the terms of debate were subtly shifting from concern over 
particular forms of mortgage financing to concern over the continuing availability 
of any financing at all. 
In September 1978, seeking to send a clear message to the FHLBB to proceed, 
Senators Cranston and Tower proposed new language to Senate Concurrent Resolution 9, 
making it a Senate resolution calling for authorization of VRMs, GPMs, ROMs, and 
RAMs.  Proxmire, fearing that the resolution, with only four committee members present, 
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would indeed prompt the FHLBB to move ahead with its July AMI proposal, objected “I 
am absolutely 100 percent – maybe I should say 1000 percent against this proposal. This 
is a situation where you are going to put the onus on the back of the borrower, rather than 
where in my view it belongs, which has traditionally been, in this country, on the 
lender.”83  
 The Cranston-Tower endorsement never formalized as a resolution, but neither 
was there any congressional action prohibiting VRMs comparable to H.R. 6209 and S. 
Con. Res. 45 in 1975. Though Proxmire and others continued to express concern about 
the implications of alternative mortgage instruments, the FHLBB felt emboldened to 
issue the proposed regulations in December, effective January 1, 1979. The dramatic 
growth of higher-cost MMC deposits afforded regulators a justification for expanding 
thrift asset powers. Though noting the protests of thrift officials, the final regulations 
retained a 50% portfolio limit on AMIs (meaning at least 50% in traditional fixed-rate 
mortgages), and the restriction to states in which AMI authorization would address 
competitive imbalance. The latter limitation had been loosened somewhat in the final 
regulations to allow that competition might come from institutions other than state-
chartered S&Ls, and such competition would be considered by FHLBB regulators in 
determining in which states federal-charters would be authorized to issue AMIs. The 
explanation acknowledged that VRMs, in particular, “have been controversial and [the 
FHLBB] deems it of the greatest importance that a real choice be made available to 
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borrowers offered [VRMs].”84 Accordingly, the “documented choice” requirements 
added a mandated statement indicating that a borrower could choose a standard mortgage 
instrument. The final rules were modest, especially in their limited geographical scope. 
FHLBB Chairman Richard Pratt would later testify that the authorized instruments were 
“not used by institutions to any degree because of [their] limitations.”85 
 Yet the geographic restriction was short-lived. Effective July 1, 1979, the FHLBB 
authorized VRMs nationwide. To justify the change, FHLBB regulators revived their 
1975 rationale, stating, “such investment authority is necessary to offset the costs of 
paying higher interest rates on savings accounts and … in order to maintain competitive 
balance with other financial institutions.”86 The period of relative interest rate stability 
that had afforded the opportunity to couch the 1978 proposal in consumer choice 
language had since passed. The new rules explained, “The rapid growth of money market 
certificates has exacerbated the ‘lending long and borrowing short’ problem of savings 
and loan associations, creating a severe competitive disadvantage for savings institutions 
as a group relative to other financial institutions with more flexible asset portfolios.” 
According to this reasoning, the loosening of interest rate ceilings required deregulation 
of assets, authorization of VRMs in particular. As much as some legislators would have 
liked to have kept the issues separate, the FHLBB regulators became increasingly 
insistent that they be paired. Perhaps to appease VRM opponents, the revised regulations 
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simultaneously amended the safeguards to extend the notification period of rate increases 
and window for penalty-free prepayment from 60 to 90 days. Additionally, along with a 
“worst case” payment schedule, lenders would be required to disclose a 10-year history 
of the national cost-of-funds index, in order to give borrowers a better understanding of 
the risk they were assuming.     
Despite the move to national authorization, however, VRMs still failed to take 
hold as the regulators had hoped. As late as May 1980, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury 
John Mingo reported, “The experience with VRMs under the regulatory constraints under 
which Federal S&Ls have been authorized to issue VRMs has not been that good, 
especially outside of California,” where VRMs comprised only 1% of thrift mortgage 
portfolios. FHLBB Chairman Jay Janis claimed that the ‘worst case’ disclosure 
requirement had doomed the VRM because it “distort[ed] the picture from a borrower’s 
point of view.”87 Seeking wider flexibility for thrifts to find a more marketable alternative 
to the fixed-rate mortgage, in December 1979, the FHLBB proposed a new type of 
mortgage instrument, the Renegotiable Rate Mortgage (RRM), an automatically 
renewing short-term (three to five year) notes secured by a long-term mortgage. At each 
renewal, the interest rate would be renegotiated, presumably bringing it close to the 
prevailing market rate. The proposed rules limited the maximum rate increase to 0.5% in 
any year and 5% over the life of the loan, double the limit in prior VRM proposals.  
 During the comment period on the RRMs proposal, while the House and Senate 
Banking committees worked toward passage of H.R. 4986, the eventual DIDMCA, a 
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House subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations convened hearings on 
the RRM proposal. The hearings provided a platform to the regulators, who argued that 
RRMs would benefit both lenders and consumers, and to irate consumer advocates, who 
registered their shock at the new rules’ departure from the limitations contained in 
previous proposals and regulations. FHLBB Chairman Janis explained that RRMs would 
“help savers by allowing the market rates to be paid on deposits, they will help borrowers 
by assuring that there will be an adequate flow of mortgage funds, and they will help 
lenders by allowing them to adjust to inflationary pressures.”88 Despite painting this rosy 
picture, when pressed, Janis later conceded that not everyone would benefit from RRMs. 
“In my view,” he observed, “it is ignoring reality to believe S&Ls can pay market rates 
on deposits to enable savers to keep abreast of inflation, without mortgage borrowers 
bearing the brunt.”89 Citing inflation and the increasing proportion of thrift liabilities in 
market-yield MMCs, then 32%, Janis argued that thrifts could not survive if they 
continued to “bear the brunt” through “severe stress on earnings.”90 Out of the status quo 
of high inflation, market rates to savers through the MMCs, and thrift portfolios 
dominated by fixed-rate mortgages, something had to give. For Janis and the FHLBB, the 
answer was clear; “use of the long-term, fixed-rate mortgage is the prime reason why so 
many thrift portfolios are ‘underwater’ in terms of the low yielding loans they contain.”91  
Subcommittee Chairman Ben Rosenthal (D-NY) disagreed that the troubles of the 
thrifts should be remedied at the expense of borrowers. “It would be unfortunate indeed,” 
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he said, “if the burden of protecting the soundness of savings institutions, borne for so 
long by small savers, should now be shifted over to mortgage borrowers.”92 Esther 
Peterson, director of the U.S. Office of Consumer Affairs shared Rosenthal’s sentiment, 
concluding in her submitted testimony, “In the final analysis, the consumer will be 
bailing the associations out of their economic problems.”93   
In light of the FHLBB’s 1979 national authorization of VRMs, Peterson and most 
other consumer advocates had resigned themselves to living with alternative, flexible 
mortgage instruments and focused their attention on securing appropriate protections for 
borrowers. On this score, Peterson expressed “great disappointment at the Bank Board’s 
issuance of proposed regulations which contain virtually no consumer safeguards.”94 
Consumer advocates cited two main concerns, familiar from previous debates over 
variable-rate instruments: discrimination against borrowers not considered by lenders to 
be upwardly mobile, and the inability of borrowers to cope with rate hikes. Roger Kuhn, 
representing the Center for National Policy Review, argued that the expansion of the 
range of different mortgage instruments made consumer choice more difficult than ever, 
particularly for “those who, by reason of economic disadvantage and previous 
discrimination, have least experience in financing home ownership–that is, minorities and 
women.”95 Peterson concluded, “Any replacement of the traditional mortgage with the 
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RRM is likely to even further close the dream of their own home to the American 
minority and, if increases continue, will do so for the average American as well.”96  
“I cannot understand,” Gail Cincotta told the subcommittee, “that, when we had a 
Republican administration and Tom Bomar was the head of the Federal Home Loan 
Bank, he had to have hearings in this Congress on variable-rate mortgages. Now we have 
Mr. Janis, who is going to do it by regulation.”97 Yet it was not just that VRMs had not 
been explicitly approved by Congress that bothered consumer advocates, they were 
especially upset by the dramatic reduction in consumer safeguards in the latest 
regulations. Kuhn argued, “Assuming that it is necessary to authorize an additional type 
of instrument to meet the needs of the savings and loan industry, we can see no 
justification for casting aside the borrower safeguards which were adopted just 15 months 
ago in the Board’s VRM regulation.”98 Kuhn called for, at minimum, a mandated choice 
of a fixed-rate option, the portfolio limitation, and the 2.5% rate increase limit from the 
previous VRM regulations. 
Successive FHLBB Chairmen had indeed become increasingly aggressive in their 
pursuit of flexible mortgage instruments. Bomar, in 1975, could have authorized VRMs 
without congressional approval. Not even the strong message sent through H.R. 6209 and 
Senate Concurrent Resolution 45 amounted to a statutory prohibition of VRMs. But 
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Bomar elected not to override the clear opposition of majorities in each house. Garth 
Marston, his successor, too consulted with Congress, seeking guidance on consumer 
safeguards before formally proposing alternative instruments. McKinney had moved 
cautiously, both by working with Congress and by first authorizing VRMs on a limited 
basis. But the increasing erosion of Regulation Q protection through the MMCs had led 
McKinney to national authorization without explicit congressional direction, and Janis, 
closely watching H.R. 4896 becoming law, beginning the formal phase-out of Regulation 
Q altogether, also felt compelled to act.   
 In April 1980, the FHLBB issued final rules authorizing renegotiable rate 
mortgages (RRMs). The rules limited rate changes to a maximum increase of 5% and no 
more than 0.5% per year. The regulations explained, “The Board is of the opinion that a 
higher figure, such as one percent, could result in increases in mortgage payments that 
some borrowers would be unable to absorb.”99 The rules required a disclosure offering a 
comparison to a fixed-rate mortgage, but not “a more extensive ‘worst case’ disclosure,” 
which the Board suggested might unduly create a competitive disadvantage (for example, 
with state-chartered institutions offering VRMs with no comparable “worst case” 
disclosure requirement).100 
 Though considerably less restrictive than the 1979 VRM regulations, the RRMs 
too made little impact on thrift portfolios (or borrowers). So scant was their acceptance 
that neither VRMs nor RRMs even registered in FHLBB annual data. Meanwhile, thrift 
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liabilities continued to be loosened as the DIDMCA was implemented and thrifts’ cost of 
deposits continued to rise, up to 8.78% in 1980 from 6.56% in 1978 (in 1965, the figure 
was 4.25%). The return on assets at FSLIC-insured institutions dipped to 0.14% in 1980, 
after 15 years in which that measure had not been below 0.46%.101 Under these near 
crisis conditions, FHLBB regulators redoubled their efforts for a less restrictive 
instrument. This renewed effort coincided with the arrival of a new FHLBB Chairman, 
Reagan appointee Richard Pratt. An economics professor at the University of Utah and 
former Chief Economist for the U.S. Savings and Loan League, Pratt was a free market 
devotee, convinced that operational freedom for thrift managers was essential to the 
recovery of the industry.102 
With like-minded John Heimann leading the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC), the regulator of national banks, federal regulators were primed to push 
for an instrument that banks and thrifts would finally embrace. Though as Heimann wrote 
to Rosenthal in 1979, “By long standing interpretation of this Office, national banks are 
permitted to issue variable rate mortgages where not prohibited by state law,” explicit 
authorization would removal all doubt and perhaps encourage banks to experiment with 
the instruments.103 On March 27, 1981, the OCC authorized federally chartered and/or 
regulated commercial banks to issue an instrument more flexible than the both the VRM 
                                                 
101 Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Savings & Home Financing Source Book, 1987 (Washington, DC: 
GPO, 1987), B-66-68. The “cost of deposits” equals the interest and dividends paid on deposits divided by 
the average deposit balance and “return on assets” reflects net income after taxes divided by average assets. 
 
102 Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Nomination of Richard T. Pratt: Hearing 
before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Ninety-Seventh Congress, First Session, 
April 6, 1981 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1981), 4. 
 
103 John Heimann, to Rosenthal, July 3, 1979, in House Subcommittee of the Committee on Government 




and RRM, the adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM). Less than a month later, on April 23, the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) followed suit, allowing federally chartered 
savings and loans to diversify their portfolios to include alternative mortgage instruments, 
subsuming renegotiable- and variable-rate mortgages under the umbrella of adjustable-
rate mortgages. By the end of the summer, both the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (FNMA or Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(FHLMC or Freddie Mac) had announced that they would purchase a wide variety of 
adjustable-rate mortgages in the secondary market, thus assuring financial institutions of 
the liquidity of such loans.  
The ARMs regulations broke from previous authorizations of VRMs and RRMs 
by eliminating the 2.5% (VRMs) and 5% (RRMs) limitation on the increase in the 
interest rate over the life of the loan. Additionally, whereas the RRM regulations 
indicated concern over borrowers’ ability to handle a 1% per year increase, the new 
regulations allowed an increase of 2% each year. The new rules preempted the 50% 
portfolio restriction, and rescinded the requirement that lenders offer a fixed-rate option. 
Instead of designating a universal index, rate changes could be tied to any index “readily 
verifiable by the borrower and beyond the control of the lender.” The FHLBB regulations 
explained that deregulation of interest rate ceilings and the increasing volatility of thrifts’ 
cost of funds while only 7% of mortgages held by thrifts had variable-rates (and those 
under the 2.5% increase limit) made the new authorization not only necessary, but urgent. 
“The Board believes it is inconsistent and unsound,” the explanation continued, “to 
expose associations to the impact of wide swings in the cost of funds, which occurred as 
a result of the deregulation of liabilities, without providing associations with the power to 
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attain complementary changes in the mortgage portfolio yield.”104 FHLBB regulators 
acknowledged consumers’ concerns over rate and payment increases, but consumers 
would be best served, they argued, by encouraging thrifts to invest in housing. Under this 
reasoning, the only way to ensure that mortgage lending would remain a viable and 
profitable business was to provide maximum freedom for thrifts to design and use 
flexible mortgage instruments.   
Unlike in 1975, when Congress held hearings on proposed regulations and 
intervened during the comment period, Congress did not hold hearings on ARMs until 
months after they had been nationally authorized. For those policymakers who still 
harbored misgivings about the flexible mortgage instruments, reeling regulations back in 
would prove much more difficult than preempting them. The hearings made clear that 
consumer advocates still objected to flexible-rate mortgages on the principle that they 
were unfair to borrowers, and, even more, that the existing consumer safeguards were 
woefully inadequate.105 Though these concerns persisted, lawmakers mustered no formal 
response, much less a rebuke to the instruments and safeguards far more liberal than 
those that it had rejected in 1975.   
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 For their part, though ARM opponents voiced a preference for fixed-rate, fixed-
payment mortgages, their attention to amending consumer safeguards indicated a certain 
resignation to the arrival of ARMs. Representative Benjamin S. Rosenthal expressed this 
position, “I have come to accept the inevitability of the present trend toward adjustability 
and interest rate flexibility in mortgage loans for home purchase, but I cannot accept the 
elimination of essential consumer safeguards that has accompanied this trend.”106 
Indicative of the political salience of deregulation, Rosenthal felt compelled to justify 
such safeguards saying that “systematic monitoring is not inconsistent with a philosophy 
of deregulation. You pursue deregulation because you believe that open competition in 
the private marketplace will serve the needs of society and lead to desirable results. But 
the proper regulatory attitude is to be openminded at all times to reconsider the need for 
specific regulation in the light of experience.”107 Rosenthal’s call for safeguards, though 
consistent with precedent dating back to the Hunt Commission, fell on deaf ears at 
FHLBB.   
 Allen Fisheim, Director of the Neighborhood Revitalization Project of the Center 
for Community Change entered into the record a statement signed by 60 local and 
national organizations including the NAACP, National Urban League, and United Steel 
Workers, calling for rigorous consumer safeguards, though also warning of the potential 
for the loosening of regulations to lead to a “new form of redlining” that would price out 
would-be homebuyers.108 Of the opponents to the new ARMs regulations testifying 
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before the House subcommittee, only Gale Cincotta maintained that a battle must still be 
fought against ARMs all together, and not just over the appropriate safeguards. Cincotta 
decried ARMs as a tourniquet for the ailing thrifts and argued that deregulation was in 
fact “re-regulation” that diverted credit allocation from housing to industry, representing 
a reordering of government priorities.109 She too suggested that consumers faced an 
economic form of redlining in which “only the big banks and the major corporations are 
borrowing, investing, and profiting from America’s money supply.”110  
 Many of the Congressmen who participated in the hearings appeared sympathetic 
to the concerns raised by the consumer advocates. Majority Leader Jim Wright, a Texas 
Democrat, called the regulations “the most insidious scheme ever foisted upon the 
American home buyers” and suggested that “the American dream of homeownership” 
was at stake.111 Committee Chairman Fred St. Germain matched Wright’s rhetoric 
concluding, “As to the American dream, I’m afraid it might be turning into a 
nightmare.”112 But this rhetorical fanfare, mourning the apparent demise of the fixed-rate 
mortgage, did not translate into action. There would be no H.R. 6209 or Sen. Con. Res. 
45, much less an enacted law requiring a prohibition of ARMs or even the 
reestablishment of a mandated fixed-rate option. 
 Soaring rhetoric notwithstanding, even the fiercest critics of flexible-rate 
mortgage instruments recognized that they were a necessary concession to gain higher 
returns to savers. Pratt left little doubt that this bargain was exactly how he justified 
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authorization of ARMs with minimal consumer safeguards. When St. Germain suggested 
that the FHLBB had removed a cap on rate increases from its safeguards because 
increases in the cost of money had outpaced capped increases in California, Pratt 
responded instead, “The reason that we did not all for a cap is that it appears to us that the 
clear intent of Congress, as expressed in H.R. 4986 [the vehicle bill for DIDMCA], was 
that institutions pay the market rate for funds. If you are not going to cap the cost of their 
funds, it is simply untenable to cap the sale price of the funds. And I think that it does the 
American public a disservice, that the true cost of funds should be transmitted to the 
borrower and he should see that cost.”113 Together, the new regulations, and the 
testimony of Pratt and others from the Reagan administration, indicated a transition from 
a position among regulators that deregulation must be accompanied by strong consumer 
safeguards to one advocating that safeguards were not necessary or desirable, and/or a 
change in circumstances that made the inclusion of consumer safeguards politically 
unnecessary.  
The 97th Congress would later endorse the OCC and FHLBB’s ARMs 
authorization through Title VIII of the Garn–St. Germain Act of 1982 (P.L. 97-320), 
known as the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act. The explicit purpose of the 
title was to “eliminate the discriminatory impact that those regulations have upon non-
federally chartered housing creditors and provide them with parity with federally 
chartered institutions by authorizing all housing creditors to make, purchase, and enforce 
alternative mortgage transactions so long as the transactions are in conformity with the 
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regulations issued by the Federal agencies.”114 In order to assure housing credit to meet 
the demand of the 1980s, the title stated, all lenders would have to be freed from the 
constraints of fixed-term and fixed-rate instruments that did not function well in periods 
of interest rate volatility. The act made the federal safeguards the default standard for all 
lending institutions in which state law and/or regulation did not apply.  
Table 1 Share of Adjustable-rate Conventional Single-family Residential Mortgages 
Year Percentage  
ARMs 
Contract Interest  
Rate-ARMs 
Contract Interest  
Rate-Fixed 
Difference 
1980 NA    
1981 NA    
1982 41    
1983 40    
1984 62    
1985 51 10.44 11.93 1.49 
1986 30 9.10 10.09 0.99 
1987 43 8.20 9.52 1.32 
1988 58 8.21 10.04 1.83 
1989 38 9.15 10.21 1.06 
1990 28 8.90 10.06 1.16 
1991 23 8.03 9.38 1.35 
1992 20 6.37 8.21 1.84 
1993 20 5.56 7.27 1.71 
Source: Kenneth A. Snowden, “Terms on conventional single-family residential mortgages, by type of 
property and mortgage: 1963-1999,” Historical Statistics of the Unites States Millennial Edition Online, 
edited by Susan Carter et al. (Cambridge University Press, 2006). Snowden, “Homeownership Rates,” 
Historical Statistics of the Unites States Millennial Edition Online. 
 
The extension of ARMs authority to all lenders coupled with the loosened 
restrictions in the 1981 regulations finally enabled the proliferation of flexible-rate 
mortgages that the VRM and RRM regulations had failed to produce. The FHLBB’s 
count of the percentage of mortgages issued with adjustable rates jumped from an NA in 
1980 to 41% in 1982.  
                                                 




By 1982, the adjustable-rate mortgage had arrived. In the deregulated system of 
housing finance, the lynchpin of the New Deal system, the long-term, fixed-rate 
mortgage would compete alongside a variety of flexible-rate mortgage instruments. 
ARMs did offer the lower initial rates that regulators had promised, and because interest 
rates began to fall from their historic highs, borrowers were not hit with excessive 
increases despite the absence of federally mandated limits. 
 If VRMs had been authorized when FHLBB first proposed, in 1969, or in 1975, 
when they tried again, they may not have become so widespread–consumers may have 
been less likely to accept them, or if they had become widespread, there might have been 
an equally broad reaction against them. Since rates rose through the early 1980s, VRM 
holders would have seen increasing payments, and might have protested against them, or 
perhaps needed government bail-out/assistance in the late 1970s and/or early 1980s. That 
they were authorized later meant that they proliferated as inflation finally began to 
decrease. Borrowers did not, by and large, have increasing payments, and thus VRMs 
quietly became a normal part of the system of housing finance. The worst predictions of 
VRM opponents did not come true because rates were going down. The underlying 
concerns remained dormant however, likely to resurface if rates did sharply increase, 
with one exception. Opponents raised the likelihood that lenders would exclude those not 
considered to be upwardly mobile, with disproportionate implications for women and 
minorities. Yet in the years that VRMs/ARMs became a part of the system of housing 
finance, changes in mortgage origination and the role of the secondary market flipped the 
concern. Because mortgage originators rarely held onto a mortgage, they did not need to 
employ stricter underwriting standards, but rather were freed to loosen standards. 
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Originators could then entice borrowers with low introductory fees, then sell off the 
mortgage before rate escalation created any risk of default. 
 Thrift officials and their regulators at the FHLBB sought authorization of flexible-
rate mortgages for a decade, but only after authorization of the new instruments became 
linked to the deregulation of interest rate ceilings did they make any headway. Congress 
flatly rejected flexible-rate mortgage proposals into the late 1970s on the basis that they 
would unfairly shift interest-rate risk to borrowers and could promote changes in 
underwriting standards that would exclude borrowers not considered upwardly mobile, 
with disproportionate impact on women and minorities. Yet as momentum for the 
elimination of interest-rate ceilings mounted, some members of Congress became willing 
to allow flexible-rate mortgage instruments in order to enable depository institutions to 
pay higher rates to savers. Even those in Congress who deeply opposed VRMs, such as 
Senator Proxmire, could accept the new asset powers if it meant an end to Regulation Q. 
Each proposal and authorization of flexible-rate mortgage instruments by the FHLBB 
followed a liberalization of interest-rate ceilings. Once Congress had committed to 
ending the ceilings all together, FHLBB regulators boldly moved to authorize instruments 
with minimal consumer safeguards. Congress prioritized the interests of consumer-savers 
over those of consumer-borrowers, accepting the shift of risk to borrowers and the 






Leveraging Deregulation–The Garn–St. Germain Act of 1982 
 
 In 1980, policymakers’ fervor for deregulation neared or perhaps reached its 
height. Major deregulatory reforms had or would soon be accomplished in the 
transportation, telecommunication, and energy industries, as well as banking, with 
widespread, bipartisan support. Rationalizations for deregulation as a policy solution for 
the economic woes of the 1970s came from “free market” economists who saw regulation 
as an unnecessary impediment to market efficiency, consumer advocates who identified 
regulations that restricted market competition that could benefit consumers, and business 
managers who contended that regulations imposed unnecessary costs.1 Though most of 
the legislation that deregulated these industries was passed by Congresses with 
Democratic majorities in both houses and signed by President Jimmy Carter (including 
the DIDMCA), devotion to deregulation seemed only more prominent as Ronald Reagan 
and a Republican Senate majority came to power following the 1980 elections.  
Yet, as this chapter demonstrates, despite broad support and lofty rhetoric touting 
the benefits of deregulation generally, and a legislative mandate for the particular 
deregulation of interest rate ceilings, in the area of banking (including housing finance), 
implementing deregulation proved exceedingly difficult. The group of regulators charged 
with overseeing the phase-out of Regulation Q, the Depository Institutions Deregulation 
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Committee (DIDC), struggled continually to weigh competing concerns and interests, 
most critically, market returns for savers against the safety and soundness of depository 
institutions. Policymakers resolved this contradiction by deregulating thrift asset powers, 
giving them more flexibility in what they could invest in, allowing them to move away 
from their traditional singular devotion to residential mortgage lending. This chapter will 
show that the DIDC leveraged their mandate to secure market rates for savers to achieve 
the passage of legislation to deregulate thrift assets.   
At a fundamental level, the difficulty of weighing competing financial interests 
stemmed from the special role that interest rate ceilings had played in the New Deal 
system of housing finance. Regulation Q and related ceilings ensured a source of low-
cost funds to depository institutions that could in turn provide low-cost credit to 
borrowers, thus fostering healthy residential construction and mortgage financing 
industries. The inescapable logic of interest rate deregulation, at least when interest rates 
were high, as they were during the early 1980s, was that it would lead to a higher cost of 
funds for depository institutions that, even if they passed much of the cost on to 
borrowers, they might or might not be able to bear. As Bank of America President A.W. 
Clausen warned in 1970, “sharp across-the-board escalation of rates in the thrift area 
could lead to imprudent lending and investment practices in order to justify payment [of 
higher rates, which] may, of course, endanger the health of the banking system.”2 If this 
was true in 1970, the stakes would only be greater in the late 1970s and early 1980s as 
interest rates reached historic highs.   
                                                 
2 Letter, A.W. Clausen to Arthur Burns, September 21, 1970, Folder “ABA Oct.-Dec. 1970,” Box B1, 




Some institutions were better positioned to manage an increase in cost of funds 
than others. The greater the proportion of an institution’s assets that was short-term, the 
more those assets would reflect market rates that could keep pace with increasing costs. 
This left large commercial banks most ready, and in some cases, eager, to accept an 
increasing cost of funds in order to compete with non-bank financial institutions, while 
smaller banks, and especially the thrifts, with large proportions of long-term, often low-
yield assets such as mortgages, were least prepared to take on increased costs. Some 
deregulation advocates argued that the institutions had to pay the higher costs, whatever 
the danger, in order to compete with alternative deposit options such as money market 
mutual funds, which regulators had decided not to regulate. Once the institutions could 
stem the flow of savings going to MMMFs, the logic went, the amount of available credit 
they could offer would increase, and thus increased supply would pressure the cost of 
credit downward. But others, whether or not generally in favor of deregulation, countered 
that regard for the safety and soundness of depository institutions whose earnings would 
be severely pinched by an increasing cost of funds dictated a very slow pace of 
deregulation of rate ceilings. The latter group stood its ground through 1982, largely 
thwarting the agenda of the most ardent deregulation advocates who sought faster 
deregulation, even as the Reagan administration came to power. Reagan’s appointee to 
chair the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Richard Pratt, readily, and his Treasury 
Secretary, Donald Regan, more reluctantly, slowed the pace of rate deregulation out of 
concern for the safety and soundness of the thrift industry.  
By slowing the pace of congressionally mandated interest rate ceiling 
liberalization, the DIDC turned this narrow deregulation into a much wider deregulation 
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of thrift asset or investment powers, significantly eroding their role as specialized 
housing lenders. Pratt and Regan helped make clear to the Congress that the full 
realization of their mandate that savers should receive market rates of return on their 
deposits could not be achieved unless and until the problems that rate deregulation posed 
for thrift earnings could be resolved. The DIDMCA had reflected a delicate, and 
ultimately untenable, balance of a few very specific consumer-oriented deregulations 
(phase-out of Regulation Q, authorization of NOW accounts) aimed at securing higher 
returns for savers, with continued specialization of thrifts as housing lenders. Pratt, 
Regan, and others who favored broad deregulation, leveraged the narrower agenda 
represented by the DIDMCA to achieve deregulation of thrift asset powers. In short, they 
argued that in order to achieve market returns for savers, and save the thrift industry, 
thrifts would have to become less like thrifts had been in the past, that is, less devoted to 
residential home lending.  
In 1982, seeking to break the DIDC’s stalemate over deregulation of rate ceilings 
and concern over thrift earnings, Congress passed the Garn–St. Germain Depository 
Institutions Act. In addition to expanding FDIC and FSLIC assistance powers, the 
legislation authorized thrifts to invest a large proportion of their portfolios in commercial, 
consumer, and non-residential real estate lending and government securities and insured 
certificates of deposit. The expanded powers granted by the Garn–St. Germain Act are 
widely credited with causing the collapse of the S&L industry in the late 1980s, but for 
the purposes of this study, the critical result of Garn-St. Germain was the dramatic 
reduction, throughout the decade, in the role of thrifts as lenders for residential housing. 
Largely severing the linkage between thrifts and housing, in enacting Garn–St. Germain, 
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lawmakers dealt a fatal blow to the New Deal System of housing finance. With it went 
the concomitant vision of the centrality of local depository institutions raising capital 





In passing the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act 
(DIDMCA), Congress committed to the eventual elimination of deposit rate ceilings. The 
DIDMCA created the Depository Institution Deregulation Committee (DIDC) and 
charged the committee with overseeing the phase-out of Regulation Q and related deposit 
ceilings over a period of up to six years, but “as rapidly as economic conditions warrant,” 
in order to provide “all depositors with a market rate of return on their savings with due 
regard for the safety and soundness of depository institutions.”3 As simple and succinct as 
it seemed, as chapter three demonstrated, the directive reflected a long and contentious 
debate over Regulation Q. The unresolved internal contradiction of that debate, namely 
achieving market returns without endangering depository institutions with increasing 
costs, would plague the DIDC throughout its short life.  
Congress had passed the buck, and now the messy business of implementing 
deposit rate deregulation fell to nation’s financial regulators. Meeting for the first time on 
May 6, 1980, the DIDC4 wasted little time in drawing the ire of nearly all interested 
observers, first by closing much of the meeting’s proceedings to the public, and secondly 
                                                 
3 P.L. 96-221. 
 
4 The committee members were Fed Chairman Paul Volcker (DIDC Chairman), Treasury Secretary 
William Miller, FHLBB Chairman Jay Janis, FDIC Chairman Irvine Sprague (DIDC Vice-Chairman), 
National Credit Union Administration Chairman Lawrence Connell, and a non-voting member, 




by spending the bulk of their time discussing “premiums,” non-monetary giveaways such 
as clocks and silverware, and withdrawal penalties. Because interest-rate ceilings limited 
the ability of depository institutions to compete for deposits by offering higher rates, 
many used premiums to gain an edge in enticing new depositors. At least two DIDC 
members, Jay Janis of the FHLBB and Irvine Sprague of the FDIC, argued that the 
committee should include the cost of premiums against rate ceilings (or prohibit 
premiums altogether). Sympathetic to the challenges that use of premiums posed to his 
fellow regulators, but also sensing the irony of the debate, National Credit Union 
Administration Chairman Lawrence Connell expressed his disappointment that “the first 
item considered by the Committee involved in a sense a further regulation of interest 
rates on deposits.”5 To Connell the symbolism was galling, the “deregulation committee” 
was already considering new regulations. The DIDC’s discussion of premiums would 
also awaken the sleeping giant that came to be known as the “premium industry,” which 
in turn aroused congressional representatives to their defense, contributing to the DIDC’s 
burgeoning reputation as a magnet for special interests.6 But more than just being deeply 
ironic and antagonizing toaster-oven makers, that the DIDC turned first to regulating 
premiums reflected the committee’s tacit recognition that their charge to enable market 
returns for savers while ensuring the safety and soundness of depository institutions 
                                                 
5 Minutes of May 6, 1980 Meeting; Records of DIDC Meetings, May 6, 1980–Dec. 15, 1983; Records of 
the Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee; General Records of the Department of the Treasury; 
RG 56; NACP.  
 
6 Among the premium manufactures who wrote to Congress in protest of the DIDC proposal to ban 
premiums were Dart Industries, Microtime Inc., Oneida Ltd., and the Metal Cookware Manufacturers 
Association. Senators Claiborne Pell and John Chafee, both of Rhode Island testified before the House on 
behalf of premiums manufacturers. See House Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, 
Regulation and Insurance of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Oversight Hearings 
on Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Financial 
Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance, 96th Cong., 2d sess., July 2; August 26, 1980 




would be more easily resolved than done.7 By comparison, regulating premiums was 
straightforward and achievable. On the subject of its primary mission, the DIDC directed 
its staff to study the implications of possible changes to interest rate ceilings, but took no 
further action regarding Regulation Q.  
 The DIDC met three more times that May, holding closed sessions despite the 
objections of Senators Garn and Proxmire as well as Janis, who felt that the thrifts’ 
interests, especially the housing differential, would be better protected if the proceedings 
were public.8 Not until its fourth meeting, on May 28, did the DIDC finally act on its 
charge to achieve market rates for savers. The committee voted to allow depository 
institutions to pay ¼% higher than the 6-month Treasury-bill on 6 month Money Market 
Certificates (MMCs). But rather than simply removing or raising the Regulation Q 
ceiling, in a complicated scheme, the committee set a “minimum ceiling,” of 7 ¾%, 
meaning that institutions could pay that amount even if the 6-month T-bill average was 
lower than 7 ½%. Ohio Republican Chalmers Wylie would later call these minimum 
ceilings, “which actually operate as floors… reminiscent of the ‘newspeak’ and ‘double 
think’ of George Orwell’s ‘1984’.”9 In an even more controversial move, the DIDC 
                                                 
7 Joe Nocera notes the irony of the DIDC’s attention to premiums and suggests that the “discussion had the 
unmistakable feel of Nero fiddling while Rome burned.” He argues that “at bottom… the DIDC’s mission 
was a straightforward one: to deregulate interest rates.” Joseph Nocera. A Piece of the Action: How the 
Middle Class Joined the Money Class (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 209, 208. The argument here 
is that the DIDC’s mission was anything but straightforward; rather, it was intrinsically contradictory, 
leading the committee unable to satisfy any of several competing interests. Minutes of May 6, 1980 
Meeting, 2-3; Records of DIDC Meetings, May 6, 1980–Dec. 15, 1983; Records of the Depository 
Institutions Deregulation Committee; General Records of the Department of the Treasury; RG 56; NACP. 
 
8 Senator Jake Garn, to Paul Volcker, May 22, 1980 and Senator William Proxmire, to Volcker, May 22, 
1980; Records of DIDC Meetings, May 6, 1980–Dec. 15, 1983; Records of the Depository Institutions 
Deregulation Committee; General Records of the Department of the Treasury; RG 56; NACP. Minutes of 
May 23, 1980 Meeting; Ibid. 
 
9 House Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance, Oversight 
Hearings on Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee, 3. 
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removed the differential when rates exceeded 8 ¾%, and though retaining the differential 
when rates were between 7 ¼% and 8 ¾%, ruled that banks could renew MMCs at the 
same rate as thrifts over the following 6 months. On 2 ½ year “small savers certificates” 
(SSCs), the DIDC established a minimum ceiling of 9 ¼% for commercial banks and 9 
½% for thrifts with caps of 11 ¾% and 12% respectively, thereby retaining the 
differential for the SSCs at all rates. Offering protection against depositors shifting 
money to higher yielding accounts within the same institution, the DIDC also imposed 
early withdrawal penalties equal to three months of interest.10 In short, the committee 
loosened interest rate ceilings on some deposits to give savers higher returns, but did so 
in a way that confused nearly everyone and, in some cases, would offer less protection 
for S&Ls in competing against banks for deposits.  
 Thrift industry officials were livid. The DIDC scheme would raise thrifts’ cost of 
funds and erode the protection of the housing differential. The U.S. League of Savings 
Institutions filed suit against the DIDC for violating administrative procedures law as 
well as its mandate regarding the safety and soundness of depository institutions. And for 
having finally gained the courage to alter interest rate ceilings to allow higher returns for 
savers, Congress rewarded the DIDC with oversight hearings. Fred St. Germain (D RI) 
remarked, “at this point, I am beginning to wonder whether we are all using the same 
dictionary to define ‘deregulation.’ Webster’s very simply states that deregulation is ‘the 
act or process of removing restrictions and regulations’…. Instead of removing 
regulations, the Deregulation Committee has interpreted Public Law 96-221 [DIDMCA] 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
10 Minutes of May 28, 1980 Meeting; Records of DIDC Meetings, May 6, 1980–Dec. 15, 1983; Records of 
the Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee; General Records of the Department of the Treasury; 




as requiring a whole new set of rules and procedures.”11 DIDC Chairman Paul Volcker 
did not disagree, characterizing the new ceiling structure as “not primarily designed as 
part of the deregulation process, but rather to facilitate larger credit flows by depository 
institutions to specific credit markets–viz. for mortgage, agriculture, and small business 
credit,” or, in words Volcker did not use, credit allocation.12 To Volcker, at least, 
regulating the flow of credit remained as important as deregulating rate ceilings.   
Citing bleak measures of residential construction activity, such as the lowest 
number of single-family building permits in the Chicago metropolitan area since WWII, 
thrift representatives and sympathetic lawmakers argued that the DIDC had moved too 
fast, too much in favor of the banks, and to the detriment of borrowers.13 Congressman 
Frank Annunzio (D IL), an ardent supporter of the thrift industry who had opposed the 
DIDMCA, accused the DIDC of violating the spirit and letter of the law, exclaiming, “I 
am frankly shocked and appalled that the committee would try and compress a 6-year 
timetable into 6 weeks.... In our history, only termites have done more damage to the 
building industry than has the Deregulation Committee.”14 Neither savings institutions, 
nor their regulators, U.S. League of Savings Institutions President Edwin Brooks argued, 
                                                 
11 House Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance, Oversight 
Hearings on Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee, 1. 
 
12 Paul Volcker to Alan Cranston, August 4, 1980, in Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs, Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee: Hearings before the Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d sess., August 5, 1980 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1980), 
28. 
 
13 House Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance, Oversight 
Hearings on Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee, 7. Senators Robert Morgan (D NC) and Alan 
Cranston (D CA) were among those in the Senate who similarly argued that the DIDC was moving too fast. 
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Depository Institutions Deregulation 
Committee, 23. 
 
14 House Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance, Oversight 




had been able to implement the new asset powers (including variable- and renegotiable-
rate mortgages and NOW accounts) intended to allow the thrifts to adapt to loosened rate 
ceilings. “The DIDC,” Brooks concluded, “has sentenced the American homebuyer and 
home seller to double-digit mortgage rates for the foreseeable future.”15    
 Volcker defended the committee’s actions, arguing that unregulated premiums 
complicated an orderly phase-out of rate ceilings, and that the new ceiling structure 
would better enable depository institutions to compete with investment alternatives such 
as money market mutual funds, thereby attracting more capital for housing, agriculture, 
and small business credit.16 Senior Deputy Comptroller Lewis Odom added that the 
DIDC had weighed a range of concerns including returns for savers, safety and soundness 
of depository institutions, competitive equity among institutions, and the overall health of 
the economy, noting, “the balancing of these goals and interests is not easy–either for 
Congress or the DIDC.”17 Inaugurating a line of argumentation that his successor would 
later perfect, Janis argued that the problem with DIDC action to date had been that it was 
not adequately accompanied by new asset powers according to his reading of 
congressional intent for a “careful phase-in over time in order to protect housing and to 
protect the thrifts during a difficult period of transition.”18 New thrift asset powers, he 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 19. National Association of Home Builders Vice President Herman Smith concurred, arguing that 
the DIDC’s minimum ceilings had created a floor for mortgage rates, just as rates had begun to go down 
and interest in home buying had resumed. Ibid., 345. 
 
16 Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Depository Institutions Deregulation 
Committee, 8-11. 
 
17 Ibid., 37. 
 





argued, “won’t become useful overnight and profitability won’t be improved by those 
new asset powers for several years.”19 
 Being called before both houses of Congress did little to alter the fundamental 
challenges facing the DIDC. Convening again in September 1980, the DIDC did scrap 
the idea of banning premiums altogether, instead discussing an increased limit on the cost 
of such giveaways.20 On the more pressing, and daunting, issue of interest rate ceilings on 
passbook savings and other accounts, the committee considered several options, 
including one that would have lowered ceilings (and likely enraged some members of 
Congress) on NOW accounts in New England states. Volcker concluded that there was 
“no totally satisfactory answer,” given the competing concerns at stake.21 He sought a 
cautious approach to deregulation, saying “we ain’t there yet,” and explaining that the 
DIDC “didn’t believe that the earnings of thrifts should be further strained by an increase 
in the passbook ceiling rate at this time.”22 He noted, “judgments about the level of the 
ceiling rates and any modifications of differentials on new deposit classes will depend on 
a balancing of the special problems of the thrift and housing industries against the claims 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
 
20 Minutes of September 9, 1980 Meeting; Records of DIDC Meetings, May 6, 1980–Dec. 15, 1983; 
Records of the Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee; General Records of the Department of the 
Treasury; RG 56; NACP. 
 
21 Minutes of May 28, 1980 Meeting, 28; Records of DIDC Meetings, May 6, 1980–Dec. 15, 1983; 
Records of the Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee; General Records of the Department of the 
Treasury; RG 56; NACP. 
 
22 Volcker, “Report of Activities of the DIDC,” 16; Records of DIDC Meetings, May 6, 1980–Dec. 15, 
1983; Records of the Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee; General Records of the Department 
of the Treasury; RG 56; NACP. Nocera argues that “the deregulation committee wasn’t deregulating 
largely because of its chairman, Paul Volcker.” He suggests that deregulating “rubbed against his grain so 
fiercely as to be nearly unimaginable….Volcker didn’t just disagree with [the premise that the market could 




of consumers and others for equity.”23 Rather than balancing competing concerns, 
Comptroller of the Currency John Heimann and Connell argued that the committee 
should always err on the side of deregulating. Connell concluded, “the sooner we get way 
from managing the earnings of depository institutions, the sooner we’re going to achieve 
deregulation and the better the market is going to work.”24   
 The DIDC settled on a 5¼% ceiling on NOW accounts for commercial banks with 
a ¼% differential for the thrifts. The committee left the ceiling on passbook accounts 
unchanged. The DIDC’s actions again drew ire, this time from bankers. The ABA 
protested that the move “would be, we believe, a serious mistake,” that “will 
unnecessarily increase bank costs, and that it might have lasting effects on the makeup of 
bank liability portfolios.”25 The ABA, along with several state bankers associations also 
objected to the continuation of the housing differential on passbook accounts. C.N. 
Cushing of the Kansas Bankers Association wrote that the differential “is so 
discriminatory, so contrary to the intent of Congress, and its effect will be so one-sided, 
we find it difficult to believe!”26 The DIDC took no action at its final 1980 meeting to 
address the concerns of the commercial bankers. Just months earlier, the DIDC had been 
                                                 
23 Volcker, “Report of Activities of the DIDC,” 22; Records of DIDC Meetings, May 6, 1980–Dec. 15, 
1983; Records of the Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee; General Records of the Department 
of the Treasury; RG 56; NACP. 
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25 Gerald Lowrie, Executive Director, Government Relations, ABA, to Normand Bernard, Executive 
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sued by the U.S. League of Savings Associations for violating the intent of Congress in 
eliminating the differential on some accounts, and now it faced the charge of ignoring a 
Congressional mandate to “level the playing field” between banks and thrifts by 
maintaining the differential on another class of accounts. Both the commercial banking 
and thrift industries accused the DIDC of being beholden to the other, but the 
committee’s record of offending all parties demonstrates its independence from both. 
None of the many competing interest groups that petitioned the DIDC could count on 
being able to influence the group in their favor. The various interests were continually 
deadlocked, with a swing vote cast most often on the basis of current economic 
conditions rather than any longer-standing deregulatory agenda or particular interest.    
 The first year of DIDC activity was characterized by equivocation as it attempted 
to reconcile the competing imperatives of market rates for savers and the safety and 
soundness of depository institutions. The DIDC staff opened its March 1981 strategy 
memo with a brief moral, “in considering deposit rate deregulation, the Committee might 
find some guidance from the following:” 
In Eastern European ghettos, the local rabbi was called upon to adjudicate 
disagreements within his community. After hearing the views of one party, to 
such a disagreement, one such rabbi responded, ‘You’re right!’ The other party 
said, ‘But Rabbi, you haven’t heard my side.’ After listening to the second 
argument, the rabbi said, ‘You’re right!’ The rabbi’s wife, hearing all of the 
discussion, could not contain herself and exclaimed, ‘rabbi, they can’t both be 
right,’ to which the rabbi responded, ‘You’re right, too!’27 
 
That the staff would relate to this story indicates their utter frustration at what they 
viewed as an impossible task. The only way to get around the earnings problems 
                                                 
27 Edward Ettin, et al., “Strategies for Deregulating Deposit Rate Ceilings,” March 18, 1981, 1; Records of 
DIDC Meetings, May 6, 1980–Dec. 15, 1983; Records of the Depository Institutions Deregulation 




presented by rate deregulation seemed to be to impose minimum denominations of 
$2,000, $5,000, or more, but those limits “would not be consistent with the objective of 
the DIDMCA to provide a market rate-of-return for all savers.”28 Though some, namely 
representatives of the thrift industry, believed that the DIDC was deregulating too fast, 
compressing a six-year phase-out into a matter of weeks, others viewed DIDC actions as 
moving in the opposite direction, issuing new regulation. The proposal to ban premiums 
and the early withdrawal penalties even seemed to many to be anti-consumer regulation, 
while the controversial May 28 rate ceiling restructuring with its minimum ceilings 
confused lawmakers and consumers alike. Yet the DIDC’s apparent equivocation 
stemmed from the difficulty of negotiating the contradictory elements of the DIDC’s 
congressional mandate, not an inherent distaste for deregulation among the Carter-era 
DIDC members. The deregulatory rhetoric of Heimann and Connell matched that of the 
most ardent supporters of broad deregulation, and Bill Miller had been a key supporter of 
the deregulation agenda of the DIDMCA. Janis, too, favored deregulation in principle, 
but sought a slow pace of rate deregulation and the continuation of the differential in 
order to allow thrift institutions to adjust. Even Volcker indicated a desire to move 
toward deregulation of interest rate ceilings as soon as possible; it was his concern for the 
viability of depository institutions and continued flow of credit to housing, agriculture, 
and small business that made him so hesitant. Volcker, in particular, maintained the 
traditional view of regulation serving the public interest. The key difference in the newer 
brand of deregulation, that endorsed and espoused by the incoming Reagan 





administration, was their contention that the public interest would be best served not by 





The arrival of the Reagan regime in early 1981 portended a breakthrough in the 
equivocation and caution that had characterized the DIDC’s approach to implementing 
deregulation. Ideologically committed to the superiority of free markets, it seemed the 
Reagan administration would precipitate the elimination of interest rate ceilings and other 
restrictive banking regulations and perhaps also the expansion of depository institutions’ 
investment powers. Yet, I argue here, the government of the “Reagan revolution” 
including incoming Treasury Secretary and DIDC member Don Regan, despite an even 
stronger rhetorical and ideological commitment to deregulation, found it politically 
impossible to hasten the pace of liability deregulation and resolve the contradictory 
charges to the DIDC to achieve market rates for savers and ensure the safety and 
soundness of depository institutions.  
Regan, the newly appointed Treasury Secretary, had spent the previous 35 years 
at Merrill Lynch, the last eight of which as the company’s CEO. In his confirmation 
hearing, Regan described himself as “a free competitive man, myself, a capitalist, by 
nature,”29 and noted, “I think one of the key elements of the [Reagan] economic package 
is getting a handle on Federal regulations and in fact getting into deregulation.”30 In a 
November 1978 article in Financier, Regan had revealed his deregulatory propensities. 
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Commenting on regulation of international credit markets, he wrote, “controls are, I 
think, demonstrably counterproductive. In addition to trying to prevent something from 
happening that would otherwise occur, restrictions also often cause something to happen 
which otherwise would not have happened.”31 This was precisely the argument that 
scholars like Edward Kane had leveled at Regulation Q. Regan further exposed his 
thoughts on regulation in a review of a report on Government Regulation and Business 
Relations for the Reagan campaign that concluded, among other things, “economic 
regulations almost always impose greater consumer costs than would the operations of a 
free market.”32 Regan endorsed the report to the campaign with but one caveat, 
expressing skepticism of a survey finding that “‘executives overwhelmingly accept the 
need for virtually every existing regulatory body,’” which he certainly did not.33 
Perhaps more than most deregulation proponents, Regan had a fully developed 
vision of what a deregulated financial marketplace might look like. He expressed this 
vision in an unpublished manuscript titled “The Changing Market Place.” Written for a 
popular audience, Regan used the metaphor of a supermarket to describe a financial 
services company that could meet all of a customer’s needs under one roof. This one-
stop-shop would include depository, lending, and investment functions. The winner, he 
touted, would be the consumer. His vision included a democratization of the financial 
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marketplace; “those who work daily on Wall Street or other centers shouldn’t be the only 
ones able to take advantage of either tax changes, or modes of investment. Lawyers, 
doctors, dentists, businessmen, [and] retired people all over the nation, should have the 
same opportunities.”34 Regan had also considered the future of housing finance in a world 
without specialized housing lenders. He lauded FNMA for “set[ing] up a whole new 
method of mortgage financing [because of which] the system no longer depends just on 
deposits in savings and loan associations, or mutual savings banks.”35 He was especially 
excited, however, by GNMA’s pass-through securities, which offered “the safety, the 
cash flow, the good yields, the ease of management, and the liquidity,” to meet the needs 
of conservative investors.36 Regan noted “real estate, of course, is a huge market,” that 
would be increasingly accessible to investors through secondary markets.37 In other 
words, Regan could easily imagine a system of housing finance that did not rely on 
savings institutions but rather various types of financial institutions that pooled 
investment dollars to fund housing through secondary markets. Under Regan’s 
leadership, Merrill Lynch was already moving in the direction of a financial services 
                                                 
34 Regan, “The Changing Market Place,” unpublished manuscript; Box 223; Folder 4; Personal; Speeches 
and Writings; Books; The Changing Market Place (unpublished) draft, Ch. 1-6; Papers of Donald T. Regan; 
Library of Congress; Manuscript Division. Of the financial supermarket concept Henry Schechter of the 
AFL-CIO would say, “the proponents of financial institutions deregulation claim that consumers place 
great value on the ability of institutions to offer a broad range of services. Yet, they have little evidence to 
support this position…. None of the 14 million AFL-CIO members have petitioned our headquarters to 
look into the availability of a financial services supermarket.” House Committee on Banking, Finance and 
Urban Affairs, How the Financial System Can Best Be Shaped to Meet the Needs of the American People: 
Financial Deregulation: Hearings before the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th 
Cong., 2d sess., April 11, 12; May 2, 3, 9, 10, 16, 23, 24; June 7, 12, and 19, 1984 (Washington, DC: GPO, 
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supermarket. Wall Street Letter reported in April 1979 that Merrill Lynch planned to take 
a large role in residential real estate, offering mortgage default insurance to thrifts, and 
assembling GNMA securities that could be sold through the securities arm of Merrill 
Lynch.38  
This perspective informed Regan’s approach to his role as Treasury Secretary. A 
1981 memo laid out four main objectives of Regan’s Treasury “Deregulation Program” 
as expanding depository institutions’ asset and liability powers, broadening product 
powers then restricted by Glass-Steagall, geographic expansion, and regulatory 
consolidation, but how it would influence the DIDC was not yet clear.39 Observing that 
Secretary Miller had employed his committee vote to do whatever would keep things 
moving, Regan’s staffers reassessed the relationship of the office of the Secretary and the 
DIDC. Assistant Secretary Roger Mehle presented Secretary Regan with three options; he 
could, seek to be the chair of the committee and lead the charge on deregulation, follow 
Miller’s example and just take a seat as a regular member of the committee, or push a 
legislative alternative that would achieve deregulation but not directly involve the 
Secretary. After weighing the potential downside of strengthening the public’s 
association of the Reagan Administration with the already controversial DIDC against the 
opportunity to “lead the deregulation of depository institutions to the benefit of the 
Administration’s program,” Mehle recommended that Regan seek the DIDC 
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Chairmanship.40 As the only DIDC member without a regulatory constituency, Mehle 
suggested, Regan would be uniquely positioned to lead the committee. Regan agreed and 
sought the Chairmanship,41 to which the committee readily elected him. The Treasury 
staff’s take on the previous work of the DIDC was that “the regulators have found it 
impossible to resist the pressures from trade associations, particular institutions, and other 
interest groups for case-by-case, one-time, emergency, or ‘special-interest’ rate ceiling 
changes.”42 Instead, Gordon Eastburn urged Regan to take a systematic approach to 
deregulation, and while cautioning that the Secretary should take Volcker’s temperature 
first, he suggested that a strident, organized strategy would “enhance the efforts and 
image of the Administration as a deregulator.”43 President Reagan had already signaled 
that deregulation would figure prominently in the Administration’s agenda. Immediately 
upon entering office, Reagan ordered a postponement and review of the “last minute” 
regulations made by the outgoing Carter Administration, and had heralded “among my 
priorities as President is the establishment of a new regulatory oversight process that will 
lead to less burdensome and more rational Federal regulation.”44 
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What had held back deregulation of interest rate ceilings thus far had been the 
DIDC’s, primarily Volcker’s, concern for thrift earnings (and, by extension, their 
solvency). If Regan were to speed up the pace to deregulation, as all signs indicated he 
would prefer, he would have to offer some resolution to the thrift earnings problem. The 
Treasury department staff’s diagnosis of the plight of the thrifts included what they 
viewed as dogged resistance of thrift regulators to liberalization of rate ceilings that in 
turn stemmed from the problems inherent to having regulators with a homogeneous 
constituency.45 A Treasury Department memo called for the Administration to hold the 
line on its policies, “we have the correct policy prescriptions already in place,” which 
would alleviate the problems of the thrifts as the economy improved as a whole.46  
The Administration’s appointee to head the FHLBB, Richard Pratt, disagreed, 
arguing that the thrifts required special attention. He walked a fine line in testimony 
before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, stating both that 
the thrift industry was “in its worst state since World War II,” and that “the industry does 
have a collective net worth cushion of $32.4 billion, which should see it through this 
current adverse phase of the economic cycle.”47 Despite his confidence in the net worth 
“cushion,” Pratt nonetheless requested an increase in FHLBB’s line of credit with 
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Treasury, a lowering of the threshold to qualify for FSLIC assistance, and “extraordinary 
power to arrange for insured institutions or their holding companies, notwithstanding 
current Federal or State geographic or other limitations.”48 But Regan and the Treasury 
Department staff ran with the idea that the thrifts could rely on net worth to weather their 
current crisis. To some, this attitude seemed too cavalier. In March, St. Germain wrote to 
Regan, “many believe the magnitude of the problems within the thrift industry and their 
possible ripple effects are underestimated by some within the Administration. I tend to 
agree there is validity to this observation.”49 Regan responded that the Administration 
took the issues facing the thrift industry very seriously and that the President’s economic 
program remained the best approach to helping the thrifts.50 
 Regan’s propensity for deregulation, coupled with his confidence that the thrift 
industry could survive short-term earnings difficulties, portended more aggressive action 
by the DIDC to deregulate interest rate ceilings. In a press release following his first 
DIDC meeting on March 25, 1981, Regan reaffirmed the committee’s commitment to 
enable depository institutions to compete for funds and to offer higher returns to small 
savers, and he announced his intention to lead the DIDC to “make a significant 
contribution to financial market stability by better indicating what the future pace and 
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nature of deregulation will be, thereby reducing individual and institutional 
uncertainties.”51 
At the March meeting, the DIDC had reviewed five petitions regarding interest 
rates ceilings reflecting the range of competing concerns and agendas of various types 
and sizes of institutions. The ABA pressed for an instrument that would allow banks to 
better compete with MMMFs, as did the large S&L Western Savings Bank. Citibank 
asked the DIDC to speed up the elimination of ceilings beginning with the immediate 
removal of caps on deposits of three year maturities and higher, while the National 
Savings and Loan League sought a more moderate course, urging an indexing of ceilings 
beginning with deposits with 8 year maturities. Even supporters of deregulation such as 
Senator Alan Cranston recommended the re-imposition of the differential on MMCs as a 
“short term remedy” to assist the thrift institutions.52  
In weighing the competing claims, DIDC staffer Edward Ettin wrote, “the 
theoretical arguments concerning the impact of deposit rate ceilings provide little 
guidance on the appropriate pace of deregulation. Reasonable conceptual arguments can 
be made on both sides, but their resolution depends on the interest elasticity of the 
public’s demand for deposits.”53 In other words, depositors would signal when ceilings 
would have to be relaxed. Otherwise, there was evidence to suggest that ceilings should 
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be retained to protect thrifts, including the “market” indicator that falling S&L stock 
prices reflected the assumption that ceiling liberalization would negatively impact 
earnings, and the experience of New England thrifts that increased asset powers (NOW 
accounts) did not necessarily increase the ability of the institutions to compete for 
funds.54 
 Despite the concerns cited by Ettin, Regan continued to hold that the thrifts did 
not need special protections. Instead, as Regan argued in Senate testimony, a level 
playing field for all financial services institutions offered the best solution to the thrifts’ 
problems.55 Volcker attempted to persuade Regan that the dire condition of the thrifts 
could not be ignored.56 April 1981 indeed proved to be an especially trying month for the 
thrifts, which lost $6.6 billion in deposits.57   
 Yet, as of late May 1981, Regan remained steadfast that the thrift industry’s 
earnings and net worth problems were only temporary and that they had sufficient cash 
flow to ride out the hard times. Better times, he reasoned, would come soon enough, as 
“the President’s economic program with its balanced tax, budgetary, and monetary policy 
features [worked] in concert to reduce inflation [and] also reduce short-term interest 
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rates.”58 Regan was especially emphatic that current concerns should not impede the 
progress of interest rate deregulation. “In any event,” Regan assured St. Germain, “the 
most important element of enabling thrift institutions to retain their deposit funds is a 
removal of restrictive limits on the amount of interest they can pay on their deposit 
liabilities.”59 Meanwhile, Fed regulators scrambled to draft legislation to provide 
emergency aid to the thrifts. Yet without support from the Administration, including 
Pratt, who wanted broader powers in addition to emergency aid, St. Germain and other 
concerned lawmakers elected not to take up the proposed legislation, instead seeking a 
more comprehensive approach.   
Seeking alternative ways to bolster the thrift industry, Treasury staffers actively 
pursued what they called the “demand note” concept by which a distressed institution 
could make a claim on FDIC or FSLIC insurance as way to bolster the net worth of the 
institution. Pratt liked the idea and agreed that it could be implemented without additional 
Congressional authorization. This could buy time for ailing thrifts while Pratt and the 
FHLBB drew up legislation to expand thrift asset powers. Roger Mehle suggested to 
Regan that these developments should be cited to Pratt to signal that “the groundwork for 
an accelerated phase-out [of Regulation Q] has been laid.”60 
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The moment for Regan to take the lead on deregulation had arrived, or so he 
thought. Regan opened the June 25, 1981 meeting of the DIDC, announcing, “I should 
like to take this opportunity to reiterate the problems of the thrift institutions are 
temporary and manageable, and should not be of concern to the general public.”61 
Making good on his March promise to reduce uncertainty, Regan unveiled a schedule for 
deregulation of rate ceilings, beginning with longer maturities, and working toward 
complete removal of rate caps by August 1, 1985. The plan also included a two-year 
phase-out of the differential. Consistent with his prior steering of the committee, Volcker 
responded to the proposal cautioning, “it might be an awful big step… I think four years 
is certainly as short as we could go on deregulation at the moment…remember, we can 
only go so fast.”62  
This meeting was also the first attended by FHLBB Chairman Richard Pratt. Pratt, 
who would later become known as the man most responsible for thrift deregulation, too 
called for a slower pace, arguing, “while the committee is charged with the concept of 
deregulation, [it] has similarly been charged a number of times with taking into account 
the effect of this deregulation on viability and soundness of the institutions which are 
regulated.”63 Pratt suggested that the DIDC did not have the legal authority to phase-out 
the differential as dictated by Regan’s proposal. DIDC General Counsel Peter Wallison 
countered that even if the DIDC could not remove the differential on accounts established 
prior to December 1975 without Congressional approval, it did have the power to create 
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accounts of the same maturity without ceilings.64 Pratt was not satisfied, and abstained 
from the committee’s vote approving the schedule for public comment. The real problem, 
Pratt argued, was that “the charge which this committee has is really inadequate, that 
while this committee was charged by Congress with the task of deregulating the liability 
side, that to do so in a vacuum is inappropriate and not in the public interest.”65 Without 
greater deregulation of thrift assets, Pratt would go against his deregulatory leanings to 
slow liberalization of rate ceilings, and especially the differential. Revealingly, Pratt 
argued that the thrift’s obligation to housing left them “charged with paying open market 
competitive rates for their savings while being precluded from many of the most 
profitable markets existing in this country.”66   
Despite Regan’s reassurances regarding the status of the thrifts, Pratt reported that 
at the end of May, 70% of S&Ls were experiencing operating losses, and argued, “the 
differential is a small price to pay to maintain long-run competitive viability of this 
important sector and to see that flows to housing finance are maintained.”67 Finding little 
sympathy from Sprague and Lord, who noted that the DIDMCA had granted S&Ls NOW 
account authority, Pratt insisted, “listening to the comments of my colleagues here, I hope 
that they will wholeheartedly endorse whatever legislation we might bring forward to 
make thrift institutions fully competitive with other financial intermediaries, in all 
regards.”68 Pratt thereby previewed his strategy to leverage concessions on rate ceilings 
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and the threat they posed to the survival of the thrift industry for expanded thrift asset 
powers.  
 The June 25 meeting was notable for one other reason, one that promised to 
overshadow even Regan’s phase-out schedule, a proposal to double the passbook savings 
rate, to over 10%. The proposal was a parting gift from FDIC Chairman Sprague, 
attending his last DIDC meeting. Long frustrated by the slow pace of deregulation, 
Sprague noted, “nobody has said one word about the little fellow’s passbook.”69 The 
earnings problems of the thrifts, and consequent implications for the DIDC’s charge to 
ensure the safety and soundness of depository institutions, had, thus far, eclipsed the 
DIDC’s charge to ensure market rates for savers. Certainly Regan’s phase-out schedule 
moved in the direction of speeding up higher returns to savers, but Sprague felt a more 
dramatic move was needed to precipitate deregulation. The committee agreed to put the 
proposal out for comment, but did not raise the passbook rate.  
The DIDC staff reported the results of 4,571 comment letters on Sprague’s 
proposed 5% increase to the passbook savings rate. Not surprisingly, retirees and retiree 
associations overwhelmingly supported such an increase. But almost no depository 
institutions favored a 5% change, with 94% of commenting thrifts opposing any rate 
increase, while 53% of commercial bank respondents favored a smaller rate increase.70 
The thrifts continued to plead for greater sensitivity to their earnings crunch, and thus, 
slower movement on ceiling deregulation. An executive of South Texas Savings, Zac 
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Lentz, wrote desperately to Senator Lloyd Bentsen (D TX) that while his institution was 
still in the black, at a time when fewer and fewer S&Ls could claim the same, South 
Texas Savings could not absorb a 5% increase, and complained, “you cannot change 
from a highly regulated industry to an almost completely deregulated one in a short 
period of time.”71 Thrift officials also pointed to the uneven nature of deregulation, which 
was then focused on liabilities. An S&L executive wrote to the DIDC, “No doubt we 
could withstand these pressures [resulting from a 5% passbook rate increase] if we had 
been allowed to build diversified loan portfolios as were the commercial banks. However, 
due to past regulations, our loan portfolios consist of long term fixed rate mortgages over 
which we have no control.”72 
Several depository institutions that opposed the passbook increase quoted 
additional costs that the change would mean for monthly or yearly earnings. J.L. 
Forrester of First State Savings Association in Sedalia, Missouri claimed that the 
additional $900,000 costs per year “could well be the difference between our continued 
existence and failure.”73 Forrester charged that some members of the DIDC intended to 
“homogenize” the financial industry by first making thrifts insolvent, and then 
encouraging commercial banks to take them over. The end result, he maintained, would 
be to “reduce the emphasis on homeownership that our society has experienced for the 
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past several decades,” due to the commercial banks’ “preference for non-residential 
lending.”74  
Insulated from the challenges that Regan faced within the DIDC and distant from 
the pressure coming from thrift institutions and allied lawmakers, the Reagan 
administration kept pushing for quicker deregulation of interest rate ceilings. Vice 
President George Bush wrote to Regan in July, “Regulation Q makes no sense today, and 
the action taken [to phase out Regulation Q] is pro-competitive and consistent with the 
President’s program of regulatory relief. I hope we can continue to take actions like this 
in the future.”75 From Bush’s perspective, the goal remained the rapid deregulation of 
interest rate ceilings to achieve higher returns for savers, a position facilitated by the 
administration’s optimistic view of the thrift situation. The Administration expected that 
if anything, thrift deposits should increase in the short term, as thrifts introduced “All 
Savers Certificates” (ASCs). The ASCs were part of the Reagan Administration’s 
signature economic legislation, the “Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981,” which 
allowed savers to exclude up to $1,000 of interest from the certificates from their taxable 
income.76 The Council’s memo further urged staying the course of current policies to 
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reduce inflation, interest rates, and regulation, and to support the FHLBB proposed 
legislation for expanding asset powers.  
  Meeting again in September, the DIDC continued to be hounded by the 
contradictions in its mandate, with Regan arguing for higher returns for savers and 
Volcker cautioning that safety and soundness of the institutions must come first. Regan 
viewed lost deposits as the thrifts’ primary problem, arguing, “something has to be done 
here from the marketing point of view to indicate to the small saver that all of these high 
interest rates are not passed on just to the big guy.”77 Thrifts could not expect to keep 
deposits, he continued, by “hoping that lethargy or sheer inertia will mean that the little 
guy will be kept there at his disadvantage.”78 Recognizing that the proposed 5% rate hike 
would indeed be too much for the thrifts to handle, Regan called for a more modest 
increase in passbook rates to 6.75% for banks and 7% for thrifts, keeping the differential. 
Volcker responded to Regan’s proposal acknowledging the merits of higher returns to 
savers, but concluding, “in this case I do think our injunction to have due regard for the 
safety and soundness of the depository institutions is relevant and important because in 
this case all the analyses that I have does suggest that there would be a very substantial 
earnings cost to the thrift institutions and commercial banks, for that matter.”79  
Pratt supported Volcker’s assessment, citing an estimate that each percentage 
point increase to the ceiling would eat away $1 billion in thrift earnings per year.80 He 
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also noted that the inertia that Regan identified was keeping money in passbooks despite 
the higher rates available elsewhere even though the FHLBB estimated that over 40% of 
passbook accounts held over $10,000. By this reasoning both small and large savers were 
choosing to keep money in passbook accounts despite available alternatives, a fact that 
Comptroller Charlie Lord called “one of the great mysteries of the moment,”81 leading 
Pratt to conclude that any increase in the passbook rate would be “simply an increase in 
costs and not helpful.”82 When discussion moved to proposals for instruments to compete 
with MMMFs, all with high minimum denominations, Regan remarked, “I notice the 
tenor of this discussion here is that for accounts of $10,000 minimum or maybe $5,000 
minimum and the like, we should raise interest rates [but not for the passbook accounts] 
and again I come back to my original premise, that the very small saver–that is, the one, 
$2,000 saver or even less–I think should get a better break on interest rates.”83 “Your 
logic is impeccable,” Volcker responded, but “it’s that billion and a half [estimated lost 
earnings on the low denomination All Saver’s Certificate] sticking out there that sticks in 
my craw and I can’t get around it.”84 The committee voted against Regan’s passbook 
increase proposal 3 to 2, with Isaac joining Pratt and Volcker.85 
Though he lost the first vote on an immediate increase of 1 ½%, Regan secured a 
three votes to two approval of a still more modest ½% increase,86 and continued to pursue 
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a schedule for the 6-year phase-out, this time ensuring that some ceiling and differential 
continued to March 31, 1986 (as dictated by DIDMCA). Lord and Isaac indicated 
enthusiastic support of the new plan while Volcker added, “I am tolerant of it. The 
reservation I had last time was whether we were going too fast. This, on average, I think, 
is just about as fast as we were going last time. On that basis, I am tolerant. I prefer to go 
a little more slowly.”87 FHLBB General Counsel Tom Vartanian, speaking on behalf of 
Pratt, who had left the meeting, argued, “we think it might be a bit precipitous to look at 
an overall deregulation package covering the next three or four years at this point when it 
is the right and obligation of this body to look at deregulation from time to time, and, in 
fact reassess what the effect is on the economy and the institutions this body regulates.”88  
 For the thrift industry, the ½% increase in the passbook savings rate ceiling was 
not modest enough. S&L officials flooded Congressional offices with letters of protest. 
Michael Allen, a VP of Long Beach Savings and Loan, for example urged “rescission of 
the D.I.D.C.’s precipitous and irrational decision[s], arguing “we have witnessed an 
enormous increase in our costs through the deregulation of a variety of savings accounts 
which have led to skyrocketing mortgage interest rates.”89 Gerald Kuhn, a commenter 
with no apparent institutional affiliation characterized the decision to increase the 
passbook savings rate by one-half of one percent “stupid,” and called for the abolition of 
                                                 
87 DIDC, “Depository Institutions Meeting of the Deregulation Committee,” September 22, 1981, 78. 
 
88 Ibid., 79 
 
89 Michael H. Allen, to Congressman Glenn Anderson, November 1981 (copy); Congressional 
Correspondence; Records of the Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee; General Records of the 




the DIDC.90 Kuhn reasoned that the increase was too small to change savers’ behavior, 
but large enough to pose a crippling earnings problem for the depository institutions. The 
institutions that could survive the earnings squeeze, he continued, would only raise loan 
rates.91 Kuhn’s explanation of his own saving behavior flew in the face of most 
regulators’ assumption that savers were solely motivated by interest returns. Kuhn argued 
that depositors “utilize passbook savings due to its convenience and security,” and added, 
“I do not want to be served by a Merrill Lynch computer hundreds of miles from my 
house.”92 Kuhn had not (yet, anyway) embraced the “modern” financial environment, 
instead favoring community institutions, despite differences in interest rate returns. 
Responding to Rep. John Erlenborn (R IL), who had forwarded Kuhn’s letter to the 
DIDC, Executive Secretary Steve Skancke argued that whether or not savers like Kuhn 
would be moved by changes in yield, enough savers had demonstrated that they would 
indeed leave depository institutions all together in order to receive greater returns.93 
 While Regan, Skancke, and others focused on disintermediation as the main threat 
to the thrifts, most thrift officials remained more troubled by the increased cost of 
retaining funds. William D. Hoover, an executive of Randolph Savings and Loan 
Association in North Carolina, complained to Representative Ike Andrews (D NC), “the 
DIDC is proposing new deposit instruments which will only add to our losses and costs. 
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We stand to gain little, if any, new deposits.”94 A Texas S&L official cried that the 
September authorizations, “confirm our early suspicion that this committee is consumed 
with the idea of writing off the savings and loan industry.”95 As they pressed their case 
for a slower pace of deregulation, the S&L officials never ceased to stress their 
importance to housing finance. S&L Vice President Tobin Grady wrote to his 
Congressman, “I would like for you to impress upon this committee the fact that the 
savings and loan industry is a special business with a special purpose. Housing has been 
and will continue to be the number one financial priority of most Americans. Let’s not 
allow Mr. Regan and the DIDC to continue playing havoc with the American Dream of 
home ownership.”96  Defending the original September 22 DIDC vote in favor of a ½% 
increase to the passbook savings rate ceiling, Skancke explained that the DIDMCA 
required a vote on the issue within 18 months, that the majority of the comment letters 
received on the issue requested a 5% increase (most of those from savers, not depository 
institutions), and that the DIDC intended that the much more modest increase would at 
least signal to depositors that the rate would eventually be going up, and thus stem the 
tide of disintermediation.97 But lawmakers such as Senator Dale Bumpers (D AR) 
suggested that the ½% passbook rate increase alone could jeopardize the viability of the 
thrift industry, and to underscore the stakes added, “without these institutions millions of 
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young persons in this country may never be able to buy a home,”98 while Senator Lloyd 
Bentsen (D TX) protested to Secretary Regan in early September 1981 that an increase on 
the passbook savings rate would offset any gains made through the ASC.99  
 The outcry from the S&L industry and pressure from Congress led the DIDC to 
rescind the September 22 authorization of a ½% increase to the passbook ceiling. Regan 
appeared especially persuaded by Senator Bentsen’s line of argument. Skancke circulated 
a notation ballot to the DIDC members under the following memo: 
Preliminary information regarding All Savers Certificates indicates that they are 
drawing funds from passbook savings accounts more heavily than was 
anticipated. At the same time, money market fund assets have continued to 
increase. In light of the apparent magnitude of this outflow from savings accounts 
and the small movement from MMFs to All Savers Certificates, the scheduled 
increase in the passbook savings rate ceilings adopted at the DIDC’s September 
meeting appear likely to have much less of an impact stemming the savings 
outflow than was anticipated at the time. Chairman Regan, therefore, has 
proposed postponement of the scheduled one-half percentage point increase 
pending review of more definitive information regarding the outflows from 
passbook savings accounts.100 
 
Predictably, Pratt and Volcker joined Regan in voting to postpone the increase. Isaac, 
Conover, and non-voting member, Charlie Lord disagreed with the postponement. 
Volcker added a handwritten note to his ballot saying, “however, I disagree with analytic 
reasoning above. My view in December is not likely to depend on ASC flows. I would 
continue to oppose December consideration.”101 For his part, Lord added his dissent from 
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Regan’s analysis, but from the other side, writing “evidence is far from clear that 
passbook funds are flooding into ASCs. Nevertheless, [the] basic purpose of [a] 50 b.p. 
[½%] increase was to recognize the existence of small saver and combine to move to 
close the gap. 150 b.p. [1 ½%] would have been better than 50 [½%].”102 
 Regan continued to seek liability deregulation, always in the name of the small 
saver, at each turn, but was repeatedly forced to retreat as thrift institutions struggled to 
bear the increasing cost of deposits. The Regan-led DIDC proved no better able than the 
preceding committee membership in reconciling the fundamental contradiction 
underlying its dual charge to deregulate interest rate ceilings and protect the solvency of 
banks and thrifts. Some saw deregulation of thrift asset and investment powers as a 
possible solution, but advocates of such deregulation were struggling to secure majority 
support in Congress as the banking and thrift lobbies tussled over proposed legislation 
and some lawmakers remained skeptical of asset deregulation altogether. As long as this 
logjam persisted, the DIDC would continue to strain to implement its mandate to loosen 
and eventually eliminate interest rate ceilings.  
 
Leveraging Liability Deregulation into Asset Deregulation 
 
It was becoming increasingly clear that the DIDC could make little progress in 
deregulating interest rate ceilings without first, or at least also, expanding thrift asset 
powers. Roger Mehle wrote to Regan in October that S&L earnings problems continued 
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because rate ceiling deregulation outpaced asset deregulation, leading the S&Ls asking 
for short-term aid such as the All Savers Certificate and noted “Congress is all too willing 
to oblige.”103 Two pending asset-power reform initiatives, a Pratt/FHLBB bill and a bill 
sponsored by Senator Garn, promised a more permanent intervention, but passage of 
neither bill appeared imminent.  Slowly the members of the DIDC came to the conclusion 
that they might be able to force Congress to act on asset deregulation by withholding 
action to deregulate interest rate ceilings until thrifts were granted more flexible 
investment powers.    
The various proposals for expanded thrift and bank asset powers caused some to 
fear that thrifts might abandon their traditional role as specialized housing lenders. To 
dispel such concerns, Regan testified before the Senate that “providing thrift institutions 
with new asset powers need not diminish their contribution to housing finance. Real 
estate lending is their area of greatest expertise and they are likely to continue expanding 
this activity….moreover we expect the new alternative mortgage instruments to make 
real estate lending more attractive to many financial institutions.”104 Senator Proxmire 
remained skeptical, “I wonder if this legislation that is before us wouldn’t, in effect, just 
walk away from that special function that thrifts have performed very well over the last 
many years and create a situation in which home buyers and homebuilders just wouldn’t 
have a financial institution which would provide the kind of service that thrifts have in 
the past at the price they have in the past with the expertise they have in the past.”105 
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Edwin Brooks of the U.S. League of Savings Associations testified that the Garn bill 
contained important improvements to the bill designed by Pratt in its preemption of state 
prohibitions of due on sale clauses and raising the insurance limit for IRA-Keogh 
accounts. Still leveraging, however, Brooks argued, “the more flexible asset and liability 
powers are welcome, but… no one should be misled into thinking that the grant of new 
powers can solve our immediate problems of high-interest rates, asset-liability imbalance, 
and negative earnings. They cannot. Many of these new authorities will take years before 
the benefits are realized.”106 In other words, thrifts needed new asset powers, but they 
also wanted Regulation Q protection, and the differential, for as long as they could get it.  
 As Congress considered thrift asset legislation, the DIDC’s December 16 agenda 
had promised consideration of four short-term accounts with liberalized interest rates. For 
the second time in four months, the DIDC elicited a furry of letters pleading for a slow-
down in the pace of deregulation. Again, S&L officials wrote to their Congressional 
representatives and the DIDC, and Congress leaned heavily on the DIDC to postpone 
consideration of the proposed accounts. The letters came from members of both parties 
and cited both the dire conditions of the thrifts and the prospect of new legislation 
concerning the asset structure of the thrift industry as reasons to wait. Within this broad 
consensus, the tone of the letters varied widely from angry accusations that the DIDC had 
strayed from its Congressional mandate to those that applauded past DIDC efforts and 
merely asked for time to allow Congressional action to deregulate thrift assets.  
Representative Bill Lowery (R CA) frankly summarized the contending interests: 
                                                                                                                                                 
 




The DIDC faces a very difficult dilemma in implementing the mandate given it by 
Congress under [DIDMCA]. On one hand, large commercial banks would like the 
liability side of the ledger deregulated as quickly as possible in order to allow 
them to compete more effectively with what have come to be called ‘near banks,’ 
i.e. money market mutual funds and other non-traditional entities entering the 
financial services industry. On the other hand, small commercial banks, savings 
and loans, and mutual savings banks favor a very slow deregulation schedule for 
obvious reasons.107 
 
Representative Stephen Neal (D) of North Carolina cast the drama differently: 
The DIDC members may be pursuing their own vision of a new financial 
marketplace, but across the country millions of people are worried about the 
condition of local institutions, where they have invested their savings, and about 
the lack of affordable houses and mortgages. Let me assure you that ordinary 
people are more concerned about these things than about regulations and 
economic theories.108  
 
Even Newt Gingrich (R GA), a supporter of deregulation, had been persuaded that a 
temporary moratorium was necessary, concluding “it won’t do us any good to deregulate 
these institutions if we kill them in the process,” and that the proposed accounts “could 
only further hurt an already wounded savings industry.”109 Similarly, Senator Richard 
Lugar (R IN) reiterated his general support of deregulation, but qualified that stance, 
arguing,” there is, however, a special responsibility in the instance of financial 
institutions in light of the overriding public policy requirement for safety and soundness 
of depository institutions and the compelling fact of federal deposit insurance.”110 Further 
deregulation at that time, he reasoned, “could exacerbate the current earnings difficulties 
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of thrifts, and delay, if not eliminate, their return to a profitable status.”111 For Neal, 
however, it was not merely the health of the institutions that was at stake, but also the 
community-oriented promotion of homeownership that they represented. Prescient 
though his warning turned out to be, such concern for the traditional model of local 
savings institutions and lenders at the heart of the New Deal system of housing finance 
was drowned out in subsequent debate. 
Eclipsing Neal were those who argued that while it was imperative that the DIDC 
slow the pace of deregulation of liabilities, a parallel deregulation of assets was long 
overdue. A Hawaii Representative, Cecil Heftel, wrote to Regan “while the DIDC has 
deregulated the assets of financial institutions… it has not deregulated the thirty year low 
interest liabilities which thrift institutions have incurred over the years.”112 Many, like 
Senators Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D NY) and Alfonse D’Amato (R NY) specifically 
referred to pending legislation, S. 1720 (which would become the vehicle bill for the 
Garn–St. Germain Act) while requesting a temporary moratorium on DIDC action.113 
Walking a political tightrope between the interests of savers and borrowers, and 
emblematic of the continuing dilemma of the DIDC, a letter from the Illinois 
Congressional delegation to Regan argued “while of course we want to see savers 
achieve the maximum possible interest rate, we also realize that in order to have lower 
interest rates for borrowers there must be a balance between the rates paid to savers and 
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the rates charged to borrowers.”114 Extending this logic, the delegation reasoned that the 
new accounts would further stress the beleaguered housing market. The letter emphasized 
that the undersigned supported the concept of deregulation, but asserted that the DIDC 
had eschewed the statutory six-year timetable. Furthermore, the letter alleged that the 
DIDC had violated the DIDMCA requirement that deregulated interest rates did not 
exceed market rates, arguing that “rather than being governed by the market rate ceiling, 
the DIDC is actually making the market rate.”115 For others, like Christopher Dodd (D 
CT), the deregulated environment meant the possibility of “disorderly bidding,” meaning 
that neither the DIDC nor a rational market would determine interest rates.116  
The DIDC had finally broached the possibility of higher rates to the smallest of 
savers, those with only passbook savings, and Congress, at the behest of the thrift 
industry, immediately sought to reign in the committee. The interests of consumers as 
savers seemed to be pitted against those of consumers as borrowers, and certainly against 
those of thrift institutions. “As desirable as it is for consumers to receive a higher rate of 
interest on their deposits,” wrote Senator Slade Gorton (R WA), “it is also important that 
the thrift industry and housing industry survive the period of adjustment.”117  
Prior to the holiday recess, Regan instructed his staff to send a response letter to 
the 38 senators and 136 representatives who had requested that the DIDC take no action 
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in December. As Skancke explained to Senator Abdnor, “at the request of several 
members of Congress, consideration of [short term deposit proposals] was postponed 
until the March meeting of the DIDC. This delay was to permit the Congress and others 
more time to become familiar with these important issues…”118 Of the delay, 
Comptroller Todd Conover noted, “I am disappointed because we are not going ahead 
and providing the depository institutions with the liability products that they need to 
compete effectively with financial services companies.”119 Despite Conover’s desire for a 
more competitive short-term instrument, the DIDC staff remained cautious, “there is a 
legitimate concern that a new short-term instrument, which imitates many of the features 
of an MMF share, will also encourage internal shifts from existing low-cost savings 
deposits and thereby depress earnings,” and estimated that institutions would have to 
attract $4-6 of new savings to offset the costs of every $1 shifted from a low-yielding 
account.120 
 Yet the Treasury staff kept up its rosy view of thrift conditions, trying to open the 
door to resumption of a quickened pace of interest rate deregulation. In a memo prepared 
to brief President Reagan on the status of the thrift industry in January 1982, the Treasury 
Department sounded a very positive note: “despite fears expressed throughout 1981 that 
severe disintermediation would subject the industry to an outflow of deposits which, in 
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turn, would lead to their insolvency, total S&L deposits grew $13 billion or 2.6%, 
(including $38 billion of interest credited to accounts, which more than offset a $25 
billion decline in new deposits) and a number of accounts paying market returns have 
proven quite successful in attracting new savings flows.”121 But such assessments failed 
to account for increased cost to the institutions. The memo conceded that total net worth 
was down to $27 billion from $32 billion at the end of 1980, and that 23 mergers were 
required to aid 30 ailing institutions. The memo concluded, “lasting solutions to the 
problems being experienced by thrift institutions are long term in nature and require a 
restructuring of the industry’s asset and liability powers so that they may profitably 
compete in all economic environments.”122 Pending legislation offering such a 
restructuring, however, had been stalled by wrangling between the thrift and commercial 
banking lobbies.123 Senate Banking Committee Chairman Garn, however, insisted on 
consensus between the groups before proceeding with the legislation.  
While the thrift industry and supporters in Congress sought to slow the DIDC’s 
efforts to liberalize rate ceilings, others complained that the committee was not moving 
fast enough. Between the December 16, 1981 and the March 22, 1982 meetings, the 
DIDC was inundated with pro-deregulation letters, mostly from commercial bankers who 
were then feeling increased competition from MMMFs, but not the long-term asset 
concerns of the thrifts. The staff’s summary report of the letters indicated that the banks 
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remained upset about the DIDC’s reversal of the passbook rate increase passed at the 
September meeting. Each of the major trade associations had proposed a new short-term 
instrument, reflecting the break between the cautions thrifts and small banks and the more 
eager large commercial banks. The American Bankers Association pled for a ceilingless, 
$5,000 transaction account, while the U.S. League of Savings Associations recommended 
a 91-day account tied to the comparable Treasury bill rate and with a differential favoring 
the thrifts, along with a continued delay in a ceiling increase on savings, and 
reinstatement of a 12% ceiling on SSCs.124  
 By March, Regan could point to a modest increase in thrift deposits and reassured 
depositors that “there should be no public concern about the viability of [the thrift] 
industry. The existing resources of the Federal Deposit Agencies are adequate to deal 
with any problems of institutions and these resources will be expanded if the need 
arises.”125 The Chairman of the “Deregulatory Committee” thereby affirmed one of the 
many lines that deregulation would not cross, that of the regulations providing deposit 
insurance. In fact, throughout the debate on deregulation, deposit insurance would only 
be expanded despite the competitive advantage it gave to insured institutions in what 
policymakers otherwise claimed to be (finally) making into a level playing field.  
 The committee discussed a possible 3 ½ year account of fixed- or variable-rate 
that would give maximum flexibility to institutions to design requirements (such as 
whether to allow additions after the initial purchase of a certificate). Regan argued, 
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“we’re leaving it to the marketplace–in which I, at least, believe–to decide that it wants to 
do. If the marketplace decides against it, that’s up to them.”126 The DIDC approved the 
instrument for comment. Yet in attempting to design short-term instruments, DIDC staff 
member Susan Krause noted, “the committee has before it the difficult task of 
considering the creation of a new deposit instrument which will enable depository 
institutions to compete more effectively for short-term funds but would not exacerbate 
any current earnings difficulties.”127 Comment letters revealed that a majority of 
commercial banks supported a new short-term instrument, while the majority of thrifts 
were opposed.128 Pratt argued at length that any new short-term instrument should have a 
differential. Isaac was furious, “it’s philosophically wrong. This committee was 
appointed to deregulate interest rates and now we’re talking about coming up with a new 
instrument with a differential on it, trying to direct fund flows… we were supposed to be 
moving in the other direction.”129 On a competitive instrument, Volcker reminded, “we 
have an impossible job when we try to define an instrument that’s going to compete with 
nondepository institutions more effectively and still not add, importantly, to the cost of 
the depository institutions and in particular the S&Ls.”130 He suggested that any short-
term instrument should have a $10,000 minimum denomination saying, “I think the risk it 
too grave to what Chairman Isaac referenced in terms of cannibalizing low cost deposits. 
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Otherwise, we can always go ahead and change it in the light of experience and make it 
more liberal, but it’s very difficult to make it less liberal.”131 Regan offered a 
compromise, advocating a $7,500 minimum denomination, 91-day maturity instrument, 
with a fixed-rate ceiling based on the most recent Treasury bill of the same maturity, and, 
shockingly, a differential favoring the thrifts. “Somehow or another,” he argued, “the 
thrifts have to be protected at least for the moment while we attempt to get interest rates 
down. We cannot just sit idly by and do nothing for that industry.”132 He urged that the 
differential be authorized for one year, after which it could be extended if conditions 
warranted. Conover agreed to the Regan compromise, as did Pratt, though preferring a 
one-year review of the differential rather than a default end point. Volcker did not 
particularly like the instrument, preferring a $10,000 minimum, and asked that the 
committee commit to revisiting the issue. He said, “I have a fear of doing too much 
today… I don’t like this account much, but go ahead.”133 Regan countered that he was 
determined to “do something positive today,” and pressed for a vote, which approved the 
proposed account.134 The committee compromised, moving on deregulation, as desired 
by commercial banks, but ultimately designing an instrument that most closely resembled 
the recommendation of the U.S. League. With Regan now siding with protecting thrift 
earnings, it became clear that the deregulation of interest rate ceilings as mandated by the 
DIDMCA would be held up until the thrifts’ earnings problems could be resolved. 
Regan’s net/worth, mergers, and FSLIC demand note plan would not be enough, 
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Congress would have to further deregulate thrift assets in order to allow the DIDC to 
proceed at any speed with rate ceiling deregulation. 
 By June 1982, Regan could see an impending breakthrough in the logjam of 
competing mandates that had long handcuffed the DIDC.  Regan announced, “our long-
term plan for the deregulation of the liabilities of depository institutions, coupled with the 
proposals for restructuring the asset powers of these institutions now pending in 
Congress, should allow our insured depository institutions to compete fully in the 
changing financial services market.”135 In the interim, the best the DIDC could do would 
be a “moderate step in the direction of deregulation by providing institutions with a 
slightly more competitive short-term account.” Then, he continued, “after legislation has 
passed, and the asset powers for thrifts are expanded further, so these institutions can 
generate the earnings needed to pay for additional market rate deposits, I’ll urge the 
committee to consider authorizing a truly competitive market rate, transaction type 
account.”136 Regan thereby positioned the DIDC to leverage progress on the deregulation 
of interest rate ceilings in exchange for asset deregulation.   
 Following up on the promise to revisit the issue and seeking a compromise 
account that could move towards higher returns without too much harm to thrift earnings, 
the committee discussed new short-term accounts with no rate ceilings, no prescribed 
maturity, limited check-writing, and, significantly, high initial minimum denominations, 
as much as $20,000. Both Regan and Isaac argued that the minimums could be 
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incrementally lowered, the latter adding, in-step with “actions by Congress to deregulate 
thrift asset powers which we feel strongly must be done in connection with liability 
deregulation.”137 Pratt agreed, arguing that the survival of the thrift industry under 
liability deregulation depended on further asset deregulation. He continued, “the 
committee should make very clear [to Congress] that it does view that there is a 
substantial linkage there,” and suggested that the DIDC propose an account that would be 
even more competitive with MMMFs than the current proposal, but to make its approval 
conditional on congressional passage of expanded thrift assets.138 The proposed account 
passed, but Volcker noted that competitiveness with MMMFs would still be hindered by 
reserve requirements for banks and thrifts that did not apply to the MMMFs. Both he and 
Isaac argued that Congress should move, not to deregulate reserve requirements for banks 
and thrifts, but to extend the reserve requirements to MMMFs.139 Aside from this 
limitation in competitive equity, the instrument failed to offer any immediate relief to 
small savers.   
 Effectively holding rate deregulation for small savers hostage, the DIDC awaited 
movement by Congress on liberalizing thrift assets. Negotiations proceeded slowly, but 
Regan remained confident that Congress would have to act on a deregulation bill sooner 
than later. At its September 17, 1982 meeting, the DIDC denied the petitions of four 
states (South Dakota, New Jersey, Texas, and Washington) requesting exemptions from 
rate ceilings both to avoid competitive inequalities that would result and because the 
DIDC members believed that imminent Congressional action would preempt the states’ 
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concerns with a national policy.140 Regan noted progress on Senate Resolution 2879, the 
latest version of the Garn bill, which he believed would clarify the intent of Congress, 
and “strengthen the safety and soundness of our depository institutions.”141 Finally, at 
long last, it seemed that the perpetual impasse over the charge to give institutions the 
means to compete with MMMFs and concern over earnings (especially of the thrifts) 
would be taken out of their hands and settled by Congress. Interest rates were also falling, 
from 13% to 8% over the quarter, meaning that the stakes for deregulating deposit 
ceilings would be lessened though not escaped entirely.142   
Congress, which had voted two years prior to proceed with liability deregulation, 
was gradually coming around to the position that asset deregulation was necessary to 
implement the elimination of deposit rate ceilings. Garn wrote, “DIDC itself has 
expressed its frustration with being given the task of deregulating liabilities without the 
authority to expand asset powers. Absent any change in the asset structure of the thrifts 
and a clear Congressional mandate, it is unlikely that DIDC will produce a competitive 
instrument in the near future.”143 Expanded asset powers for thrifts finally seemed 
imminent, but the competing interests of thrifts and banks still had to be negotiated. Garn 
sought to appease the ABA, assuring them that the primary emphasis of asset 
deregulation legislation would be to “provide a new, market-sensitive deposit instrument” 
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so that banks could “compete against non-depository financial intermediaries.”144 Issues 
involving Glass-Steagall, Garn told ABA President Llewellyn Jenkins, would have to 
wait for the next Congress.145 Later that month, Dennis Thomas reported to Secretary 
Regan that “negotiations between the Senate Banking Committee and the American 
Bankers Association appear to be progressing satisfactorily.”146  
Regan stressed administration support for the Garn bill, indicating that “Titles I, 
II, and III of S. 2879 [had been] endorsed by the Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs 
and specifically reviewed with the President,” and impressed the necessity of the bill’s 
passage during the current Congress upon Majority Leader Howard Baker.147 In a letter to 
St. Germain, Regan added to his endorsement that Title II “does not require an institution 
receiving assistance to channel that assistance into new mortgage investment at the very 
time when flexibility of asset powers and broader investment is the highest priority,” and 
noted, “clearly the initial and modest liberalization of thrift asset powers in the financial 
reform legislation of 1980 did not go far enough.”148 Regan indicated Treasury support of 
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accounts competitive with money market funds, but only “contingent on the realization of 
the expanded asset powers for thrifts.”149  
 In September, Congress passed the Garn–St. Germain Act. By most accounts, the 
Act was emergency legislation to save the long-suffering thrift industry.150 But the DIDC 
had also played a critical role by holding up rate deregulation on the condition of 
legislation expanding thrift asset powers. The maneuver also helped bring the commercial 
banks on board with Garn-St. Germain despite the fact that it fell short of the asset reform 
that the banks wanted for themselves, and that it gave thrifts some powers that had been 
exclusive to banks. But because many commercial bankers, especially those representing 
the largest institutions, so desperately wanted an instrument that could compete with the 
MMMFs, they backed Garn–St. Germain with only a phase-out of the differential, and 
the promise of future consideration of further banking deregulation.  
 
The Garn–St. Germain Act of 1982 
 
 
Congress had finally passed legislation deregulating thrift asset powers. 
Deregulation proponents, as early as the Hunt Commission report had sought greater 
freedom for S&Ls to invest in short-term assets such as consumer loans and in 
investments other than residential mortgages, including commercial real estate. The aim, 
and the result, was to make thrifts less specialized (as residential mortgage lenders) and 
more like commercial banks. The majority of thrift managers, who felt trapped by the 
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dead weight of low-yielding 30-year mortgages even as they were rapidly losing 
Regulation Q protection, too had long pursued added flexibility in composing their asset 
portfolios. But just as they had been reluctant to warm to or accept variable-rate 
mortgages, many policymakers had been slow to rally around additional asset 
deregulation, despite the severe crisis conditions thrifts faced in the early 1980s. What 
had broken the impasse that had long held up efforts to secure asset deregulation, I argue 
here, was the ultimatum of the DIDC: there would be no further movement on achieving 
market rates for savers or authorizing a MMMF-type account for banks and thrifts until 
Congress expanded thrift asset powers.   
The Garn–St. Germain Act offered a broad package of expanded asset and 
emergency powers for thrifts. The Act explicitly authorized the FDIC and FSLIC to 
facilitate mergers and otherwise assist failing institutions in order to avoid liquidation, 
powers that Regan and the Treasury staff had long argued the corporations already 
possessed, including the purchase of “net worth certificates” to infuse capital into 
troubled banks and thrifts. Of greatest interest to the thrift industry, however, were the 
long awaited asset powers that would allow the institutions to diversify their portfolios 
beyond the traditional preponderance of long-term residential mortgages. The Garn–St. 
Germain Act allowed thrifts to invest in non-residential real property up to 40% of their 
assets, deposit instruments of insured institutions, government securities (no more than 
10% to any one issuer), commercial lending (up to 5% of assets before Jan. 1, 1984, and 
10% thereafter), consumer loans up to 30%, personal property loans up to 10%, education 
loans, and foreign assistance loans and small business stock up to 1% of assets. The act 
set a two-year deadline for elimination of the differential, but also allowed thrifts to issue 
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demand accounts, facilitated conversion to stock as opposed to mutual ownership, and 
preempted state prohibitions of due-on-sale clauses that had allowed home sellers to pass 
on their low interest rate mortgages to buyers rather than paying back a loan in full upon 
sale. Finally, and most significant for savers, the title directed the DIDC to create a 
“Money Market Deposit Account” for banks and thrifts designed to compete directly with 
MMMFs.151  
Seeking to head off charges that the expanded investment powers would reduce 
the devotion of the thrifts to residential mortgage lending, Title III, the “Thrift 
Institutions Restructuring Act,” declared, “the lending and investment authorities are 
conferred by this section to provide such institutions the flexibility necessary to maintain 
their role of providing credit for housing.”152 Yet the powers extended through the title 
gave thrifts the opportunity to largely abandon their devotion to housing in pursuit of 
more lucrative and flexible short-term investments.153 The Realtors® had in fact dubbed 
the bill “legislation to curb mortgage lending by savings and loans,” asking, “how can 
Congress dismantle the system of locally based financial institutions that provide housing 
money?”154 Though thrifts could still opt to specialize in mortgage lending, the new 
powers meant that they did not have to do so, and under the pressure of an increasing cost 
of funds due to liability deregulation, many opted to reduce the proportion of their 
portfolios tied up in long-term, fixed-rate mortgages.  
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 For the DIDC, the passage of Garn–St. Germain meant that the committee could 
proceed with the phase-out of Regulation Q with less concern for the earnings of the 
thrifts. Though the earnings problems would not disappear overnight, the committee 
could be more confident that the institutions would be able to adapt to changes in interest 
rate ceilings. The Garn–St. Germain Act also explicitly directed the DIDC to authorize an 
account that would directly compete with the MMMFs. Though the law provided some 
parameters, the DIDC still had some discretion in determining the features of the account. 
At one extreme, Callahan argued, “to be directly competitive with the money market 
mutual funds this account has to have the same flexibility that they have. They have 
absolutely no restrictions…. I really believe that if we try to fashion an account that will 
be competitive we will most probably fail, but if we let those institutions have the 
flexibility they need to compete,” they will strike a better balance between 
competitiveness and safety.155 But even Don Regan was not prepared to give depository 
institutions free reign. He wanted, for an initial period at least, a $2,500 minimum on the 
new account. For all he had said since joining the DIDC about achieving market rates for 
small savers, “having persuaded myself that I was afraid of what would happen to the 
passbook savings accounts and other things,” Regan was still concerned about thrift 
earnings. To his surprise, Pratt no longer seemed quite so worried. Neither he nor any of 
the lobbying groups that had commented to the committee had suggested that a minimum 
denomination was necessary.156 Pratt, having finally secured the deregulated asset powers 
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he had sought, no longer felt compelled to slow liability deregulation. Throwing up his 
hands, Volcker conceded, “if there’s no minimum denomination here I think the straight-
forward way would be just to eliminate the interest rate ceilings on savings deposits since 
this account has all the advantages of a savings deposit plus more. I don’t know why the 
Committee would want to go in that direction but that seems to be the logical and 
equitable thing to do. I think it would have a disastrous effect on the earnings of the 
institutions but in concept that seems to be what we’re doing.”157 
 Regan argued, “if we go with no minimum whatsoever and take all restrictions 
off, you throw the thing wide open. This is the most competitive way to go. There’s no 
doubt about it. My only caution is that I don’t want to throw the baby out with the bath 
water and find that we’ve created something that we can’t control at a later date.”158 From 
Pratt’s perspective, the damage had already been done. Due to incremental relaxation of 
ceilings, the amount of money still left in savings accounts was no longer enough to pose 
a substantial threat, in his judgment, to earnings given new asset powers.159 With Pratt 
shifting toward favoring brisk deregulation, it seemed that Volcker might find himself 
alone on the side of caution. But Regan and Isaac came off the fence to join Volcker in a 
3 to 2 vote establishing a $2,500 minimum for the new account category.160 So the 
congressionally mandated Money Market Deposit Account (MMDA) would have a 
minimum denomination putting it out of the reach of truly small savers, and it had limited 
transactions (thus providing an advantage to keeping funds in a passbook account with 
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unlimited transactions). But for those who could reach the minimum, money market rates 
could now be had at a local bank or thrift, with the added benefit of deposit insurance.161 
 MMDAs attracted a staggering $19 billion in their first six days, but, 
unfortunately for the thrifts, “most of the money came from passbook savings accounts 
rather than from competing money-market mutual funds.”162 By the following February, 
banks and S&Ls had gained $254 billion into new accounts, while MMMFs lost $40 
billion over the same period.163 The latter figure indicated that the depository institutions 
might have finally begun to compete effectively with the MMMFs, but at increased cost. 
Even with the minimum denomination, Regan and Volcker’s fear that funds would pour 
out of low-yielding (and thus low-cost) passbook accounts into the higher-yielding 
MMDAs was being realized.  
 Since savers were moving their money out of passbook accounts anyway, the 
DIDC staff recommended that the committee might as well grant consumers the benefits 
of unlimited transactions. Pratt enthusiastically endorsed the move, and argued that the 
accounts should be available to all entities, individuals, non-profits, and businesses alike, 
arguing, “whatever makes the market more efficient benefits all of society.”164 This time 
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it was Isaac who wished to apply the breaks on deregulation, “I don’t see the rush to get 
this new account…. I think it’s a mistake…. I don’t think most institutions are expecting 
it. I think most institutions are praying that we don’t do it.”165 Though insistent on reserve 
requirements, for the transaction accounts, Volcker had more or less given up on steering 
the committee away from full deregulation of deposit ceilings. Given the MMDA, he 
reasoned, “we are well on our way to blurring the distinction irrevocably between 
transactions and other accounts,” so there was little more harm the new accounts could 
do.166 Over Isaac’s objections, the DIDC authorized an account comparable to the 
MMDA, but with unlimited transactions, called the Super NOW account.167  
 The MMDA, the Super NOW account, and the transfer of funds into those 
accounts went a long way toward deregulating interest rate ceilings. Only a few limits 
remained, such as those on passbook accounts. When the DIDC reconvened in March 
1983, the committee bowed to the overwhelming comments of financial institutions 
asking that the remaining ceilings be left unchanged while they adjusted to the challenges 
of offering market rates on MMDA and Super NOW accounts.168 The DIDC had also 
received comments on the possibility of allowing for-profit institutions to use Super Now 
accounts. Comments from thrifts, who had few business accounts, favored the 
authorization two-to-one as they could possibly attract new deposits. But the bankers saw 
only the possibility of paying higher rates on deposits they already held. As the DIDC 
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staff reported, nine out of ten bankers opposed the authorization, expressing “the fear that 
the proposal could ultimately endanger the soundness of the banking system through 
excessive rate competition for deposits.” In other words, bankers suddenly found 
themselves rearticulating the case for Regulation Q-type ceilings. Pratt could not help 
himself in noting the irony that the bankers now sought a slow-down in deregulation of 
the remaining ceilings, precisely the position that he had held on behalf of the thrifts for 
so much of his time with the DIDC.169  
 Regan heralded the progress of the committee in achieving market rates for 
depositors, noting that $300 billion were deposited in deregulated accounts as opposed to 
$20 billion a year prior.170 But depository institutions were paying the price. In December 
1982, MMDAs paid, on average, 2 ½ to 3 % higher than MMMFs to gain market 
share.171 Fixed rate ceilings remained only on passbook savings and regular NOW 
accounts, ironically, the accounts most likely to be held by small savers.172 DIDC staffer 
Susan Krause reported “in total, since November 1982, depository institutions have lost 
$50 billion in savings deposits, $116 billion in small time deposits, and $68 billion in 
large time deposits…. The declines in time and savings deposits coupled with the success 
                                                 
169 DIDC, “DIDC Meeting,” March 1, 1983, 17; Records of DIDC Meetings, May 6, 1980–Dec. 15, 1983; 
Records of the Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee; General Records of the Department of the 
Treasury; RG 56; NACP. 
 
170 Ibid., 2. 
 
171 Ibid., 11. 
 
172 DIDC, “Press Release,” July 1, 1983; Records of DIDC Meetings, May 6, 1980–Dec. 15, 1983; Records 
of the Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee; General Records of the Department of the 




of the MMDA have taken their toll on the balance sheets of depository institutions.”173 
Yet cause for continued caution on remaining ceilings had largely passed, as DIDC 
Policy Director Gordon Eastburn reported, deposits had shifted so much into market-
linked accounts that there was no real reason not to deregulate the other accounts. 
Volcker suggested that withdrawal penalties could still help protect institutions from 
internal shifts of funds into market-rate accounts. Callahan objected, “we have to move 
sooner or later to let these institutions make these decisions for themselves… I think that 
would be far more consistent with deregulation than to be doling this out a little bit at a 
time. I think we are still influencing the marketplace too much.”174 Volcker responded, “I 
don’t really see this as a matter of deregulation philosophy. Presumably there is going to 
be a certain amount of regulation remaining and this seems to me a safety and soundness 
consideration basically, and what kind of ground rules do you want to establish perhaps 
on a permanent basis.”175 Even if an institution wanted to impose its own withdrawal 
penalties, as Callahan argued an institution could, in a free market, Volcker countered 
that competition might make that impossible, with the most aggressive competitors 
moving the market to rates that safety and soundness would dictate that it should not go. 
Edwin Gray, who had replaced Pratt as FHLBB Chairman, sided with Volcker, arguing 
that if the DIDC established a target date at which time passbook ceilings would go up, 
and interest rates indeed went up in the interim, that there could be a severe impact on the 
thrift industry, just then beginning to show signs of recovery. Again, even as late as June 
                                                 
173 DIDC, “DIDC Meeting,” June 30, 1983, 6-7; Records of DIDC Meetings, May 6, 1980–Dec. 15, 1983; 
Records of the Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee; General Records of the Department of the 
Treasury; RG 56; NACP. 
 
174 Ibid., 14. 
 




1983, the DIDC’s thrift representative warned, “this committee ought to proceed with 
great caution.”176  
 Gray remained the most reluctant to proceed with deregulating the last vestiges of 
Regulation Q ceilings. In September 1983, Regan argued that in order to ensure market 
rates for “the very small saver, or the saver who wants to utilize these types of 
[uncapped] savings accounts but is unsophisticated, doesn’t know how to of about 
changing or is frightened of changing, or is afraid of the unknown,” that minimum 
denominations would have to be lowered, and ceilings would have to be removed on 
passbook accounts.177 Volcker advocated a phase-out of the minimum ceilings to mitigate 
the potential negative earnings impact, with Gray arguing to keep the minimums to help 
“protect the safety and soundness of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 
Corporation,” against losses due to thrift insolvency.178 
 At the final DIDC meeting of 1983, Gray reported, “the rapid growth of MMDAs 
fortunately occurred at the time that interest rates were falling. Even though MMDAs 
were crucial in reversing deposit outflows at thrifts as I have suggested, the fact is the 
new deposit flows were costly.”179 Charles Partee, representing the Federal Reserve, 
argued that the most important accomplishment of rate deregulation had been to redirect 
funds that had gone to MMMFs back into traditional depository institutions. “It is often 
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asserted.” Partee continued, “that the cost of credit is higher as a result of the 
deregulation and the higher rates paid for funds. I don’t know any banker or any savings 
and loan man that I have talked to that doesn’t believe that and doesn’t say, well, I have 
to pay more for my money and so I have to charge more for my money.”180 But Partee 
said that increased credit availability meant lower rates, and that costs had been 
overestimated by the press and by Congress. Chairman Isaac argued that while Garn–St. 
Germain and lower interest rates allowed the DIDC to deregulate liabilities quickly to the 
benefit of savers and the financial system as a whole, that “Congress has got to deal with 
the asset side of balance sheets to a greater degree than it has with Garn St. Germain. We 
must make available new profit opportunities for banks and thrifts to help them cope with 
the cost of liability-side deregulation.”181 In other words, even with expanded asset 
powers, liability deregulation had put enormous pressure on the banking and thrift 
industries to cope with increasing cost of funds.  
Regan looked back at the DIDC’s tenure, defending both the pace of deregulation, 
“we had no choice but to move rapidly because the industry itself was and in changing 
rapidly,” and the committee’s accomplishments, “we should not forget that the ultimate 
beneficiary of all of this is the American consumer of financial services [who] want and 
deserve the best financial services at the best price. They want a reasonable return for 
their investments. And we want and need a modern, healthy financial services industry 
which can provide just that. That’s what we are all about.”182 Regan cited an estimate of 
$20 to $40 billion that had been lost to depositors due to Regulation Q, and said that the 
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DIDC had only delayed the creation of an MMDA-like account “in order to spur support 
for Congressional action to rescue ailing thrift institutions. Passage of the Garn–St. 
Germain Act satisfied [this] objective.”183 Regan concluded, “the economic perspective 
of this Administration is based on a faith in the market-place…what we have done here is 
to take some very important steps to reintroduce the positive power of the market system 





It had been a tumultuous road to “reintroducing” the market system into the 
financial services industry. In the case of banking and housing finance, the process of 
deregulation frequently involved re-regulation or attempts to continue certain regulations 
to protect the safety and soundness of depository institutions and direct credit towards 
housing. Even the most ardent proponents of deregulation, like Regan, found themselves 
struggling to reconcile the competing mandates of achieving market returns for savers 
and due regard for the safety and soundness of depository institutions. The struggle made 
policymakers abundantly aware of the difficulties that rate deregulation would pose for 
housing lenders, and yet they forged ahead, cautiously at first, until ultimately reconciling 
the problem by allowing thrifts to pursue various investment opportunities other than 
housing. Forcing their hands, policymakers argued, was increased competition from non-
bank financial services companies; rate ceilings had to be loosened not only to achieve 
market returns on (insured) savings, but so that depository institutions could compete for 
                                                 
183 Ibid., 26. 
 




savings against MMMFs. But, as discussed in Chapter Four, it was the same 
policymakers who had chosen not to reign in the MMMFs, arguing that the instruments 
filled a previously unmet market demand. And so policymakers privileged market rates 
for savers over protected (lower) rates for prospective homebuyers, leveraging the narrow 
deregulation of interest rate ceilings into broad deregulation of thrift asset powers. 
 At the insistence of House conferees, the Garn–St. Germain Act explicitly (and 
paradoxically) claimed to grant non-housing investment powers so that thrifts could 
maintain their role as housing lenders. But the share of mortgage originations by thrifts 
declined considerably through the 1980s. Increased deposit flow following the 
introduction of MMDAs coupled with falling interest rates contributed to a brief increase 
in the thrifts’ share of mortgage originations immediately following the passage of Garn–
St. Germain, but this trend was short-lived despite the fact that interest rates continued to 






Source: Kenneth A. Snowden, “Originations, Purchases, and Sales of Mortgages, by Type of Institutional 
Lender: 1970-1997,” Historical Statistics of the Unites States Millennial Edition Online. Eds. Susan Carter 
et al. (Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
 
Over the longer-term, the relevant trend was a dramatic reduction of the role of 
S&Ls in housing finance beginning in 1978, when, through MMCs, thrifts began to pay 
market rates on an increasing portion of their deposits. As policymakers such as Senator 
Proxmire had feared, thrifts largely “walked away” from housing finance. Significantly, 
the dwindling role of thrifts in housing finance largely divorced residential lending from 
the types of community institutions at the heart of the community reinvestment 
movement.  
It was not yet clear, in 1982, who would fill the void left by the S&Ls, but as the 
chart above shows, mortgage companies would take the place of thrifts as the primary 
originators of residential mortgages. Though specialized housing lenders, these mortgage 
companies would operate much differently than S&Ls. The mortgage companies or 
mortgage brokers did not collect deposits, nor did they keep mortgage loans in their 
portfolio, instead, they would raise capital and sell the mortgages they originated through 
secondary mortgage markets. The rapid growth of secondary mortgage markets in the 
1980s, and policymakers’ “turn” to those markets as the primary source of capital for 









  “Real estate,” Don Regan, then CEO of Merrill Lynch, noted, “is a huge 
market.”1 In the 1970s and into the 1980s, saver/investors had been shifting savings 
capital from depository institutions into capital markets, threatening to deprive this “huge 
market” of adequate credit. In addition to the disintermediation of the 1970s (mainly into 
MMMFs), a longer-term development, the growth of private pension funds over the 
course of the twentieth century, further diverted savings that otherwise would likely have 
found its way into depository institutions instead into capital markets.2 Secondary 
markets offered a means to reconnect this disintermediated savings-capital with housing, 
bypassing the depository institutions altogether. To Regan and others on Wall Street, 
including Lewis Ranieri at Salomon Brothers, residential mortgage finance represented a 
vast market that had long been beyond the reach of their investment banks. Ranieri, by 
the late 1970s, was leading Salomon into housing finance via mortgage-backed securities 
(most of them guaranteed by the federal government). Along with this modest entry into 
housing finance by a few investment banks, government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, had stepped up their traditional role of supplementing 
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mortgage capital through secondary mortgage markets when depository institutions 
retreated, to take over an increasing share of housing finance. In the early to mid-1980s, 
with S&Ls struggling to stay solvent, and a growing, though still small, role for 
secondary markets led by the GSEs, policymakers gradually turned to the secondary 
markets to replace the thrifts as the primary source of capital for housing. 
Though they had become increasingly important over the course of the 1970s, and 
into the 1980s, secondary mortgage markets took on a fundamentally new role in the 
mid-1980s. This new role was two-fold. First, in the early to mid-1980s, policymakers 
identified secondary mortgage markets as the primary source of mortgage capital, 
replacing traditional depository institutions and their collected household savings. 
Policymakers viewed the growth of the GSEs’ secondary market activity as proof that the 
secondary markets could serve as an alternative source of capital for housing, and moved 
to facilitate a more permanent reliance on the secondary markets, which they did through 
both regulatory and legislative changes.3 Second, the Reagan administration and allies in 
Congress made a concerted effort to widen private4 participation in secondary markets 
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that had previously been dominated by the GSEs. Some in the Reagan administration 
sought the full privatization of the GSEs themselves, leaving them to compete in the 
private market with no explicit or implicit relationship to the federal government. Yet the 
consensus that ultimately emerged in Congress included both the GSEs and private actors 
in an expanding secondary market for mortgages.   
Congress endorsed and facilitated the emergence of the secondary mortgage 
market as the primary source of capital for housing finance both by deregulating thrift 
asset powers, allowing S&Ls to devote less and less of their portfolios to residential 
mortgages, and by easing regulations governing the sale of mortgage-backed securities. 
This two-step process shifted the majority share of mortgage originations away from 
local depository institutions to mortgage companies and brokers. This change in 
mortgage origination had significant bearing on Fair Housing and Community 
Reinvestment Act enforcement, as market share transferred from depository institutions 
that fell under federal regulation and oversight in these areas to mortgage companies and 
brokers who did not. These consequences, however, were scarcely considered during 
debate over the turn to secondary markets. In addition to undermining fair housing and 
community reinvestment enforcement, the restructuring of housing finance perpetuated 
racial inequality by making credit more costly for all borrowers. Borrowers who were just 
gaining access on equal terms (to the extent that they did) were accessing less favorable 
terms than had borrowers under the New Deal system. While this negatively affected all 
new borrowers, it was especially harsh for those who benefited least from 
intergenerational transfers of wealth and other advantages accrued through 
homeownership.   
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 The turn to secondary markets as the principal source of capital for housing 
marked a fundamental transition in housing finance. Residential mortgages would 
increasingly be financed by investment capital, as opposed to savings capital, and would 
increasingly be originated by mortgage companies and brokers rather than thrift 
institutions. Housing finance would no longer enjoy protected status, as it had when 
Regulation Q funneled low-cost capital to housing lenders, but would be integrated into 
the broader capital market and compete with other sectors. But in one important way the 
turn to secondary markets, because of the preeminence of the GSEs, represented 
continuity with the New Deal system. The reconfigured system of housing finance 
remained deeply dependent on the federal government. As economist Robert Van Order 
has written, the increasing importance of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac “[did] not 
represent an increase in government support as much as a change in the nature of support 
from the depository charter to the GSE charter.”5 Because of the implicit guarantee 
behind the GSE charter, the federal government increasingly subsidized the investment 
risk in the housing market, much more so than it ever did through FHA insurance alone. 
Through FNMA and FHLMC, the federal government drastically escalated its 
underwriting of the mortgage market in order to support both an increasing 
homeownership rate in the face of stagnant wages and decreased affordability and the 
profits/dividends to private investors who invested in housing finance through secondary 
markets.6    
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The Institutional Inheritance: Secondary Markets from the New Deal through the 1970s 
 
 
 Neither secondary mortgage markets nor a federal presence therein were new in 
the 1980s. Both the inherited institutional structure and the past activity of the 
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), the Federal National Mortgage Association 
(FNMA, or Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC, or 
Freddie Mac), and the government agency, the Government National Mortgage 
Association (GNMA, or Ginnie Mae), informed debate over the ongoing function of 
secondary markets in housing finance. Here I document the development of secondary 
mortgage markets and the GSEs through the 1970s in order to provide context for 
policymakers’ decision to rely on both as central components of housing finance 
beginning in the mid-1980s. I argue that until the early 1980s, policymakers viewed 
secondary mortgage markets as a countercyclical mechanism, stepping in only when 
traditional lenders had retreated. Over the course of the 1970s, successive countercyclical 
interventions demonstrated the capacity of secondary markets to raise capital for housing. 
In the early 1980s, as policymakers considered the future of housing finance in light of, 
first, thrifts’ struggle to remain profitable during interest rate ceiling deregulation, and 
second, thrifts’ retreat from mortgage lending as they exercised new investment powers 
granted in Garn–St. Germain, secondary markets appeared to be a ready and viable 
alternative to the thrifts as the primary source of capital for housing.     
Federal policymakers had outlined a role for a secondary market to provide 
liquidity to the primary market in federally-insured mortgages as early as the 1934 
Housing Act (Title III), allowing for the formation of “national mortgage associations” to 
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buy and sell such loans.7 After no private-sector investors stepped in to perform this 
function, Congress established the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA, or 
Fannie Mae) in 1938.8 Since its inception, FNMA had provided liquidity for FHA-
insured, and, later, VA-insured, loans that found no buyers in private markets.9 As the 
agency demonstrated that it would buy these loans, eventually even issuing advance 
contracts, it induced lenders to make mortgages that they would not otherwise have 
made, thus expanding the mortgage market. Even if FNMA did not purchase a particular 
loan, the likelihood that it would if needed, encouraged lenders to issue more mortgages. 
FNMA’s market-making influence thereby extended beyond its actual purchases, but the 
purchases in themselves became an important tool for stimulating mortgage activity when 
tight credit conditions forced private lenders to retreat. In 1958, 1969-70, 1973-74, and 
1978-9, FNMA, in some cases at the express urging and funding of Congress, 
dramatically increased its purchasing to counteract cyclical downturns due to tightening 
credit.10  
Congress reorganized FNMA in 1954, making it partially private, with both 
government ownership and capital raised from private stockholders, and in 1968, FNMA 
was further privatized, with its stock publicly traded, and its debts divorced from the 
                                                 
7 P.L. 73-479, Title III. 
 
8 Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, The Role of the Federal National Mortgage 
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10 For the 1958 intervention, see David M.P. Freund, Colored Property: State Policy & White Racial 
Politics in Suburban America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 193. FNMA purchases 
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federal budget.11 Yet FNMA retained its federal charter, and came under direct oversight 
by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, with five of its board members 
also appointed by the President.12 This quasi-private status allowed private ownership of 
the agency’s profits, while its quasi-government status entailed continued obligation to 
the public interest, the continued benefit of borrowing from the U.S. Treasury, and the 
competitive borrowing advantage in capital markets due to investors’ perception that the 
U.S. government would not allow the agency to fail.13 During this transition to a more 
fully private status, policymakers primed FNMA to take a stake in the conventional (not 
government-insured) market, while the function of purchasing government-insured 
mortgages primarily remained public (explicitly so), under the auspices of the newly 
formed Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA or Ginnie Mae). Rather 
than holding purchased mortgages, as FNMA did, beginning in 1970, GNMA insured 
pass-through mortgage-backed securities in which guaranteed payments of interest and 
principal from federally-insured mortgages “passed-through” to investors. Mortgage 
brokers and thrifts would pool FHA- and/or VA-insured mortgages, which they would 
typically continue to service, and then issue the securities, with the GNMA guarantee, to 
investors.14 In 1970, as part of the Emergency Home Finance Act, Congress chartered the 
                                                 
11 Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, The Role of the Federal National Mortgage 
Association, 5. See also, Sarah Lehman Quinn, “Government Policy, Housing, and the Origins of 
Securitization, 1780-1968,” (PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley, 2010). 
 
12 Viral V. Acharya, Matthew Richardson, Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, and Lawrence J. White, Guaranteed to 
Fail: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Debacle of Mortgage Finance (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2011), 17. 
 
13 Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, The Role of the Federal National Mortgage 
Association, 34. Deposit Interest Rate Ceilings and Housing Credit: The Report of the President’s Inter-
Agency Task Force on Regulation Q. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1979), 112-3. 
 
14 Charles M. Sivesind, “Mortgage-Backed Securities: The Revolution in Real Estate Finance,” Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly Review (Autumn 1979): 1-8, 4. 
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Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) to establish a secondary market for 
conventional mortgages issued by S&Ls, which owned stock in the new agency and 
shared a common regulator in the FHLBB (FHLMC stock would not be publicly traded 
until 1989).15 In 1971, FHLMC issued its first mortgage-backed security, a “participation 
certificate” modeled after the GNMA pass-through instrument, and the following year 
FNMA also entered the conventional market for the first time (though it had the authority 
to do so since 1970).16  
The expanded operations of FNMA, FHLMC, and GNMA fueled the impressive 
growth of secondary markets through the 1970s. GSE participation in secondary markets 
followed one of two basic models. GNMA and FHLMC largely insured and/or issued 
mortgage backed-securities, Ginnie’s backed by government insured loans, and Freddie’s 
by conventional loans. FNMA, which was not authorized to issue MBSs until 1980,17 
followed the model of the thrift industry, raising funds by issuing debt, purchasing 
mortgages to be held in portfolio, and profiting on the spread between the cost of funds 
and the return on the mortgages. In absolute dollars and as a proportion of the overall 
market mortgages, GSE activity, both in MBSs and outright purchases, increased 
substantially over the course of the 1970s. This activity, however, was, and was 
understood by policymakers to be, supplemental to the activity of traditional lenders and 
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sources of funds, stepping in as a countercyclical check during periods in which those 
sources dried up.18 
The privatization of FNMA and the chartering of GNMA and FHLMC 
represented policymakers’ turn to the secondary markets (the GSEs in particular) as an 
enhanced countercyclical apparatus, but not yet as a permanent and primary conduit of 
capital for housing.19 Through the 1970s, the three GSEs acted mainly to assure lenders 
of the liquidity of FHA- and VA-insured loans, and to counteract periods of tight credit 
through increased purchases of both insured and conventional mortgages.20 The first test 
of the GSEs’ capacity to see the housing industry through a period of tight credit 
occurred in 1970, and by the account of the Hunt Commission, the new apparatus worked 
as intended. The Commission reported, “for a time during 1970, FNMA became the 
major mortgage lender. Without FNMA purchases and the expanded role of the Federal 
Home Loan Banks, the performance of the mortgage market in 1970 almost certainly 
would have been worse than in 1966.”21 As in 1970, FNMA stepped up its purchases 
when credit tightened again in 1974, buying up $7 billion in mortgages (including $1 
                                                 
18 See Herbert M. Kaufman, “FNMA and the Housing Cycle: Its Recent Contribution and its Future Role in 
a Deregulated Environment,” in The Federal National Mortgage Association In a Changing Economic 
Environment; Supplement to a Report by the Comptroller General of the United States (Washington, DC: 
GPO, 1985): 41-74. http://gaonet.gov/assets/150/143071.pdf (accessed June 12, 2012). 
 
19 John C.Weicher, “The New Structure of the Housing Finance System,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis Review 76, no. 4 (July 1994): 47. Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed April 10, 2012). 
 
20 Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, The Role of the Federal National Mortgage 
Association, 1-2. The report noted, “throughout its history FNMA has increased its level of commitments 
during periods of relatively scarce credit, and allowed its commitment level to decline during periods of 
relative ease [and] … sales of mortgages from FNMA’s portfolio have also generally followed a 
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private corporation in 1968.” 
 
21 President’s Commission on Financial Structure and Regulation, The Report of the President’s 




billion in the conventional market).22 GNMA likewise intervened during the 1974 crunch 
through an emergency program that became known as the “Tandem plan” or the Brooke-
Cranston program, after the Senators, Edward Brooke (R MA) and Alan Cranston (D 
CA), who sponsored the enacting legislation. Under the Tandem plan, GNMA agreed to 
buy below-market rate mortgages issued to low-income buyers, and then sold them to 
investors, including FNMA, at market rates, subsidizing the difference.23 FNMA 
President Oakley Hunter explained the countercyclical role of the GSEs in 1975, “as a 
general rule, our business volume is up when mortgage money is in short supply from the 
institutions that traditionally supply the bulk of the money for residential financing in the 
United States.”24 The GSEs would again assert their influence as the decade came to a 
close and rising interest rates coupled with bank and thrift liability deregulation (via 
authorization of market-rate Money Market Certificates) again created a tightening of 
credit from traditional lenders. In 1978, FNMA purchased over $12 billion in mortgages 
($5.6 billion of them conventional) after only $4.6 billion the previous year.25  
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24 “Remarks of Oakley Hunter: Before the Economic Club of Detroit,” March 17, 1975; Folder “Federal 
National Mortgage Association (FNMA),” Box 10; F. Lynn May Papers; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann 
Arbor, MI. 
 



































Share of Market for Depository
Institutions
 
Source: Data from Kenneth Snowden, “Secondary Residential Mortgage Market Activity of Federal-
Related Agencies: 1970-1999,” and Snowden, “Originations, Purchases, and Sales of Mortgages, by Type 
of Institutional Lender: 1970-1997 [One- to four-family homes],” Historical Statistics of the Unites States 
Millennial Edition Online. Eds. Susan Carter et al. (Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
 
The cumulative countercyclical interventions over the course of the 1970s and 
especially during the long period of rising interest rates in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
made for a remarkable expansion of the secondary markets. FNMA enlarged its mortgage 
holdings from $2.5 billion in 1965 to $37.6 billion in 1978.26 GSE secondary market 
purchases increased at a higher rate than originations over the 1970s, indicating their 
increasing importance to the overall market. While mortgage originations increased 
356% over the decade ($44.4 billion in 1970 to $202.3 billion in 1979), secondary market 
purchases increased 419% (from $14.4 billion in 1970 to $74.9 billion in 1979).27 In 
addition to increased purchases and holdings, the GSEs fueled the proliferation of 
mortgage-backed securities. By 1979, there were over 33,000 mortgage pools and more 
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than 800 brokers and thrifts actively issuing the securities.28 Outstanding federally 
underwritten mortgage-backed securities grew from $0.4 billion in 1970 to $110.8 billion 
in 1980, representing a jump from 0.1 percent of total residential mortgage debt to 10 
percent by the end of the decade.29 While MBSs remained a small part of the overall 
outstanding debt, they financed an increasing portion of mortgages each year, as much as 
25% in 1978.30 Consistent with a supplementary role, the 12.5% increase in the share of 
outstanding residential mortgage debt held in federally-insured mortgage pools or pools 
backed by federally-insured mortgages offset the 12.3% decline in the share held by 
thrifts (8.3% of which was in portfolios of mutual savings banks) between 1970 and 
1982.31  
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, during a prolonged period of tight credit, the 
GSEs had demonstrated a capacity to raise capital for housing at precisely the times that 
the traditional sources faltered. Furthermore, the GSEs provided relief to those very 
institutions by buying their low-yielding mortgages, allowing them to take them off their 
portfolios. Even better than selling newly originated mortgages, the ailing thrifts could 
“swap” some of the older, low-yielding mortgages on their portfolios in exchange for 
FNMA and FHLMC participations in MBSs.32 The ability of traditional lenders to sell off 
the mortgages they originated became especially important in 1978-9 as thrift liability 
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deregulation began in earnest through the advent of MMCs, raising their cost-of-funds 
precipitously. By 1980, overall secondary market sales had risen to nearly half of the 
value of all mortgage originations that year (49.2%).33  
In many ways the increased scale of secondary market activity, the creation of 
new institutions (GNMA and FHLMC), the changing status of existing institutions 
(further privatization of FNMA), and innovations in market instruments (the mortgage-
backed security) during the 1970s marked a turning point in housing finance. As early as 
1979, Federal Reserve Bank of New York economist Charles M. Sivesind heralded a 
“revolution in real estate finance,” through the emergence of mortgage-backed 
securities.34 Yet critically, as housing expert Jack Guttentag writes, “while the secondary 
market underwent substantial transformation during the 1970s, not much happened to 
affect segmentation of primary markets,” that is, they remained local rather than 
national.35 The traditional model of banks and savings and loans raising capital and 
lending locally still predominated. The decline in thrift holdings, offset by increased GSE 
purchases, had not yet been accompanied by any significant shift in mortgage origination 
(as would happen in the 1980s, with thrift originations dropping to 30% in 1990 from a 
high of 61% in 1976), indicating that thrifts had simply been selling off more of their 
originations. Until Garn–St. Germain, in 1982, thrifts had no choice but to continue their 
traditional lending role. Had thrift asset powers not been deregulated in 1982, it is 
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conceivable that the industry could have continued to serve as the primary mortgage 
originators, with growing secondary markets allowing the thrifts to move those 
mortgages off their portfolios, or with some other form of government intervention. 
However, by deregulating thrift asset powers, policymakers opened the space for new 
originators to gain market share as thrifts pursued non-housing investments. 
In addition to being primarily countercyclical and supplemental, the growth of 
secondary market activity over the 1970s was almost exclusively government related.36 
The first notable private issues of conventional MBSs, by Bank of America and the First 
Federal Savings and Loan Association of Chicago, came in 1977. Salomon Brothers 
trader Lewis Ranieri later called the issue a “total failure” due to the illegality of the 
instrument in all but fifteen states.37 Between 1977 and 1981, only $1.6 billion in private 
issues of MBSs were made to the public, and only $2.2 - $2.8 billion more were privately 
offered before June 1982.38 Though private entities had issued mortgage-backed 
securities and bonds modeled after those issued by their government-sponsored 
counterparts, the private issues paled in comparison to the federally-related market share. 
As debate over the role of secondary markets continued into the 1980s, most 
policymakers agreed that greater private participation should be encouraged alongside a 
continuing GSE presence, while some argued that secondary markets should become 
wholly private.   
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 Secondary markets, and especially the GSEs, had been increasingly important 
during the 1970s, providing critical supplementation when traditional lenders scaled back 
lending during periods of rising interest rates. But it was not until the early 1980s, after 
Garn–St. Germain, that policymakers committed to a permanent and preeminent role for 
secondary markets in housing finance. At that point, relatively minor regulatory and 
legislative changes could redeploy the inherited institutional structure, including FNMA, 
FHLMC, and GNMA, to replace the thrifts, and the household deposits they collected, as 
the primary source of capital for residential mortgage finance. The remainder of this 
chapter will consider when and how policymakers would turn to the secondary markets to 
replace the thrifts, and how this change would thoroughly transform housing finance.  
 
Envisioning the Future of Housing Finance, 1978-1983 
 
 
Given the increasing importance of secondary mortgage markets and the GSEs 
during the 1970s, policymakers’ decision that both would feature centrally in the future 
of housing finance was almost an easy one. Particularly as thrifts struggled to adapt to 
interest rate ceiling deregulation, and, after 1982, began to pursue the non-housing 
investment powers granted by Garn–St. Germain, consensus grew that secondary markets 
would play a vital role. Yet while the “turn” to secondary markets mainly embraced and 
accelerated changes already occurring in the marketplace (as a consequence of 
deregulation of thrift liabilities, and, later, thrift assets), it was early enough in the 
restructuring that policymakers could still shape the long-term direction and character of 
secondary markets in housing finance. Two major questions remained. First, what role, if 
any, would thrifts play in the restructured system of housing finance? If thrifts would not, 
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and most observers believed they could not,39 hold long-term, fixed-rate mortgages in 
their portfolios, someone else would have to, or else the fixed-rate mortgage would 
disappear. Secondary markets allowed other capital investors, such as pension funds, 
which like 30-year mortgages had a long-term orientation, to own mortgages. But 
pension funds and other capital market investors would not be mortgage originators, so 
thrifts, like mortgage brokers, could have continued in their traditional role as the primary 
mortgage originators, even if they did not keep the mortgages on their own portfolios. 
The Garn–St. Germain Act, despite its statement claiming that expanded powers were 
intended to preserve the role of thrifts in housing finance, made this course less likely by 
allowing thrifts to become less devoted to residential mortgage lending. Subsequent 
policy also facilitated the emergence of mortgage brokers as the foremost mortgage 
originators, eclipsing the thrifts.  
The second remaining question was: how would secondary mortgage market 
activity be divided between public and private parties? Some in the Reagan 
administration, especially in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), wanted the 
secondary markets to be exclusively private, including full privatization of the GSEs 
(removing any link, explicit or implicit, between the GSEs and the U.S. Treasury).40 But 
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this approach was soundly rejected by Congress, including the Republican majority in the 
Senate. The consensus that emerged from the legislative branch held that while private 
participation in the secondary markets should be encouraged, it was essential that the 
GSEs, with both the special advantages and obligations owing to their federal charter and 
oversight, continue to support housing during good times and bad (they assumed private 
players would not do the latter). By and large, lawmakers accepted the argument of 
secondary market proponents that by bringing new investors into housing, the supply of 
mortgage credit would increase and stabilize, translating into more affordable mortgage 
rates for borrowers. This presumed benefit, they reasoned, justified the risk borne by the 
U.S. Treasury in backing the GSEs. Though there is some indication that a Carter 
Administration Task Force on Housing for the Eighties would have investigated the 
implications of secondary markets on the cost of credit, that possibility was lost in the 
1980 presidential election, and the central premise that secondary markets would benefit 
borrowers was otherwise generally unquestioned.41    
The questions regarding the future role of the thrift industry and the appropriate 
mix of public and private activity in secondary markets were taken up by the Carter and 
Reagan administrations as well as Congress. Carter’s “Interagency Task Force on Thrift 
Institutions,” and short-lived “President’s Task Force on Housing for the Eighties,” and 
Reagan’s President’s Commission on Housing similarly concluded that whatever the 
continuing role of thrift institutions, secondary markets would play an increasingly 
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important role in raising capital for housing finance. The Interagency Task Force 
envisioned thrifts acting more like mortgage brokers, that is, continuing to originate and 
service mortgages, but selling them to investors through the secondary market rather than 
holding them in their own portfolios. Citing the “phenomenal growth of the secondary 
market in the 1970’s,” the task force expressed confidence that capital market investors 
would eagerly support an increasing volume of mortgages.42 The task force made a 
handful of policy recommendations regarding secondary markets, urging state 
legislatures to remove any statutory restrictions against thrifts selling mortgages in the 
secondary market,43 facilitation of pension fund investment in secondary markets, and 
relaxation of the requirement that S&Ls have 82% of their portfolios invested in 
qualifying housing investments in order to receive tax advantages.44 The latter 
recommendation linked secondary market expansion to thrift asset deregulation, which 
the task force also recommended, but in this case with the explicit goal of continuing 
thrift mortgage origination.  
 The task force’s report represented the fullest effort of the Carter Administration 
to articulate a vision of the future of housing finance. Had Carter defeated Reagan in the 
1980 election, the continuing reassessment of housing finance would have fallen to the 
“President’s Task Force on Housing for the Eighties,” a group announced in October 
1980. Chaired by former HUD Secretary Robert Weaver, the housing task force was 
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scheduled to report by June 30, 1981, but the outgoing administration never issued any 
findings, and it is not clear that the task force ever met. The “fact sheet” announcing the 
task force, is telling, nonetheless, and suggests a somewhat different approach than that 
Reagan’s Presidential Housing Commission would later take. The fact sheet reaffirmed 
the deregulation of interest rate ceilings and the limited asset deregulation contained in 
the DIDMCA, and acknowledged that secondary market activity had brought stability to 
credit availability, but also noted that the growth of secondary market activity as well as 
deregulation had affected the cost of credit. Echoing findings of the earlier Interagency 
Task Force, the fact sheet concluded, “with the development of the secondary market, 
mortgages are being priced by investors like other capital market instruments and thus 
must maintain rates competitive with alternative investments.”45 For the “Task Force on 
Housing for the Eighties,” the role of the secondary markets and the GSEs and their 
impact on credit cost would be the subject of inquiry and debate, as the desirability of 
expanded secondary market activities remained in question, whereas the Reagan 
commission viewed the benefits of the secondary markets as a foregone conclusion. 
 Established by Reagan’s executive order on June 16, 1981, the President’s 
Commission on Housing (PCH) was chaired by San Francisco Federal Home Loan Bank 
Chairman William McKenna. The body informed the administration’s stance on the on-
going Congressional debates leading to Garn–St. Germain, made recommendations for 
regulatory changes to enhance pension fund investment in mortgages, and formed the 
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basis of the administration’s side of the legislative push resulting in the Secondary 
Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984 (SMMEA).  
 Like the Carter housing groups that preceded it, the PCH saw housing finance in 
transition, with the thrifts reeling, and secondary markets rapidly expanding. The PCH 
also foresaw thrifts acting more like mortgage brokers in the future, but more so than the 
previous task forces or the lawmakers who had supported DIDMCA and even those who 
would support Garn–St. Germain, they explicitly sought a replacement for thrifts as the 
primary conduit of capital for housing. Reasoning that thrifts would utilize the expanded 
asset powers then being considered by Congress, the PCH argued in an interim report, “a 
strong industry that devotes a smaller portion of its portfolio of assets to mortgages could 
be a better source of housing funds than a weak industry fully committed to mortgage 
investment.”46 The PCH even asserted that a reduced role for thrifts would directly 
facilitate secondary market investment, “in properly functioning markets, a reduction in 
mortgage supply at thrift institutions would place upward pressure on mortgage yields, 
and investors that operate in both mortgage and other capital markets would move more 
funds into mortgages.”47 The underlying assumption, one not featured elsewhere in the 
commission’s analysis, was that costs for borrowers, at least temporarily, would go up 
(“upward pressure on mortgages yields” for investors meant upward pressure on costs for 
borrowers).    
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 The overall emphasis of the PCH, however, remained that thrifts would no longer 
be singularly committed to housing finance. The commission had posited an alternative 
centered on a wider set of mortgage originators and investors, connected through 
secondary markets: 
In the future, housing will not be as dependent as it has been on this 
limited sector of the capital market; housing will draw more funds from a 
wide range of private institutions, including pension funds, insurance 
companies, and commercial banks. To encourage greater participation in 
housing finance by such institutions, the commission recommends the 
removal of various tax, legal, and regulatory impediments to widespread 
private investment in mortgages and mortgage-backed securities. 
Secondary markets dealing in new types of mortgage-related securities 
will help attract these new participants to housing finance.48 
 
The commission envisioned a system of housing finance in which capital would come to 
the housing market not in the form of deposits, but in the form of investments, including, 
but not limited to, pensions. According to the principles outlined by the PCH, this 
increased investment would ideally be private investment, facilitated by private 
intermediaries, but at the time the dominant players in secondary mortgage markets were 
the “quasi-private” government chartered FNMA and FHLMC. “The government should 
create,” the commission reported, somewhat paradoxically, “the economic and market 
environment necessary for a shift of certain government housing credit programs to the 
private sector and should carefully manage and monitor the changeover.”49 
The commission’s members, which included industry representatives, regulators, 
and former lawmakers, had been carefully selected to reflect Reagan’s free market and 
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limited government orientation.50 The PCH was indeed unapologetic in its ideological 
orientation, reporting, “the genius of the market economy, freed of the distortions forced 
by government housing policies and regulations that swung erratically from loving to 
hostile, can provide for housing far better than Federal programs.”51 The group’s avowed 
faith in “the market economy” to provide the best housing outcomes may explain why it, 
unlike Carter’s “Housing for the Eighties” Task Force, seemed unconcerned about the 
implications of increased secondary market activity for the cost of credit. Where the 
Carter group noted that as secondary markets more closely linked housing to capital 
markets, “mortgages … must maintain rates competitive with alternative instruments,” 
the PCH either assumed that increased supply of capital through secondary markets 
would (eventually, if not immediately) lead to lower cost of credit, or that ensuring the 
availability of credit was more important than ensuring the affordability of credit.52 In a 
free market, the commission argued, investors would participate in the secondary market 
“because financing the housing market is profitable, not because of regulation or indirect 
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Thygerson, and Charles Urstadt. Kent Colton served as staff director over a group that included John 
Weicher, David Seiders, Andrew Carron, and John Tuccillo. Of a group of possible members, Deputy 
Assistant for Policy Development Ed Gray advised, “it is absolutely essential that we know they are solid 
Reagan people who support the President and his economic policies and who will directly reflect that 
support in the work of the Commission.” Memo, Ed Gray to Pendleton James, November 18, 1981, folder 
“Housing Commission (5 of 6),” Martin Anderson Files, Ronald Reagan Library. 
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credit allocation.”53 Credit would be available, then, for those who could compete to get 
it. 
President Reagan endorsed the Commission’s recommendations, most concretely 
by instructing the Department of Labor to enable pension funds to invest in housing.54 As 
of May 1982, pension funds were authorized to invest widely in mortgage-related 
securities, and, after January 1983, in securities backed by second mortgages.55 But 
except for these changes, the PCH’s policy recommendations would rely on action by 
Congress. For its part, the Congress proved much more ambivalent about the division of 
public and private secondary market activity than the PCH. There was, after all, no small 
amount of confusion over what was public or private activity given the ambiguous status 
of the GSEs. In hearings on secondary mortgage markets, for example, Democratic 
Congressman Tim Wirth (CO) noted recent buzz about private sector involvement in the 
secondary mortgage market, specifically citing a report that such activity had become 
“the largest, single profit sector for Salomon Bros.”56 “The mortgage-backed security in 
the Ginnie May form is, sir,” witness Preston Martin, then a Fed Vice Chairman, 
clarified, “but not the kind of issue we are talking about here, that a private company, 
privately insured with conventional loans–I bet they can’t even find the volume at 
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Salomon Bros. for that one. [Private sector growth had occurred only] if it is guaranteed 
or passed through Freddie Mac or some other of the other three agencies. Not if it is 
private, private, private, no sir.”57 The private sector was participating and profiting from 
the secondary mortgage market, but only by trading publicly guaranteed securities. The 
purely private market envisioned by the PCH did not then exist, and not everyone agreed 
that it could. Lewis Ranieri, the Salomon Brothers broker often credited as a pioneer in 
mortgage securitization, testified, “I agree with the potential growth of the [private] 
market. It is also true, however, that that additional growth cannot be expected, were not 
some relief to the private sector to be forthcoming. It would be my contention that the 
system would collapse in and of itself without that [government] relief. As to the 
agencies, I do not think anybody believes that the agencies do not have a vital role to play 
in this process, certainly in the near term, until a larger private sector exists.”58 While the 
ideological orientation of the PCH led to the conclusion that the agencies should get out 
of the market immediately, Ranieri, the practitioner, knew that the highly profitable 
arraignment he was perfecting for Salomon Brothers relied heavily on the guarantees 
offered by GNMA. 
The GSE heads, whose corporate titles distinguished them from agency directors 
and cabinet secretaries, offered little help in clarifying the murky status of the FNMA and 
FHLMC. Their own descriptions belied the ambiguous nature of the GSE. David O. 
Maxwell, Chairman and CEO of FNMA, proudly asserted, “Fannie Mae is entirely self-
supporting. We do not use the resources of the United States to carry out our business.” 
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And yet, moments later, Maxwell identified and defended exactly how the resources of 
the United States helped FNMA to carry out its business, “Fannie Mae’s agency status, 
which enables us to borrow at favorable rates in the capital markets, is a very valuable 
tool for middle-income home buyers in this country, and a creative and magnificent tool 
that has saved the American taxpayers billions of dollars since Fannie Mae became a 
private company in 1970.”59 Maxwell’s counterpart, Kenneth J. Thygerson, President of 
the FHLMC, sounded a similar tone, though more directly acknowledging the debt and 
responsibility of the GSE, “no Federal appropriations or outlays support the operations of 
Freddie Mac. The Corporation’s congressional charter and ties to the Federal home loan 
bank system do nevertheless provide it significant advantages to fulfill its congressional 
mandate. Consequently, Mac believes that these advantages bring with them 
commensurate duties and responsibilities to the Congress and to the public.”60  
As Congress reassessed the role of the GSEs and secondary markets within the 
rapidly evolving structure of housing finance, many of its members showed a reluctance 
to let go of the potential influence that could be wielded through the GSEs if they 
remained obligated to the public interest. It was Lew Ranieri, of all people, who pointed 
out during Congressional testimony, “to view the capital market in the context of housing 
without the agencies is to leave the Congress without the very valuable tool of public 
policy that the agencies represent by their sheer girth.”61 The more the secondary markets 
were turned over to private entities (if that was even possible), the less effective that 
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“valuable tool of public policy” would become. Representative of many lawmakers, who 
saw continuing utility of holding the GSEs to public account, New York Republican 
George Wortley reminded Maxwell, “You may be a private company. Nevertheless, your 
charter comes from the Government. And you have to come back to us.”62 As 
policymakers embraced and sought to facilitate the greater role of the secondary markets 
in housing finance, the consensus that emerged aligned with Wortley’s view rather than 
that advocating the complete privatization of the GSEs. Congress would move to increase 
private participation in the secondary markets, but would maintain a prominent role for 
the GSEs while holding them accountable to their federal charters. 
 
The Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act–No Turning Back 
 
 
The policy initiative to facilitate the shift to secondary markets as the primary 
source of mortgage capital eventually took the form of the Secondary Mortgage Market 
Enhancement Act of 1984 (SMMEA), as a majority in Congress came to agree that “as 
the demand for housing rises throughout this decade, the sale of mortgage backed 
securities to provide housing credit will become increasingly important.”63 The emerging 
consensus that secondary markets would replace the thrifts crystallized in SMMEA as 
lawmakers sought to remove any impediments to their continuing growth. In addition to 
endorsing secondary markets as the main source of capital for housing, the SMMEA 
attempted to facilitate participation of private (meaning other than the quasi-private 
GSEs) entities in secondary market activities, through “procedural deregulation” to 
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facilitate purchase and exchange of MBSs, by opening MBSs to institutional investors, 
and by limiting the competitive advantage of the GSEs. The Act also preserved the 
market for securities backed by mortgages of over $108,300 to the (fully) private sector, 
while recognizing, “the continuing and important role [Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac] 
will play especially to the market serving lower and middle income homebuyers.”64 The 
Act’s emphasis on MBSs indicated policymakers’ preference for that model, as opposed 
to FNMA’s portfolio approach. The bill authorized “updates” to existing regulation to 
extend registration exemptions to include securities backed by manufactured and 
cooperative home loans as well as second mortgages, those backed by other mortgage 
pools, and by any HUD-approved mortgages so as to include those issued by mortgage 
bankers as well as by depository institutions. It also facilitated investment in MBSs by 
depository institutions, arguing that such investments would not jeopardize the safety and 
soundness of the institutions given that the MBSs “are backed by a pool of many 
mortgages with relatively low default risk as well as mortgage insurance on both the 
individual mortgages and the pool.”65 
SMMEA emerged from the policymakers’ attempt to reconcile their desire for a 
robust mortgage market and the rapid withdrawal of thrifts from residential mortgage 
lending. By 1983-4, as S&Ls exercised their new asset powers it became commonplace 
to attribute the need for expanded secondary markets to deregulation.66 Congressman 
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Wirth summarized the evolving role of the secondary markets in the context of 
deregulation:  
Government-sponsored agencies have been called upon to support mortgage 
originators and have turned to the capital markets as a source of funds for 
housing. Private participants have entered the arena, and [the Secondary Mortgage 
Market Enhancement Act] seeks to further encourage their participation. The 
rapid growth of the secondary mortgage market is a response to a major 
regulatory change–the lifting of regulation Q ceilings on short-term deposits. 
Because of this change, banks and thrifts must now pay market rates of interest on 
deposits and many no longer want to accept the risk of using short-term, variable-
rate funds to make long-term fixed rate mortgage loans. Many experts argue that 
depository institutions will no longer be able to provide sufficient credit for 
housing. New sources of long-term funds are said to be required to meet the rising 
needs for mortgage credit.67 
 
To the extent that depository institutions, particularly thrifts, would continue to contribute 
to housing finance, FNMA CEO Maxwell suggested that they “are going to function 
more like mortgage bankers.”68 Thrifts could continue to lend, but increasingly would 
raise funds from secondary market investors rather than depositors.   
 Consistent with arguments made in favor of deregulation in other arenas, 
proponents argued that new rules to broaden participation in secondary markets would 
benefit consumers, in this case explicitly consumer-borrowers. Lawmakers were 
generally less likely to tout the benefits to consumer-investors though their interests were 
certainly at stake, and who, arguably, were even more likely to benefit. Senator John 
Tower, declared, “it is the hope of this [Senate Banking] committee to support a properly 
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functioning market in which funds can flow freely to meet demands, not unduly 
influenced by any one sector of the industry or any one organization, but subject to 
healthy competition which creates the lowest price and fairest terms to the home 
buyer.”69 The Committee’s report, recommending the bill’s passage, added that “as 
population shifts and home building demand moved cross country to the west and 
southwest, the demand for mortgage capital and its sources became separated,” arguing 
that efficient national secondary markets would get capital where it was needed, erasing 
regional differences.70  
Opening housing investment more fully to private investors in the capital market, 
argued Ralph Horn of the Dealer Bank Association, was essential to maximizing 
competitive forces to the benefit of consumers. “Without full participation by all financial 
institutions in the capital market system,” Horn testified, “potential homeowners will be 
unduly penalized because the market will not work as efficiently as it can. A highly-
efficient secondary mortgage market should not only make it easier for families to buy 
their own homes by keeping mortgage interest rates down, but should also increase 
demand for housing, and thereby increase jobs in the construction and other related 
businesses.”71 Horn’s primary objective, of course, was to make sure that banks could 
underwrite and deal mortgage securities, and the argument that such powers would 
benefit homeowners could only help. Ranieri upped the ante, claiming that the future of 
the fixed-rate mortgage, still held dear by most policymakers despite the recent 
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authorization of ARMs, depended on the secondary market, and thus for borrowers over 
the price limits for FNMA and FHLMC, on private participation in the secondary 
market.72 Ranieri explained that MBSs would result in lower mortgage rates for 
borrowers by increasing the supply of credit, moving capital from areas of surplus to 
areas of demand, and by reaching a wider range of investors through collateralized 
mortgage obligations.73 Senators Riegle, Cranston, Sarbanes, Dodd, Dixon, Sasser, and 
Lautenberg agreed on the benefits of secondary markets, underscoring the need for 
increased credit for housing as the so-called “baby boomers” reached the age that many 
of their parents had become homeowners, citing that “leading housing analysts suggest 
that mortgage-backed securities will have to supply over 75% of all housing credit by 
1990.”74 But the group was less convinced about fully private participants, calling 
GNMA, FNMA, and FHLMC “the foundation of our country’s housing finance 
system.”75  
Indeed, while the bill aimed to facilitate private participation in the secondary 
markets, the debate occasioned a hearty defense of a continuing role for the GSEs. While 
some in the Reagan administration, especially in the OMB, favored the complete 
privatization of the secondary markets, many in Congress insisted that the GSEs played 
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an indispensable role in housing finance. Texas Democrat Henry Gonzalez argued, “I feel 
that the primary mission of these institutions [Fannie and Freddie] is to serve the great 
middle segment of the housing market….Let it be recorded that these institutions–more 
than any other force–kept the housing industry alive during the deepest part of the 
recession. These institutions were active in the market when no one else was; they remain 
the biggest and most vital force in stabilizing and strengthening the homebuilding 
industry.”76 The main contention of the privatization proponents, such as the PCH, was 
that government should not do anything that private enterprise could do. Gonzalez 
countered that government intervention was necessary precisely to do what private 
enterprise would not do. Others, like FHLBB Chairman turned Merrill Lynch executive, 
Richard Pratt, acknowledged the pioneering role that the GSEs had played in the 
innovation of the mortgage-backed security and the collateralized mortgage obligation, 
and in developing the secondary markets more generally, but argued that private entities 
could now take over the bulk of secondary market activity.77 Ultimately, the SMMEA 
struck a compromise, seeking to stimulate private participation, but not by scaling-back 
the GSEs. The Senate report on SMMEA defended the continuing role of the quasi-
private entities, “We want to point out, in particular, that this bill rejects the radical 
suggestion of some members of the Administration who want to quickly terminate or 
greatly reduce the Federal Government’s role in housing finance.”78 The GSEs, the report 
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argued, would support the secondary markets in good times as well as continuing their 
countercyclical role when private investors might retreat.  
Republican Congressman Bill McCollum (FL) called for further study of the 
secondary mortgage markets and the role that the GSEs should play within them, 
suggesting that the Congress did not yet have a handle on the dramatic changes taking 
place in housing finance.79 Except for this reservation, the bill received enthusiastic 
bipartisan support and passed by voice vote in both houses. President Reagan signed the 
bill into law on October 3, 1984. To facilitate institutional investment in MBSs, the Act 
authorized that in cases in which state or federal law limited investment options to U.S. 
Treasury obligations, that “securities issued or guaranteed by the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation or the Federal National Mortgage Association, shall be considered 
to be obligations issued by the United States for purposes of the limitation.”80 The Act 
allowed the GSEs to purchase loans on manufactured homes and second mortgages, and, 
crucially, it included mortgages issued by any HUD-approved mortgagee (mortgage 
brokers and companies) as qualified for mortgage related securities for the purposes of 
the Act. 
The Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984 put a Congressional 
stamp on and further facilitated the rapid growth of the secondary markets as the primary 
source of capital for residential mortgages. While commercial banks continued to 
originate mortgages at roughly the same share of the market as they had through the 
postwar era, the traditional leaders in origination, the thrifts, quickly became marginal 
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players. By the mid-1980s, three of the most central aspects of the New Deal system of 
housing finance, interest rate ceilings, the fixed-rate mortgage, and finally, the thrift 
industry, had been, respectively, ended, challenged, and diminished. Thereafter, instead 
of a protected source of low-cost deposit funds, investment capital raised in secondary 
markets would finance the majority of residential mortgages, fixed-rate mortgages would 
compete with adjustable-rate alternatives, and mortgage companies would become the 
primary mortgage originators. Like the New Deal system before it, the newly 
reconfigured system of housing finance would shape opportunity for homeownership. 
The assumption of most policymakers who had supported SMMEA and the turn to the 
secondary markets was that by bringing in more investors, the secondary markets would 
increase the supply and stability of credit, leading to more affordable credit for 
borrowers. 
 
Implications for Fair Housing and Community Reinvestment 
 
 
Debate over the secondary mortgage enhancement bill provided on-going 
opportunity to examine the consequences of the changing institutional and structural 
landscape of housing finance, but unlike for the PCH, this debate occurred after Garn–St. 
Germain. Like the PCH, however, the relevant congressional committees largely passed 
on taking a closer look at the implications of secondary markets for the cost of credit. But 
in view of the precipitation of thrifts’ withdrawal from residential mortgage lending as 
they exercised their widened investment powers, those same committees did discuss the 
consequences of the increasing importance of mortgage companies or brokers. One of the 
central arguments of this study is that deregulation and the restructuring of housing 
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finance undermined fair housing and community reinvestment policies by reducing the 
share of mortgage origination by the institutions targeted by those policies. Remarkably, 
policymakers largely failed to anticipate or even consider the implications of such a 
fundamental change. Yet because policymakers recognized that secondary markets would 
facilitate mortgage origination by mortgage brokers, debate over the SMMEA presented a 
ripe opportunity for just such a consideration. Indeed, critics raised concern over the 
(comparatively) unregulated status of mortgage brokers during SMMEA hearings, but it 
was not over the interests of consumer-borrowers, much less those borrowers that fair 
housing and community reinvestment policies were intended to protect, rather, it was 
over the interests of investors that critics called for caution. Gale Cincotta, who led the 
push for the CRA in 1977, alone raised the issue of a lack of fair housing and 
reinvestment accountability for unregulated originators, but her call for extension of the 
CRA to all financial institutions, especially new entrants to housing finance as well as 
mortgage brokers, went unheeded.  
Concern over investor protection arose over the “procedural deregulation” in 
SMMEA, which included provisions to loosen the requirements governing registration of 
mortgage-backed securities. MBSs pooled mortgages over time, most of them after 
investors had first committed to purchase the security. Instead of requiring individual 
registration of each security, beginning in 1981, SEC regulators allowed for continuous 
registration, by which, as long as the underlying mortgages remained essentially similar, 
subsequent securities could be issued under the previous registration. SMMEA added to 
the SEC’s loosening of registration regulations by exempting registration of MBSs sold 
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to institutional investors in amounts of $250,000 and higher, and, crucially, made this 
exemption applicable to securities backed by mortgages issued by mortgage brokers.  
Critics of these loosened regulations raised two main objections. First, the 
registration exemptions would require less disclosure to investors. While policymakers 
intended the $250,000 threshold to separate “sophisticated,” from “unsophisticated” 
investors (the former needing less protection), Henry Schechter of the AFL-CIO 
suggested that large pension funds, for example, might be managed by inexperienced 
investors but still meet the $250,000 minimum. Schechter additionally pointed to the 
higher default rates of second mortgages, which would also qualify for exemption under 
the bill.81 Fed Vice Chairman Preston Martin too expressed misgivings about the 
registration exemptions and the more fundamental problem of lacking sufficient 
knowledge about the pools of mortgages behind the securities. Martin raised further 
objection to SMMEA’s loosened regulations, questioning the extension of exemptions to 
securities backed by mortgages issued by mortgage brokers. Martin argued, “I have some 
trouble with extending the SEC exemption to all HUD-approved mortgagees, including 
mortgage companies not subject to the levels of supervision, and regulation and 
examination that depository institutions have. It raises questions of the quality of the 
mortgages in the underlying pool, and they can vary very greatly….”82 Martin suggested 
that some minimal “parameters” might be advisable, including registration of the loan to 
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value ratios, geographic distribution, and insurance status of mortgages and/or the pool, 
and, favored exempting only the top two ratings categories.83  
Richard Malmgren of the North American Securities Administrators Association 
even warned that lax regulation, particularly preemption of state regulations, could create 
openings for questionable or even illegal lending practices, though not mentioning 
discrimination in particular. “As a deregulatory mode or concept permeates Federal 
regulation,” he argued, “that increases the opportunity for certain segments of our society 
to come into a particular State jurisdiction and involve themselves in illegal activity.”84 In 
other words, the exemptions created a regulatory blind-spot, in which mortgage 
origination would take place outside of the purview of the federal financial regulators.  
These warnings, drawing attention to the comparative lack of oversight over 
mortgage brokers and the problem of questionable quality of mortgages underlying 
MBSs, were quickly dismissed by key regulators and other witnesses. SEC Chairman 
Charles Cox indicated that concerns over investor protection had been resolved to the 
Commission’s satisfaction. Former FHLBB Chairman Richard Pratt and MBS trader 
Lewis Ranieri too assured the committee that the ratings agencies offered adequate 
protection to consumers. At the time, Moody’s had been the only ratings agency to 
develop a presence with mortgage related securities. But faith in the ratings agencies was 
not universal. Malmgren had noted in testimony that Moody’s fourth category included 
“securities where ‘certain protective elements may be lacking or may be characteristically 
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unreliable over any great length of time.’”85 Subcommittee Chairman Tim Wirth (D CO), 
similarly pressed Cox on the role of the ratings agencies, citing an SEC report that had 
found that Moody’s ratings of New York City securities had misled investors in the mid-
1970s. But Cox replied that the fact that the exemption applied only to purchases over 
$250,000 meant that such protections were not necessary.86  
A second critique of the turn to secondary markets emerged out of concern over 
concentration of financial power among a few financial firms. This line of argumentation 
also had clear implications for community reinvestment. Keith Willoughby of the 
National Council of Savings Institutions warned, “if the terms of … mortgages 
[originated for sale in secondary markets] are dictated by investment bankers, we believe 
it will change the nature of capital markets in this country dramatically… the lack of 
participation of local financial institutions in the marketing of such securities will lead to 
the concentration of capital flows [that] would be undesirable for this country.”87 
Representing the S&Ls, Michael Wise, of the U.S. League of Savings Associations, 
cautioned that while thrifts could originate and buy securities, “the intervening steps, 
issuance, underwriting, and distribution, would be left to others, especially to the Wall 
Street firms. We do not understand why Congress would want to concentrate the capital 
for home finance in this way.”88 The ABA too opposed concentration of benefits to “four 
or five dominant securities firms,” but ultimately endorsed the concept of secondary 
market enhancement so long as commercial banks could underwrite and deal all types of 
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mortgage-backed securities.89 All self-interested defenses of local depository institutions, 
these critiques nonetheless spoke to a public interest concern, the concentration of capital. 
The same system that promised to deliver credit more efficiently throughout the nation 
also had the potential to channel capital predominately through a few money-center 
financial services firms, including, as it turned out, the quasi-private Fannie and Freddie. 
Though capital might flow more freely, it would flow to whoever could compete to pay 
for it. Credit would be allocated by market demand, which could be vastly different from 
allocation based on the local obligations of depository institutions. Markets would 
measure demand by ability/willingness to pay, not by need, likely leaving the credit-
starved locations championed by CRA activists wanting.    
The lone voice calling attention to the implications of secondary market growth 
for the CRA, Gale Cincotta argued that the concentration of capital threatened the 
mechanisms for securing credit for underserved neighborhoods. “If American Express, 
J.C. Penney, Sears, Equitable Life, Dreyfus, Beneficial, Parker Pen, and Western Family, 
a chain of furniture stores, want to play in the financial game,” Cincotta said of the 
financial services firms that would increase their involvement with housing via secondary 
markets, “they all must play by the same rules and meet the credit and service needs of 
the communities where they are doing business. This is what we call a level playing 
field…. If Merrill Lynch is bullish on America, why aren’t they bullish on our 
communities?”90 Seeking greater accountability for the mortgage brokers and other non-
bank entities that did not fall under the authority of the CRA, Cincotta requested an 
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extension of the act to cover “the entire national financial services industry.”91 But of 
Wirth’s “traditional concerns” only investor protection found a place in an agenda 
primarily concerned with market efficiency. The CRA’s efficacy in assuring fair and 
equal access to credit and capital and related concerns about concentration of financial 
power were drowned out by promises of more efficient allocation of capital.   
 
The Cost of Credit 
 
 
A final critique of the secondary markets raised during Congressional hearings 
questioned the most fundamental claim of secondary market proponents, that they would 
benefit consumer borrowers. It was Michael Wise, who, like the Carter Task Force on 
Housing for the Eighties before him, raised doubts about the implications of secondary 
markets on consumer cost: 
As mentioned, we are somewhat skeptical about claims that the efficiencies made 
possible by mortgage securities will result in significantly lower mortgage rates 
for homebuyers. That is an untested proposition. It is entirely possible that the 
addition of new middlemen could diminish the alleged rate savings. In addition, 
there are obviously winners and losers in local markets when mortgage rates are 
dominated by national securities products which tend to even out rates throughout 
the country…. We don’t really know if the mortgage-backed securities products 
enhanced by this legislation will deliver more affordable home loans.92 
  
But claims about competition and efficiency ruled the day. The majority of policymakers 
bought into the assertion of the free market thinkers of the PCH that secondary market 
efficiencies would benefit consumers. As secondary markets attracted new investors to 
housing finance, they reasoned, the supply of credit would increase, assuring both the 
availability and affordability of residential mortgages.   
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 Congressman Wirth, who had chaired the House Telecommunications, Consumer 
Protection, and Finance Subcommittee’s hearings on the Act, however, felt the issue 
needed to be revisited. In hearings held in April 1984, titled “Financial Restructuring: 
The Road Ahead,” Wirth cautioned, “given the rapidity of change outside the existing 
legal framework,” he argued, “a new financial system could emerge that fails to balance 
concerns for competition and efficiency against our traditional and equally valid concerns 
for safety and soundness; for the protection of investors, depositors and policy holders; 
for the fairness and equity of access to capital and credit; and for the prevention of 
conflicts of interest and financial concentration. These principles have been ignored in 
the rush to deregulate.”93 Wirth saw in the recommendations of the PCH, the SMMEA, 
and the changing marketplace itself, the elevation of “competition and efficiency” over 
goals that had been, for much of the twentieth century, sought through regulation.  
The consequences of the turn to the secondary markets, instead of unmitigated 
benefit to borrowers, have been greater costs and risks for borrowers, a shift to a majority 
of originations by under-regulated mortgage companies and brokers, and greater systemic 
risk. Both the increase in borrower cost and the shift in mortgage origination undermined 
fair housing and community reinvestment policies. Increasing borrower cost under the 
deregulated system of housing finance meant that fair housing and community 
reinvestment policies opened up access to credit to previously excluded borrowers on less 
favorable terms than those available to borrowers who had accessed credit under the New 
Deal system. This historic inequity perpetuated racial inequality, as well as imposing 
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comparative hardships on all borrowers under the new system. But fair housing and 
community reinvestment policies themselves became less effective under the new system 
as more and more mortgage origination shifted away from the depository institutions that 
fell under the hard-won fair housing and reinvestment regulations and to the 
comparatively less regulated mortgage companies and brokers. Secondary markets 
brought more investors to housing finance, creating an incredible amount of residential 
mortgage credit, but the cost and quality of that credit detracted from the advantage of 
increased credit availability. 
Several complementary pieces of evidence support the claim that the deregulated 
system of housing finance increased cost to borrowers. The logic of the operation of the 
secondary markets, with increased intermediaries and a shift from reliance on savings-
capital to investment-capital, suggests higher costs compared to the New Deal system.94 
Capital raised in secondary markets differed in character from that traditionally raised by 
depository institutions. Secondary market capital was investment capital, speculative by 
nature, with varying expectations regarding risk and correspondingly variable 
compensation for such risk (with some investors taking on higher risk for the chance of 
higher returns). In an integrated capital market, housing finance competed with other 
investment options, meaning that capital went to housing when it offered comparative 
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benefits to investors in return and security. By comparison, depositors had placed 
household savings in banks and thrifts at no risk (after the advent of deposit insurance) 
and with little speculation over future returns. These depositors valued safety, 
convenience and liquidity in addition to a modest rate of return. This vast pool of deposit 
capital supplied lenders with low-cost capital that they could lend profitably at relatively 
low rates.   
Secondary market capital was also more mobile than that deposited in local 
institutions. Though deregulation and technological changes were reducing barriers, the 
Community Reinvestment Act continued to restrict the mobility of deposit-capital, that is, 
it had to be invested locally. Secondary market proponents argued that the comparatively 
mobile investment-capital would more efficiently match supply and demand. In theory, 
this quality could benefit capital-short communities, but demand would be measured not 
by need, but by the profitability of lending in a particular area. In other words, capital 
could be more available, as long as borrowers could compete to pay for it. Capital-
deprived communities, of course, were least able to bear such costs.   
Reliance on secondary markets meant additional intermediaries in housing 
finance. Rather than a thrift originating and holding a mortgage, a lender would originate 
a mortgage; the lender or another party would then service the mortgage; then another 
party might insure the mortgage; another party would bundle the mortgage with others 
and create a security (mortgage-backed security); a ratings agency would assess the 
quality of the pool. Each of these intermediaries would be compensated for their services, 
and then an investor, expecting a return, of course, would buy the security. Indeed, the 
turn to secondary markets was as much about giving new investors and financial 
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institutions access to housing, recall, as Don Regan noted “real estate, of course, is a huge 
market,” as it was about giving homebuyers access to new investors and capital.95 
Supporting the profits of all of these intermediaries and the return to investors meant that 
credit raised in secondary markets would cost more than that raised in depository 
institutions under interest rate ceilings.  
Several indicators of housing affordability point to increasing costs through the 
1980s despite subsiding inflation.96 The rate of homeownership began to stagnate after 
decades of increase,97 foreclosures increased,98 and housing scholars, in response to 
changing costs, adjusted the “rule of thumb” from 25% to 30% as the amount of income 
that households should be expected to devote to housing.99 Frank S. Levy and Richard C. 
Michel write in their 1991 study, “the percentage of a young family’s income necessary 
to pay the principal and interest on a new home rose from 15-16 percent in the 1950s and 
1960s to 28 percent in the 1980s.”100 This affordability crunch was not exclusively 
attributable to changes in housing finance, rising construction costs and stagnant wage 
growth also played a role, but higher mortgage interest rates indicate that the new system 
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increased costs for borrowers. Data presented by Michael Stone on the inflation-adjusted 
mortgage interest rate on single family conventional mortgages show that while coming 
down from an early 1980s peak, rates remained higher into the 1990s than they had been 
at any time between 1967 and 1981.101 While some academic studies have shown modest 
benefit to borrowers attributable to either secondary markets or GSE participation, in 
particular, others have found no indication of benefits to borrowers. Taken together, the 
logic of the new system, the lack of scholarly consensus on benefits to borrowers, and 
evidence of higher mortgage interest rates, make a compelling case that borrowing costs 
were in fact higher under the deregulated system of housing finance.   
A number of studies have sought to quantify the benefit gained by secondary 
market activity as promised by secondary market proponents, public, private, and 
quasi.102 A 1989 study of California loans closed in 1978 and 1986 by Patric Hendershott 
and James Shilling found that conforming loans (those meeting Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac qualifications, less than $153,000 in 1986) had rates of 15 to 30 basis points lower 
than nonconforming loans.103 A series of further studies found similarly modest benefits 
to homebuyers, finding between 16 to 21 basis points in lowered rates attributable to 
securitization or other secondary market activity. Other studies, notably those by Steven 
Todd and by Andreas Lehnert, Wayne Passmore, and Shane M. Sherlund, reported no 
relationship between mortgage rates and securitization. Todd, accounting for different 
risk associated with adjustable- and fixed-rate mortgages, found no gains to homebuyers 
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in terms of interest rates from passthrough securities or CMOs, but did conclude that 
securitization correlated with reduced fees (which may have been attributable to 
institutional changes in origination, rather than securitization per se).104 Lehnert, et al., 
focusing on the GSEs, and on purchases rather than MBSs, find “that GSE portfolio 
purchases have no significant effects on either primary or secondary mortgage rate 
spreads.”105 Quigley likewise argues “there is little or no evidence [that GSE purchases] 
stabilize cyclical swings in home purchases or reduce interest rates to home 
purchasers.”106  In sum, there is no scholarly consensus that secondary mortgage activity 
reduced interest rates for borrowers, and those studies that do find benefits for home 
buyers calculate gains that fall short of what secondary market proponents predicted in 
the early 1980s. Into the 1990s, inflation-adjusted mortgage rates remained higher than 
they had been at any point between 1967 and 1981, indicating that the newly 
reconfigured system of mortgage finance was in fact more costly than the New Deal 
system. 
As costs increased, credit quality also declined. “In the opinion of most informed 
observers,” Jack Guttentag wrote in 1984, “residential mortgage-loan quality deteriorated 
markedly during 1980-84… heavily driven by parties who profit from transactions, but 
do not take any significant risk.”107 As secondary market investors purchased loans, they, 
or the insurers of those loans, assumed the risk from the originator. Unlike the depository 
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institutions that had held the mortgages they originated in their own portfolio, the 
mortgage brokers that became the primary originators retained no such risk once they 
sold a mortgage in the secondary market. This moral hazard, coupled with comparatively 
less regulatory oversight, created opportunity for a host of predatory lending practices. 
Secondary markets also facilitated issuance of the risk-shifting adjustable-rate mortgages. 
In 1981, the year that ARMs were federally authorized, FNMA purchased over $100 
million of the new instruments. FNMA, according to President David Maxwell, brought 
“standardization to the ARM market [that was] essential for attracting mortgage capital, 
especially from non-traditional lenders–and to reduce buyer confusion.”108 The shift of 
risk associated with ARMs and the deterioration of credit quality in the 1980s was only 





The turn to secondary markets accelerated and then completed the transformation 
of housing finance. By the mid-1980s, central elements of the New Deal system had been 
significantly altered or altogether dismantled. Interest rate ceilings, which had enabled 
the growth of the thrift industry in the 1930s and 1940s and provided a protected source 
of low-cost funds to housing lenders throughout the post-war decades, were fully 
deregulated. This first step in deregulation, carried out in the name of “small savers,” 
initiated crisis conditions for thrifts, which, in turn, justified further asset deregulation 
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and the growth of the secondary mortgage market. Among the new asset powers, which 
extended not just to the thrifts, but to all mortgage originators, were adjustable-rate 
mortgages. The fixture of the New Deal system, the fixed-rate mortgage would no longer 
be the exclusive mortgage instrument. Further asset powers allowed thrifts to invest less 
and less in residential mortgages, and secondary markets facilitated greater competition 
from non-depository originators. In sum, the deregulation to save the thrifts ultimately 
destroyed them. As Lewis Ranieri put it, “the federal government started the process in 
the late 1970s by deregulating financial institutions. The removal of Regulation Q and the 
ceilings on savings deposits in the late 1970s left thrifts with mismatched thirty-year, 
fixed-rate loans. Wall Street, though securitization, finished the job by taking away the 
thrifts’ primary business of home lending.”109 
With the thrift industry out of the way, mortgage companies and mortgage 
brokers, including new entrants to real estate, filled the void, originating mortgages to be 
sold in the secondary market. Typically bundled and backed by securities, these 
mortgages found ready investors, institutional and individual. Housing finance had 
shifted from household savings capital plus federal subsidy to household and industry 
investment capital plus federal subsidy. The nature of the capital financing 
homeownership had changed from being primarily savings capital, deposited by 
households with little to no speculation on the rate of return, to investment capital, on 
which investors expected a significant yield. The key to this shift was the growing wealth 
of middle-class households that increasingly turned their savings (especially after paying 
off a mortgage) into capital markets through stocks, mutual funds, and pensions. 
                                                 




Secondary markets reconnected that savings-turned-investment to housing finance. The 
nature of federal subsidy had changed somewhat too, as the bulk of that subsidy came 
through the implicit guarantee behind the behemoth GSEs. The profits from that backing 
remained private while the risk was public until the implicit became explicit and both 
became public when FNMA and FHLMC came under federal conservatorship in 2008.  
Deregulation and the turn to secondary markets ended an era of relatively cheap 
credit for housing and of expanding rates of homeownership.110 The stated commitment 
to equal access to homeownership and the “American Dream” for all and an imperative 
that the profitability of housing finance be competitive with and integrated into all other 
capital markets, created contradictory policy goals. Policymakers were asking the new 
system to produce yields for investors and profits for a host of intermediaries while 
reducing costs for borrowers. Instead, borrowers bore higher costs while borrowers, 
investors (to some extent), and the federal government shared increased risk. In the short-
term, this contributed to constrained opportunity for homeownership, as through the 
1980s, the homeownership rate plateaued at 64%.111 Over the long term, into the 1990s 
and 2000s, the contradiction in goals created a market for new and often risky credit 
instruments in order to restart an expansion of homeownership rates and new-home 
construction in the face of an affordability gap. Those risky instruments, often forms of 
adjustable-rate mortgages, flourished in the regulatory blind-spot created by the shift in 
mortgage origination from depository institutions to mortgage brokers, and 
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disproportionately coincided with discriminatory and predatory lending practices. The 
risk in this burgeoning subprime market spread throughout the newly integrated financial 
markets, and when the risky loans proved unsustainable, the deregulated system of 





The Transformation of Housing Finance: From Three Revolutions to Three Crises  
 
 The dismantling of the New Deal system of housing finance played a central role 
in three economic crises in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries: the S&L 
crisis of the late 1980s, the subprime crisis of the mid to late 2000s, and a more enduring 
crisis of racial inequality that raises questions about the relationship between opportunity 
and democracy. The transformation of federal housing policy in the late 1970s and early 
1980s–the deregulation of interest rate ceilings and thrift asset powers, combined with the 
turn to the secondary markets–fundamentally restructured the way that residential 
mortgage credit was created and allocated. The newly reconfigured system of housing 
finance proved remarkably capable of raising vast amounts of capital for housing– 
making residential credit abundantly available. But that credit came at higher cost and 
risk for borrowers compared to those under the New Deal system. Systemic risk 
increased too, as secondary markets integrated housing finance into broader capital 
markets, pulling in more and more investors and institutions–both sharing and spreading 
risk.  
 
The S&L Crisis 
 
 
 Throughout the 1970s, as deregulation proponents and then champions of “small 
savers” argued for an end to Regulation Q, S&L officials repeatedly insisted that they 
could not continue as the leaders in residential lending, or even survive as an industry, 
without the protection of interest rate ceilings. They were right. Beginning in 1978, when 
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regulators authorized high-ceiling Money Market Certificates, the S&Ls’ cost of funds 
began to rise precipitously. Policymakers continued to push depository institutions to 
provide higher returns to savers, ultimately committing to the elimination of Regulation 
Q ceilings. Implementing the phase-out of Regulation Q proved difficult, however, as 
S&Ls, their portfolios still dominated by long-term mortgages earnings rates far lower 
than their inflated cost of funds, suffered a severe pinch in earnings each time ceilings 
were liberalized. The profitability of the thrifts plummeted, eating away at the net worth 
of many institutions. Creative accounting (encouraged by federal regulators) papered 
over the effective insolvency of much of the industry, buying time to search for a long-
term solution.1 What thrift officials and their regulators asked for (and eventually got) 
was more deregulation, but deregulation of a different kind. While most thrift officials 
had fought against interest rate deregulation, they claimed that deregulation of investment 
powers, including both the authorization of adjustable rate mortgages and freedom to 
invest outside of residential mortgages, would return the industry to profitability.  
 The efforts to deregulate thrifts out of insolvency failed miserably. Allan Sloan 
and Allan Dodds Frank wrote in Forbes in December 1984, “politicians started out to 
save the S&Ls, intending to help housing, and ended up encouraging, among other 
things, corporate greenmail[takeovers],” with S&L money increasingly flowing to 
financiers like T. Boone Pickens and Saul Steinberg. Sloan and Frank concluded, “the 
theory was that expanding the power of S&Ls would help homeowners, because profits 
from new businesses would allow S&Ls to subsidize their sickly mortgage portfolios. But 
markets are perverse. Instead of acting the way politicians hoped they would, many 
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savings and loans are using their new freedom to lend money where it will earn the 
highest return …. Just what you would expect…..”2 In other words, thrift officials were 
doing precisely what Regulation Q ceilings originally had been designed to prevent: 
competing for deposits by offering higher returns, and then pursuing high-risk, high-
return investments to cover the costs and make a profit.3 The deregulation of interest rate 
ceilings led to crippling competition and then the deregulation of thrift asset powers 
widened the range of investment options. 
But S&L officials had been specialized mortgage lenders for decades.4 They were 
ill qualified to successfully expand into commercial real estate or consumer lending. Too 
many of the high risk-investments, including junk bonds, office buildings, commercial 
real estate, “barbeque stands [and] ski resorts,” failed to pan out.5 As economist Robert 
Samuelson put it, “the gamble backfired. S&Ls–not experienced in these areas–made 
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billions of dollars of lousy loans. A bad situation became worse.”6 The S&Ls never dug 
their way out of the earnings crunch precipitated by the combination of high inflation and 
interest rate ceiling deregulation in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Many institutions, at 
the urging of federal regulators, employed dubious accounting methods to stave off 
bankruptcy for years, but by the late 1980s the industry had effectively collapsed.7  
Long before the S&Ls went out of business, they had ceased to be the leaders of 
the business of residential mortgage lending. The collapse of the thrift industry had little 
impact on the flow of credit to housing, as secondary markets and mortgage companies 
substituted for the thrifts’ capital raising and mortgage originating roles. The magnitude 
of the S&L crisis is instead typically measured by the cost to taxpayers to cover for the 
S&Ls’ losses that went far beyond exhausting the industry’s federal insurance fund, the 
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, which insured deposits (up to $100,000 
per account) held by S&Ls. Estimates of the total cost vary, and range as high as $500 
billion, leading to characterizations such as “one of the worst financial disasters of the 
twentieth century.”8 But a cost was borne too when local depository institutions ceased to 
be at the center of housing finance. The local obligations of lenders and capital investors 
would be significantly eroded, contributing to an immeasurable, but no less critical, crisis 
in housing finance. S&Ls, and to a lesser extent, commercial banks, had been the key 
lever for community reinvestment. Under the Community Reinvestment Act, only 
depository institutions could be compelled to loan in the community in which they were 
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chartered, rather than simply pursuing the most profitable investments. As the S&Ls 
retreated from housing finance, the community reinvestment movement became less able 
to encourage lending to historically underserved neighborhoods.  
 
The Subprime Crisis 
 
 
 With a longer incubation period, the transformation of housing finance that was 
completed by the mid-1980s also laid the structural foundation of the so-called “Great 
Recession,” of 2007-2009.  While the financial deregulation of the early 1980s and the 
turn to the secondary markets as the primary source of capital for housing might not have 
inevitably led to the subprime and broader financial crises, and intervening developments 
such as the repeal of Glass–Steagall among others also played a role, several critical 
policy changes in the late 1970s and early 1980s combined to make a crisis both more 
likely and more severe. Regulators’ authorization of adjustable rate mortgages in 1981 
made possible many of the complex, confusing, and risky mortgage instruments that 
enticed borrowers with low initial “teaser-rates” that later escalated out of their reach and 
induced default. Federal preemption of state consumer protection laws such as usury 
ceilings in the 1980 DIDMCA allowed those rates to go even higher than they could have 
otherwise. The thrift asset deregulation contained in the 1982 Garn–St. Germain Act, 
coupled with the turn to secondary markets, facilitated the shift in mortgage origination 
from heavily regulated depository institutions to comparatively unsupervised mortgage 
brokers. Finally, moving from depository institutions to secondary markets as the primary 
source of capital for housing made the development of exotic investment instruments 
 
 427
more likely, and spread the risks associated with housing finance throughout the global 
economy.   
Deregulation of mortgage instruments during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 
authorization of alternatives to the traditional 30-year, fixed-rate mortgage, without 
strident consumer safeguards, allowed lenders to issue mortgages that were riskier for 
borrowers and harder for them to understand. During debate over alternative mortgage 
instruments in the 1970s, all parties conceded that flexible-rate mortgages shifted risk to 
borrowers. Successive authorizations of increasingly liberal flexible-rate mortgage 
instruments in the late 1970s and early 1980s and then the passage of the Alternative 
Mortgage Transaction Parity Act as part of the Garn–St. Germain Act opened the door to 
the wide range of often complicated and risky mortgage instruments that dominated the 
subprime market. Policymakers eschewed long-standing consumer protections such as 
limits on rate hikes (both incremental and overall), and the DIDMCA had already 
preempted state usury ceilings, which would have limited the maximum rate of interest 
that could be charged to borrowers.9 The market, regulators such as Richard Pratt argued, 
would provide all the safeguards that consumers would need. Under these wide-open 
conditions, various alternatives to the traditional fixed-rate mortgage proliferated, 
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increasing from 32% in 1998 to 55% in 2004, and those loans, according to McCoy and 
Renuart, carried a foreclosure risk 62% to 123% higher than a fixed-rate alternative.10 
 A market for such risky mortgage instruments emerged in large part because the 
deregulation of thrift asset powers and the turn to secondary markets facilitated the 
emergence of mortgage originators outside the highly regulated depository institutions 
who operated with comparatively little oversight. In addition to being less closely 
monitored, these originators, by and large, did not keep the mortgages they issued on 
their own portfolios, instead selling them to investors through the secondary market. This 
created moral hazard. That is, these originators had nothing to lose if borrowers could not 
repay, and profited from high upfront fees.   
The subprime market and subsequent subprime crisis also emerged out of a 
particular reconciliation of the transformation of housing finance in the 1980s with the 
civil rights revolution in housing finance that opened access to racial minorities. As Gary 
Dymski argues, minority borrowers achieved access to mortgage credit, but “under terms 
far more adverse than were offered to non-minority borrowers.”11 All else being equal, 
these adverse terms, by definition, would have been harder to repay. But minority 
borrowers were not on equal footing, both due to continuing discrimination and inequity 
in income and historic inequalities in wealth.  
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The new system of housing finance held in tension contradictory goals of 
providing equal access to homeownership to all and conforming to the imperative that 
mortgage financing be competitive with and integrated into global capital markets. 
Policymakers, homeowners, would-be homeowners, financial institutions, the 
construction and real estate industries, and investors simply asked too much of housing 
finance, especially in the context of stagnating wages. The New Deal system had worked, 
and worked well, in large part because it did not have to produce profitable returns to 
investors and layer upon layer of intermediaries. The New Deal system had buckled 
precisely when savers demanded higher returns and policymakers forced lenders to 
provide them. The new system too reached a breaking point when it had extracted all it 
could out of borrowers. Because housing finance had been so thoroughly integrated into 
the global economy, when the subprime market crashed, it produced a much broader 
financial crisis.   
 
A Crisis of Inequality  
 
 
 The subprime crisis, with its disproportionate impact on racial minorities, 
continued and exacerbated racial inequality in wealth and housing. A recent study 
published by Brandies University’s Institute on Assets & Social Policy finds that the gap 
in wealth between white and black households tripled between 1984 and 2009. The 
authors of the study argue that 27% of the difference in wealth growth between white and 
black households over this period can be explained by the number of years of 
homeownership (by far the largest single factor). The gap in homeownership rates 
between white and black households remains high, near 30%, and those black households 
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that have achieved homeownership have done so later than white households and often 
on costlier terms. Among the reasons for earlier homeownership for white households are 
the greater likelihood of inheritance and financial assistance from family, both related to 
the historical disparities in homeownership over the course of the twentieth century.12 
 How has a racial wealth gap, largely rooted in unequal access to homeownership, 
persisted and even widened, now four decades after the passage of the Fair Housing Act 
and three decades after the passage of the Community Reinvestment Act? The answer 
provided here is that the deregulation of housing finance in the late 1970s and early 
1980s undermined the capacity of fair housing and community reinvestment policies to 
promote equality in two important ways. First, deregulation facilitated a shift in mortgage 
origination away from the highly regulated and supervised depository institutions that the 
Fair Housing and Community Reinvestment Acts had been designed to affect to the 
comparatively less regulated mortgage brokers who were not beholden to the Community 
Reinvestment Act and not subject to the same fair housing inspection and supervision. 
Fair housing and community reinvestment policies affected less and less of the overall 
share of mortgage originations, and as discussed above, subprime and predatory lending 
flourished beyond their reach. While this shift opened access to mortgage credit for some 
minority borrowers, that access came on discriminatory terms that made homeownership 
more attainable, but less sustainable.  
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(accessed March 3, 2013). This study is just the latest to document the longstanding and fluctuating 
disparities in wealth by race. See also Melvin L. Oliver and Thomas M. Shapiro, Black Wealth/White 




Second, deregulation ended an era of protected status for housing finance. 
Borrowing would become more risky and more costly for all homebuyers compared to 
borrowing under the New Deal system of housing finance (not just for subprime 
borrowers). In other words, just as women borrowers and racial minorities ostensibly 
attained equal access to housing finance, the system itself became less generous and 
expansive than it had been during the previous four decades. Though all borrowers were 
affected by the increasing risk and costs of the new system of housing finance, racial 
minorities were more likely to be victims of predatory lending,13 and largely because of 
previous exclusion from the mortgage market, were less likely to benefit from inter-
generational transfers of wealth to mitigate the increasing costs of homeownership.14   
 While I do not argue that policymakers deliberately set out to undermine fair 
housing and community reinvestment policies via deregulation, characterizing this 
development as a case of unintended consequences risks obscuring unheeded warnings 
and accepted risks. When policymakers elected to pursue higher returns for consumer-
savers via interest rate ceiling deregulation, they may have reasoned that they would also 
be ensuring the availability of credit to borrowers because depository institutions could 
better compete for deposits. They might have hoped that an increasing supply of deposits 
could lower the cost of credit. But they did so over countless assurances from bankers 
and S&L officials that borrowers would pay the cost of higher returns to savers through 
higher rates and fees. Many, but not all, consumer groups likewise ignored the warnings 
of higher costs to borrowers to secure higher yields for savers. One consumer advocate 
                                                 
13 See Dymski. 
 




who had always been wary of the implications of rate ceiling deregulation, Gale Cincotta, 
observed in 1984, “many Americans bought a bill of goods back in 1979, when Congress 
passed the Depository Institution Deregulation and Monetary Control Act. The sponsors 
and press at the time justified this major move toward deregulation of banks as necessary 
in order to extend to the small saver the higher interest privileges of the big savers. We 
opposed this bill. Now, 5 years later, the small saver is in worse trouble than ever.”15    
Lawmakers too had considered the potential dangers of adjustable-rate mortgages 
for borrowers. Knowing that the instruments shifted risk from lenders to borrowers and 
that borrowers were least equipped to judge such risks, lawmakers and even most ARM 
proponents had advocated for strict consumer safeguards (and recall that as late as 1975, 
Congress emphatically rejected ARMs altogether). But in the early 1980s, regulators 
abandoned most of the traditionally accepted consumer safeguards and Congress 
mounted no formal response to reverse the move, and eventually endorsed it. For 
policymakers like FHLBB Chairman Richard Pratt, the absence of safeguards was 
necessary to allow S&Ls to survive and further justified by the rationale that “the market” 
                                                 
15 House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance, Financial 
Restructuring: The Road Ahead: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer 
Protection, and Finance, of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d sess., April 4, 5, and 
May 17, 1984 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1984), 415. Glenn Nishimura, Consumer Federation of America, 
“The record under deregulation is dubious… we see, thus far, in the name of convenience and to the benefit 
of the more affluent, deregulation has shifted costs onto lower and middle income consumers.” Ibid., 478. 
Jonathan Brown of PIRG conceded that his group had indeed backed the phase out of Regulation Q, but 
also stated, “we made efforts to try to raise the issue of credit allocation and credit controls and 
affordability of housing with little success.” House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 
How the Financial System Can Best Be Shaped to Meet the Needs of the American People: Financial 
Deregulation: Hearings before the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d 
sess., April 11, 12; May 2, 3, 9, 10, 16, 23, 24; June 7, 12, and 19, 1984 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1984), 
1901. Allen J. Fishbein, Director of Neighborhood Revitalization Project of the Center for Community 
Change, said, “the benefits that are most often touted by deregulation enthusiasts is that fierce competition 
will ensue between banks, insurance, and retail chains offering consumers the best possible deal. The 
argument falls flat, however, with small depositors and low and moderate income consumers who have yet 




would provided its own consumer protections. And for policymakers such as Senator 
William Proxmire, the authorization of ARMs with minimal safeguards was tolerable 
(only) as a trade-off for increased returns to savers. Surely neither intended the abuses of 
ARMs that would emerge in the subprime market, but both knowingly accepted the 
possibility.16  
Finally, lawmakers had been warned of the possible dangers of secondary markets 
facilitating mortgage origination by unregulated mortgage originators. Federal Reserve 
Vice Chairman Preston Martin, among others, had suggested that investors would have 
little assurance of the quality of the loans issued by mortgage brokers. Though most 
observers had raised this concern in respect to secondary market investors, consumer 
advocates such as Cincotta added that these unregulated mortgage brokers would not be 
obligated to the Community Reinvestment Act. Lawmakers could not have claimed they 
were unaware of the potential for the growing share of mortgage origination by mortgage 
brokers to reduce the effectiveness of the Community Reinvestment Act. Rather, they 
declined to take up Cincotta’s urging to extend the reach of the CRA to cover all 
mortgage-issuing financial institutions.    
Policymakers were well aware that they were witnessing and shaping a 
fundamental transformation in the system of housing finance. By and large, they 
neglected to consider the implications of that transformation for fair housing and 
community reinvestment. Trumping such concerns, and driving the transformation of 
                                                 
16 Regulators also largely ignored the early sign of abuses. In 1983, the FHLBB Office of Community 
Investment received its highest volume of written consumer complaints since the record began in 1978. 
Complaints over alternative mortgage instruments had increased 160% over the previous year. An industry 
insider, the Chairman of 1st Nationwide Savings in California “expressed concern that lending institutions 
were advertising initial low rates on alternative mortgage instruments without adequately disclosing that the 
rates would increase in six to twelve months.” Richard Tucker, Director, Office of Community Investment, 
FHLBB, “Consumer Complaint System Briefing Memorandum,” February 16, 1984; Legislative Files, 
1944-1988; Records of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board; RG 195; NACP. 
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housing finance, was a populist politics on behalf of consumer-saver/investors. The fact 
that a broader swath of Americans, including anyone with a pension, had a real stake in 
high-yield investment outlets, the stock market, in rising home values, etc. made for a 
formidable majority coalition to favor policies that ultimately led to a deregulated system 
of housing finance.  
 The New Deal system of housing finance helped to expand homeownership to a 
majority of American households, thereby changing their relationship to a system of 
regulations that asked savers to subsidize borrowers. Once a borrower had a home loan, 
locked in at a fixed-interest rate, they had nothing more to gain from interest rate ceilings, 
but rather stood to lose as savers. During the 1970s, enough of those consumer-savers 
opted out of the New Deal system, moving their money to other intermediaries, 
pressuring lawmakers to eliminate interest rate ceilings, and preventing policymakers 
from extending rate ceilings to cover investment alternatives, to create sufficient support 
to pass the DIDMCA. As Henry Schechter of the AFL-CIO put it, “It goes back to the 
growth, over a number of years, of a large number of economically literate and affluent 
households who began a couple of decades ago to deploy their funds, themselves, instead 
of leaving it in depository institutions.”17 It is worth noting that the legislation that 
inaugurated the phase-out of interest rate ceilings passed after a decade and a half of rate 
ceiling extensions and the support of the S&L industry and only after it was paired with 
an urgent reauthorization of widely popular consumer-friendly bank accounts. Further 
deregulation of thrift asset powers, both the authorization of adjustable-rate mortgages 
                                                 
17 House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance, Financial 
Restructuring: The Road Ahead: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer 
Protection, and Finance, of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d sess., April 4, 5, and 
May 17, 1984 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1984), 455. 
 
 435
and the ability to invest outside of residential mortgages, turned on the implementation of 
interest rate ceiling deregulation. Regulators authorized ARMs to enable them to better 
adjust to the rising cost of funds due to interest rate ceiling deregulation, and Congress, 
including ARM opponents such as Senator Proxmire acceded to the bargain. Similarly, 
the Garn–St. Germain Act was largely seen as necessary for the thrifts to adjust to the 
phase-out of Regulation Q, and its passage was directly precipitated by the DIDC’s 
refusal to continue with liability deregulation until Congress acted on asset deregulation. 
The turn to the secondary markets followed as a necessary response to the thrifts’ retreat 
from housing finance as they exercised their new asset powers.  
The populist politics of the consumer-saver/investor tipped the balance towards 
deregulation and capital flowing to the highest returns and away from efforts direct a 
protected source of capital to housing, and particularly, to traditionally underserved areas. 
This was never more evident than in the debates over the proposed regulation of Money 
Market Mutual Funds. In a battle over the very soul of the New Deal system of housing 
finance, FHLBB staffers argued over whether savings capital should freely flow to 
market-determined returns wherever they might be found, or if a source of low-cost 
capital should be preserved for locally-oriented depository institutions and lenders. Only 
the latter seemed to fit the model of the newly won Community Reinvestment Act. As 
reinvestment advocate Gale Cincotta pleaded “All we are asking for is a fair return on our 
savings into our communities.”18 But by the 1980s, Cincotta’s vision of a fair return on 
savings–abundant and affordable home loans to underserved areas–lost out to the 
                                                 
18 Cincotta, in Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
of 1975: Hearings before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st sess. 




prevailing vision of fair return on savings–market yields. In order to reconcile changing 
interests of the new majority of homeowning consumer-saver/investors, policymakers 
restructured housing finance in a way that restricted opportunity for the minority. 
Any victory for the middling majority, however, was short-lived. Scholars have 
pointed to the disproportionate accrual of wealth to the elite under the workings of a 
financialized, deregulated, neoliberal regime, and, correspondingly, increasing insecurity 
for the working and middle classes, of which the transformation of housing finance was a 
significant part.19 Certainly the reconfigured system of housing finance opened up 
opportunities for the financial elite to prosper from new ways to invest in residential 
mortgages. But, while many working and middle class households benefited from 
increased access to mortgage credit, they did so on terms more costly and risky than had 
borrowers under the New Deal system. Given essentially stagnant income growth for 
lower- and middle-income households,20 access on such terms, taking on large sums of 
debt, proved unsustainable for many. The momentary victory for middle-class 
homeowner-saver/investors ultimately ushered in an era of increasing inequality between 
an elite wealthy few and a low- to middle-income many, and continued and exacerbated 
racial inequality. 
                                                 
19 While the literature on the neoliberal turn accurately describes the inequitable outcomes of the new 
regime, few studies make any effort to historicize the processes by which neoliberal policies were 
implemented. Too often the election of Ronald Reagan and the policies of Fed Chairman Paul Volcker 
stand in for more complex and contingent processes. David Harvey, in his Brief History of Neoliberalism 
raises the question of the “construction of consent,” or, in other words, why would the many consent to a 
government that primarily serves the interests of the few? Looking closely at when and how deregulatory 
policies gained the support or implicit consent of Congress offers considerable insight into the construction 
of consent. Harvey A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 39. 
 
20 On income trends since the 1970s, see Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics: How 
Washington Made the Rich Richer–And Turned Its Back on the Middle Class (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2010), 21-28. Household incomes for these groups rose modestly since 1979, but largely due to 





Archival and Manuscript Sources: 
 
Gerald R. Ford Library (Ann Arbor, MI) 
 
Arthur Burns Papers 
F. Lynn May Papers 
Gerald R. Ford Papers 
 
Library of Congress (Washington, DC) 
 
Papers of Donald T. Regan  
 
National Archives and Records Administration (Washington, DC) 
 
Records of the U.S. House of Representatives  
 
National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, MD) 
 
General Records of the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
General Records of the Department of the Treasury 
Records of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation  
Records of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
  
Ronald Reagan Library (Simi Valley, CA) 
Martin Anderson Files  
Wisconsin Historical Society (Madison, WI)  
William Proxmire Papers 
 
Published Primary Sources 
Government Documents 
 
Congressional Record  
Federal Home Loan Bank Board Journal 
Federal Register 
 




Newspapers and Periodicals 
 
Baltimore Sun 





Los Angeles Times 
The Milwaukee Journal 
The New York Times 
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 
The Pittsburgh Press 
Sarasota Herald-Tribune 
Time 
Wall Street Journal 
The Washington Post 
Wilmington Morning-Star 
 
Other Published Primary Sources 
 
Carron, Andrew S. The Plight of the Thrift Institutions. Washington, DC: Brookings  
Institution, 1982. 
 
Cook, Timothy Q. and Jeremy G. Duffield. “Money Market Mutual Funds: A Reaction to  
Government Regulations Or A Lasting Financial Innovation?” Federal Reserve 
Bank of Richmond Economic Review 65 (July/August 1979). 
 
Guttentag, Jack. “Recent Changes in the Primary Home Mortgage Market.” Housing  
Finance Review Housing Finance Review 3, no. 3 (July 1984): 221-254. 
 
Jaffee, Dwight M. Kenneth T. Rosen, Benjamin M. Friedman, and Lawrence R. Klein.  
“Mortgage Credit Availability and Residential Construction.” Brookings Papers 
on Economic Activity 1979, no. 2 (1979): 333-386. 
 
Kahn, Alfred E. The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions. New York:  
Wiley, 1970. 
 
Proxmire, William. The Fleecing of America. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1980. 
 
Ranieri, Lewis S. “The Origins of Securitization, Sources of Growth, and Future  
Potential.” In Leon T. Kendall and Michael J. Fishman, eds. A Primer On 
Securitization Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996: 31-44. 
 
Sivesind, Charles M. “Mortgage-Backed Securities: The Revolution in Real Estate  
 
 439
Finance.” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly Review (Autumn 1979): 
1-8. 
 
Stigler, George. “The Theory of Economic Regulation.” Bell Journal of Economics and  





Aalbers, Manuel B. “The Financialization of Home and the Mortgage Market Crisis,”  
Competition and Change 12, no. 2 (June 2008): 148-166. 
 
Acharya, Viral V., Matthew Richardson, Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, and Lawrence J.  
White. Guaranteed to Fail: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Debacle of 
Mortgage Finance. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011. 
 
Adams, James Ring. The Big Fix: Inside the S&L Scandal: How and Unholy Alliance of  
Politics and Money Destroyed America’s Banking System. New York: Wiley, 
1990.  
 
Apgar, William C. Allegra Calder. “The Dual Mortgage Market: The Persistence of  
Discrimination in Mortgage Lending.” In Xavier de Souza Briggs ed. The 
Geography of Opportunity: Race and Housing Choice in Metropolitan America. 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005: 101-123. 
 
–––, George S. Masnick, Nancy McArdle. Housing in America: 1970- 
2000: The Nation’s Housing Needs for the Balance of the 20th Century. 
Cambridge, MA: Joint Center for Housing Studies, Harvard University, 1991. 
 
Apgar, William C., and H. James Brown. The State of the Nation’s Housing. Cambridge:  
Joint Center for Housing of Harvard University, 1988. 
 
Aharony, J., A. Saunders, and I. Swary. “The Effect of DIDMCA, on Bank  
Stockholders' Returns and Risk.”Journal of Banking and Finance. 12 (1988): 
317–331. 
 
Bartels, Larry M. Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age.  
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008. 
 
Barth, James R. The Great Savings and Loan Debacle. Lanham, MD: University Press of  
America, 1991. 
 
Benston, George. “Discrimination in Mortgage Lending: Why HMDA and CRA Should  
Be Repealed.” Journal of Retail Banking Services (Autumn, 1997): 47-57. 
 
–––. “The Community Reinvestment Act: Looking for Discrimination That Isn’t There.”  
 
 440
Policy Analysis no. 354 (October, 1999). 
 
Blinder, Alan S. “The Rise and Fall of Keynesian Economics.” Economic Record (1998):  
278-94. 
 
Bonastia, Christopher. Knocking on the Door: The Federal Government’s Attempt to  
Desegregate the Suburbs. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008. 
 
Bratt, Rachel G., Chester Hartman, and Ann Meyerson eds. Critical Perspectives on  
Housing. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986. 
 
Calavita, Kitty, Henry N. Pontell, and Robert Tillman. Big Money Crime: Fraud and  
Politics in the Savings and Loan Crisis. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1997. 
 
Carr, James H., and Nandine Kutty, “The New Imperative for Equality.” In James H.  
Carr and Nandine K. Kutty eds. Segregation: The Rising Costs for America. New 
York: Routledge, 2008: 1-37. 
 
Carter, Susan et al., eds. Historical Statistics of the Unites States Millennial Edition  
Online. Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
 
Christiano, Marilyn Rice. “The Community Reinvestment Act: The Role of Community  
Groups in the Formulation and Implementation of a Public Policy.” PhD diss., 
University of Maryland, 1995. 
 
Coggins, Bruce. Does Financial Deregulation Work? A Critique of Free Market  
Approaches. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Press, 1998.  
 
Cohen, Lizabeth. A Consumers’ Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar  
America. New York: Knopf, 2003. 
 
Collins, Robert M. Transforming America: Politics and Culture during the Reagan  
Years. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. 
 
Day, Kathleen. S & L Hell: The People and the Politics Behind the $1 Trillion Savings  
and Loan Scandal. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1993. 
 
Derthick, Martha and Paul J. Quirk. The Politics of Deregulation. Washington, DC:  
Brookings Institution, 1985.     
 
Devaney, F. John. Current Housing Reports: Tracking the American Dream: 50 Years of  
Housing History from the Census Bureau: 1940 to 1990. Washington, DC: GPO, 
1994. 
 
Diggins, John P. Ronald Reagan: Fate, Freedom, and the Making of History. New York:  
 
 441
W.W. Norton, 2008. 
 
Downs, Anthony. The Revolution in Real Estate Finance. Washington, DC: Brookings  
Institution, 1985. 
 
Dubofsky, Jean Eberhart. “Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a Perspective.”  
Washburn Law 8 (1969): 149-166. 
 
Dymski, Gary, Gerald Epstein, and Robert Pollin, eds. Transforming the U.S. Financial  
System: Equity and Efficiency for the 21st Century. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 
1993. 
 
–––, and Dorene Isenberg, eds. Seeking Shelter on the Pacific Rim: Financial  
Globalization, Social Change, and the Housing Market. Armonk, NY: M.E. 
Sharpe, 2002.  
 
–––. “Financial Globalization and Housing Policy: From ‘Golden Age’ Housing to  
‘Global Age’ Insecurity.” In Full Employment and Price Stability in a Global 
Economy, edited by Paul Davidson and Jan Kregel, 139-165. Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar, 1999.  
 
Edsall, Thomas Byrne and Mary D. Edsall, Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, 
Rights, and Taxes on American Politics. New York: W.W. Norton, 1991. 
 
Ehrman, John. The Eighties: America in the Age of Reagan. New Haven: Yale University  
Press, 2005. 
 
Eichler, Ned. The Thrift Debacle. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989. 
 
Engel, Kathleen C. Patricia A. McCoy. “From Credit Denial to Predatory Lending: The  
Challenge of Sustaining Minority Homeownership.” In James H. Carr and 
Nandine K. Kutty eds. Segregation: The Rising Costs for America. New York: 
Routledge, 2008: 81-124. 
 
Erickson, David J. “Community Capitalism: How Housing Advocates, The Private  
Sector, and Government Forged New Low-Income Housing Policy, 1968-1996.” 
The Journal of Policy History 18, no. 2 (2006): 167-204. 
 
Farley, Reynolds ed. State of the Union: America in the 1990s, Volume One: Economic  
Trends. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1995. 
 
Ferguson, Niall. The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World. New York:  
Penguin Press, 2008. 
 
Fink, Gary and Hugh Davis Graham, eds. The Carter Presidency: Policy Choices in the  




Florida, Richard, ed. Housing and the New Financial Markets. New Brunswick, NJ:  
Center for Urban Policy Research, 1986. 
 
Florida, Richard L. “The Political Economy of Financial Deregulation and  
Reorganization of Housing Finance in the United States.” International Journal of 
Urban and Regional Research 10, no. 2 (June 1986): 207-231. 
 
Follain, James R. David C. Ling, and Gary A. McGill. “The Preferential Income Tax  
Treatment of Owner-Occupied Housing: Who Really Benefits?” Housing Policy  
Debate 4, no. 1 (1993): 1-24. 
 
Fox Gotham, Kevin. Race, Real Estate, and Uneven Development: The Kansas City  
Experience, 1900-2000. Albany: State University of New York, 2002. 
 
–––. “The Secondary Circuit of Capital Reconsidered: Globalization and the U.S.  
Real Estate Sector,” American Journal of Sociology 112, No. 1 (July 2006): 231-
75. 
 
Freund, David M.P. Colored Property: State Policy and White Racial Politics in  
Suburban America. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2007. 
 
Gilens, Martin. Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in  
America. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012.  
 
Goering, John M. Housing Desegregation and Federal Policy. Chapel Hill: University of  
North Carolina Press, 1986. 
 
–––, and Ron Wienk, eds. Mortgage Lending, Racial Discrimination, and Federal  
Policy (Washington, DC: The Urban Institute Press, 1996. 
 
Gramlich, Edward. Subprime Mortgages: America’s Latest Boom and Bust. Washington,  
DC: Urban Institute Press, 2007. 
 
Green, Richard K. and Susan M. Wachter. “The Housing Finance Revolution.” Housing,  
Housing Finance, and Monetary Policy: A Symposium Sponsored by the Federal 




Gyourko, Joseph and Peter Linneman. “The Affordability of the American Dream: An  
Examination of the Last 30 Years.” Journal of Housing Research 4, no. 1 (1993):  
39-72. 
 
Hacker, Jacob. The Divided Welfare State: The Battle Over Public and Private Social  




–––. The Great Risk Shift: The New Economic Insecurity and the Decline of the  
American Dream. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
 
–––, and Paul Pierson. Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich  
Richer–And Turned Its Back on the Middle Class. New York: Simon & Schuster, 
2010. 
 
Hammond, Thomas and Jack H. Knott. “The Deregulatory Snowball: Exploring  
Deregulation in the Financial Industry.” The Journal of Politics 50, no. 1 (Feb 
1988): 3-30. 
 
Harris, Richard A., and Sidney M. Milkis. The Politics of Regulatory Change: A Tale of  
Two Agencies. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. 
 
Harvey, David. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
 
Hays, R. Allen. The Federal Government and Urban Housing: Ideology and Change in  
Public Policy. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995. 
 
Hendershott, Patric H., and James D. Shilling. “The Impact of the Agencies on  
Conventional Fixed-Rate Mortgage Yields.” Journal of Real Estate Finance and 
Economics, 2, no. 2 (1989): 101-115. 
 
Henretta, John C. “Parental Status and Childs’ Home Ownership,” American Sociological  
Review 49, no. 1 (February 1984): 131-140. 
 
Hillier, Amy E. “Redlining and the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation.” Journal of Urban  
History 29, no. 4 (May 2003): 394-420. 
 
Hoffman, Susan. Politics and Banking: Ideas, Public Policy, and the Creation of  
Financial Institutions. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001. 
 
Hornstein, Jeffrey M. A Nation of Realtors ®: A Cultural History of the Twentieth- 
Century American Middle Class. Durham: Duke University Press, 2005. 
 
Howard, Christopher. The Hidden Welfare State: Tax Expenditures and Social Policy in  
the United States. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997. 
 
Hyman, Louis. Debtor Nation: The History of America in Red Ink. Princeton: Princeton  
University Press, 2011. 
 
Immergluck, Dan. Credit to the Community: Community Reinvestment and Fair Housing  
in the United States. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004. 
 
–––. Foreclosed: High-Risk Lending, Deregulation, and the Undermining of America’s  
 
 444
Mortgage Market. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009. 
 
Isenberg, Dorene. “The Political Economy of Financial Reform: The Origins of the US  
Deregulation of 1980 and 1982.” In Festschrift in Honor of Howard Sherman, 
edited by Robert Pollin. Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2000. 
 
Jackson, Kenneth T. Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States. New  
York: Oxford University Press, 1985.  
 
Jacobs, Meg. “Inflation: ‘The Permanent Dilemma’ of the American Middle Classes.” In  
Oliver Zunz, Leonard Schoppa, and Nobuhiro Hiwatari, eds. Social Contracts 
Under Stress: The Middle Classes of America, Europe, and Japan at the Turn of 
the Century. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002: 130-156. 
 
Kane, Edward. The S & L Insurance Mess: How Did it Happen? Lanham, MD:  
University Press of America, 1989. 
 
Katz, Alyssa. Our Lot: How Real Estate Came to Own Us. New York: Bloomsbury,  
2009. 
 
Katznelson, Ira. When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial  
Inequality in Twentieth-Century America. New York: W.W. Norton, 2005. 
 
Kaufman, Herbert M. “FNMA and the Housing Cycle: Its Recent Contribution and its  
Future Role in a Deregulated Environment,” in The Federal National Mortgage 
Association In a Changing Economic Environment; Supplement to a Report by 
the Comptroller General of the United States. Washington, DC: GPO, 1985: 41-
74. 
 
Kendall, Leon T. The Savings and Loan Business. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall,  
Inc., 1962. 
 
Krippner, Greta R. “The Financialization of the American Economy,” Socio-Economic  
Review 3, no. 2 (2005): 173-208. 
 
–––. Capitalizing on Crisis: The Political Origins of the Rise of Finance. Cambridge:  
Harvard University Press, 2011. 
 
Krugman, Paul. Peddling Prosperity: Economic Sense and Nonsense in the Age of  
Diminished Expectations. New York: W.W. Norton, 1994. 
 
Lamb, Charles. Housing Segregation in Suburban America since 1960: Presidential and  
Judicial Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
 
Lassiter, Matthew D. The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South.  




Lea, Michael. “Innovation and the Cost of Mortgage Credit: A Historical Perspective.”  
Housing Policy Debate 7, no. 1 (1996): 147-74. 
 
Lee, Matthew. “Community Reinvestment in a Globalizing World: To Hold Banks  
Accountable from The Bronx to Buenos Aires, Beijing and Basel.” In Gregory D. 
Squires, ed. Organizing Access to Capital: Advocacy and the Democratization of 
Financial Institution. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003: 135-153.  
 
Lehnert, Andreas, Wayne Passmore, and Shane M. Sherlund. “GSEs, Mortgage Rates,  
and Secondary Market Activities. “Journal of Real Estate Finance and 
Economics 36 (2008): 343-363. 
 
Levy, Frank S. Richard C. Michel. The Economic Future of American Families: Income  
and Wealth Trends. Washington, DC: Urban Institute press, 1991. 
 
Lowy, Martin E. High Rollers: Inside the Savings and Loan Debacle. New York:  
Praeger, 1991.      
 
Marisco, Richard D. Democratizing Capital: The History, Law, and Reform of the  
Community Reinvestment Act. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2005. 
 
–––. “Shedding Some Light on Lending: The Effect of Expanded Disclosure  
 Laws on Home Mortgage Marketing, Lending and Discrimination in the New  
York Metropolitan Area.” Fordham Urban Law Journal 27 (1999): 481-532. 
 
Massey, Douglas S., and Nancy A. Denton. American Apartheid: Segregation and the  
Making of the Underclass. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993. 
 
Mason, David. From Buildings and Loans to Bailouts, 1831-1995. New York:  
Cambridge University Press, 2004.  
 
Mayer, Martin. The Greatest-Ever Bank Robbery: The Collapse of the Savings and Loan  
Industry. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1992. 
 
McCarthy, George, Sharon Van Zandt, and William Rohe. The Economic Benefits and  
Costs of Homeownership: A Critical Assessment of the Research. Washington, 
DC: Research Institute for Housing America, 2001. 
 
McConnell John J., and Stephen A. Buser. “The Origins and Evolution of the Market for  
Mortgage-Backed Securities.” Annual Review of Financial Economics 3 (2011): 
173-92. 
 
McLean, Bethany and Joseph Nocera. All the Devils Are Here: The Hidden History of the  




Meeropol, Michael. Surrender: How the Clinton Administration Completed the Reagan  
Revolution. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1998.  
 
Meyerson, Ann. “The Changing Structure of Housing Finance in the United States.”  
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 10, no. 4 (Dec. 1986): 
465-497. 
 
Mitchell, J. Paul ed. Federal Housing Policy and Programs: Past and Present. New  
Brunswick, NJ: Center for Urban Policy Research, 1985. 
 
Myers, Dowell, and Jennifer R. Wolch, “The Polarization of Housing Status.” In  
Farley, 269-334. 
 
Nocera, Joseph. A Piece of the Action: How the Middle Class Joined the Money Class.  
New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994. 
 
Oliver, Melvin L. and Thomas M. Shapiro. Black Wealth/White Wealth. New York:  
Routledge, 1995. 
 
Patterson, James T. Restless Giant: The United States from Watergate to Bush v. Gore.  
New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
 
Perkins, Edwin J. Wall Street to Main Street: Charles Merrill and Middle Class  
Investors. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
 
Pierson, Paul. Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis. Princeton:  
Princeton University Press, 2004. 
 
Peterson, Christopher. “Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and the Mortgage  
Electronic Registration System.” University of Cincinnati Law Review 78, no. 4 
(2010). 
 
Phillips-Fein, Kim. “Conservatism: A State of the Field.” The Journal of American  
History 98, no. 3 (Dec., 2011): 723-743, 731. 
 
Pogge, Jean. “Reinvestment in Chicago Neighborhoods: A Twenty-Year Struggle,” in  
Squires From Redlining to Reinvestment. 
 
Quadagno, Jill. The Color of Welfare: How Racism Undermined the War on Poverty.  
New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. 
 
Quigley, John M. “Federal Credit and Insurance Programs: Housing.” Federal Reserve  
Bank of St. Louis Review 88, no. 4 (July 2006): 281-309. 
 
Radey, Linda A. “The Effects of the Depository Institution Deregulation and Monetary  
 
 447
Control Act of 1980 and the Garn Bill on the Competition between the 
Commercial Banking and Savings and Loan Indudtries.” PhD diss., University of 
Maryland, 1984. 
 
Ross, Stephen and John Yinger. The Color of Credit: Mortgage Discrimination, Research  
Methodology, and Fair Lending Enforcement. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002.  
 
Roussakis, Emmanuel N. Commercial Banking in an Era of Deregulation. Westport, CT:  
Praeger, 1997. 
 
Schafer, Robert and Helen F. Ladd. Discrimination in Mortgage Lending. Cambridge,  
MA: The MIT Press, 1981. 
 
Schaller, Michael. Right Turn: American Life in the Reagan-Bush Era, 1980-1992. New  
York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
 
Schulman, Bruce. The Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and  
Politics. Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 2002. 
 
–––, and Julian Zelizer, eds. Rightward Bound: Making America Conservative in the  
1970s. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008. 
 
Schwartz, Alex F. Housing Policy in the United States: An Introduction. New York:  
Routledge, 2006. 
 
Shapiro, Thomas. The Hidden Cost of Being African American: How Wealth Perpetuates  
Inequality. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. 
 
Shiller, Robert. The Subprime Solution: How Today’s Global Financial Crises  
Happened, and What to Do about It. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008. 
 
Sidney, Mara. Unfair Housing: How National Policy Shapes Community Action.  
Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2003. 
 
-----. “Images of Race, Class, and Markets: Rethinking the Origin of U.S. Fair Housing  
Policy.” Journal of Policy History 13, no. 2 (2001): 181- 214. 
 
Skrenty, John. The Minority Rights Revolution. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,  
2002. 
 
Snowden, Kenneth. “Delinquency and Foreclosure Rates for Single-family Home  
Mortgages: 1979-1999.” Historical Statistics of the Unites States. 
 
–––. “Housing Units, by Occupancy and Ownership: 1890-1997.” Historical Statistics of  




–––. “Mortgage Foreclosures and Delinquencies: 1926-1979.” Historical Statistics of the  
Unites States. 
 
–––. “Originations, Purchases, and Sales of Mortgages, by Type of  
Institutional Lender: 1970-1997 [One- to four-family homes].” Historical 
Statistics of the Unites States. 
 
–––. “Secondary Residential Mortgage Market Activity of Federal- 
Related Agencies: 1970-1999.” Historical Statistics of the Unites States. 
 
Squires, Gregory. Organizing Access to Capital: Advocacy and the Democratization of  
Financial Institutions. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003. 
 
–––. Capital and Communities in Black and White: The Intersection of Race, Class, and  
Uneven Development. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994.  
 
–––. From Redlining to Reinvestment: Community Responses to Urban Disinvestment.  
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992. 
 
Stein, Herbert. Presidential Economics: The Making of Economic Policy from Roosevelt  
to Reagan and Beyond. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research, 1988. 
 
Stein, Judith. Pivotal Decade: How the United States Traded Factories for Finance in the  
Seventies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010. 
 
Stone, Michael. Shelter Poverty: New Ideas on Housing Affordability. Philadelphia:  
Temple University Press, 1993. 
 
Sugrue, Thomas J. The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar  
Detroit. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. 
 
Taylor, William L. The Passion of My Times: An Advocate’s Fifty-Year Journey in the  
Civil Rights Movement. New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2004. 
 
Todd, Steven. “The Effects of Securitization on Consumer Mortgage Costs.” Real Estate  
Economics 29, no. 1 (2001): 29-54. 
 
Troy, Gil. Morning in America: How Ronald Reagan Invented the 1980s. Princeton:  
Princeton University Press, 2007. 
 
Van Order, Robert. “Foreword.” Housing Finance Review 3, no. 3 (July 1984). 
 
–––. “The Structure and Evolution of American Secondary Mortgage  
Markets, with Some Implications for Developing Markets.” Housing Finance 




Vietor, Richard H. K. Contrived Competition: Regulation and Deregulation in America.  
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994. 
 
Wachter, Susan M. “The Limits of the Housing Finance System.” Journal of Housing  
Research 1, no. 1 (1991): 163-174. 
 
Wallison, Peter J. and Bert Ely. Nationalizing Mortgage Risk: The Growth of Fannie Mae  
and Freddie Mac. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute Press, 2000.  
 
Wallison, Peter J., Thomas Stanton, and Bert Ely. Privatizing Fannie Mae and Freddie  
Mac and the Federal Home Loan Banks: Why and How. Washington, DC: 
American Enterprise Institute Press, 2004. 
 
Wallison, Peter J. ed. Serving Two Masters, Yet Out of Control: Fannie Mae and Freddie  
Mac. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute Press, 2001. 
 
Weicher, John C. “The Future Structure of the Housing Finance System.” in William S.  
Haraf and Rose Marie Kushmeider eds. Restructuring Banking and Financial 
Services in America. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research, 1988.  
 
–––. “The New Structure of the Housing Finance System.” Federal Reserve Bank of St.  
Louis Review 76, no. 4 (July 1994). 
 
White, Lawrence J. The S&L Debacle: Public Policy Lessons for Bank and Thrift  
Regulation. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. 
 
Wiese, Andrew. Places of Their Own: African American Suburbanization in the  
Twentieth Century. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004. 
 
Wilentz, Sean. The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974-2008. New York: Harper Collins,  
2008. 
 
Wyly, Elvin and Steven Holloway. “The Disappearance of Race in Mortgage Lending.”  
Economic Geography 78 (2002): 129-69. 
 
 
 
 
